賴利坤 v. 莫鳳梅
[2026] HKCFI 6261 · HCSD 29/2026
Court of First Instance
HCSD 29/2026 and HCSD 30/2026
(Heard Together)
[2026] HKCFI 6261
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
APPLICATION TO SET ASIDE STATUTORY DEMAND
NO 29 OF 2026
_________________
BETWEEN
賴利坤 Applicant
and
莫鳳梅 Respondent
_________________
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
APPLICATION TO SET ASIDE STATUTORY DEMAND
NO 30 OF 2026
_________________
BETWEEN
廖家驍 Applicant
and
莫鳳梅 Respondent
_________________
Before: Deputy High Court Judge Alan Kwong in Chambers (Not Open to Public)
Date of Hearing: 13 November 2026
Date of Decision: 13 November 2026
DECISION
A. Introduction
1. By applications dated 2 April 2026, the Applicants
seek to set aside the 2 sets of statutory demands
dated 25 March 2026 (the “Statutory Demands”),
pursuant to which the Respondent claims a judgment
sum of HK$19,389,224.00.
B. Material Background
2. The Statutory Demands are based on the judgment
dated 13 February 2025 against the 1st and 2nd
Defendants in HCA 1258/2024 (the “HCA Judgment”).
Under the HCA Judgment, the 1st and 2nd Applicants
shall pay the Respondent (i) the sum of
HK$19,389,224 together with interest and (ii)
costs of HK$11,045.00.
3. The Applicants do not dispute the indebtedness
under the HCA Judgment.
4. According to the Applicants, they have repaid an
aggregate sum of HK$2,568,530 to the Respondent
during the period from 5 September 2023 to 15
August 2026.
5. The Respondent admitted that the Applicants have
repaid HK$1,235,088 since the HCA Judgment was
entered.
C. Legal Principles
6. The applicant bears the burden of satisfying the
court that there is a valid reason that the demand
ought to be set aside: DCKD v JPWL [2022] HKCFI
1059 at para 22 (per Linda Chan J).
7. When considering an application to set aside, the
court only undertakes a limited exercise and will
only be concerned with whether the creditor is
able to pursue bankruptcy proceedings founded on
the statutory demand: see Budge v AF Budge
(Contractors) Ltd [1997] BPIR 366, 372A-
D, per Peter Gibson LJ).
8. As Kwan J (as she then was) explained in Re Choy
Wai Bor (HCB 8565/2001, 28 May 2002) at para 22:
“[T]he mechanism to set aside a statutory demand is intended to
be a filtering process to protect the debtor against a petition
being presented based on a statutory demand that is demonstrably
unjustified.”
9. In DCKD v JPWL (supra) at para 24, Linda Chan J
stated: -
“For the purpose of demonstrating that the debt is disputed on
substantial grounds within rule 48(5)(b), the Applicants must
establish by sufficiently precise factual evidence which is
believable that they have a defence of substance, not just a
fair probability of one (Chan Ping Lam Waymond v Noble Art Ltd,
CACV 270/2012, 30 September 2013, §8, per Fok JA (as he then
was)). The Court will consider the case being put forward with
a reasonably critical eye, testing the case against the other
background facts and circumstances (Lai Kar Yee v The Prudential
Assurance Company Limited, CACV 233/2014, 9 June 2017, §12, per
Barma JA).”
10. Where a debtor argues that the indebtedness
claimed in the statutory demand has been
overstated, the court will consider whether an
injustice would be caused to the debtor. In
particular, the court will consider whether there
is evidence showing that the debtor would have
been in a position or prepared to pay and settle
the debt had it been correctly stated and whether
the indebtedness that is undisputedly due is in
excess of the statutory threshold required for
issuing a bankruptcy petition. In Chan WS & Anor
v CC Bank [2022] 3 HKLRD 520 at paras 23 to 25 and
34 to 36, Au JA stated:-
“23. It is well settled that an over-statement of the
indebtedness in the statutory demand will not automatically
entitle the debtor to have the demand set aside. The relevant
question is whether injustice would be caused to the debtor by
allowing the particular demand to stand: see Re Kwok Chok Yee
(supra) at 548G-H per Le Pichon J, citing Re a Debtor (No 1 of
1987) [1989] 1 WLR 271 at 276 and 279.
24. Ms Chan drew our attention to a long line of authorities
in which this principle was applied: see Winterthur Life
Insurance Company v Au Oi Fong Susana (unreported, HCB
1178/1999, 28 November 2000) per Chu J (as she then was); Re Ip
Pui Man Nina (supra) at [75] per Au J (as he then was); Li Wo
Hing v Raiffeisen Bank International AG (Beijing Branch)
(unreported, HCSD 19/2014, 10 July 2014) at [29] per To J; and
Re Lo Kwai Ying Louisa (unreported, HCB 3145/2015, 27 July 2016)
at [47] - [49] per Lok J.
25. In Re Ip Pui Man Nina, although it was found that the
relevant debt was arguably overstated in the demand (due to
questions of limitation in respect of accrued interest and the
inclusion of other indebtedness extraneous to the mortgage
loan), the Court went on to consider whether injustice would be
caused to the debtor, and held that it would not. In so
finding, the Court had regard to the fact that there was no
evidence that the debtor would have been in a position or
prepared to pay and settle the debt had it been correctly
stated, and that the principal sum of the mortgage loan
undisputedly due was well in excess of the statutory minimum of
$10,000 prescribed under the BO.
