WONG DEREK SAU LEUNG AND ANOTHER v. WONG SAU MAN SAMUEL AND OTHERS

HCAP 17/2024

[2026] HKCFI 3635

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

PROBATE ACTION NO. 17 OF 2024

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J U D G M E N T

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1.  The Plaintiffs are the executors appointed under the last will of the Deceased dated 18 March 2020 (“Last Will”). This is their summary judgment application to pronounce for the validity of the Last Will in solemn form pursuant to RHC Order 14.

A.  THE BACKGROUND FACTS

2.  The Deceased was born in 1934 and passed away on 3 February 2023, at the age of 88. He was survived by his wife Madam Wong Mok Yee Ching Sadie (“Madam Wong”), his eldest son Wong Sau Man Samuel (“1^st Defendant”), his second son Wong Sau Lung Benjamin (“Benjamin”) and his younger son Wong Derek Sau Leung (“1^st Plaintiff”). The 2^nd Plaintiff is the Deceased’s younger brother.

3.  The 2^nd Defendant is the daughter of the 1^st Defendant. The 3^rd and 4^th Defendants are respectively a grandnephew and a grandniece of the Deceased. The 5^th Defendant is one of the Deceased’s grandsons.

4.  Under the Last Will, the Deceased, amongst other things,

(1)  revoked all former testamentary dispositions made and declared the Last Will to be his last will and testament;

(2)  appointed the Plaintiffs to be his executors and trustees of the will;

(3)  gave, devised and bequeathed the shares in his name and held by the 2^nd Plaintiff as his nominee in Wilson Re Limited to Madam Wong (100,000 shares), Benjamin (100,000 shares), and the 1^st Plaintiff (the remaining shares), and directed, inter alia, that Madam Wong and Benjamin should only sell or dispose of such shares to the 1^st Plaintiff;

(4)  gave, devised and bequeathed his specified landed properties to the 1^st Plaintiff;

(5)  gave, devised and bequeathed various pecuniary legacies to 24 individuals who were his family members, his secretary and his maid;

(6)  gave, devised and bequeathed the remainder of his properties to his executors and trustees to sell, call in, and convert the same into money and to hold the net proceeds to pay his debts, estate duty and testamentary expenses, and to hold his residuary estate upon trust for the 1^st Plaintiff absolutely.

5.  On the face of the Last Will, it was signed by the Deceased in the presence of Mr Wong Chi Leung (a partner of the law firm Messrs Hobson & Ma) (“Mr CL Wong”) and Dr Edmund KW Woo (a neurologist) (“Dr Woo”).

6.  After the Deceased died on 3 February 2023, the following caveats were registered against the sealing of the grant in the estate of the Deceased:

(1)  a caveat filed on behalf of the 1^st Defendant on 15 May 2023;

(2)  a caveat filed on behalf of the 2^nd Defendant on 21 September 2023;

(3)  a caveat filed on behalf of the 1^st Defendant on 6 November 2023; and

(4)  a caveat filed on behalf of Madam Wong Susanna Mei Ling (the 1^st Defendant’s wife) on 19 March 2024.

7.  On 21 May 2024, the Plaintiffs commenced the present action to propound for the validity of the Last Will in solemn form.

8.  On 23 July 2024, the 1^st Defendant, acting in person, filed his Defence and Counterclaim.

9.  The 2^nd Defendant initially did not file any acknowledgement of service of the Re-Amended Writ. Subsequently, the 2^nd Defendant filed an affidavit to support the position of the 1^st Defendant.

10.  The 3^rd, 4^th and 5^th Defendants have confirmed, through their solicitors, that they would not contest these proceedings.

11.  On 2 October 2025, the Plaintiffs gave notice to the pecuniary legatees of the Last Will (except the Defendants in these proceedings) to inform them that they could acknowledge service of the Re-Amended Writ to become a party to these proceedings, and that they would be bound by any judgment given in these proceedings if they did not acknowledge service. All the pecuniary legatees subsequently confirmed through their solicitors that they would not apply to join as parties to the action and would be prepared to be bound by the judgment of the court.

12.  On 26 November 2025, the Plaintiffs issued a summons to seek summary judgment for the grant of probate of the Last Will in solemn form and to strike out the Defence and Counterclaim under RHC O.18 r.19.

