WONG CHI HO JIMMY (suing as the sole executor of the estate of Wong Chung Ming and personally) v. WONG TAI WAI DAVID JASPER

HCMP 370/2022

[2025] HKCFI 1483

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 370 OF 2022

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BETWEEN

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JUDGMENT

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The Parties and Background

1.  By an Originating Summons dated 13 April 2022 (“OS”), the Plaintiff (“Jimmy”) commenced these proceedings under RHC Order 52 rule 1 for an order of committal against the Defendant (“David”).

2.  Jimmy’s case against David arose from a long ongoing family dispute.

3.  The family members are as follows.

(1) The family patriarch was Mr Wong Chung Ming (“Mr Wong”).

(2) Mr Wong and his first wife had a daughter (“Helen”).

(3) Mr Wong and his second wife (“Madam Chan”) had a son (“Eddie”).

(4) Eddie is David’s father.

(5) Mr Wong and his third wife (“Madam Cheung”) had a son, viz., Jimmy, and a daughter (“Monica”).

4.  Under Mr Wong’s will, Jimmy was appointed sole executor of his estate. Madam Chan, Madam Cheung, and a long-time employee of Mr Wong would receive specific legacies and/or annual annuities. Jimmy, Eddie, David, Monica, and Helen would receive residual distributions.

5.  Jimmy, Eddie, David, and Helen are also shareholders in the company (“FamCo”) which held the family business.

6.  Legal battles ensued.

(1) In HCMP No. 2391 of 2013, Eddie, David, and Helen sought to remove Jimmy as executor.

(2) In CACV No. 94 of 2015, Jimmy appealed against the costs order in HCMP No. 2391 of 2013. At one point, Helen was found to be incapacitated. David applied to be appointed as her next friend on the basis of an alleged enduring power of attorney (“EPOA”).

(3) In HCCW No. 298 of 2013, Eddie, David, and Helen petition to wind up FamCo. The proceedings were later converted into HCMP No. 1779 of 2015. David applied to be appointed as Helen’s next friend.

(4) In HCA No. 1560 of 2015, David and Helen sued Jimmy for an account of certain loans. David applied to be appointed as Helen’s next friend.

(5) In HCMP No. 1672 of 2016, Jimmy applied for orders to revoke the EPOA and to compel David to produce records and accounts of Helen’s assets. Wilson Chan J found essentially for Jimmy and ordered a committee of Helen’s estate (“Helen’s Committee”).

(6) In HCA No. 1252 of 2017, Jimmy sued David and the law firm (“CKM”) which acted for David and Helen in HCCW No. 298 of 2013, HCMP No. 1779 of 2015, and HCA No. 1560 of 2015 for purporting to act for Helen without authority.

(7) In HCMP No. 2157 of 2018, David sought (again) to remove Jimmy as executor.

(8) In HCMP No. 295 of 2020, Jimmy as executor sought directions for continuance of proceedings action against David for occupation of the estate’s properties.

7.  There are a lot of details to the above proceedings. Many may be said to show David in a bad light. I have borne the points as submitted to me in mind, even though I do not recite them all here.

The Statements about Payments

8.  David made certain statements (“Statements”) in the course of the many sets of proceedings, concerning two payments out of a bank account of Helen’s to him: a payment in the sum of $600,000 on 9 February 2015 (“Feb Payment”) and another payment in the sum of $500,000 on 29 June 2016 (“Jun Payment” and, with the Feb Payment, “Payments”).

9.  In respect of the Feb Payment, David stated:

(1) In his 4^th Affirmation in HCMP No. 1779 of 2015 dated 17 December 2015, at paragraph 56 (“Statement 1”):

“ As for legal costs, on 9^th February 2015 Helen gave me $600,000.00 being her contribution and shares of all litigation that commenced earlier, including the HCMP 2391/2013 and HCMP 1779/2013 [sic: 1779/2015]…”

(2) In his 5^th Affirmation in HCMP No. 1779 of 2015 dated 29 January 2016, at paragraph 36 (“Statement 2”):

“ I have set out Helen’s payment of tuition fee of her 3 nephews including Kobe and the fact that she gave me $1,100,000 in total ($600,000 and $500,000 on 9^th February 2015 and 29^th June 2015 respectively) for legal costs in paragraphs 55 to 59 of my 4^th Affirmation …”

(3) In his 2^nd Affirmation in HCMP No. 1672 of 2016 dated 25 February 2019, at paragraph 21 (“Statement 3”):

