HKSAR v. QUINTERO BERNAL DIEGO-JHOVANNY

CACC 98/2021 , [2026] HKCA 1517

On Appeal From [2021] HKCFI 968

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO 98 OF 2021

(ON APPEAL FROM HCCC NO 301 OF 2019)

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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

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Hon Macrae Acting CJHC (giving the Reasons for Judgment of the Court):

1.  By a Form XIII Notice filed on 11 November 2025, the applicant (D1 at trial) sought to renew his application for leave to appeal against his sentence of 13 years and 1 month’s imprisonment in respect of a single count of trafficking in a dangerous drug, namely 1,230 grammes of a solid containing 740 grammes of cocaine (Count 2), contrary to section 4(1)(a) and (3) of the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance, Cap 134. The respondent did not oppose the renewal of the present application or the necessary extension of time within which to appeal.

2.  On 12 August 2026, having granted the applicant an extension of time to appeal, we granted him leave to appeal and allowed the appeal, reducing his sentence from 13 years and 1 month’s imprisonment to 12 years and 1 month’s imprisonment.  We said we would hand down our reasons in due course, which we now do.

Background and procedural history

3.  The background to the case and the subsequent developments in the law may be briefly set out as follows:

(i)  The applicant committed the offence on 30 June 2018 and has remained in custody ever since;

(ii)  On 9 September 2019, the applicant and D2 were committed to the High Court for trial and both pleaded not guilty to the original joint charge.  The case was subsequently fixed for trial to commence on 10 March 2021 before Campbell-Moffat J (“the judge”)[1] in the High Court;

(iii)  On 10 March 2021, the first day of trial, and before the jury was empanelled, defence counsel submitted that the indictment was defective because joint enterprise could not be proved.  Following a ruling from the judge, the prosecution then amended the indictment to include two alternative counts reflecting the individual quantities of drugs seized from the applicant and D2 respectively.  These became Count 2 and Count 3[2].  On 11 March 2021, the applicant pleaded not guilty to Count 1 and the alternative Count 2, and the judge received submissions from the parties on the defence of duress, which the judge regarded as the only issue at trial.  On 15 March 2021, the judge handed down a preliminary ruling “to facilitate an agreed understanding of the law so far as it pertains to the case at hand”[3];

(iv)  On 16 March 2021, the fifth day of trial, the applicant pleaded guilty to Count 2 on the amended indictment, and not guilty to the original Count 1.  On 9 April 2021, he was sentenced by the judge in accordance with the sentencing guidelines laid down in HKSAR v Abdallah[4];

(v)  On 6 May 2021, the applicant filed an application for leave to appeal against conviction on the ground that his guilty plea was null and void because he had been coerced into entering it by his counsel.  On 26 April 2022, the applicant was granted an appeal aid certificate[5]. On 24 November 2022, at the hearing of the leave application, the applicant, through counsel, withdrew his application for leave to appeal against conviction. In a judgment handed down on 6 December 2022, the Single Judge addressed the applicant’s complaint that he had been forced to abandon his defence of duress and plead guilty to the alternative count[6];

(vi)  On 2 December 2022, the applicant filed an application for leave to appeal against sentence out of time on the ground that the sentence was manifestly excessive.  On 30 November 2023, perfected grounds of appeal against sentence were filed, alleging that the judge had failed to take duress into account as a mitigating factor and to grant an appropriate reduction (Ground 1); erred in failing to consider that the applicant was a victim of human trafficking (Ground 2); and imposed a sentence that was, in all the circumstances, neither fair, balanced, nor just (Ground 3).  On 7 June 2024, the Single Judge refused leave to appeal against sentence[7];

(vii)  On 4 September 2024, the applicant sought leave to apply for judicial review in HCAL 1530/2024, challenging the refusal by the Director of Public Prosecutions to conduct a victim identification screening for trafficking in persons; the alleged continuing failures of the Secretary for Security and/or the Commissioner to conduct such screening and to investigate whether he was a victim of forced or compulsory labour under Article 4 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights; and the alleged failure or decision not to legislate for a complete statutory defence for persons who commit offences in the course of such forced or compulsory labour.  Leave was granted on the papers on 10 September 2024[8]. The substantive hearing took place a year later on 10 September 2025.  Although judgment was initially scheduled to be handed down on or before 31 October 2025, it was in fact handed down on 16 July 2026, whereby the application was dismissed[9];

(viii)  On 5 March 2025, this Court handed down its decision in HKSAR v Huang Ruifang (No 3)[10], revising downward the sentencing guidelines for trafficking in very large and exceptionally large quantities of heroin, cocaine, and “Ice”;