B.  PROVING A WILL BY SOLEMN FORM IN SUMMARY JUDGMENT APPLICATION

13.  The court in an appropriate case may give summary judgment to propound a will in solemn form. Nonetheless, such “an application needs to be approached with care, having regard to the special nature and feature of a probate action, of the role of the court therein and of an order pronouncing in favour of a will”. See Re Estate of Chan Fook Lai (Deceased) [2024] 1 HKLRD 29 at [2] (G Lam JA).

14.  The “special nature and features of a probate action include (i) a probate action is an action in rem, (ii) the court’s function in a probate action is inquisitorial (and thus the court will, at the trial, endeavour to make a positive finding as to which is the valid will, or whether the deceased died intestate, and, in the case of an interest action, who is entitled to representation, and generally will not, except in the case of a revocation action, merely dismiss the action without more), (iii) a defendant is entitled to insist upon a will being proved in solemn form of law and attend the trial to cross-examine the attesting witnesses, and will not be ordered to pay costs unless the court is of the opinion that there was no reasonable ground for opposing the will, and (iv) a will proved in solemn form is, subject to two recognised exceptions (namely, discovery of a later will, and judgment obtained by fraud), generally irrevocable. For these reasons, it would only rarely be appropriate, or seldom be likely, for summary judgment to be given in a contentious probate action.”  See Chiu Mei Cherry v Yip Ngan Yuk [2025] 4 HKLRD 391 at [20] (Chow JA).

15.  “Summary judgment is, of course, for clear cases, whether in probate or other cases. Where the plaintiff has on his evidence established the constituent elements of his cause of action, it is for the defendant to show an issue in dispute that ought to be tried or that for some other reason there ought to be a trial. In setting up her defence the defendant must condescend upon particulars; the mere assertion in an affidavit of a given situation is not sufficient. Where the defendant has raised factual disputes, the court may nevertheless enter judgment summarily if the defendant’s allegations are not credible. But where the allegations cannot be dismissed in this way, the court will not conduct a trial by affidavit.”  See Re Estate of Chan Fook Lai (Deceased) (above) at [3] (G Lam JA).

C.  MATTERS RAISED BY THE 1^st DEFENDANT

16.  In his written skeleton argument filed on 12 June 2026 (and ostensibly for the 2^nd Defendant as well), the 1^st Defendant advanced the following 7 issues as triable issues or other reasons for the matter to proceed to trial:

(1)  The Deceased’s lack of testamentary capacity;

(2)  Absence of Dr Leung’s report and reliability of the reports of Dr Miao and Dr Woo;

(3)  The Deceased’s want of knowledge and approval and other suspicious circumstances;

(4)  Undue influence;

(5)  The Plaintiffs’ non-disclosure of medical records and results;

(6)  The 1^st Plaintiff’s credibility;

(7)  Dr Chuk’s contradictory answers.

17.  Prior to the hearing, the 2^nd Defendant wrote to inform the court that she would not be able to attend the substantive hearing as she would be outside of Hong Kong. She said that her father (the 1^st Defendant) “will be attending the hearing and is aware of the matter before the Court”.

D.  PROPOUNDING A WILL

18.  The general principles for the propounding of a will (in the absence of any allegation that the will was procured by fraud or undue influence) may be summarised as follows:

(1)  A person who propounds a will has the legal or persuasive burden of proving on balance of probabilities that:

(a)  there was due execution of the will;

(b)  the testator was of testamentary capacity; and

(c)  the testator knew and approved of the contents of the will.

See Nina Kung v Wong Din Shin (2005) 8 HKCFAR 387 at [171]-[173] (Ribeiro PJ).

(2)  If someone wishes to dispute the validity of a will on the grounds that there is want of due execution, or of testamentary capacity, or of the requisite knowledge and approval, that person bears an evidential burden of putting the relevant ground of challenge in issue. If the evidence adduced by him or otherwise arising in the case is of a sufficient cogency to raise such an issue, the court, when assessing the evidence as a whole at the end of the case, decides whether the proponent of the will has discharged the persuasive burden in relation to the relevant fact in issue on the balance of probabilities. See Nina Kung (above) at [176] (Ribeiro PJ)

D1.  Due Execution of the Last Will

19.  Where one is concerned with a non-Chinese will, proof of “due execution” requires proof that the will was signed by the testator (or by some other person in his presence and by his direction), and that the statutory requirements for the formal validity of the will (set out in section 5(1) of the Wills Ordinance (Cap 30)) were complied with: Nina Kung (above) at [175] (Ribeiro PJ).

20.  The 1^st Plaintiff has filed an affidavit to depose that the original of the Last Will has been lodged with the Probate Registry and to exhibit a copy of the Last Will. As mentioned earlier, the Last Will on its face suggests that it was signed by the Deceased in the presence of two witnesses present at the time (namely Mr CL Wong and Dr Woo).

