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CACV 1189/2025, [2026] HKCA 438
On Appeal From [2025] HKCFI 5606
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF APPEAL
CIVIL APPEAL NO 1189 OF 2025
(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 1169 OF 2025)
________________________
| RE: |
MADUBUKO NNNAEMEA PAUL alias CHIMANGENI DELBY |
Applicant |
________________________
| Before: |
Hon Au JA and Leung J in Court |
| Date of Judgment: |
24 March 2026 |
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J U D G M E N T
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Hon Au JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):
1. This is the applicant’s appeal against the order of Deputy High Court Judge KW Lung (“the Judge”) dated 1 December 2025 ([2025] HKCFI 5606) (“the Leave Decision”) refusing his application for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 30 April 2025 (“the Board’s Decision”), whereby the Board dismissed his appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 22 January 2025, refusing his non-refoulement claim.
2. The appeal was listed to be heard on 2 February 2026. By the directions made by the Registrar of Civil Appeals on 15 December 2025, which were received by the applicant in person on the same day, he was directed to lodge two sets of skeleton argument on or before 19 January 2026, failing which, he would be deemed to have waived his right to have an oral hearing for the appeal and the hearing date would be vacated with the appeal being determined on paper. However, he did not lodge any skeleton argument in support of his appeal.
3. As the applicant failed to lodge any skeleton argument by the stipulated time, he was deemed to have waived his right to have an oral hearing and elected to have his appeal disposed of on paper. The hearing date was thus vacated on 20 January 2026.
4. The applicant’s background, the basis of his claim and arguments advanced before the Board as well as the Board’s reasons for rejecting his appeal are all set out in the Board’s Decision: see [3] - [9] of the Leave Decision. The Judge has also set out in detail his reasons for refusing the Leave Application: see [10] - [17] of the Leave Decision. We will not repeat the details herein.
5. By the Notice of Appeal filed on 15 December 2025, the applicant stated:
“I can sense an error and unfairness in the area of country of origin judgement. The burden of proof is upon me and not the assessors. I have said the real risk and danger on my way but it seems not to be agreed upon.” (sic)
DISCUSSION
6. The relevant legal principles governing appeals in non-refoulement cases are set out in Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14].
7. In particular, in an appeal against refusal of leave to apply for judicial review in non-refoulement cases, the Court of Appeal will only examine the decision of the judge in light of the grounds advanced by the applicant. If no viable ground is put forward to reverse the judge’s decision, the appeal should be dismissed. The Court’s role is not to examine the decision maker’s decision afresh as if it were a fresh application for judicial review. See Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14(6)].
8. In light of the above, it is thus incumbent on the applicant to point out the errors in the Leave Decision with sufficient particulars and specifics.
9. However, nowhere in his Notice of Appeal did the applicant identify any error committed by the Judge with specific particulars or give any ground in support of his appeal. Insofar as his complaints regarding the country of origin information are concerned, as properly noted by the Judge at [14] of the Leave Decision, the Court will not interfere the findings of fact made by the Board, as they are exclusively within the realm of the Board, unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board: Re Kartini [2019] HKCA 1022 at [13]. The Judge was clearly correct in finding that the applicant failed to raise any valid ground to challenge the Board’s findings: see [15] of the Leave Decision.
10. Moreover, his assertions are all general, bare and vague allegations unsupported by specific particulars or evidence. General assertions of his fear if refouled do not constitute proper grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar [2022] HKCA 627 at [6]. Clearly, his assertions do not constitute viable grounds of appeal and must fail. We see no basis to interfere with the Leave Decision.
11. For the above reasons, the applicant’s appeal against the Leave Decision has no merit and is dismissed.
| (Thomas Au) |
(Simon Leung) |
| Justice of Appeal |
Judge of the Court of First Instance |
The applicant acting in person
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