HOANG VAN LUONG v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE

HCAL 482/2021

[2026] HKCFI 1877

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 482 OF 2021

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D E C I S I O N

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Introduction

1.  This is the Applicants’s application by summons filed on 16 March 2026 for extension of time to appeal the order of this Court dated 5 December 2025 (the “Order”)  refusing him leave to apply for judicial review (the “leave application”)  of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office.

The law

2.  Under Order 53, rule 3(4)  of the Rules of the High Court, where an application for leave to apply for judicial review is refused by a judge, the applicant may appeal the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days after such order.  By the time the summons was filed, it was three months and four days out of time.  In Jagg Singh and Torture Claims Appeal Board/non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office[1], the Court of Appeal held that in considering whether to extend time for appealing a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the court will take into account: (1)  the length of delay; (2)  the reasons for the delay; (3)  the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted.  If the delay is not substantial, it would be readily condoned if there is some credible explanation and an arguable ground of appeal.  If the first three factors are resolved against granting leave, there is no need to consider prejudice to the respondent.

Explanation for the delay

3.  The delay of more than three months in an appeal period of 14 days is very substantial.  The Applicant’s explanation for the delay as stated in his supporting affirmation is that he had never received any correspondence from the Court about his leave application, ie the Order and the Form CALL-1.  

4.  The Applicant’s address as stated in his Form 86 is at Nga Kwai House.  Notice of hearing had been sent to that address and he appeared at the hearing on 17 November 2025.  It is the practice of this Court to update the applicant’s address at every hearing.  At the conclusion of the hearing on 17 November 2025, the Applicant provided a new address at Winki House.  He was specifically reminded that if he moves from that address he must notify the Court immediately. 

5.  On 25 November 2025, this Court informed him by letter that the decision relating to his leave application would be ready by late December 2025.  The letter was sent to him by post to the Winki House address.  On 5 December 2025, the Court sent him the Order and Form CALL-1 by post to the Winki House address.  These documents were never returned through the course of mail, indicating, prima facie, that delivery had been effected.

6.  Then, on 27 February 2026, the Court’s letter dated 25 November 2025 was returned and marked “Refused”.  This indicated that the address was correct, but the residents thereat refused to accept the letter. 

7.  However, the Applicant’s address as stated in his summons and supporting affirmation is not the Winki House address, but the Nga Kwai House address.  For reasons best known to himself, he reverted back to his earlier address. If the Applicant’s claim that he never received the Order and Form CALL-1 is true, it must be because he had moved out of the Winki House address without informing the Court of his change of address.  Otherwise, it is just a convenient excuse which is not genuine.  Whatever the situation, the Applicant is responsible for the consequence because of his failure to inform the Court of his change of address.  In Karamjit Singh[2], the Court of Appeal said:

“As we have said before, it is common sense that if a litigant or a claimant does not notify the authority (be it the Immigration Department, the board, or the court)  in his change of address, there would be delay in communication. If he does not do so, he should arrange for timely transmission of mail from his old address to his new address. It is the duty of a litigant/claimant to give the authority an address to which correspondence or notice can come to his attention in timely manner. The consequence of any delay occasioned by the ineffectiveness of such an address would fall on the shoulder of the litigant/claimant, see: Islam Raja Rais v Director of Immigration HCMP 881/2017, 26 June 2017; Said Umair v Torture Claims Appeal Board [2018] HKCA 82; and Re Saqlain Muhammad [2018] HKCA 346. That said, however, we note that the delay in this case was very short, being only some 6 days. In such situations, the board should generally have regard to the merits of the case as disclosed by the available material, rather than simply dismissing the application for lateness.”

It is the Applicant’s duty to update the Court with his change of address.  If he did not, he has to bear the consequence of his neglect.  His explanation is not a reasonable or credible one.

Prospect of the intended appeal – grounds of appeal

8.  The Applicant’s ground of appeal is that “the decision … has been reached unfairly without allowing me an opportunity to clarify my case and situation in my country”.  As noted in paragraph 8 of the Form CALL-1, at the hearing before this Court, after the legal principles applicable to judicial review had been explained to him, he confirmed that he had no complaint about errors of law in the Decision, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Decision and would left it to the Court to scrutinize the Decision for those vitiating elements.  It is also the standard practice of this Court to invite a final submission, particularly if an applicant has no specific complaints.  He made no final submission.  He obviously had ample opportunities to clarify his case and the situation in his country.  There is no substance in this ground.  This is the only ground of his intended appeal.  The intended appeal stands no prospect of success.

Conclusion

9.  In view of the finding above, there is no need to consider the question of prejudice to the respondent if extension of time is granted. As the Applicant has no reasonable explanation for the very substantial delay and his only ground of appeal has no prospect of success, his application for extension of time to appeal is refused.