“ … I wish to clarify that the said sum of $600,000 has been used to settle the 1^st Defendant’s share of legal costs in the legal actions against the Plaintiff. The balance sum of $500,000 paid by the 1^st Defendant was earmarked for her share of legal costs of HC Action No. 1560 of 2015 has been refunded by me to Ernst & Young. I have no alternatives but to settle the 1^st Defendant’s share of her legal accosts [sic: costs] to C.K. Mok & Company [i.e., CKM]. Aside from the said sums of $500,000 and $600,000 I have not received any other funds from the 1^st Defendant for my own gain and benefit and dealt with her assets in any way with the use of the said EPOA. In fact I promised the 1^st Defendant that aside from the said sum of $500,000 and $600,000 she does not have to pay any more as I will shoulder the rest of the legal costs of all 3 sets of proceedings.”

(4) In his Defence in HCA No. 1252 of 2017, as supported by a Statement of Truth, both dated 20 November 2017, at paragraph 29.9 (“Statement 4”):

“ (2) David contributed substantial sums of money to the legal fees for HCMP 2391 of 2013 and HCMP 1779 of 2015.

(3) Helen asked if she could help, and proposed that she could contribute HK$600,000.00 to David, which she later did.”

(5) In his Answer to Request for Further and Better Particu-lars in HCA No. 1252 of 2017 dated 23 April 2018, at paragraph 5 (“Statement 5”):

“ (1) Before the commencement of HCMP 2319 [sic:2391]/ 2013, Helen understood that she has to contribute to the legal fee, therefore, she insisted that she will pay the 2^nd Defendant [i.e., David] back when she receives the estate distribution from Jimmy. At that time, she proposed she could share the legal fee of around HK$1 million. The 2^nd Defendant’s father Eddie told her that she had no need to be worry about the fee because we can upfront first and she can share the fee when she will receive the estate distribution from Jimmy.

After the first appearance in court day of HCMP 2319 [sic: 2391]/2013, Helen’s [sic: Helen] proposed again that she will imburse the 2^nd Defendant when she received the estate distribution from Jimmy.

…

(3) Helen and the 2^nd Defendant went to the Chong Hing Bank (Kowloon City Branch) and Helen purchased a cashier order in the sum of $600,000 in favor of the 2^nd Defendant.”

10.  In respect of the Jun Payment, David stated:

(1) In his 4^th Affirmation in HCMP No. 1779 of 2015 dated 17 December 2015, at paragraph 56 (“Statement 6”):

“ … and on 29^th June 2015, Helen again gave me $500,000.00 being her contribution and share of this action, details of which are set out hereinbelow.”

(2) In the same Affirmation, at paragraph 58 (“Statement 7”):

“ Thus, when I talked with Helen and suggested that we take out HCA 1560/2015, Helen agreed and offered to pay $500,000 for the legal costs. At first, I refused to accept the said money as I told her that I would support her. However, she insisted that she needed to pay her part.”

(3) Statement 2 above, in particular the reference to:

“ … she gave me … $500,000 on … 29^th June 2015 … for legal costs in paragraphs 55 to 59 of my 4^th Affirmation.”

(4) Statement 3 above, in particular the reference to:

“ … The balance sum of $500,000 paid by the 1^st Defendant was earmarked for her share of legal costs of HC Action No. 1560 of 2015 has been refunded by me to Ernst & Young …”

(5) In his Defence in HCA No. 1252 of 2017, as supported by a Statement of Truth, both dated 20 November 2017, at paragraph 29.9 (“Statement 8”):

“ (4) The HK$500,000.00 was held by David for Helen in anticipation of future legal expenses.”

(6) In his Answer to Request for Further and Better Particu-lars in HCA No. 1252 of 2017 dated 23 April 2018, at paragraph 6 (“Statement 9”):

“ (1) Helen once asked the 2^nd Defendant [i.e. David] if he has enough Cash flow to finance the ongoing litigation. Upon hearing the 2^nd Defendant claiming that he can barely manage, Helen then proposed to put him in funds in the sum of $500,000.

(2) Again Helen and the 2^nd Defendant went to the Chong Hing Bank (Kowloon City Branch) where she purchased a cashier order in the sum of $500,00 [sic: $500,000] in favor of the 2^nd defendant.”

