CFH v. YKK

FCMC 10724 / 2020

[2025] HKFC 171

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES NO. 10724 OF 2020

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J U D G M E N T
(Ancillary Relief)

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1.  In this Judgment, I shall refer to the Petitioner-Wife as the “Wife”, and the Respondent-Husband as the “Husband”. This is the trial of the Wife’s application for ancillary relief.

2.  Before proceeding further, I take this moment to address a concern arising from the conduct of this trial and to offer a cautionary word. Practitioners are encouraged to exercise discernment in advancing only those arguments properly grounded in evidence and law, rather than resorting to a scattershot approach to submissions. The Court ought not to be burdened with plainly untenable arguments simply because a party wishes to make an exhaustive presentation by leaving no stone unturned. The Court’s already limited resources ought not be utilised this way.

A.  BACKGROUND

3.  The Husband and Wife are respectively 74 and 48 years old. They were married in March 2016 and separated in October 2019. This was a childless marriage.

4.  It is common ground that despite separation, Parties initially remained living under the same roof but in separate households until June 2020. Thereafter, the Wife moved out of the former matrimonial home and into rented accommodation.

5.  The Husband is the sole proprietor of an engineering company (the “Unlimited Company”) and formerly held majority shares in a related limited company in the business of construction (the “Limited Company”). It is the Husband’s case that he has retired since about 2019 and that his son from his previous marriage has taken over the operations of the Limited Company, with the Husband himself only retaining a 1% shareholding. Despite his retirement, the Husband remains to be the sole proprietor of the Unlimited Company. According to the Husband’s Opening Submissions, his monthly income is about HK$57,785.

6.  The Wife has been an insurance agent in Hong Kong since 2016. In her Form E, the Wife declares that she earns about HK$5,610 on average per month. However, it is the Wife’s case that she has now tendered her resignation. This is a topic that will be analysed in further detail hereinbelow. In addition, the Wife has been receiving rental income of about RMB¥9,300 (about HK$10,230) per month. In total, her monthly income would have been about HK$15,840.

7.  The Wife also had a previous marriage. In the Husband’s evidence, there are certain allegations relating to the bogus nature of the Wife’s previous marriage. I place no weight on these allegations, as they are irrelevant to the present determination of ancillary relief.

8.  The Wife previously commenced divorce proceedings in FCMC 7130/2020. There, the divorce suit was defended and the Husband filed an Answer and Cross-Petition. Subsequently, leave was granted to withdraw the same, and the fresh Petition herein, on the basis of 1-year separation with consent, was filed.

9.  The Decree Nisi was pronounced on 15 November 2022, and the Decree Absolute on 25 August 2023.

10.  By Summons dated 8 August 2022, the Wife sought to join the Husband’s 2 sons from his previous marriage as the 2nd and 3rd Respondents for the determination of beneficial interest(s) over certain assets. By Order dated 28 June 2023, leave was granted to the Wife to withdraw the said Summons.

11.  The trial of the ancillary relief was originally set down for 4-days in July 2024. However, the original trial was refixed upon the Husband’s application to file and serve a further affirmation. The trial was then refixed to the present dates.

12.  At trial, the Wife was represented by Mr Cyrus Lau, and the Husband was represented by Ms Phyllis Lee. Both Counsel confirmed that this is a sharing case. Parties are in fact not far apart on their respective Open Proposal(s). This is something I will set out in detail hereinbelow.

B.  APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES

13.  Section 7 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance (Cap. 192) sets out a list of factors which the Court ought to have regard in deciding an ancillary relief award:

“(1) It shall be the duty of the court in deciding whether to exercise its powers under section 4, 6 or 6A in relation to a party to the marriage and, if so, in what manner, to have regard to the conduct of the parties and all the circumstances of the case including the following matters, that is to say—

(a) the income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources which each of the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future;

(b) the financial needs, obligations and responsibilities which each of the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future;

(c) the standard of living enjoyed by the family before the breakdown of the marriage;

(d) the age of each party to the marriage and the duration of the marriage;

(e) any physical or mental disability of either of the parties to the marriage;

(f) the contributions made by each of the parties to the welfare of the family, including any contribution made by looking after the home or caring for the family;

(g) in the case of proceedings for divorce or nullity of marriage, the value to either of the parties to the marriage of any benefit (for example, a pension) which, by reason of the dissolution or annulment of the marriage, that party will lose the chance of acquiring.”

