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HCAL 2298/2025
[2026] HKCFI 3307
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST
NO 2298 OF 2025
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BETWEEN
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Bui Thi Hoa |
Applicant |
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and |
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Torture Claims Appeal Board |
Putative Respondent |
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and |
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Director of Immigration |
Putative Interested Party |
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| Before: |
Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG in Chambers (Open to Public) |
| Date of Hearing: |
28 May 2026 |
| Date of Handing Down of Decision: |
10 June 2026 |
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D E C I S I O N
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Background
1. By way of summons filed on 16 March 2026 (“the Summons”), the applicant applies for an extension of time to appeal against my order made on 7 January 2026, which dismissed the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board dated 14 November 2024.
2. Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, stipulates that “Where an application for leave is refused by a judge …, the applicant may appeal against the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days after such order”.
3. In Re Li Jing [2015] 2 HKLRD 933, it was held that the time for lodging an appeal against the refusal of granting leave to apply for judicial review started to run from the date of the making of the order, not from the date when the sealed order was issued, nor from the date when the sealed order was mailed, and no account should be taken of the fact that the applicant received the sealed order late (see also Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226).
4. As my order was made on 7 January 2026, the last day for the applicant to lodge an appeal was on 21 January 2026. The time for appealing against my order has therefore expired, and the applicant requires leave from this court to appeal out of time.
The applicable law
5. In considering whether to extend time for appealing a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the court will take into account: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted (see Jagg Singh v Torture Claims Appeal Board and another [2020] HKCA 844).
6. However, the crucial consideration in such an application is whether the applicant can show that there is a reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur, supra), and the court will not grant extension for a hopeless appeal to be pursued (see Re Adumekwe Rowland Ejike [2019] HKCA 702).
Discussion
7. In the Summons, the applicant did not give any reason for her delay in lodging the appeal, nor any ground for the intended appeal. In paragraph 3 of her supporting affirmation dated 16 March 2026, the applicant explained her delay by saying that she was afraid of being yelled at for wasting the court’s valuable time, as what happened to her before when she was in the cell.
8. However, in giving this explanation, the applicant referred to paragraph 13 of my decision for her leave application, which stated that “The delay of 8 months is very substantial and the explanation given by the applicant is not satisfactory”, and the applicant wanted to clarify that her explanation was unsatisfactory because she did not dare to explain further.
9. At the hearing of the Summons on 28 May 2026, I tried to clarify with the applicant as to what she wanted to say in paragraph 3 of her affirmation. The applicant could not give any explanation apart from saying that her friend helped to prepare the affirmation for her.
10. From the context of her affirmation, it seems that the applicant was trying to clarify why she did not explain for her delay in filing the leave application for judicial review. It does not seem to be an explanation for her delay in lodging the intended appeal.
11. In paragraphs 4 to 6 of her supporting affirmation, the applicant gave an account of how she had lost her belongings including her passport, mobile phone and Vietnamese identity card and then found them on 4 December 2025. This account does not explain why she was late in lodging the intended appeal, as she had already recovered the lost items on 4 December 2025, well before my decision delivered on 7 January 2026.
12. At the hearing of the Summons, the applicant explained her delay in lodging the intended appeal by saying that when she received the decision, she needed to find a friend to help her and when she could find her friend, it was already late in lodging the appeal. Her friend hence helped her to file the present application instead.
13. It is clear that the explanations given by the applicant in her affirmation were not valid reason for the delay in lodging the intended appeal at all. The explanation given at the hearing is also unsatisfactory as it is no excuse to take more than 2 months to find a friend to help her. There was no reason given as to why she could only locate her friend after such a long period. If she indeed wanted to appeal, she should have sought her friend’s help within the time limit.
14. In any event, there was no valid ground of appeal given by the applicant. In paragraph 7 of her affirmation, the applicant mentioned that “I understand that there is a good ground of appeal that was not necessarily considered at the stage of applying for leave for judicial review.” This is clearly not a valid ground of appeal.
15. At the hearing of the Summons, when I asked the applicant for the grounds of her intended appeal, she merely adopted the grounds as stated in her affirmation without any further elaboration.
16. Thus, the applicant has failed to give any valid ground for her intended appeal. What she mentioned in her affirmation and at the hearing are not grounds to challenge my decision at all.
17. For this application to be successful, the applicant must demonstrate that this court had made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant matters already placed before this court or was otherwise plainly wrong (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).
18. The applicant failed to demonstrate any of the above. Hence, there is simply no valid ground for the intended appeal or the intended judicial review.
19. In the circumstances, there is no proper excuse for the applicant’s delay in lodging the appeal and there is no reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review. I am not prepared to grant any extension of time for the applicant to pursue such a hopeless appeal.
Conclusion
20. For reasons aforesaid, the Summons is dismissed.
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(Michael WONG) |
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Deputy High Court Judge |
The applicant appeared in person
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