(ix)  On 11 November 2025, the applicant filed a Form XIII Notice, renewing out of time his application for leave to appeal against sentence, supported by an affirmation explaining that the delay arose from the fact that the Court had since issued revised guidelines in Huang Ruifang (No 3); and

(x)  On 20 January 2026, this Court handed down its decision in HKSAR v Lam Man Tak[11], in which it set out its approach to the application of the revised sentencing guidelines in Huang Ruifang (No 3), stating, inter alai, that an applicant or appellant sentenced on or after 18 September 2018, and who is still “in the system” for the purposes of any appeal, is in principle entitled to benefit from the guidelines.

The Summary of Facts[12]

4.  On 30 June 2018, the applicant and his girlfriend (D2) were intercepted by Customs officers upon arrival at Hong Kong International Airport from Colombia, via São Paulo and Dubai.  Suspecting that they had contraband concealed in their bodies, the officers took them to North Lantau Hospital for examination, where foreign objects were found in the body cavities of both of them.

5.  Upon his arrest and caution, the applicant admitted that there were about 40 “pieces” of cocaine inside his body, whereas D2 remained silent.

6.  They were then taken to Queen Elizabeth Hospital, where the applicant discharged 73 pellets containing cocaine, the subject matter of Count 2, whereas D2 discharged 29 pellets containing cocaine, the subject matter of Count 3.

7.  In a video recorded interview, the applicant stated, inter alia, that: (i) he had flown to Hong Kong from Bogotá, Colombia, via São Paulo, Brazil, and Dubai, United Arab Emirates; (ii) he owed a Colombian man 30 million Colombian pesos (about US$10,000), and, in order to settle the debt, he was told to swallow pellets containing drugs on 28 June 2018 and deliver them to Macao; (iii) D2, his girlfriend, also swallowed drug pellets to help him settle the debt; (iv) the Colombian man arranged their flights to Hong Kong and purchased tickets to Macao for both of them; (v) they were to be paid US$5,000 for completing the delivery, although he later claimed that he did not think he would in fact be paid; and (vi) he confirmed that he had discharged 73 pellets containing dangerous drugs.

8.  In a written recorded interview on 2 July 2018, D2 confirmed the following: (i) the applicant was her ex-boyfriend; (ii) he was indebted to a Colombian man, who instructed them to swallow drugs and transport them to Hong Kong; (iii) the applicant swallowed over 70 pellets containing dangerous drugs, whilst she had swallowed 29 pellets, in a hotel in Colombia; (iv) she confirmed that she discharged 29 pellets, which she believed contained cocaine.  Although what D2 said to Customs officers was not admissible evidence against the applicant, it was relied on as tending to confirm aspects of what he had said.

9.  The estimated street value of the drugs seized was HK$2,292,095.

10.  The applicant admitted that, at the material time, he had knowingly possessed the drugs for the purpose of unlawful trafficking.

Mitigation

11.  The applicant was 39 years of age at the time of sentence.  In mitigation[13], it was advanced on his behalf that he committed the offence because he owed a Colombian gang leader (who was certified dead on 23 February 2019)[14], about 30 million Colombian pesos, and that this man had threatened to kill his family unless the debt was repaid by transporting drugs to Hong Kong[15]. It was submitted that the applicant should receive the one-third discount for his guilty plea, and not be penalised for any lack of proper advice before committal.  Furthermore, it was argued that he should receive credit for three matters, namely (i) his participation in Father Wotherspoon’s anti-drugs campaign[16]; (ii) his offer of cooperation to the Hong Kong Police by letter dated 21 November 2018, shortly after his arrival in Hong Kong, which was never followed up; and (iii) his full cooperation with the authorities, as revealed in interview[17].

Reasons for sentence

12.  The judge found the applicant (and D2) to be “couriers simpliciter”[18] and adopted, in respect of the applicant, a starting point of 20 years and 9 months’ imprisonment under the guidelines set out in Abdallah[19], which she reduced by 6 months to reflect “the very real threats made to him and the stature of (the Columbian gang leader) and his network”[20], but enhanced by 9 months for the international element of bringing drugs across the border into Hong Kong, thereby yielding a notional starting point of 21 years’ imprisonment.  A full one-third discount was then granted for the plea, notwithstanding that it was entered on the fifth day of trial, on the basis that the delay was not the applicant’s fault.  The final arithmetic appears to reflect a further reduction of about 8 months for his cooperation and suggested attempted assistance to the authorities, and a further 3 months for his participation in Father Wotherspoon’s programme, resulting in a final sentence of 13 years and 1 month’s imprisonment[21].