11.  Jimmy alleges that at least some if not all of these Statements were false. He bases his case on five arguments: see paragraphs 65 to 69 of the OS respectively. He also alleges that David must have known the Statements to be false at the time when he made them: see paragraph 77 of the OS.

Burden and Standard and Proof

12.  The present proceedings being for alleged contempt of court, Jimmy bears the burden of proving every element of the alleged contempt beyond reasonable doubt. The benefit of any doubt goes to David.

13.  Moreover, Jimmy is held strictly to how his pleaded his case. I shall address his arguments as stated in the OS.

14.  If I find that Jimmy has not proved the Statements to the false, it does not mean that I believe David to have been telling the truth.

First Argument on Falsity

15.  As I noted earlier, Jimmy’s pleaded case has five arguments on falsity. First, in relation to the Feb Payment, he says:

(1) Statement 1 and Statement 2 were to the effect that the Feb Payment “related to HCCW 298/2013 and HCMP 2391/2013 specifically”: see paragraph 65.1 of the OS.

(2) Statement 3 was to the effect that the payment “related to legal actions involving Helen and Jimmy, i.e., HCMP 2391/2013, HCMP 1779/2015, and HCA 1560/2015”: see paragraph 65.2 of the OS.

(3) Statement 4 was to the effect that the payment “was for legal costs, without suggesting that it was linked to any particular proceedings”: see paragraph 65.3 of the OS.

(4) Statement 5 was to the effect that the payment “related only to HCMP 2391/2013”: see paragraph 65.4 of the OS.

16.  Jimmy argues that the Statements – read in the above ways – were inconsistent, thus some if not all of them must be false.

17.  This is reading too much specificity or precision in or into the Statements. Reading the Statements fairly and in context:

(1) Statements 1 and 2 meant that the Feb Payment was to be part of Helen’s contribution to the legal expenses for mounting actions against Jimmy, “including” HCCW 298/2013 (later HCMP 1779/2015) and HCMP 2391/ 2013. They did not say that the payment was limited to those two actions, or that it must go to both or either of those two actions.

(2) Statements 3 and 4 meant that the Feb Payment was for legal expenses for actions involving Helen and David. They did not say that the payment was limited to one or more specific actions, or that it must go to all and every one of the actions involving Helen and David.

(3) Statement 5 referred to events in HCMP 2391/2013, viz., the commencement and the first court hearing thereof, in order to answer Jimmy’s request for particulars as to the timing of the Feb Payment. At most, the statement suggested that because the payment was prompted by the legal expenses for HCMP 2391/2013, it would go at least partly to that action. But this does not necessarily mean that the payment was for HCMP 2391/2013 only.

18.  As I noted earlier, Jimmy bears the burden of proving every element of the alleged contempt, including falsity of a Statement, beyond reasonable doubt. The benefit of any doubt goes to David. It follows that, to any extent a Statement could be read in more than one way, it should be read in the way more favourable to David.

19.  Reading the Statements fairly and in context, and to any extent necessary in the ways more favourable to David, they are not inconsistent. I cannot accept Jimmy’s first argument.

Second Argument on Falsity

20.  Second, Jimmy points to:

(1) A letter from David to Helen’s Committee dated 10 July 2018 (“David’s Letter”), where he repeated Statements 1 and 2 in relation to the Feb Payment: see paragraph 66.1 of the OS.

(2) A letter from Messrs Dundons as solicitors for David to the solicitors for Helen’s Committee dated 7 May 2020 (“Dundons Letter”) which broadly repeated Statement 5 in relation to the Feb Payment: see paragraph 66.2 of the OS.

21.  Jimmy alleges that what these two letters stated about the Feb Payment were inconsistent, and insistent with the Statements, hence one or more of the Statements must be false. This argument is materially the same as his first. In the same ways as I have explained above, this is reading too much specificity and precision in or into what the letters said.

22.  Moreover, a closer reading of David’s Letter and the Dundons Letter shows that Jimmy’s summaries thereof are themselves incomplete.