14.  In LKW v DD (2010) 13 HKCFAR 537, the Court of Final Appeal laid down 4 core principles in approaching the section 7 exercise. These are:

(1)  The objective of fairness;

(2)  Rejection of discrimination;

(3)  The yardstick of equal division; and

(4)  The rejection of minute retrospective investigations.

15.  Further, in approaching the section 7 exercise, the Court of Final Appeal identified a 5-step approach to be adopted:

(1)  The identification of assets;

(2)  Assessing the parties’ financial needs;

(3)  Deciding to apply the sharing principle;

(4)  Considering whether there are good reasons for departing from equal division; and

(5)  Deciding the outcome.

16.  It is with the above principles and concepts borne firmly in mind that this Court approaches the determination of ancillary relief.

C.  PARTIES’ OPEN PROPOSALS

17.  By the Wife’s Open Proposal dated 27 January 2025 (the “Wife’s 1st Open Proposal”), it is proposed that the Husband shall pay the Wife a lump sum of HK$10,000,000. Alternatively, the Husband may transfer his landed properties in Hong Kong to the Wife in satisfaction of the lump sum, with the balance to be paid in cash.

18.  By the Husband’s Open Proposal dated 4 February 2025 (the “Husband’s 1st Open Proposal”), it is proposed that:

“1. H do transfer or cause the transfer of the authorization/ 受托人 in [the 1/F Shops] to W within 6 months from the date of the order to be made;

2. H do transfer or cause the transfer of the authorization/ 受托人 in [the 2/F Shops] to W within 6 months from the date of the order to be made;

3. H do transfer or cause the transfer all his interests and rights in [the Residential Land] to W within 6 months from the date of the order to be made;

4. All costs and expenses arising from the transfers shall be shared by the parties equally;

5. H do pay W a lump sum of HK$500,000 within 3 months from the date of the order to be made;

6. If W accepts the above offer – there be no order as to costs including all reserved costs for the ancillary relief proceedings.”

19.  To give context to the Husband’s 1st Open Proposal, the following are the agreed values of the abovementioned properties in Mainland China:

Property	Value
1/F Shops	HK$2,750,000
2/F Shops	HK$1,650,000
Residential Land	HK$2,922,040

20.  In figures therefore, together with the lump sum, the Husband’s position is in total HK$7,822,040. However, the bulk of such settlement was to be achieved by way of transfers of landed properties in Mainland China or related authorisations.

21.  In figures, Parties therefore differed by about HK$2.1 million.

22.  On the first day of the trial, the Husband submitted an updated Open Proposal (the “Husband’s 2nd Open Proposal”). The principal modification is that, rather than the property transfers, the Husband offers an alternative whereby the properties may be sold, with the net sale proceeds to be paid in full to the Wife. Prior to commencement of trial, the Husband further increased the lump sum from HK$500,000 to HK$1 million. Assuming the properties in question could be sold at their agreed values, the Husband’s 2nd Open Proposal, in figures, comes to HK$8,322,040.

23.  The Wife also submitted an updated Open Proposal (the “Wife’s 2nd Open Proposal”). There, she reduced the lump sum from HK$10 million to HK$7.5 million, with payment terms as follows:

“(1) H shall pay HK$1,000,000 to W in cash within 14 days from the date of the Order;

(2) H shall pay HK$6,500,000 to W in cash within 6 months from the date of the Order.”

24.  As part of the Wife’s 2nd Open Proposal, she also asks for costs (including all reserved costs and outstanding unpaid cost orders) to be paid by the Husband, to be taxed if not agreed.

25.  Pausing here, I consider that the Wife’s position on costs operates as a deterrent, if not also an obstacle, to the resolution of this dispute. It instills uncertainty in the Wife’s 2nd Open Proposal. As at the date of the Wife’s 2nd Open Proposal, no figure or breakdown of such legal costs was provided whether to the Court or to the Husband – a matter accepted by the Wife at closing. In other words, the Wife’s 2nd Open Proposal had no certainty in quantum. It was only pursuant to the Wife’s Form H (filed on the 3rd day of trial upon inquiry from the Court) and closing submissions that the costs of HK$941,080 were spelt out.