Ground of appeal

13.  Represented by Mr Chan in this appeal[22], the applicant advanced a single ground of appeal that he should benefit from the downward revision of the sentencing guidelines in Huang Ruifang (No 3). Mr Chan submitted that the ‘state of affairs’ giving rise to that revision already existed when the applicant was sentenced on 9 April 2021, which was after the operative date of 18 September 2018 identified in Lam Man Tak[23].  He explained that the renewal application was taken out on 11 November 2025 only after the judicial review proceedings in HCAL 1530/2024 had been expected to conclude[24].

14.  Applying the revised guidelines, Mr Chan submitted that 740 grammes of cocaine would, on a purely arithmetical basis, attract a starting point of about 17 years’ imprisonment, rather than 20 years and 9 months under Abdallah.  After applying the judge’s sentencing adjustments, namely a 6-month reduction to reflect the accepted threats made against him, a 9-month enhancement for the international element, a one-third discount for the guilty plea, and further reductions of 8 months and 3 months respectively for the offer of assistance and participation in Father Wotherspoon’s anti-drugs programme, he submitted that the appropriate sentence would be 10 years and 7 months’ imprisonment, some 2 years and 6 months less than the original sentence.

15.  Mr Chan accordingly sought the applicant’s immediate release, submitting that on a revised sentence the applicant would have been entitled to be released on 3 August 2025, taking into account a one-third remission for good behaviour since his remand on 3 July 2018.

The respondent’s submissions

16.  It was accepted by Mr Lau, on behalf of the respondent, that, despite the refusal of leave to appeal by the Single Judge on 7 June 2024 and the failure of the applicant to renew his application for leave until November 2025, more than 17 months after the refusal of leave, it was still open to this Court as a discretionary exercise to grant leave to appeal out of time and, by doing so, place the applicant back “in the system”.  The Court was not functus officio and retained a discretion to allow an applicant to appeal out of time, if his appeal had obvious merit.

17.  Mr Lau accepted that the starting point on a purely arithmetical basis under the revised guidelines would be 17 years’ imprisonment.  However, he advocated that the international element warranted an enhancement of 12 to 16 months[25], that no reduction should be allowed for the applicant’s willingness to assist the authorities because he provided no information leading to any useful or practical result[26], and that at most a reduction of 2 to 3 months should be allowed for his participation in Father Wotherspoon’s campaign.

18.  On that basis, the respondent submits that, under the revised guidelines, a proper sentence would be in the range of 11 years and 5 months’ to 11 years and 9 months’ imprisonment, rather than the 10 years and 7 months’ imprisonment contended for by the applicant.  

Discussion

19.  The judge’s sentencing approach under the former guidelines prevailing at the time was so unorthodox that it has placed this Court in some difficulty as to how to deal with this appeal.  Her approach was, with respect, not only extraordinary, it was unprincipled and has led to the bizarre result that when the sentence is now considered by the Court under the revised guidelines in Huang Ruifang (No 3), it would be higher than the one passed by the judge under the former guidelines in Abdallah.  It is not difficult to see how this has happened.

20.  Firstly, the judge reduced the applicable arithmetical starting point under the former guidelines by 6 months on the grounds that the applicant was suffering under duress, before finding that the applicant was not even a simple courier but a mere “vessel for the drugs”[27].  There was no proper evidential basis whatsoever for such findings, which the judge appears to have determined on the basis of defence counsel’s submissions from the Bar table alone.  The identity of a major Colombian drug trafficker or gang leader, who had supposedly forced the applicant to traffic cocaine to Hong Kong, and who had since been assassinated, could easily be gleaned from newspapers and public knowledge. Such ‘evidence’ from Colombian newspaper clippings provided no link at all with this case.  The applicant never gave evidence and there was nothing concrete or cogent to base any claim of duress.  Nevertheless, the judge went even further and indulged in wholly unwarranted speculation that the major drug trafficker concerned had somehow set the applicant and his girlfriend up as “decoys to be sacrificed for the good of the enterprise”[28]. We are at a complete loss to understand how the judge entertained such an extraordinary and fanciful notion.

