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HCAL 1295/2020
[2026] HKCFI 941
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1295 OF 2020
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BETWEEN
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Mehtab Singh |
Applicant |
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and |
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Torture Claims Appeal Board |
Putative |
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Respondent |
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and |
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Director of Immigration |
Putative |
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Interested Party |
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. On this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent be amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board” and the name of the putative interested party be amended to “Director of Immigration”.
2. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.
Observations for the applicant:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 24 June 2020, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 12 June 2020 (“the Board’s Decision”). The Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2020/HCAL001295_2020_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The Board found that the applicant was unable to make out his claims for non-refoulement protection on any of the applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“the USM”). Hence, the Board rejected the applicant’s appeal/petition against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 10 October 2018 and confirmed the same.
Amendments
3. The applicant named the Board as the putative respondent and both the Board and the Director as the putative interested parties in Form 86, but spelt the name of the Board wrong.
4. In fact, the Board should just be named as the putative respondent and only the Director should be named as the putative interested party.
5. Thus, this court makes an order on its own motion to amend the name of the putative respondent to “Torture Claims Appeal Board” and the name of the putative interested party to “Director of Immigration”.
The applicant’s case
6. It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s Decision, which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.
7. In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because if refouled to India, he would be at risk of harm from, ill-treated or killed by his three paternal uncles and their sons (“collectively “Relatives”) due to a land dispute in the applicant’s home area.
Disposal on paper
8. The applicant did not request for an oral hearing of the Leave Application. This court is also satisfied that the Leave Application can be disposed of based on the written materials before this court. Thus, the Leave Application is dealt with on paper.
Grounds for judicial review
9. The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).
10. The applicant did not advance any ground for his intended judicial review in Form 86, nor in his supporting affirmation dated 24 June 2020.
Discussion
11. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm, availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation. The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way of judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness, or irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).
12. Thus, despite the fact that the applicant did not advance any ground for the intended judicial review, this court will scrutinize the Board’s Decision for any errors of law, procedural unfairness, or irrationality as aforesaid.
13. In assessing the appeal by the applicant, the Board held an oral hearing on 28 April 2020. The applicant was present and was given the chance to present his case to the Board in person.
14. As can be seen from the Board’s Decision, the Board gave very full and detailed reasoning in finding that the applicant’s claim for non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong failed on all the applicable grounds under the USM.
15. The Board accepted the basic facts asserted by the applicant, such as (1) he was involved in a land dispute with his Relatives; (2) he had been attacked on a few occasions in around 2015; (3) he was injured as described, but fully recovered within a relatively short period of time; and (4) he received verbal threats from his Relatives from time to time.
16. However, the Board did not find his account that the police had filed a false criminal case against him or that a warrant of arrest had been issued to be credible. There was no evidence of the false case or warrant of arrest.
17. The Board also found no, or no reliable evidence to show that:
(1) The applicant’s Relatives would harm or kill him if he were to return to India;
(2) The applicant faced risk throughout India;
(3) The applicant suffered injuries to the required severity; and
(4) The state of India was unwilling to help the applicant for a Convention reason.
18. After due consideration of all the evidence, the Board was satisfied that the applicant was not targeted for any of the Convention reasons but for a private land dispute. The Relatives were non-state actors. The issue of state acquiescence or failure of due diligence did not arise in the circumstances of the applicant’s case. The land dispute was the subject of ongoing court proceedings in the local court system. There was nothing to suggest that the dispute would not be properly and fairly resolved, which would likely bring an end to the family issues and the applicant’s claimed fear of returning to India.
19. The Board found that state protection appeared to be available to the applicant. The applicant also accepted at the Board’s hearing that he could avail himself of state protection if needed. Thus, the Board found that the applicant’s claim failed on all the applicable grounds under the USM.
20. Despite its findings as summarised above, the Board did go on to assess the viability of internal relocation for the applicant as a matter of caution. The Board found that there was nothing to suggest that his Relatives’ influence extended beyond the local area. The Board considered that the applicant, being young, able-bodied, college educated with several years of work experience as a farmer, could reasonably and safely relocate to other parts of India such as Mumbai or Delhi where he had not experienced any impediment, to further reduce his risks from his Relatives.
21. The finding of facts including the assessment of evidence and risk of harm was solely within the ambit of the Board. The Board was entitled to make its own decision. This court finds nothing wrong or unreasonable in the way the Board reached its conclusion.
22. Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable grounds under the USM, the burden of proof and the standard of proof. The Board also correctly identified the issues and observed a very high standard of fairness. This court could detect no errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board to reach its decision.
23. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence leave must be refused.
Conclusion
24. For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed.
Dated the 16th day of February 2026
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( Irene LEE )
for Registrar, High Court
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Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
Notes for the applicant:
If leave has been granted, the applicant or his solicitors must:
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a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);
b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and
c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).
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Sent/Handed to the applicant/the applicant’s solicitors
on: 16 February 2026
Applicant’s ref. no:
Nil |
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Sent/Handed to the putative respondent / the putative respondent’s solicitors / such putative interested parties as may be directed by the Court / the putative interested parties’ solicitors on: 16 February 2026
Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Putative respondent’s ref. no.:
USM 14044/18/10/386/IN2774
Director of Immigration
Putative interested party’s ref. no.:
QA T/C 3515/18
(formerly as RBCZ 11560/17) (PSO)
Department of Justice,
Senior Assistant Law Officer
(Civil Law)
(Civil Litigation Unit 2) |
Form CALL-1
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