26.  That said, upon deciphering Parties’ 2nd Open Proposals, their respective positions, in monetary terms, are in fact quite close. In figures, the Husband offers HK$8,322,040, whereas the Wife asks for HK$8,441,080. The fundamental divergence between the Parties lies in logistics and timing, outlined as follows:

(1)  The Husband’s 2nd Open Proposal will be dependent on a sale or transfer of the abovementioned Mainland properties (which transfers are not accepted by the Wife), whereas the Wife asks for a cash lump sum or the transfer of Hong Kong properties.

(2)  The viability and workability of the Wife’s 2nd Open Proposal is dependent on the composition of the Husband’s side of the Pot. Compounded with this is the Wife’s proposed timeframe of payment. The said viability and workability is something I will consider later on in this Judgment.

27.  Through her closing submissions, the Wife further revised her updated Open Proposal (the “Wife’s 3rd Open Proposal”). In terms of the lump sum, the Wife invited the Court to “award a more advantageous sum to W – which can be up to HK$12,000,000”.

28.  For the Husband, a 2nd updated Open Proposal was also put forward in closing (the “Husband’s 3rd Open Proposal”) in the following terms:

“1. H do transfer or cause the transfer of all his interests and rights in [the Residential Land] to W within 6 months from the date of the order to be made;

2. All costs and expenses, including stamp duty and legal costs (if any) arising from the transfer to be borne by H;

3. H do pay W a lump sum of HK$1,000,000 within 3 months from the date of the order to be made;

4. H do pay W a lump sum of HK$4,000,000 within 3 years from the date of the order to be made;

5. If W accepts the above offer – there be no order as to costs including all reserved costs for the ancillary relief proceedings.”

29.  In other words, the main change is that the Husband no longer insists on the transfer or sale of the 1/F and 2/F Shops. He, however, maintains the transfer of the Residential Land. With the Residential Land having an agreed value of HK$2,922,040, the Husband’s offer is therefore back to HK$7,922,040 – a figure similar to his 1st Open Proposal in quantum.

30.  I am mindful that despite the Open Proposals put forward by the Parties at different stages of the trial, I am not bound by the respective proposals: LSM v CMP FCMC 7040/2011 (unrep., 21 September 2015) per Deputy District Judge I. Wong (as HH Judge I. Wong then was) at §§14-16.

D.  CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES

31.  The Parties were the only witnesses. In assessing their evidence, I have borne in mind the well-established principles discussed in the authorities, such as Hui Cheung Fai v Daiwa Development Ltd HCA 1734/2009 (unrep., 8 April 2014) at §§77-83.

32.  Having heard their evidence, I find neither of the Parties to be entirely credible witnesses. To highlight in particular:

(1)  I find the Wife’s evidence in relation to the unexplained or “forgotten” transactions in her bank account unconvincing.

(2)  As for the Husband, I note that he is 74 years old and may have lost recollection of events dating back 10 years ago, as canvassed in cross-examination. Nevertheless, I do find his explanation(s) on certain recent conduct unpersuasive. In particular, his closure of an investment account upon the Wife’s inquiries on point is questionable; so too is his true level of income.

33.  I shall address the credibility of both Parties’ evidence by topic hereinbelow.

E.  STEP 1: IDENTIFICATION OF THE ASSETS

34.  Parties produced an Agreed and Disputed Schedule of Assets and Liability.

E1.  Agreed Assets and Liabilities

35.  The Agreed Pot comes to HK$36,264,065. Of this, the Husband’s share is HK$35,686,316.8, and the Wife’s is HK$577,748.2.

36.  Most of the Agreed Pot is illiquid. On the Husband’s side, HK$31,408,522 (or 88% of the Agreed Pot) is in the form of landed properties. The Husband’s portfolio is summarised as follows.