21.  Secondly, the judge uplifted an already erroneously reduced starting point by a mere 9 months for the international factor, notwithstanding that the applicant had travelled from South America, through the Middle East to Asia with 740 grammes of cocaine narcotic concealed within his body; not to mention that he travelled with his girlfriend who was also trafficking in dangerous drugs at the same time.  Even Mr Chan had to accept that the enhancement for the international element was inadequate and suggested that it should have been at the lower end of the 12 to 16 months range.

22.  Thirdly, the judge gave a full one-third discount for the ‘plea’, notwithstanding that the applicant had only pleaded guilty on the fifth day of the trial.  The judge endeavoured to explain her largesse by accepting various submissions from the Bar table to find that the delay in pleading guilty “should not be laid at the door of the (applicant)”[29].  We shall examine the circumstances giving rise to the plea shortly in closer detail.  Whatever the circumstances, there was no warrant for giving the applicant a full one-third discount.

23.  Fourthly, the judge gave a further 8 months’ discount because the applicant had “attempted to and would have provided assistance” to the authorities[30]; presumably in respect of the major drug dealer, who had, unfortunately for the applicant, since been assassinated.  There was no assistance, practical or otherwise, as even Mr Chan had to accept.

24.  Fifthly, the judge gave the applicant 3 months’ discount for assisting Father Wotherspoon’s anti-drugs campaign, on the basis of a single letter uploaded onto a website by Father Wotherspoon.  There was nothing exceptional about the applicant’s contribution to Father Wotherspoons’ campaign, which should not have merited more than a token 1 or 2 months’ reduction.

25.  Under the revised guidelines, the starting point for trafficking in 740 grammes of cocaine narcotic on a purely arithmetical basis would be 17 years’ imprisonment.  If we accepted that the role and culpability of the applicant as an international drugs courier merited a notional sentence after trial of 18 years’ imprisonment (17 years + 12 months for the international aspect of his trafficking), and ignored the judge’s undeserved discounts for duress, assistance and plea, we would arrive at a higher sentence than had the applicant pleaded guilty under the revised guidelines.  The discount for his contribution to Father Wotherspoon’s anti-drugs campaign, which should not have been more than 1 or 2 months would not affect that result.  The judge’s overall leniency has placed this Court in a very difficult, indeed unprecedented, position.

26.  The judge herself recognised the consequences for defendants of being unduly lenient, when she remarked during mitigation[31]:

“…my experience of the way I’ve managed to sentence previously, if I get too lenient, I start getting my hands slapped back again, and then of course your clients are at risk of going the other way”.

Unfortunately, there are also consequences for appellate courts, who then have to unravel capricious sentencing exercises and sentence again in accordance with established principles.

27.  The problem for this Court, however, does not end with the judge’s unprincipled sentence.  In his written submissions, Mr Lau, on behalf of the respondent, having accepted the judge’s reduced starting point of 6 months for duress and her one-third discount as well as the 3-month reduction for the Father Wotherspoon factor, stated that “based on the revised sentencing guidelines, a fair, just and balanced sentence for the Appellant would be in the region of 11 years and 5 months, as opposed to the 13 years and 1 months’ imprisonment imposed by the judge”[32]. This conclusion will have been read by the applicant, as would the ensuing statement by Mr Lau that “the estimated discharge date taking into account remission of the Applicant would be as early as January 2026”[33] (this statement had been underlined in Mr Lau’s Written Submissions for emphasis).  In other words, according to the respondent, the applicant had already been incarcerated for more than 6 months longer than necessary.

28.  With great respect to the respondent’s counsel, while Mr Lau was no doubt trying to assist this Court in assessing the appropriate sentence under the revised guidelines, he made the mistake, quite often made by counsel on both sides, of accepting without any proper analysis a judge’s reasoning and deductions and assuming that we would simply do so too, when some of the judge’s discounts were unsupportable and plainly wrong.  As we have repeatedly stressed, when we are persuaded to interfere with a sentence on the basis of the revised guidelines, the Court must sentence afresh.  We recently stated in HKSAR v Nkausu Roosevelt[34]:

“On an appeal against sentence under the revised guidelines, the Court is required to sentence an appellant afresh and is not bound by the trial judge’s view or interpretation of the facts, or his application of sentencing principles[35], although the Court will obviously wish to consider the judge’s reasons….”

29.  The unfortunate consequence of the parties’ position is that the applicant’s expectations of how the appeal will be resolved in his favour have been needlessly raised.  The fallacy of Mr Lau’s submission, with respect, is that it was based on some of the same fundamental errors made by the judge, which he, at least initially, replicated and endorsed in writing, and thereby gave false hope to the applicant that the respondent would effectively concede the appeal.