21.  There is also affirmative evidence from Dr Woo to explain how he witnessed the Deceased’s execution of the wills dated 24 April 2017 and 3 November 2017, and the Last Will dated 18 March 2020.

(1)  Dr Woo stated that he was instructed to assess and reassess the Deceased’s testamentary capacity and to act as a witness of the will on each of the three occasions, and that he prepared a medical report to record why the Deceased went to his clinic for assessment, his findings, and his comments on the Deceased’s testamentary capacity on each occasion.

(2)  Dr Woo confirmed that the information in his reports was based on what he heard from the Deceased and his findings during the assessments.

(3)  Dr Woo further explained that after he had examined the Deceased on each occasion and was satisfied that the Deceased had testamentary capacity, Mr CL Wong would then interpret the contents of the will in Cantonese to the Deceased in Dr Woo’s clinic. Thereafter, as stated by Dr Woo, the Deceased would then sign every page (except the cover page) of the will in the presence of Mr CL Wong and Dr Woo, after which Mr CK Wong and Dr Woo would then sign every page of the will (except the cover page) as witnesses.

22.  The 1^st and 2^nd Defendant do not appear to challenge, or raise any triable issue on, the due execution of the Last Will.[1]  In these circumstances, I am satisfied that the Plaintiffs has proved that there was due execution of the Last Will.

D2.  Whether the Deceased had Testamentary Capacity

23.  The general principles on whether a deceased person had testamentary capacity to make a will may be summarised as follows:

(1)  The court should ask three questions to determine whether a person had testamentary capacity to make a will:

(a)  Whether the deceased was capable of understanding the nature of the act of making the will and its effects?

(b)  Whether the deceased was capable of understanding the extent of the property of which he was disposing?

(c)  Whether the deceased was able to comprehend and appreciate the claims to which he ought to give effect?

See Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 5 QB 549 at 565 (Cockburn CJ) & Re Estate of Au Kong Tim [2018] 2 HKLRD 864 at [45] (Kwan JA).

(2)  The question of testamentary capacity is a practical question to be assessed holistically by reference to the whole of the evidence (and not confining to the medical evidence), and judicial common sense is to be applied in the exercise: Re Estate of Lau Heung [2019] HKCA 769 at [19] (Lam VP).

D2a.  Whether the Deceased was capable of understanding the nature of the act of making the Last Will and its effects

24.  The Plaintiffs relied on Dr Woo’s report dated 18 March 2020 (“Dr Woo’s Report”) to show that the Deceased was capable to understand the nature and effects of making a will. The report was prepared after Dr Woo met with the Deceased on 18 March 2020 for an interview and examination. Dr Woo made the following findings in his report:

“Mr. Wong was calm, courteous and co-operative during the 1‑hour interview and examination. He was attentive throughout and maintained good eye contact. His affect was neutral with no evidence of any anxiety or depression. There was no apathy, impulsivity, confabulation or aggressiveness. There was no delusion or hallucination. He retained social graces.

Mental state examination showed normal cognitive functions. Tests of orientation, calculation, concentration, registration, memory, praxis and language were normal. He could relate the day, the date, the month, the season and the year. He knew my clinic was on the 11th floor of Melbourne Plaza in Central. He could indicate his own address. He could register 3 items immediately and recall all 3 of them after an interval. He recalled seeing me some years ago. He subtracted 7 serially from 100 with speed. There was no dysphasia: his naming and repetition were normal and he could execute written/verbal commands. He could construct a sentence and copy a geometric figure. His MMSE (mini-mental state examination) score was normal at 30/30. Test of general knowledge was normal; he could relate recent news items (on the coronavirus outbreak, the anti-extradition bill and the potential revival of Article 23 legislation). In the test of abstract thinking, he could indicate the differences between 2 common fruits. His executive function was normal; in the semantic fluency test, he could name 15 (normal at least 11) animals in 1 minute; in the trail-making test, he completed both trails accurately and in good time. His clock‑drawing test (a screening test for cognitive dysfunction) was also normal. His speech was relevant and coherent. His responses were appropriate and of normal speed.

...