HUSBAND
Asset	Amount (in HK$)
Landed Properties	$31,408,452
Bank Accounts	$2,606,883.62
Business and Companies	$267,193.42
Others (including insurance policies and valuables)	$1,403,788
TOTAL	$35,686,317.04

37.  As to the Wife’s portfolio, it is summarised as follows.

WIFE
Asset	Amount (in HK$)
Landed Properties	$440,000
Bank Accounts	$5,589.07
Others (including insurance policies and valuables)	$132,159.16
TOTAL	$577,748.23

E2.  Disputed Assets and Liabilities

1/F and 2/F Shops

38.  These are properties in Mainland China. Parties agree that the values of the 1/F and 2/F Shops are respectively HK$2,750,000 and HK$1,650,000, amounting to HK$4,400,000 in aggregate. Despite Parties’ acquisition, there was no formal transfer of titles. The 2 properties remain legally held by the previous owner, one Madam Wong.

39.  It is common ground that Parties own the beneficial interests in these 2 properties. The only point of divide is who, i.e. the Husband or the Wife, owns such beneficial interest.

40.  The Wife’s position is that she owns the entire beneficial interest in these 2 properties. She says that she contributed RMB¥1,450,000 to the acquisition of the 2/F Shops and that the 1/F Shops were gifted to her by the Husband.

41.  In support of her contention, the Wife produced evidence of the payment of RMB¥400,000. This was paid directly to the vendor, Madam Wong. As to the remaining RMB¥1,050,000, the Wife explained that she had paid this sum to the Husband, who onward paid it to Madam Wong. The Wife says that the source of such funds was the sale of another property owned by her in Mainland China.

42.  The Husband denies both allegations. He maintains that he owns the entire beneficial interest in the 1/F and 2/F Shops, although the Wife was permitted to handle leasing matters and to collect rent for her own use. He contends that the Wife’s purchase funds originated from him, asserting that although the Wife made a direct payment of RMB¥400,000 and transferred RMB¥1,050,000 to him, these amounts were in fact his funds.

43.  Pausing here, I find argument over the above point to be unconstructive. Neither Party is contending that the 1/F and/or 2/F Shops is or are non-matrimonial in nature, or are to be ringfenced from division. In such a case, the 1/F and 2/F Shops remain to be marital assets which are to be shared. Accordingly, a determination of who, of the Parties, owns beneficial interests in these properties helps nothing.

44.  On the first day of trial, the Court queried the relevancy of the above dispute in resolving this ancillary relief suit. Whether the beneficial interests rest with the Husband or the Wife, Parties are in agreement that the 1/F and 2/F Shops form part of Parties’ assets. Given that the 1/F and 2/F Shops are held by a 3rd party who has not been joined to these proceedings, i.e. Madam Wong, the Court has no jurisdiction to direct a transfer of these Shops anyway. It is also to be noted that these are landed properties situated in Mainland China.

45.  In response to this, Counsel for the Husband agreed. However, Counsel for the Wife argued that a determination of beneficial interest (i.e. beneficially belonging to the Husband, or the Wife) would be relevant to the Wife’s needs case. With respect, this is difficult to follow. First, Parties are in agreement that this is a sharing case. Second, irrespective of any finding on who owns beneficial interest in the 1/F and 2/F Shops, these assets form part of the pot and are to be factored into the ancillary relief exercise in any event. Particularly pertinent is that the Wife is not seeking the transfer of the 1/F and 2/F Shops to her in any event. It is therefore not understood why the Court is to determine the issue of beneficial interest between spouses.

46.  Be that as it may, my finding bears out the credibility of the Parties. Whilst I find it unnecessary to make a determination of who (as between the Parties) owns beneficial interest in these properties for reasons I have mentioned above, I find the Husband’s evidence much more likely and credible. My reasons are as follows.

47.  First, there is no dispute that the Husband paid for, at least, the 1/F Shops. Apart from the Wife’s mere say-so, there is no evidence of this being a gift. The only circumstantial evidence is that the Wife was permitted to handle leasing, maintenance etc affairs of the 1/F and 2/F Shops and to collect and pocket the rent. However, this is consistent with the Husband’s case, namely that he acquired these properties so that the Wife could earn rental income therefrom.

