RE SHUI HING INVESTMENT COMPANY LIMITED

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

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JUDGMENT

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Fuad, J.A.:

1. This is an application for a stay of an Order made by Jones, J. on the 3rd May appointing the Official Receiver as a provisional liquidator of two companies involved under section 193 of the Companies Ordinance, pending appeal to this Court.

2. There is a difficulty about an early date for the hearing because although the 14th and 15th of May have been offered, opposing Counsel suggests that at least five days will be necessary.

3. The matter started some time ago. The petitions to wind-up the companies, Nos.100 and 101 of 1984, were presented on 19th March 1984. They were met with a motion to strike out. The striking out applications were heard and dismissed. A Notice of Appeal was given against the refusal to strike out, but this appeal was compromised later and the appeal was not proceeded with.

4. The summons for the appointment of the provisional liquidator was heard by the learned Judge over three days at the end of April and he gave judgment on the 3rd day of this month.

5. Mr. Bokhary, appearing for the Applicants, has taken us through the salient facts and has contended, in effect, that irrevocable harm would be done to the companies if a stay were not granted. We have been referred to the judgment given by Jones, J. and I do not wish to say too much about it because it is the subject of an appeal. However I would say that a court hearing an application of this kind has a delicate balancing act to do, and I am not persuaded that the Applicants have come within measuring distance of making out a case for the grant of a stay pending appeal. I would refuse the application.

Kempster, J.A.:

6. In May 1984, Mr. Wang Teh Huei affirmed as to the prejudice to the business of Shui Hing Investment Company Limited that would be caused by the appointment of a provisional liquidator. Despite that concern it was found by Jones, J., following a three day hearing, that at least three significant breaches of the terms of a consent order made on the 31st July 1984 had been committed by the Applicants and that the assets of both companies, which are the subject of the two consolidated petitions, are in jeopardy. In the face of those findings and despite all that has been urged on us by Mr. Bokhary, who has had a most difficult brief to hold, I agree that the applications must be dismissed.