NG CHU WOH, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF NG TING KA, deceased v. LAI SHUK CHING, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF NG KOON PONG, deceased AND OTHERS

HCMP 751/2025

[2026] HKCFI 1674

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 751 OF 2025

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J U D G M E N T

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A. INTRODUCTION

1.  This is the substantive hearing of the Plaintiff (“CW” as the Administrator of the Estate of Ng Ting Ka (“Father”) (Deceased))’s Re-Amended Originating Summons (“RAOS”) for a Beddoe Order in respect of the underlying proceedings of DCMP 4023/2023 (“the Main Action”).  The application is supported by the 2^nd Defendant (“Lau”, as the personal representative of the Estate of Ng Wai Lam (“WL”) (Deceased)), and the 3^rd Defendant (“SY” in her personal capacity), but is opposed by the 1^st Defendant (“Lai”, as the Administratrix of the Estate of Ng Koon Poon (“KP”) (Deceased))

2.  In this hearing, CW is represented by Mr Wayne Hariman.  Lai is represented by Mr Rex Yam.  Lau and SY have filed their respective affirmations, in which they had stated their support to the application made by CW in these proceedings.  They have chosen not to attend this hearing.

3.  Ng Yan Lok (“YL”) is WL’s son.  CW has named YL as his lawful attorney in the Main Action.

4.  Apart from the evidence before me and the parties’ respective submissions, I have also considered the confidential memorandum lodged by CW in accordance with PD20.3. Following §19 of PD20.3, at the end of the hearing, I have also heard Mr Hariman’s submissions on the merits of CW’s claim in the Main Action in the absence of Lai’s legal representatives.

B.      BACKGROUND

5.  The Father had 3 sons (namely, WL, CW, and KP) and 1 daughter (ie SY).  WL and KP have passed away and their respective wives, Lau and Lai, are representing their estates.

6.  CW is the second son and administrator de bonis non of the Father’s Estate.  The Father passed away intestate on 2 May 2006.  Letters of Administration of the Father’s Estate dated 13 July 2007 were granted to his third son KP.  However, KP passed away on 27 February 2022 before administration of the Father’s Estate was completed and so CW took over the administration matters.  Letters of Administration de bonis non were granted to CW on 20 September 2022.

7.  The Mother of the family predeceased the Father.  Hence, by the operation of s.4(5) of the Intestates’ Estates Ordinance, the beneficiaries to his estate are the Father’s children at the time of the Father’s death.

8.  The Father’s Estate is substantial and includes some valuable immovable assets.  One of the immovable assets in the Father’s Estate is a village house at No.192 Ng Uk Tsuen, Ping Shan, Yuen Long, New Territories (“the Village House”).  The Village House is a two-storey building comprising of G/F, 1/F, 2/F and the Roof.

9.  According to a valuation report produced by CW, as at 18 December 2024, on vacant possession basis, the values of different parts of the Village House were as follows:

G/F	HK$5,700,000
1/F	HK$4,100,000
2/F and Roof	HK$5,200,000
TOTAL	HK$15,000,000

10.  The dispute in the Main Action concerns the title and possession of the Village House.

(1)      The Main Action was commenced by YL as the lawful attorney of CW (in the capacity of the Administrator of the Father’s Estate) by invoking the Order 113 procedure.  YL named Lai (in her personal capacity) as the 1^st defendant, and all unknown persons in occupation of the 2/F and the Roof as the 2^nd defendant.

(2)     At [3] of YL’s affirmation dated 22 August 2023 filed in support of the Order 113 application, YL called Lai as “the mistress and cohabitee of [KP] at his death”, and YL said that Lai “had on diver dates unknown to the Plaintiff but in any event after the death of [KP] trespassed on and entered into illegal possession and occupation of [the Village House] without the consent of the Plaintiff”.

(3)     In Lai’s affidavit in opposition filed on 7 May 2024, Lai said that he and KP got married on 3 December 1995 and produced a copy of the marriage certificate (“the Marriage Certificate”).  Lai also said that in about late 2010, it was orally agreed between KP and his siblings that the Village would be divided among them as follows (“the Agreement”):

(a)     G/F would be owned by WL and his family;

(b)     1/F would be owned by CW and his family;

(c)     2/F and the Roof would be owned by KP and his family.

Lai said that after such division, rental incomes from the respective floors of the Village House were distributed to the corresponding family in accordance with the Agreement.