(1) David’s Letter actually stated:

“ 早前，本人已經告訢貴行，WOL曾在2015年2月9日將HK$600,000交給本人作為HCMP2391/2013及HCMP1779/2013 [sic: HCMP 1779/2015] 已使用的律師費，及在2015年6月29日將HK$500,000交給本人作為未來預計將會使用的律師費。及後，本人已於2017年12月14日將WOL交給本人的上述HK$500,000轉交貴行。”

(2) The Dundons Letter actually stated:

“As explained in our client’s 2^nd Affirmation at paragraph 21, the withdrawal of HK$500,000 and HK$600,000 on two occasions from Chong King Bank Limited (Kowloon City branch) was done by Madam Wong personally (accompanied by her domestic helper). The first withdrawal of $600,000 has been paid to C.K. Mok & Company being Madam Wong’s share of legal costs in HCMP No. 2391 of 2013. The other sum of $500,000 being Madam Wong’s share of legal costs for HCMP No. 1779 of 2015 and HCA No. 1560 of 2015 was later refunded by cheque to your client;”

23.  Thus, David’s Letter stated the Feb Payment to be for HCMP 2391/2013 and HCMP 1779/2015 (formerly HCCW 298/2013). This is not inconsistent with Statements 1 to 5, read fairly and in context.

24.  The Dundons Letter stated that the Feb Payment was paid to CKM and applied to Helen’s legal costs in HCMP 2391/2013. This is not inconsistent with those Statements, and David’s Letter, which said that the payment was meant to cover actions involving Helen.

25.  It is unsurprising, indeed quite natural, that a client’s payment of costs to a firm of solicitors would be kept as costs on account, and could go to settle the legal expenses of one or more matters in which the solicitors are acting for the client.

26.  In this regard, the Petition in HCCW 298/2013 (later HCMP 1779/2015) and David’s 4^th Affirmation in HCMP 2391/2013 showed that CKM had given the two matters the same internal file number. Thus, even if (arguendo) Statements 1 to 5 meant that the Feb Payment was intended for both HCCW 298/2013 and HCMP 2391/2013, that it might eventually have been applied to only one of the two actions would hardly render those Statements to be false.

27.  I am not persuaded by Jimmy’s second argument.

Third Argument on Falsity

28.  Third, in relation to the Jun Payment, Jimmy says:

(1) Statement 6 was to the effect that the Jun Payment “was for HCMP 1779/2015”: see paragraph 67.1 of the OS.

(2) Statement 7 was to the effect that the payment “was for HCA 1560/2015”: see paragraph 67.2 of the OS.

(3) Statement 2 adopted both Statement 6 and Statement 7: see paragraphs 67.1 and 67.2 of the OS.

(4) Statement 3 was to the effect that the payment had been “‘earmarked’ for HCA 1560/2015 only”: see paragraph 67.3 of the OS.

(5) Statement 8 was to the effect that the Jun Payment “was for proceedings other than HCA 1560/2015 and HCMP 1779/2015”: see paragraph 67.4 of the OS.

(6) Statement 9 was “without suggestion that [the payment] was related to any particular proceedings, or that it was earmarked for HCA 1560/2015”: see paragraph 67.5 of the OS.

29.  Jimmy argues that the Statements – read in the above ways – were inconsistent, thus all or some of them must be false.

30.  Again, this is reading too much specificity and precision in or into the Statements. Reading them fairly and in context:

(1) Where Statement 6 referred to “this action”, it did not mean HCMP 1779/2015, even though Statement 6 was in David’s 4^th Affirmation in HCMP 1779/2015.

(2) This can be seen, firstly, from Statement 1, immediately preceding Statement 6 in the same paragraph 56 of the Affirmation. Statement 1 referred to HCMP 1779/2015 expressly by its case number, not “this action” or “these proceedings”.

(3) Secondly, Statement 6 referred to “this action, details of which are set out hereinbelow”. Immediately below this Statement 6 at the end of paragraph 56 was a new section heading “Commencement of Legal Proceedings of HCA 1560/2015” and paragraphs 57 to 59 setting out some details of HCA 1560/2015.

(4) Thirdly, Statements 6 and 7, in paragraphs 56 and 58 of the same affirmation and only a few lines apart, must be read together and in the context of each other.

(5) Statement 2 in adopting both Statements 6 and 7 must have meant to refer to the two statements as consistent with each other.

(6) Statement 8 said the Jun Payment “was held by David for Helen in anticipation of future legal expenses”. It did not say that the “future legal expenses” were legal expenses of future actions. It cannot be read as saying that the payment was for actions subsequent to and thus excluding HCA 1560/2015 and HCMP 1779/2015.

(7) Statement 9 purported to give a general explanation of why the Jun Payment was made, without relating it to a particular action. This does not mean that the payment was not intended for or related to HCA 1560/2015.