48.  Second, according to the Letter of Authorisation (委托書) in respect of the 2/F Shops, the Husband (and not the Wife) was vested with wide powers equivalent to and/or assimilating those enjoyed by a property owner. Were the Wife’s contention true – namely that she funded and beneficially owns the 2/F Shops – it is improbable that she would have allowed sole authorisation to be granted to the Husband without including herself. This reasoning likewise holds true had the Husband in fact gifted her the 1/F Shops.

49.  On this point, the Wife explained that had she been the authorised person, as a matter of Mainland law or policy, the 2 properties could not be transferred into her name in the future without triggering substantial taxes. However, no expert evidence of Mainland law or policy was adduced. In cross-examination, the Husband first denied knowledge of such Mainland law or policy but later appeared to agree. Nonetheless, it is also the Husband’s evidence that in acquiring the 1/F and 2/F Shops, no one apart from him was envisaged to be the authorised person.

50.  Third, despite her case, the Wife has at no stage contended that Parties agreed upon or contemplated a definitive schedule for effecting such transfer of the registered owner.

51.  Having considered all the circumstances and evidence on point, I prefer the Husband’s case.

52.  Thus, for calculation purposes, the 1/F and 2/F Shops, with their combined agreed value of HK$4,400,000, are to be attributed to the Husband’s portfolio.

Husband’s Bank of China 6217 Account; Bank of China 6251 Account; Citibank 5082 Account

53.  According to the Agreed and Disputed Schedule of Assets and Liability, the Wife’s grievance on the Accounts in question is as follows:

“Subject to proof by H that these are credit card accounts as stated in Answer 9 of H’s Amended Answer… and if so, W agrees that the amount should be HK$0.”

54.  Thus, the only issue is whether these are credit cards. In H’s Answer, apart from the Citibank 5082 Account, he has already deposed that these are credit cards. In cross-examination, he further deposed that the Citibank 5082 Account, too, was also a credit card, though at one point he did say that this is a bank card.

55.  I accept that these are credit cards. In any event, absent any basis to infer that these Accounts hold funds or that there is any other impropriety surrounding these Accounts, I accept that these Accounts are empty and therefore value them at HK$0.

Citibank 4791 Account

56.  As to the Citibank 4791 Account, the Wife’s grievance is that the Husband has not produced the relevant credit card statements. On this basis, the Wife asks the Court to draw an adverse inference that the Husband has concealed assets and income.

57.  In CCYL v CCSR [2023] 1 HKC 335, HH Judge I. Wong stated that:

“84. Due to the husband’s failure and non-engagement, the court is placed in very difficult positions as it simply does not have a good idea of what the husband’s real financial position is. I acknowledge that on the one hand there are matters that call for explanation and clarification such as his failure to provide adequately for his family which might or might not have been due to his cash-flow problem. On the other, I should be careful to ensure that the husband’s failure does not give rise to what is called a ‘cheat’s charter’ as Dame Butler-Sloss P put it in Baker v Baker [1995] 2 FLR 829 (CA) and quoted by Mostyn J in NG v SG (Appeal: Non-Disclosure) [2011] EWHC 3270 (Fam), [2012] 1 FLR 1211. If the drawing of adverse inferences is to be too conservative, unfairness would be visited on the claimant giving rise to what might be termed a non-discloser’s dividend: NG v SG (Appeal: Non-Disclosure) at [15]. I accept that the court must be astute to avoid this unfairness and that a strong message must be sent out that a non-discloser should not be able to procure a result from his non-disclosure better than that which would be ordered if the truth were told. But the court must be realistic and there must surely be some finding, soundly based on admissible evidence, as to the broad extent of the hidden funds. This finding can be as broad or precise as the facts of the case demand.

85. Mostyn J summarised the relevant principles in NG v SG (Non-Disclosure) on how adverse inferences are to be drawn:

[16] Pulling the threads together it seems to me that where the court is satisfied that the disclosure given by one party has been materially deficient then:

(i) The Court is duty bound to consider by the process of drawing adverse inferences whether funds have been hidden.

(ii) But such inferences must be properly drawn and reasonable. It would be wrong to draw inferences that a party has assets which, on an assessment of the evidence, the Court is satisfied he has not got.