He knew the purpose of the interview – to re-assess his testamentary capacity. He understood the nature of a will. His estate consisted mainly of his business and his apartment in Happy Valley (though he could not give an approximate figure on the total value of his estate). He could list out the names of his 3 sons in their correct ranking. He was aware that he made previous wills in 2017 and he provided the reasons for the change. He has disowned his eldest son Samuel who took him to court; Samuel lost. Besides, he has already given a lot of money to Samuel. He is also unhappy with Benjamin (the second son). Benjamin is not a successful entrepreneur who is lazy and not efficient in managing his business m London. He would bequeath his apartment and all residuary estate to his youngest son Derek (the residuary estate was divided up into many fractions in the earlier will but Derek would now be given the full-say to ensure simplicity) because Derek now takes care of his re-insurance business and he is very efficient in keeping the business alive; he can solve all the problems. He is hard‑working and very filial to the parents. He would also reward his Filipino maid who has been utterly faithful. He added that he was not under any coercion or undue influence in changing the will. He understood that the will might be contested in court and he could not prevent it. He deliberately wrote everything down in his new will to avoid any dispute.”

25.  At the end of his report, Dr Woo concluded:

“1. Mr Wong had a history of limbic encephalitis which is an inflammatory disorder of the brain. It is a monophasic, self-limiting, non-progressive illness from which he made an excellent recovery. In the past 5 to 6 years, he has continued work though on a part-time basis.

2. There is no evidence of any other organic disease that may impair cerebral function. He has no history of any previous stroke or clinical evidence of dementia. The medications he is taking have no adverse effect on his cognition.

3. There is no clinical evidence of anxiety, depression or any emotional disturbance.

4. His mental state examination shows that he has normal cognitive functions. His attention and concentration span are normal. His affect is neutral. He is not under the influence of any delusion or hallucination.

5. There is no clinical evidence of any emotional or cognitive dysfunction. He has a sound mind and normal testamentary capacity. He is capable of managing and administering his own properties and affairs.”

26.  That the Deceased was able to understand the nature of the act of making a will and its effects can be supported by other objective evidence before the court. Before the Deceased made his Last Will on 18 March 2020, he had made 5 other wills previously, namely the will dated 27 August 2013 (“1^st Will”), the will dated 15 July 2014 (“2^nd Will”), the will dated 14 February 2015 (“3^rd Will”), the will dated 24 April 2017 (“4^th Will”) and the will dated 3 November 2017 (“5^th Will”). All the 5 previous wills have been exhibited by the Plaintiffs in their affirmation evidence. In my view, the fact that the Deceased had made 5 previous wills before the Last Will to some extent reinforces the notion that he was capable of understanding the nature of the act of making a will and its effects.

27.  Moreover, Dr May Y K Miao (a specialist in psychiatry) (“Dr Miao”) assessed the Deceased’s testamentary capacity on 15 July 2014 (the date when the Deceased executed the 2^nd Will) and 14 February 2015 (the date when the Deceased executed the 3^rd Will). In the two reports prepared for the assessments, Dr Miao stated that the Deceased understood the nature, purpose and contents of the relevant will, and why he needed to make the amendments. Dr Miao also witnessed the Deceased’s execution of the 2^nd and 3^rd Wills.

28.  The 1^st Defendant referred to various documents to suggest that the Deceased had suffered a number of medical conditions from 2012 until his death in 2023. However, no cogent evidence (particularly from any medical doctors) has been adduced by the 1^st or 2^nd Defendant to demonstrate that such conditions, whether individually or cumulatively, would undermine Dr Woo’s conclusion that the Deceased was capable of understanding the nature of making the Last Will and its effects when it was made on 18 March 2020.

29.  Further, the 1^st Defendant pointed to a number of matters arising from the reports of the doctors who had witnessed the Deceased’s execution of the wills, and suggested that cross-examination is required at the trial to ascertain the Deceased’s testamentary capacity. These matters include, for example, (1) the absence of written assessment by Dr Leung Sai Chan who witnessed the Deceased’s execution of the 1^st Will, (2) the fact that Dr Miao wrote her report on 11 March 2015 which was about 25 days after the Deceased executed the 3^rd Will, (3) there was no mention of certain conditions of the Deceased in the reports of Dr Miao and Dr Woo, (4) both reports of Dr Miao contained many identical features, (5) the three reports of Dr Woo contained many identical features (6) Dr Woo stated that he obtained the Deceased’s medical history from the 1^st Plaintiff in his 2017 report, (7) Dr Woo was factually wrong when he said the 1^st Defendant “lost” in the litigation with the Deceased. As the Plaintiffs are seeking to propound the Last Will, it is important to focus on the events relevant to the Deceased’s execution of the will in March 2020. I am unable to agree that the matters relied upon by the 1^st Defendant, whether individually or cumulatively, would provide a basis to suggest that the Deceased was incapable of understanding the nature of making the Last Will and its effects when it was made on 18 March 2020.