31.  So understood, the Statements are not inconsistent. I am not able to accept Jimmy’s third argument.

Fourth Argument on Falsity

32.  Fourth, also in relation to the Jun Payment, Jimmy points to:

(1) David’s Letter, where David said he had been holding the Jun Payment for expected legal expenses but did not suggest “the payment related to HCA 1560/2015 and/or HCMP 1779/2015 specifically”: see paragraph 68.1 of the OS.

(2) The Dundons Letter, which stated that the Jun Payment “was to cover both HCA 1560/2015 and HCMP 1779/ 2015”: see paragraph 68.2 of the OS.

33.  Jimmy alleges that what these two letters stated about the Jun Payment were inconsistent, and insistent with the Statements, hence one or more of the Statements must be false. The argument is materially the same as his third argument.

34.  Again, this is reading too much specificity and precision in or into what the letters said. Reading them fairly and in context:

(1) David’s Letter did not say the expected legal expenses were or were not specific to any particular action.

(2) The Dundons Letter said the Jun Payment had been held for HCMP 1779/2015 and HCA 1560/2015.

35.  The letters are not inconsistent with each other.

36.  At the highest, Jimmy may complain that the Dundons Letter is different from Statements 3 and 7. The letter referred to “The other sum of $500,000 being Madam Wong’s share of legal costs of HCMP No. 1779 of 2015 and HCA No. 1560 of 2015”, whilst Statements 3 and 7 mentioned that the Jun Payment was meant for HCA 1560/2015.

37.  There is, however, an issue of timing to consider. Statements 3 and 7 were made in a context where David was explaining how the Jun Payment came to be made, which was on 29 Jun 2015. The Dundons Letter was referring to how the payment was being held at a later time, when the sum of $500,000 was turned over to Helen’s Committee, which was on 14 December 2017, more than two years after the payment was made.

38.  Thus understood, the Dundons Letter and Statements 3 and 7 are not strictly inconsistent.

39.  This is all the more so when one considers, as I noted earlier, that a client’s payment of money for legal expenses to a firm of solicitors would naturally be held and/or later applied to all matters in which the firm acts for the client. Further, as I also noted, CKM treated the two actions as the same matter. A payment of legal fees prompted by one action, and then being held and applied to both actions, is not remarkable.

40.  I cannot uphold Jimmy’s fourth argument.

Fifth Argument on Falsity

41.  Fifth, Jimmy mentions an alleged agreement between Eddie and David. He says:

(1) “In around December 2018, Jimmy was provided with a set of documents which indicated that Eddie had formed an agreement with David as to the payment of legal costs arising from HCMP 2391/2013 and HCMP 1779/2015 (formerly HCCW 298/2013) in around 2014 and 2015 (‘the Eddie/David Costs Agreement’)”: see paragraph 57 of the OS.

(2) “David appeared to have agreed with Eddie to pay for all legal costs arising from the said proceedings himself in return for the transfer of 12,000 of Eddie’s shares in [FamCo]”: see paragraph 58 of the OS.

(3) The agreement “indicates” that David had agreed with Eddie that David “would be solely responsible for the legal costs of HCMP 2391/2013 and HCCW 298/2013 (i.e., HCMP 1779/2015)”: see paragraph 69.1 of the OS.

(4) “It is therefore to be inferred that David did not intend to use the Payments for legal costs of HCMP 2391/2013 and HCCW 298/2013 / [i.e.,] HCMP 1779/2015. The Statements which set out this account of the uses of the Payments would therefore be false”: see paragraph 69.2 of the OS.

42.  Before I turn to the documents which Jimmy says reflect the Eddie/David Costs Agreement, I must observe that Jimmy’s pleaded case is itself logically problematic.

(1) Jimmy does not say that that the agreement was reached before the Payments. Thus even if the agreement shows that David meant to shoulder all the costs, it would not undermine what he stated as to why the Payments were made.

(2) Even supposing ythat the agreement were made before the Payments, and even if it shows that David meant to shoulder all the legal costs, this would not preclude the possibility of Helen wanting to pay and David accepting her offers – which indeed was the picture David sought to paint in his Statements.

(3) An agreement is a promise. Perhaps one could presume the promisor to intend, at the time of the agreement, to fulfill his promise. It is difficult to infer that henceforth at all times he intended to and would have fulfilled his promise. In this case, it is difficult to infer that because of the agreement, David would never use anyone else’s money to pay legal costs.

43.  I am unable to make the logical inference which Jimmy urges for. I am certainly unable to make an inference which is strong enough to be proof of David’s subjective intention beyond reasonable doubt.