30.  To be fair to Mr Lau, he did backtrack in his oral submissions on a number of issues engaged by the Court, which he had previously appeared to accept in written submissions.  And he has rightly never accepted the judge’s reduction for supposed assistance.  Ultimately, we should make clear we were assisted by Mr Lau’s revised submissions.

31.  Unfortunately, by the time the applicant appeared before us, he would have known what the respective positions of the parties were, at least in writing, and the Court was unnecessarily placed in a very awkward position.  The position confronting us was what to do about a plainly erroneous set of sentencing reasons, which both parties had for the most part accepted, at least initially, and then simply transposed to the revised guidelines.

32.  We said we would return to the issue of the discount for plea.  Although the circumstances are not very clear, the applicant was originally jointly charged with his girlfriend for trafficking in the total quantity of 1,082 grammes of cocaine narcotic, which they were said to be carrying between them.  This was the charge in the first indictment, dated 16 September 2019.  In the case management questionnaire signed on 4 December 2019, the applicant indicated through his counsel that he would contest the charge and advance the defence of duress.

33.  The trial was fixed before the judge to commence on 10 March 2021.  At some stage prior to the trial (it is not clear when), the applicant through his legal representatives, made an application for alternative charges to be laid in respect of the particular quantity being carried by each defendant.  The matter was pursued on the first day of trial with an application by the applicant’s counsel, not Mr Chan, under section 23(1) of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance, Cap 221 for individual counts to be added to the indictment to reflect the drugs carried separately by the applicant and D2.  The judge agreed with the submission and found the indictment was defective for not including two alternative counts.  This resulted in the prosecution filing an amended indictment, adding Count 2 and Count 3 on 10 March 2021.

34.  Defence counsel then made an application to the judge for a ruling on the defence of duress, which he was proposing to run at trial.  The judge obligingly gave her views of the matter.  Her ruling, dated 15 March 2021, has already been the subject of criticism by Zervos JA in HKSAR v Quintero Bernal Diego-Jhovanny[36], at the application for leave to appeal against conviction, where he noted:

“…Instead of being a ruling on the law on which defence counsel could then discuss with his client, armed with full and complete instructions, it was an opinion by the Judge on the viability of the applicant’s defence based on a limited understanding of the facts, rather than on evidence properly adduced either in a voir dire or at trial.”

35.  There then followed what seems to have been a plea negotiation, with the prosecution accepting a plea by the applicant and D2 to the alternative counts in respect of the quantity of the drugs they were individually carrying.  Whilst D2 had previously indicated that she would plead guilty and would not run the defence of duress, the applicant waited until he received the ‘ruling’ from the judge on the question of duress.  On 16 March 2021, the applicant entered a plea of guilty to the alternative Count 2 and agreed the Summary of Facts.  Even then, the applicant was later to complain at his application for leave to appeal against conviction that he had been forced to change his plea by his counsel and the judge.

36.  Nevertheless, in these circumstances and against this background, which even up to now has never been made clear by either party, we are prepared to consider a discount of 27.5%; however, a full one-third discount by the judge was wholly unwarranted for a change of plea that came about five days into the trial and when all indications to the court hitherto had been that the applicant would put forward the defence of duress at a contested trial.  A discount of 27.5% lies between what should at best have been the discount for a late plea, namely 25%, and an even more generous view of 30%, if we were to accept everything that the judge seems to have accepted of what she was told in the most favourable possible light. Accordingly, if we reduce the enhanced starting point of 18 years’ imprisonment by 27.5%, we would arrive at a sentence of about 13 years’ imprisonment. 

37.  We would not have considered a reduction of more than 1 or 2 months for the Father Wotherspoon factor, but we are prepared in the light of the way the judge went about her sentencing exercise, and the more than 5 years that have now passed since then, to accept a 3 months’ discount.  The sentence thus becomes 12 years and 9 months’ imprisonment.

38.  However, as we have stated, the hopes and expectations of the applicant, who was approaching the end of his sentence, have unfortunately been excited by the initial positions adopted by counsel for the applicant and the respondent, who appeared to concede that the applicant had already served more than he should have served, if the revised guidelines were applied.  That was unfortunate enough.  But there is another matter, which has made the problem even more acute in this particular case. 

39.  We were conscious as we approached this appeal of the appalling tragedy unfolding in Colombia and the consequent destruction and loss of life resulting from the devastating earthquake in that country a mere two days before the hearing of this appeal.  Although, strangely, it was not mentioned by defence counsel, it was a matter that the applicant himself rather poignantly raised with the Court, explaining that he had not heard from his family since the earthquake struck.  We can sympathise with his position, especially when he must have had every expectation that his appeal would be allowed and he would be able to return to his country as soon as it could be arranged following his release.  We should make clear, however, that had he not been near the end of his original sentence, we would not have taken the course we took.

