HKSAR v. CHAU HIU KANG

DCCC 1678/2025

[2026] HKDC 109

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 1678 OF 2025

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REASONS FOR SENTENCE

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The defendant pleaded guilty to 2 charges of "Money laundering". In short, she let someone use her bank accounts.

Summary of Facts

2.  On 16 June 2021, the defendant opened online a bank account (No.8000431276)  with Fusion Bank Limited (the "Fusion Account").  She was its sole signatory.

3.  On 14 July 2021, the defendant opened online a bank account (No.04348210439560)  with Nanyang Commercial Bank Limited (the "NCB Account").  She was its sole signatory.

Part-time job fraud

4.  Between 11 and 22 July 2021, 4 victims (PWs 1 to 4)  were deceived in a part-time job scam[1].  They transferred a total sum of $309,160 to the Fusion Account and the NCB Account[2].  The matter was later reported to the police.

Deposits and withdrawals

5.  Between 4 and 12 July 2021, the Fusion Account received 147 deposits, which aggregated to a sum of $1,344,745.03.  Simultaneously, an aggregated sum of $1,344,745 was withdrawn from the Fusion Account by 138 withdrawals.  The Account was closed by the bank on 6 September 2021.  Based on the timing and amount of the deposits and withdrawals, the police found a "mirror pattern" in those transactions, which is a typical indicator of money laundering.

6.  Between 16 and 23 July 2021, the NCB Account received 90 deposits, which aggregated to a sum of $2,150,879.82.  Simultaneously, an aggregated sum of $2,150,300 was withdrawn from the NCB Account by 43 withdrawals.  The Account was closed on 10 August 2021.  Based on the timing and amount of the deposits and withdrawals, the police found a "mirror pattern" in those transactions, which is a typical indicator of money laundering.

7.  The defendant was arrested on 29 May 2023 in relation to the Fusion Account.  Under caution, she admitted having opened the account.

Mitigation & Sentence

8.  The defendant is 44 and has 4 conviction records involving 5 offences unrelated to money laundering.  Defence counsel Mr. Li informed me that the defendant is not married but has 1 daughter and 2 sons.  She was unemployed at the time of her arrest.  She resides in a public housing unit in Tseung Kwan O.  In mitigation, Mr. Li submitted that the defendant simply lent her bank accounts to other people for their use.

9.  The prosecution has applied for an enhanced sentence pursuant to section 27(2)(c)  and (d)  of the Organized and Serious Crimes Ordinance (Cap.455)  on the basis of prevalence as well as the nature and extent of harm caused to the community. Mr. Li did not object.

10.  I bear in mind the Court of Appeal's decision in HKSAR v Xu Mai Qing CACC 464/2005, whereas Yeung JA (as he then was)  held "Under section 27(11)  of OSCO, what the prosecution has to prove is the prevalence of the offence, not the increase in the number of such offences[3]."

11.  I have read the witness statement of CIP Li dated 29 December 2025. I am satisfied that in 2021, deception-related money laundering cases were prevalent in Hong Kong in terms of the number of cases as well as the total value of monetary loss.

12. There is clear and cogent evidence before me that money laundering through bank accounts opened by "ML Stooges" remains widespread in Hong Kong today. What true criminals need are gullible scapegoats, like the defendant in the present case, who would take the blame for them when law enforcement takes action. The court must send a clear message to the general public that people who play the role of "ML Stooge" will receive severe punishment, so that there is a deterrent effect. When there are few or no willing "ML Stooges", criminal activities which rely on their bank accounts will fail.

13.  This is a typical case of money laundering by way of stooge bank accounts. Even if the defendant did not know about the part-time job fraud against PWs 1 to 4, such a scam would have been meaningless without her bank accounts. Assuming what the defendant said is true, given her role, the total sum which went through the Fusion and NCB Accounts and the overall circumstances, I grant the prosecution's application and will enhance the sentence by 25%.

14.  The Court of Appeal in SJ v Wan Kwok Keung [2012] 1 HKLRD 201 held :-

Generally, the sentence for "money laundering" offences should mainly reflect the amount of "black money" laundered and not the benefit obtained by the defendant or others. The reason being that it is very difficult to prove the benefit concerned, and in most "money laundering" cases, there may not be evidence to show from what indictable offence the "black money" are in fact derived. Of course, if there is information to prove that the "black money" is originated from serious crimes, including drug trafficking, kidnap and blackmail, illegal human trafficking, other organized crimes, etc. or the defendant's benefit is huge, then the sentence should be adjusted upward.[4]

15.  In determining the proper starting point, I have reminded myself of the sentencing principles laid down in HKSAR v Hsu Yu Yi [2010] 5 HKLRD 545 and HKSAR v Boma Amaso [2012] 2 HKLRD 33. I have also borne in mind the amount of money involved, the duration of the offences, the defendant's role in relation to the movements of funds as well as her personal circumstances.

16.  In SJ v Ngai Fung Sin Apple [2013] 5 HKLRD 104, Yeung V-P held :-

Neither the fact that the "illicit/black money"was actually not derived from an indictable offence nor the defendant's ignorance of the actual source of the "illicit/black money" is necessarily a valid mitigating factor…[5]

17. I accept there is no evidence showing that the defendant was involved in or had any knowledge of the scam against PWs 1 to 4. As the sole owner of the Fusion and NCB Accounts, the defendant should have retained their ultimate control and paid attention to their transactions on a regular basis. On the other hand, I cannot overlook the fact that a total sum of almost $3.5 million went through both accounts within 1 month.

18.  By lending her bank accounts to other people and thus allowing funds of unknown origins to pass through the Fusion and NCB Accounts, the defendant played a pivotal role in helping the mastermind(s)  of criminal activities to access their illegal funds without revealing their identities.

19. For Charge 1, I consider a starting point of 3 years' imprisonment appropriate and just[6]. With the timely guilty plea, the sentence is reduced to 24 months. Apart from this, I see no other mitigating factors which warrant any further reduction. With the 25% enhancement, I sentence the defendant to 30 months' imprisonment.

20. For Charge 2, a starting point of 3 years' imprisonment is appropriate and just. With the timely guilty plea, the sentence is reduced to 24 months. With the 25% enhancement, I sentence the defendant to 30 months' imprisonment.
21. A total sum of almost $3.5 million went through the defendant's 2 bank accounts. Bearing in mind the totality principle, I consider a global starting point of 4 years' imprisonment for both charges appropriate and just. With the timely guilty pleas, the overall sentence is reduced to 32 months. With the 25% enhancement, the final overall sentence becomes 40 months. To achieve this, I order 10 months in Charge 2 to run consecutively to the sentence for Charge 1.

22. Moments ago, I have just sentenced the defendant to 35 months' imprisonment for a similar "money laundering" offence in DCCC 558/2024, which took place roughly 9 months before the present case. She was arrested for both cases on the same date. The total sum which went through her 3 bank accounts in both cases was $6.3 million odd. For that amount, with the timely guilty pleas and enhancement, the final sentence is 40 months. Hence, I order the sentence in DCCC 558/2024 to run concurrently with the sentences in the present case.