44.  Moreover, I have studied the contents of the documents which Jimmy says reflect the Eddie/David Costs Agreement. There are words in some instances which may be read to suggest the agreement was that David would shoulder all the costs – and neither Eddie nor Helen would bear any costs. But those words are equivocal. They were not even said by David. Furthermore, there are other words in other instances which may suggest the agreement was only that Eddie would not bear any costs.

45.  Without reliable proof of what the alleged Eddie/David Costs Agreement was, there is no basis to consider what inference may or may not be justified.

46.  I am unable to accept Jimmy’s fifth argument.

Inference from David Not Giving Evidence

47.  David elected not to give evidence. These being proceedings for alleged contempt of court, it is his right to do so. It is also trite that no adverse inference may be drawn from his election to do so.

48.  Jimmy’s Counsel, Mr Bernard Man SC leading Mr Harrison Miao, raise a very interesting legal argument in their closing submissions. They argue that because the circumstances of the Payments were squarely within David’s ability to explain, his choice not to give an explanation is significant and can go to support an inference against him.

49.  Citing Li Defan v HKSAR (2002) 5 HKCFAR 320 at §27, Mr Man SC and Mr Miao distinguish between the Court (i) drawing adverse inference merely from silence, and (ii) “being more inclined to come to an available conclusion on the factual evidence on the ground that the accused has not supported any hypothesis which is consistent with innocence with facts which should be within his knowledge”: paragraph 18.3 of Jimmy’s closing submissions.

50.  The legal issue is very interesting and worthy of careful study. Without the assistance of full argument from both sides, however, I should not attempt to say much more, and should be content to note that the issue does not really arise in the present case, or at least in the way I am disposing of the present case.

51.  I have come to my conclusion against Jimmy’s arguments on falsity on the basis of how the Statements and letters are to be read, fairly and in context. This is not an exercise which would have been influenced by David giving evidence, which at most would go to his subjective belief of what he thought the Statements meant.

52.  In David’s closing submissions, his Counsel Mr Walker Shum and Mr Rex Yam raise the possibility that the Dundons Letter mistakenly referred the Jun Payment to HCMP 1779/2015 and HCA 1560/2015, when Statements 3 and 7 related the payment only to HCA 1560/2015. Mr Shum and Mr Yam say the letter’s reference is an obvious mistake, given that the letter itself cited Statement 3 (which said, “As explained in our client’s 2^nd Affirmation at paragraph 21”).

53.  The suggestion of mistake may be the kind hypothesis which Mr Man SC and Mr Miao rightly say should be supported by evidence, and David’s choice not to provide the evidence could justify or at least support an advance inference.

54.  Even here, I am not entirely sure. Jimmy’s case on contempt concerns falsity in the Statements, not the Dundons Letter. David does not have to explain the Dundons Letter, so long as any apparent inconsistency between it and the Statements does not amount to rendering the Statements to be false.

55.  In any event, as I explained earlier, I do not think the Dundons Letter, read fairly and in context, is strictly inconsistent with the Statements.

56.  Lastly, I should note that Mr Man SC and Mr Miao refer also to certain allegations of David’s mistreatment of Helen and argue that they tend to support a case that Helen could not have voluntarily offered or paid to share legal expenses. The evidence in this regard is indirect, scant, and falls far short of being sufficient to prove such serious allegations. Indeed, this may be why the point is not even made in the relevant part of the OS.

Conclusion and Disposition

57.  In conclusion, for the reasons explained, I decline the OS.

58.  As I have noted at the outset, this matter is but a part of a long ongoing family dispute which has already given rise to many different sets of proceedings. There is deep distrust between the parties.

59.  In this context, it is perhaps only natural that the parties would read whatever the other said with great suspicion or, when questioned, be more inclined to argue than to clarify or explain. I have very much felt this about Jimmy and David in the context of these proceedings.

60.  In particular, as Mr Man SC and Mr Miao pointed out, David could have provided, not just in these proceedings but much earlier in the other proceedings, information to put to rest questions about the Payments. He appears not to have done so. He should hardly be surprised that Jimmy would escalate the matter.

61.  Taking these considerations into account and, moreover, not wanting arguments about costs to add to the long ongoing dispute, I will make an Order Nisi of no order as to costs. The Order will become absolute in 14 days unless any party applies by Summons to vary it.

62.  I thank Counsel on both sides for their assistance.