(4)     The basis of Lai’s opposition to YL’s claim in the Main Action is the Agreement.

(5)     On 16 May 2024, after considering the evidence filed by the parties and the respective submissions made by the parties, the Registrar of the District Court directed that the proceedings be continued as if begun by writ, and pleadings be filed and served.

(6)     In the Statement of Claim dated 10 September 2024, notwithstanding the production of the Marriage Certificate, YL still chose to call Lai as “the partner” of KP at [1(4)] of the Statement of Claim.

(7)     Lai filed a Defence and Counterclaim dated 8 November 2024.  Lai has put forward a counterclaim in the Main Action.  In the Counterclaim, Lai (in the capacity of the Administratrix of KP’s Estate) claims against the Estate of WL (the 1^st defendant in the Counterclaim), and against CW (in his personal capacity and in his capacity as the Administrator of the Father’s Estate) (the 2^nd defendant in the Counterclaim).  Lai counterclaims for all the interests in and all the rights to the 2/F and the Roof.  The basis of the Defence and the Counterclaim is the Agreement.

(8)     CW denies the existence of the Agreement.

(9)     CW has given his express agreement to everything said by YL in the affirmations and pleadings filed in the Main Action.[1]

11.  CW’s refusal to admit Lai as KP’s lawful wife in the Main Action is an indication of the immense tension between CW and Lai.

12.  In the hearing before me, in the presence of Lai’s legal representatives, Mr Hariman told me that in the Main Action, CW is not prepared to make another application for summary judgment.  Mr Hariman submitted that CW has a meritorious claim in the Main Action.  However, Mr Hariman accepted that the strength of CW’s case has not reached the requisite threshold for summary judgment.  Mr Hariman also accepted that Lai has an arguable case in the Main Action.

13.  Apart from the Main Action, there is another set of proceedings, ie HCMP 6/2025.  On 2 January 2025, Lai (in the capacity of the Administratrix of KP’s Estate) commenced these proceedings against CW (in the capacity of the Administrator of the Father’s Estate) for an order requiring CW to produce accounts of the unadministered part of the Father’s Estate.  These proceedings are still ongoing.  The proceedings in HCMP 6/2025 serve as a background showing the hostility and the lack of trust between CW on the one hand and Lai on the other hand.

14.  The parties have attempted to settle the dispute between them by mediation and a settlement conference was held on 3 September 2025.  No settlement agreement was reached in that conference.  In the circumstances, it is likely that the Main Action would proceed to trial.

C.      DISCUSSION

15.  The subject matter in the Main Action is the title and interest in the 2/F and the Roof of the Village House.  CW (on behalf of the Father’s Estate) and Lai (on behalf of KP’s Estate) have put forward their respective claims to these interests.  Which side would succeed hinges upon the truthfulness of the Agreement alleged by Lai.

16.  There is no doubt that Lai (on behalf of KP’s Estate) is making a claim against the Father’s Estate in the Main Action.  There is also no doubt that all the other beneficiaries (ie CW, Lau (representing WL’s Estate), and SY) are all adults and sui juris (of full legal capacity).  Where the beneficiaries are all adults and sui juris and can make up their own minds whether the claim should be resisted or not, there must be countervailing considerations of some weight before it is right for the action to be pursued or defended at the cost of the estate.[2]

17.  In the circumstances of this case, I am of the view that there is no sufficient countervailing consideration leading to the conclusion that it would be right for the Original Claim in the Main Action to be pursued and the Counterclaim in the Main Action to be defended at the cost of the Father’s Estate.

18.  In my view, it would not be unjust for CW to carry the risk of costs personally irrespective of the outcome of the Main Action.

(1)     As said in the above, which side would succeed in the Main Action hinges upon the truthfulness of the Agreement alleged by Lai.  The truthfulness of the Agreement must be a matter within CW’s personal knowledge.

(2)     CW is not participating in the Main Action only in the capacity of the Administrator of the Father’s Estate.  He is being sued in both his personal capacity and in the capacity of the Administrator of the Father’s Estate in the Counterclaim. Thus, CW may well put forward the case that the Agreement is untrue in his personal capacity.

(3)     Although Mr Hariman submitted that CW has a meritorious case in the Main Action, Mr Hariman at the same time accepted that each side has an arguable case in the Main Action.  In other words, who would be the successful party would only be known after trial.