30.  In particular, I disagree with the 1^st Defendant’s submissions that there are various matters in Dr Woo’s Report which undermine its reliability.

(1)  Although the three reports of Dr Woo did not refer to the Deceased having had a stroke or cerebral atrophy, it does not follow that all of Dr Woo’s findings from his interview and examination of the Deceased are to be rejected. The 1^st Defendant has not identified the particular finding(s) from Dr Woo’s Report that he seeks to challenge, and has not demonstrated how the lack of reference to a stroke or cerebral atrophy on the part of the Deceased would affect such finding(s).

(2)  I have carefully examined the three reports of Dr Woo. Contrary to the 1^st Defendant’s submission, they are not “word-for-word identical”. There is no basis for the 1^st Defendant to suggest that Dr Woo somehow used a template and prepared his subsequent reports without fresh analysis.

(3)  The fact that the Deceased said to Dr Woo that the 1^st Defendant had “lost” in the litigation does not in any way undermine the reliability of Dr Woo’s record. There is objective evidence that the 1^st Defendant’s application against the Deceased in HCMP 2550/2016 was dismissed on 14 August 2017. The fact that the 1^st Defendant subsequently received HK$16 million odd from the Defendant pursuant to a consent order dated 21 August 2019 in HCMP 2550/2016 does not mean that the 1^st Defendant did not “lose” in the court application. Significantly, this was how the Deceased perceived the event at the time, which was then conveyed to Dr Woo and recorded in Dr Woo’s Report. I do not see any basis to question the accuracy of Dr Woo’s Report.

31.  For these reasons, I consider that the plaintiff has established that the Deceased was capable of understanding the nature of the act of making the Last Will and its effects.

D2b.  Whether the Deceased was capable of understanding the extent of the property of which he was disposing

32.  In my view, the passages from Dr Woo’s Report quoted above suggest that the Deceased was capable of understanding the extent of the property of which he was disposing.

33.  Indeed, the 1^st and 2^nd Defendant have not adduced any cogent evidence to challenge the account in Dr Woo’s Report. Nor have they suggested that there was any asset comprised in the Deceased’s estate which was not covered by the Last Will.

34.  The 1^st Defendant pointed to Dr Woo’s Report where the Deceased was recorded not to be in a position to “give an approximate figure on the total value of his estate”. This was relied upon by the 1^st Defendant to suggest that the Deceased did not have testamentary capacity. I do not agree with this submission. As can be seen from the Last Will, the Deceased’s estate comprised, amongst other things, shares in a private company (Wilson Re Ltd) and landed properties in Happy Valley. Dr Woo was clearly aware that the Deceased “could not give an approximate figure on the total value of his estate”. Yet, Dr Woo nonetheless came to the conclusion that the Deceased had “normal testamentary capacity”. This means that Dr Woo clearly did not think that the Deceased, who was unable to give an approximate value of his estate comprising shares in a private company and landed properties, would be considered as someone who lacked testamentary capacity. Importantly, the 1^st Defendant has failed to adduce any evidence to suggest that Dr Woo’s opinion in this regard is wrong.

35.  Further, the matters relied upon by the 1^st Defendant (as referred to in paragraphs 28 to 30 above) cannot suggest that the Deceased was incapable of understanding the extent of the property of which he was disposing under the Last Will.

36.  In these circumstances, it seems to me that the Plaintiffs have satisfactorily discharged their burden to show that the Deceased was capable of understanding the extent of the property of which he was disposing under the Last Will.

D2c.  Whether the Deceased was able to comprehend and appreciate the claims to which he ought to give effect

37.  On the face of the Last Will, it appears that the Deceased was able to recall in 2020 the family members whom he considered would be fitting objects of his estate, and had an understanding to comprehend their respective relationship to himself.

38.  Two matters were raised by the 1^st Defendant to dispute this. First, the 1^st Defendant submitted that the Deceased was erroneous in his belief that the 1^st Defendant “lost” in the litigation. I disagree with the Defendant’s suggestion that the Deceased had no rational basis to disown him. What the Deceased told Dr Woo was this: “He [the Deceased] has disowned his eldest son Samuel who took him to court; Samuel lost. Besides, he [the Deceased] has already given a lot of money to Samuel.”  As explained in paragraph 30(3) above, these beliefs of the Deceased are supported by objective evidence and cannot be faulted.