40.  In the unusual, if not unique, circumstances of this appeal, we considered that justice required that we reduce the sentence further. Given the history of this matter, the way it was dealt with by the judge and the applicant’s anticipation of his imminent release against the uncertainty for himself and his family caused by recent events in his country, we felt that humanitarian considerations required the course we took.

41.  This is an exceptional case, particularly in the light of recent events, and should not be regarded as a precedent in other cases.  Had the applicant not been almost at the end of his sentence, we would not have taken the course we did.  However, for the reasons we have discussed, we granted an extension of time, allowed the appeal and reduced his sentence from 13 years and 1 month’s imprisonment to 12 years and 1 month’s imprisonment.

[1]  Appeal Bundle (“AB”), p 430, at [9].

[2]  The applicant and his girlfriend (D2) were originally jointly charged with one count of trafficking in a dangerous drug, namely 1,723 grammes of a solid containing 1,082 grammes of cocaine (Count 1), but the indictment was later amended to allege alternative counts reflecting the quantities seized from each of them, namely 1,230 grammes of a solid containing 740 grammes of cocaine against the applicant (Count 2) and 493 grammes of a solid containing 342 grammes of cocaine against D2 (Count 3).

[3]  HKSAR v Quintero Bernal Diego-Jhovanny (Unrep., HCCC 301/2019, 15 March 2021), at [4].

[4]  HKSAR v Abdallah [2009] 2 HKLRD 437.

[5]  HKSAR v Quintero Bernal Diego-Jhovanny (Unrep., CACC 98/2021, 26 April 2022).

[6]  HKSAR v Quintero Bernal Diego-Jhovanny [2023] 1 HKLRD 156, per Zervos JA.

[7]  HKSAR v Quintero Bernal Diego-Jhovanny (Unrep., CACC 98/2021, 7 June 2024), per Zervos JA.

[8]  Qbd v Secretary for Security and Others (Unrep., HCAL 1530/2024, 10 September 2024).

[9]  Qbd v Secretary for Security and Others (Unrep., HCAL 1530/2024, 16 July 2026).

[10]  HKSAR v Huang Ruifang (No.3) [2025] 2 HKLRD 138.

[11]  HKSAR v Lam Man Tak [2026] 2 HKLRD 199.

[12]  AB, pp 6-9.

[13]  AB, pp 383T-395J; pp 430-431, at [10].

[14]  AB, pp 389D-390A; pp 497-498.

[15]  AB, pp 430-431, at [10].

[16]  AB, pp 392M-393L.

[17]  AB, p 394J-T.

[18]  AB, p 434R.

[19]  Under Abdallah, 740 grammes of cocaine fell within the 600 to 1200 gramme band, with an applicable sentencing range of 20 to 23 years’ imprisonment.

[20]  AB, p 435B-C.

[21]  AB, pp 434-441, at [17]-[29].

[22]  Mr Chan also appeared for the applicant in HCAL 1530/2024.

[23]  Lam Man Tak, at [48] & [50].

[24]  That judgment was initially scheduled for hand-down on or before 31 October 2025, but was in fact handed down only on 16 July 2026.

[25]  HKSAR v Lee Ming Ho [2024] 1 HKLRD 1186, at [58], [59], [70], [74]; HKSAR v Raman Kapusamy [2024] 2 HKLRD 955, at [58]-[59]; HKSAR v Cedeno Mejias Angel Rafael (Unrep., CACC 205/2025, 3 February 2026).

[26]  Secretary for Justice v Pastana Carvalho Andreza Narely [2022] 3 HKLRD 727, at [31] & [41].

[27]  AB, p 435C-D.

[28]  AB, p 441C-D.

[29]  AB, p 438G.

[30]  AB, p 441F.

[31]  AB, p 372M-O.

[32]  Respondent’s Written Submissions, at [21].

[33]  Respondent’s Written Submissions, at [22].

[34]  HKSAR v Nkausu Roosevelt (Unrep., CACC 406/2025, 13 August 2026), at [11].

[35]  HKSAR v Law Ka Fai (Unrep., CACC 60/2025, 21 November 2025), at [7].

[36]  HKSAR v Quintero Bernal Diego-Jhovanny [2023] 1 HKLRD 156, at [37].