(iii) If the Court concludes that funds have been hidden then it should attempt a realistic and reasonable quantification of those funds, even in the broadest terms.

(iv) In making its judgment as to quantification the Court will first look to direct evidence such as documentation and observations made by the other party.

(v) The Court will then look to the scale of business activities and at lifestyle.

(vi) Vague evidence of reputation or the opinions or beliefs of third parties is inadmissible in the exercise.

(vii) The Al-Khatib v Masry technique of concluding that the non-discloser must have assets of at least twice what the Claimant is seeking should not be used as the sole metric of quantification.

(viii) The Court must be astute to ensure that a non-discloser should not be able to procure a result from his non-disclosure better than that which would be ordered if the truth were told. If the result is an order that is unfair to the non-discloser it is better that than that the Court should be drawn into making an order that is unfair to the Claimant.”

58.  In TCP v KLS [2020] HKFC 67, HH Judge I. Wong summarised the legal principles on non-disclosure. The approach has been consistently applied by the Court. Recently, in WKC v KHC [2025] HKFC 20, HH Judge T. Kwan, having referred to TCP v KLS, further distilled the following principles:

“60. The relevant principles to be drawn from the above cases for the matter before me are as follows:

a. The Court needs not engage in a disproportionate investigation on the extent of undisclosed financial resources;

b. The Court is entitled to draw the necessary adverse inference in the process having regard to the nature and extent of the non-disclosure;

c. There are occasions when the Court is ‘unable to quantify the extent of his undisclosed resources;

d. In these circumstances, the Court is entitled, in appropriate cases, to infer that the resources are sufficient or are such that the proposed award does represent a fair outcome.”

59.  Having the above principles in mind, my analysis is as follows. There is no dispute that this is indeed a credit card and not a bank account. There is no evidence that this credit card is used to hold funds. The Husband’s aggregate monthly spending on the card can be seen in the Husband’s Citibank bank statements, which have been produced. The only additional thing that would be shown by production of the credit card statements are the actual transaction details.

60.  Whilst I accept that the Husband’s failure to produce these statements falls short of Form E requirements, I do not agree with the Wife that the circumstances justify drawing the inference that the Husband has concealed assets and income.

Husband’s Prudential Brokerage Account

61.  By the Husband’s 2nd Form E, he disclosed being the holder of a Prudential Brokerage Account with a value of HK$320,250. In the Wife’s 3rd Questionnaire filed in December 2023, she requested production of statements relating to this account. Six months later, in the Husband’s Answer filed in June 2024, he deposed that the account was closed in the same month, i.e. June 2024, and that no statements could therefore be produced.

62.  In cross-examination, the Husband explained that he no longer invested in securities and therefore closed the account. It was put to the Husband that he closed the account knowing that the Wife sought production of its statements and that his act of closing the account with the said knowledge was to hide his assets.

63.  Having considered the course of events, I see force in the Wife’s contention. By December 2023, the Husband would have known that the Wife was seeking disclosure of his Prudential Brokerage Account statements. Yet, instead of producing those statements in his Answer, the Husband simply closed the account and refused to produce any statement whatsoever. The only piece of documentary evidence before the Court on this account is the statement dated June 2023.

64.  Compounding matters, though the Husband stated under cross-examination that the balance would have been deposited into his Citibank account, he did not produce Citibank bank statements covering that period or that transaction. Even if it is true that the Husband could not obtain the relevant Prudential Brokerage Account statements due to its account closure, he would have been in a position to produce his Citibank account statements to make good his case. The whole course of events justifies an adverse inference to be drawn.

65.  As to the value of this account, Parties are also in disagreement. The Husband says that it is worth HK$320,250, whereas the Wife says that the HK$320,250 only represents the value of securities held in that account. The Wife says that on top of securities, there is a cash balance of HK$456,837.55. Accordingly, the Wife says that the total value of this account was, as at June 2023, HK$777,087.55.