39.  Further, the 1^st Defendant referred to the mistakes in the Last Will, namely that (1) the Chinese name of her daughter (the 2^nd Defendant) was misstated as “王曉晴” (instead of “王守晴”) and (2) Lawrence Wong was misdescribed as a grandnephew (instead of nephew). These errors were used by the 1^st Defendant to suggest that the Deceased was not of sound mind. In my view, the 1^st Defendant’s identification of these two errors in the Last Will is not sufficient to show that the Deceased was unable to comprehend and appreciate the claims to which he ought to give effect. Indeed, apart from himself, the 1^st Defendant has not suggested that the Last Will has left out anyone else for whom the Deceased would be expected to make provision when disposing of his estate.

40.  For the above reasons, I consider that the Plaintiffs have discharged their burden to show that the Deceased was able to comprehend and appreciate the claims to which he ought to give effect.

D2d.  Conclusion on Deceased’s testamentary capacity

41.  Having carried out the holistic assessment of the evidence produced by the Plaintiffs as mandated by the Court of Appeal in Re Estate of Lau Heung (above), which to a very large extent has not been challenged by cogent evidence adduced by the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants, it seems to me that the Plaintiffs have satisfactorily shown that the Deceased was of testamentary capacity at the time when the Last Will was executed, and that the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants have failed to raise any triable issue on this question.

D3.  Whether the Deceased Knew and Approved the Contents of the Last Will

42.  In Re Estate of Au Kong Tim (above), Cheung JA at [2.2] said “[it] has been repeatedly said in the authorities that the fact that a will is prepared by a solicitor and is, on the face of it, properly executed by a testator in front of the solicitor after having had the contents read over to him provides strong evidence of the testator’s knowledge and approval of the contents of the will and represents the testator’s intention at the moment he executes the will”. This appears to be a legal presumption.

43.  In Re Estate of Leung Heung (above), Lam VP (giving the judgment of the Court) at [76] referred to the trial judge’s approach of not acting on the presumption that knowledge and approval would be established upon proof of due execution and testamentary capacity, but instead looking for affirmative evidence that the deceased knew and approved the contents of the will, adopting the approach that the court would be vigilant and jealous in examining the evidence in this respect. In the end, the Court of Appeal at [84] considered that the trial judge did not err in finding knowledge and approval in the way he did.

44.  In this application, in assessing whether the Deceased knew and approved the contents of the Will, I will examine the available evidence to see if the Plaintiffs have discharged the burden of proving knowledge and approval, as opposed to merely relying on the legal presumption.

45.  Based on Dr Woo’s Report, it would appear that the contents of the Last Will were explained to the Deceased by Mr CL Wong, and that the Deceased understood the contents before signing the Last Will. Accordingly, the evidence suggests that the Deceased knew and approved the contents of the Last Will. The 1^st Defendant has not produced any cogent evidence to dispute Dr Woo’s evidence in this regard.

46.  The 1^st Defendant referred to an occasion on 7 July 2014 where the 1^st Plaintiff mistakenly sent an email to the 1^st Defendant stating “Please see email from [the 1^st Defendant], we need to sort out Dad’s will asap”. The 2^nd Will was executed 8 days later on 15 July 2014 which reduced the 1^st Defendant’s share from 190,000 shares in Wilson Re Ltd to nothing. The 1^st Defendant submitted that this was evidence that the 1^st Plaintiff “orchestrated changes to the will in response to the 1^st Defendant financial requests, not in response to any expression of independent testamentary wishes by the Deceased”, and argued that this is why the case must go to trial. I do not agree that this is a material triable issue. This event related to what happened in July 2014 when the 2^nd Will was prepared. That appears to be the first occasion when the 1^st Defendant was not provided for in the Deceased’s wills. It is to be noted that Dr Woo mentioned in his report dated 24 April 2017 (for the 4^th Will) that “[the Deceased] had excluded [the 1^st Defendant] on this occasion as he felt he had supported [the 1^st Defendant] all through the years and yet [the 1^st Defendant] started legal actions against him”. The 1^st Defendant was unable to produce any material to challenge this record made by Dr Woo. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, Dr Woo also recorded the Deceased’s reason for excluding the 1^st Defendant in Dr Woo’s Report (for the Last Will). Accordingly, I do not think there is any credible basis for the 1^st Defendant to contend that the Deceased excluded the 1^st Defendant from the wills because of the alleged orchestration on the part of the 1^st Plaintiff.