26. In Winterthur and Re Lo Kwai Ying Louisa, the learned
judges also took into account the negligible amount of the over-
statement as compared to the size of the debt in finding that no
injustice was caused to the debtors as a result of the over-
statement.
…
34. Although the Judge had apparently exercised her
discretion, we have found that she had erred or misdirected
herself on the principles governing the exercise of that
discretion, in that she specifically failed to consider whether
injustice would be caused to the Debtors if the SDs were allowed
to stand. A proper exercise of the discretion would at least
have required the Judge to consider, amongst other things,
whether there was any evidence that the Debtors could and would
have repaid the indebtedness even if it were correctly stated in
the SDs, especially in the light of the respondent’s subsequent
clarification of the correct amount due. As none of these
circumstances were taken into account by the Judge, we consider
that there is sufficient and proper ground for this Court to
interfere with the Judge’s exercise of discretion, and to
exercise the discretion afresh.
35. In our view, it is material that the letter of 8 August
2018, which was sent specifically pursuant to the Debtors’
request for a breakdown of the debt, had provided the correct
amount of the indebtedness then outstanding. The over-statement
of the debt in the SDs by clerical mistake was also subsequently
clarified in the 1st affirmation of Lam Wing Kin Alex filed on
behalf of the respondent on 4 January 2019 (at paragraphs 24 -
25). Despite these, there was no evidence to suggest that the
Debtors would have been in a position or would have been
prepared to pay or settle the correct amount of debt even if it
had been correctly stated in the SDs. Moreover, the correct
amount of the debt was in any event well in excess of the
statutory minimum of $10,000 prescribed under the BO.
36. In the premises, we do not see how any injustice would be
caused to the Debtors even if the SDs were allowed to stand. We
therefore find that the Judge was wrong to set aside the SDs
solely on the basis that the debt was over-stated, and would
allow the appeal.”
D. Deliberation
11. For the following reasons, I am of the view that
the Applicants’ applications are liable to be
dismissed.
12. The starting point is that where the petitioning
debt is based on a judgment, the court would treat
the judgment as prima facie evidence that the
debtor is indebted to the creditor, and the
bankruptcy court would not inquire into the
judgment, unless there is some evidence showing
that the judgment was obtained by fraud or
collusion or that there was a miscarriage of
justice which impinges on the validity of the
judgment: see Re Lau Wang Chi Barry [2024] 3 HKLRD
118 at para 39 (per Kwan VP); Re Sin Kwok Lam
[2025] HKCFI 3242 at para 15 (per Linda Chan J).
13. In the present case, the validity of the HCA
Judgment has not been challenged at all. The
Applicants have not brought an appeal against the
HCA Judgment; nor have they taken out an
application to set aside the HCA Judgment.
14. In fact, whilst the Applicants claim that they
have repaid HK$2,568,530, the Respondent accepts
that she has already received an aggregate
repayment of HK$1,235,088 from the Applicants
since the HCA Judgment was entered.
15. In the premises, there is no question that the
Applicants have accepted the validity of the HCA
Judgment as well as the fact that they are
indebted to the Respondent pursuant thereto.
16. Putting the Applicants case to the highest, they
have merely repaid HK$2,568,530 to the Respondent,
and there is still an outstanding indebtedness of
HK$16,820,694 (ie HK$19,389,224 less
HK$2,568,530). There is not a shred of evidence
showing that the Applicants have been able and
willing to pay the Respondent a sum of
HK$16,820,694, which far exceeds the statutory
threshold for issuing a petition. As such, even
if the amount claimed in the Statutory Demand were
overstated as alleged, it cannot be said that the
Applicants have suffered any prejudice.
17. I do not lose sight of the Applicants’ contention
that interest is excessive. There is, however, no
merit in this contention. As pointed out, the HCA
Judgment concerns a fixed sum of HK$19,389,224,
and the same has neither been appeal against nor
set aside. There is plainly no basis for the
Applicants to impeach the HCA Judgment, and I am
unable to see how they may wriggle out of it.
18. The Applicants also suggested that they have
assets and stable income, and, as such, they could
repay the indebtedness owed to the Respondent if
given time. These assertions are simply hollow.
Whilst the Applicants have failed to put forward
any concrete evidence on their assets and income,
they have also failed to put forward a concrete
repayment proposal. In the circumstances, I am
not satisfied that the Applicants would be able to
repay a sum of HK$16,820,694 to the Respondent.
E. Disposition
19. For all the above reasons, I hold that there is no
valid ground for setting aside the Statutory
Demands.
20. I make the following orders:-
1) The Applicants’ applications dated 2 April 2026 be dismissed;
and
2) The Respondent is authorized to present bankruptcy petitions
against the Applicants based on the Applicants’ failure to
comply with the Statutory Demand after 14 days of this decision.
21. Costs should follow the event.
22. I further order that the Applicants should pay the
Respondent’s costs in respect of the applications,
to be taxed (with certificate for counsel), if not
agreed.
23. I thank Ms Natalie Lam for her assistance.
(Alan Kwong)
Deputy High Court Judge
The Applicant, in person in HCSD 29/2026, present
The Applicant, in person in HCSD 30/2026, present
Ms Natalie Lam, instructed by Messrs H. Y. Leung & Co. LLP, for the
Respondent in HCSD 29/2026 and HCSD 30/2026
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