(4)     If Lai eventually succeeds in the Main Action, that would mean that:

(a)     the Agreement is indeed true;

(b)     CW’s denial of the existence of the Agreement is untrue;

(c)     knowing the existence of the Agreement, CW should not put forward the Original Claim and should not resist the Counterclaim in the Main Action, for doing so would be contrary to the truth known to him;

(d)     by putting forward the Original Claim and resisting the Counterclaim in the Main Action, CW has acted unreasonably.

(5)     Rules of the High Court, Order 62 rule 6(2) provides:

“Where a person is or has been a party to any proceedings in the capacity of trustee, personal representative or mortgagee, he shall, unless the Court otherwise orders, be entitled to the costs of those proceedings, in so far as they are not recovered from or paid by any other person, out of the fund held by the trustee or personal representative or the mortgaged property, as the case may be; and the Court may otherwise order only on the ground that the trustee, personal representative or mortgagee has acted unreasonably or, in the case of a trustee or personal representative, has in substance acted for his own benefit rather than for the benefit of the fund.” (Emphasis added)

(6)     In the event that Lai eventually succeeds in the Main Action, by reason of the matters set out in subparagraph (4) above, the Court would have every reason to conclude that CW has acted unreasonably in the Main Action.  In the circumstances, it would not be unjust to require CW to bear the costs incurred in the Main Action personally.

(7)     Mr Hariman accepted that CW has sufficient means to meet any adverse costs order against him.[3] There is also no suggestion that CW does not have the necessary financial resources to bring the Main Action to the conclusion of the trial.

(8)     If CW is the successful party in the Main Action, that would mean that the Agreement is untrue, and Lai has put forward a claim based upon an untrue agreement made up by her.  In these circumstances, it is likely that CW would obtain a costs order against Lai, and probably costs would be ordered against Lai on an indemnity basis.

(9)     If CW succeeds at the trial in the Main Action, Lai (as the Administratrix of the KP’s Estate) would still be entitled to have ¼ of the value of the Village House.  Based upon the costs estimation provided to the Court, in the event that CW succeeds in the Main Action, CW should have no difficulty in recovering the costs incurred by him in the Main Action from Lai.

19.  CW and Lai are making adverse claims against each other in the Main Action, and each of them is attacking the integrity of the other side.  It would not be unjust for the one putting forward a claim based upon untrue evidence to bear the costs personally in the Main Action.

20.  Mr Hariman has made a point, ie by putting forward his claim and denying Lai’s claim in the Main Action, CW is in fact acting contrary to his own financial interest.  If the Agreement alleged by Lai is true, CW would be entitled to have the 1/F of the Village House, and the value of which would be around HK$4,100,000.  If the Agreement alleged by Lai is untrue, CW would only be entitled to have ¼ of the Village House, and the value of the ¼ interest would be HK$15,000,000 x ¼ = HK$3,750,000.  Mr Hariman submitted that in the Main Action, CW is acting for the interest of the Father’s Estate and not for his personal interest.

21.  I agree that in the Main Action, CW is not acting for his personal interest.  However, I do not regard this factor itself is a sufficient countervailing factor.  This factor would not affect the analysis set out in §§18 and 19 above.  For those reasons, it would not be unjust for CW to carry the risk of costs personally in the Main Action.

22.  For the reasons above, I refuse to accede to CW’s application for a Beddoe Order.

D.      DISPOSITION

23.  I dismiss CW’s application for a Beddoe Order made in these proceedings.

24.  In the absence of any improper conduct, costs incurred by the parties in an application of this kind should be paid out of the estate.[4] Although CW is unsuccessful in this Beddoe application, I am of the view that CW has presented his application properly and fairly.  In my view, there is no reason to depart from the ordinary approach.

25.  I make the following costs order on nisi basis:

“Costs of CW and costs of Lai in these proceedings, including costs reserved (if any), be borne by the Father’s Estate, in the case of CW on trustee basis and in the case of Lai on common fund basis, to be taxed if not agreed.”[5]

Unless there is an application for variation of the costs order nisi by an inter partes summons within 14 days, the costs order nisi shall become absolute without a further order.

26.  Lastly, it remains for me to thank Mr Hariman and Mr Yam for the fair presentation of their respective cases and the helpful assistance provided to the Court.