47.  The 1^st Defendant further referred to two further issues to contend that there were suspicious circumstances concerning the Deceased’s knowledge and approval of the contents of the Last Will.

(1)  The two issues were (a) Madam Wong’s journal showing that the Deceased was prescribed with a medication known as nootropil two months before the Last Will was executed and (b) the Deceased not knowing of the permanent blindness of the 1^st Defendant’s left eye.

(2)  In my view, the 1^st Defendant has not produced sufficiently cogent evidence in relation to (a) the effect of nootropil on the Deceased when the Last Will was executed and (b) his own eye condition.

(3)  Importantly, as mentioned above, the 1^st Defendant was unable to undermine Dr Woo’s conclusion that the “medications [the Deceased] is taking have no adverse effect on his cognition” in Dr Woo’s Report.

(4)  Moreover, other than a bare assertion, there was insufficient material produced by the 1^st Defendant to suggest that the Deceased would have provided for the 1^st Defendant in the Last Will if the Deceased had known about the 1^st Defendant’s eye condition in 2010.

48.  Further, the matters relied upon by the 1^st Defendant (as referred to in paragraphs 28 to 30 and 38 to 39 above) cannot in my view suggest that the Deceased did not know and did not approve the contents of the Last Will.

49.  In these circumstances, I believe the Plaintiffs have discharged their burden to show that the Deceased knew and approved the contents of the Last Will at the relevant time, and there is no triable issue raised by the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants on this issue.

D4.  Other Points Raised by the 1^st Defendant

50.  I have dealt with the issues raised by the 1^st Defendant in relation to the Deceased’s alleged lack of testamentary capacity and the Deceased’s alleged want of knowledge and approval in the above sections. I will deal with the other purported triable issues raised by the 1^st Defendant in this section.

51.  The 1^st Defendant suggested a case of undue influence.

(1)  The 1^st Defendant referred to the following matters to suggest that there was “a sustained and coordinated pattern of isolation and control” of the Deceased: (a) the 1^st Plaintiff arranged and accompanied the Deceased to all of Dr Woo’s assessments, (b) the 1^st Plaintiff provided medical history of the Deceased upon which Dr Woo relied, and was the primary beneficiary of the wills that Dr Woo witnessed, (c) on 2 January 2019, the 1^st Plaintiff’s wife, Madam Wong, the Deceased’s younger brother called the police to prevent the 1^st Defendant from visiting the Deceased, (d) Madam Wong opened the Deceased’s safe deposit box in 2013 when the Deceased was critically ill.

(2)  In my view, the 1^st Defendant’s allegation of undue influence is vague and lacks particulars. First, it is unclear whether the 1^st Defendant alleged that the undue influence was actually exerted by certain wrongdoer(s), or whether there was a relationship by which the Deceased reposed trust and confidence in certain wrongdoer(s). Further, insofar as the 1^st Defendant relied on a presumption of undue influence, he has not adduced any evidence to show that the Deceased placed trust and confidence in the wrongdoer(s), or that the wrongdoer(s) acquired ascendancy over the Deceased, and that the transaction in question could not otherwise be readily explicable by the relationship of the parties. Moreover, the 1^st Defendant has not identified the wrongdoer(s) in relation his case of undue influence. See generally Bank of China (Hong Kong) Ltd v Wong King Sing [2002] 1 HKLRD 358 at [38]-[41], [47], [49], [53] (Recorder Ma SC).

(3)  For these reasons, I consider that the 1^st Defendant has failed to provide sufficient particulars to support his assertion that the Deceased was the subject of undue influence.

52.  The 1^st Defendant submitted that the Plaintiffs have not made full and frank disclosure in relation to the Deceased’s medical records and results, and that the court should draw adverse inferences against the Plaintiff. There is no substance in this submission. The general principles on summary judgment are trite (see paragraph 15 above). To support their summary judgment application, the Plaintiffs have adduced sufficient evidence to prove the Last Will (as explained in Sections D1, D2 and D3 above). It is for the 1^st Defendant to adduce cogent evidence with sufficient particulars to demonstrate why there are issues to be tried at the trial.

53.  The 1^st Defendant further submitted that the 1^st Plaintiff’s credibility needs to be tested at the trial in relation to (1) the 1^st Plaintiff’s belief that the Deceased “had mental capacity”, (2) his evidence regarding the Deceased’s stroke, (3) his evidence in relation to what happened during the mediation on 27 November 2018 and (4) his evidence regarding Madam Wong’s opening of the Deceased’s safe deposit box in 2013. I do not see how these matters can provide sufficient bases for the 1^st Defendant to be given leave to defend. These matters do not in my view go to the Deceased’s testamentary capacity when he executed the Last Will in 2010, or to the Deceased’s knowledge and approval of the contents of his Last Will.

54.  The 1^st Defendant also contended that the need to cross‑examine Dr Chuk Pui Chun (“Dr Chuk”) is a further reason for the matter to proceed to trial.

(1)  The 1^st Defendant produced transcript extracts of certain conversation recordings between Dr Chuk and the 1^st Defendant/his wife in July 2025, October 2025 and February 2026 during which Dr Chuk answered questions relating to the Deceased’s stroke. It is clear from the transcripts that the 1^st Defendant has only produced certain extracts of their recorded conversations. Contrary to the 1^st Defendant’s assertion, it is not apparent from the various extracts that Dr Chuk actually said that the Deceased “had lost his memory, and had dementia”. At the hearing, in answer to the court’s question, the 1^st Defendant confirmed that Dr Chuk was unaware that his conversations with the 1^st Defendant/his wife had been recorded.

(2)  Moreover, there was no evidence to show that Dr Chuk actually treated the Deceased in 2020 when the Last Will was executed. The Plaintiffs produced a signed letter from Dr Chuk dated 25 March 2026 to say that his old records of the Deceased had been disposed of and that his earliest record was dated 20 October 2021. In the letter, Dr Chuk further said the Deceased visited his clinic on 4 occasions in 2021 and 2022 for flu and COVID vaccinations and that on each of the occasions “there was no signs that [the Deceased] had demantia [sic] or any Cognitive impairment”.

(3)  In these circumstances, Dr Chuk’s opinion on the Deceased’s mental capacity is not in my view relevant to the questions of whether the Deceased had testamentary capacity in 2020, or whether he knew and approved the contents of the Last Will. I disagree with the 1^st Defendant that it is necessary to cross‑examine Dr Chuk at the trial.

55.  To conclude, the 1^st Defendant has failed to demonstrate any triable issues or that for some other reason there ought to be a trial.

E.  STRIKING OUT APPLICATION

56.  In the 1^st Defendant’s counterclaim, he claims against the Plaintiffs the following:

“1. An Order declaring that the transfer of 1,700 common shares in the Plaintiffs corporation by the 1^st (Defendant) to the Plaintiffs Corporation was done due to fraud, misrepresentation and or coercion by the Plaintiffs Corporation and/or the named Plaintiff, and that said share transfer should be declared void, and said shares returned to the 1^st (Defendant)

2. In the alternative, an Order directing Plaintiffs to pay the Defendant the sum of $,4,400,000.00 CAD as damages for the share transfer involving Defendant’s shares in Plaintiffs Corporation.

3. Unpaid salary of $600,000.00 USD annually, from 2013 to present and ongoing.

4. Aggravated and/or punitive damages in the amount of $6,000,000.00 USD.

5. Further and/or other relief; and

6.  Costs.”

57.  From a fair reading of his Defence and Counterclaim, it appears that the 1^st Defendant’s complaint relates to what happened during the settlement in HCMP 2550/2016 which resulted in the consent order made on 21 August 2019. In particular, he complains that during the settlement process, the solicitors for Bright Focus International Limited (“Bright Focus”) acted fraudulently and refused to release to him the audited financial statement of the company.

58.  Even if that the 1^st complaint were legitimate, it is difficult to see what cause of action he may have against the Plaintiffs in relation to the alleged fraud of Bright Focus’ solicitors. It is also unclear why the Plaintiffs would be liable to pay to the 1^st Defendant (1) any damages for the shares which he transferred under the consent order, (2) any salary, or (3) any aggravated/punitive damages.

59.  The 1^st Defendant did not make any submissions in his skeleton argument as to why his counterclaim as pleaded should not be struck out.

60.  In these circumstances, I strike out the 1^st Defendant’s counterclaim against the Plaintiffs for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

F.  DISPOSITION

61.  For the above reasons, I give summary judgment for the Plaintiffs and pronounce for the validity of the Last Will in solemn form of law. I also strike out the 1^st Defendant’s counterclaim against the Plaintiffs.

62.  I also make an order nisi that (1) the 1^st Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiffs the costs of this action (including those occasioned by the Plaintiffs’ summons dated 26 November 2025 and all reserved costs), to be taxed if not agreed, and (2) the Plaintiffs’ costs, to be assessed on a trustee basis, which are not recoverable from the 1^st Defendant, shall be paid out of the estate of the Deceased.