66.  According to the only statement produced, the HK$320,250 figure came under the value of investments (投資組合擇要). This was the representative figure of the Husband’s securities portfolio, being 5,000 shares in China Mobile. On the other hand, the HK$456,837.55 figure came under the account balance (戶口結餘摘要). Therein, the figure of HK$456,837.55 was clearly attributed to Hong Kong Dollars cash balance – distinct from investments or securities. Moreover, under the transaction details section of the statement, it is clearly stated that the previous cash balance was HK$446,656,24, which increased to HK$456,837.55 following dividends declared that month.

67.  In view of the above, I consider that the value of this Prudential Brokerage Account is HK$777,087.55. Further, in the circumstances as I have mentioned hereinabove, I take the view it is justified to draw the adverse inference against the Husband that he still holds the said amount and it is to be attributed to his financial portfolio.

Husband’s Hang Seng Bank Investments

68.  There is no room for argument on this. In the Husband’s Hang Seng Bank account, he holds HK$311,440 worth of bonds and/or investments. This item, however, was omitted from the Joint Schedule of Assets and Liabilities. It is to be added back.

Husband’s Hang Seng Bank Life Insurance Policy

69.  Under the Husband’s 2nd Form E, he disclosed a life insurance policy with Hang Seng Bank. However, the Husband failed to attribute any value to this policy. When asked to provide the surrender value of this policy, he stated in his Answer that he would inquire with Hang Seng Bank and revert. He has not done so. In these circumstances, I see no alternative but to draw an adverse inference against the Husband regarding the value of this policy.

70.  Reading the policy document, it appears that the Husband would receive a “Monthly Guaranteed Income” of HK$4,488 for the period of 20 years. There is no mention of any surrender value.

(1)  Counsel for the Husband invited the Court to attach a value to this policy by multiplying the monthly guaranteed income by the number of months elapsed since inception of this policy in July 2019 up to December 2024. This produces a figure of HK$291,720.

(2)  The Wife, on the other hand, proposed the Court do draw an adverse inference that the value of the policy is its “Total Guaranteed Income”, at the sum of HK$1,077,120.

71.  I find neither suggestion to be fair. The Husband’s proposal ignores any future income, whilst the Wife’s proposal appears to take full account of both past and future income.

72.  Doing the best I can, I take the view that attaching half of its “Total Guaranteed Income”, i.e. taking account of pay-outs up to 2029, to be fair. This would provide a sufficient safeguard against what is often referred to in precedents as the “cheat’s charter”. I therefore attach a value of HK$538,560 to this policy. This amount is to be attributed to the Husband’s financial portfolio.

Husband’s AIA Insurance Policy

73.  Under the Husband’s 2nd Form E, he disclosed a medical insurance policy with AIA. However, the Husband failed to attribute any value to this policy. In these circumstances, I have no alternative but to draw an adverse inference against him regarding the value of this policy.

74.  According to the policy document, the value of the policy as of 20 May 2021 is stated to be US$13,503.34 (i.e. about HK$105,326). This, however, is a valuation dating back almost 4 years ago.

75.  The Wife asks the Court to draw an adverse inference that the Husband can surrender this policy for “much more than HK$105,326”. This ambiguity in the Wife’s position led the Court to inquire whether she had a specific valuation to put forward for this policy, to which Counsel for the Wife answered in the negative. On this, if the Wife argues that an adverse inference is due, then it is also incumbent on the Wife to propose a figure for the Court’s consideration.

76.  Be that as it may, noting that the Husband pays US$228.20 per month for this policy, he would have contributed about US$10,269 (45 months) since the date of the policy document. Doing the best I can, I took the preliminary view that the value of this policy is US$13,503.34 plus US$10,269 equals US$23,772.34 (or about HK$185,424.25). This figure is to be rounded up to HK$186,000.

77.  When provided with the Court’s preliminary view, both Parties accepted and agreed the above figure to be the value of the AIA policy. Accordingly, I attach a value of HK$186,000 to this policy. This amount is to be attributed to the Husband’s financial portfolio.

Wife’s Dissipation of HK$372,750 between September 2019 and July 2020

78.  The Husband says that the Wife has dissipated HK$372,750, and that this sum is to be added back to the Wife’s side of the financial portfolio. This complaint roots in the Wife’s contention that she has “forgotten” the nature and/or purpose of transactions totalling HK$372,750. The Wife conversely argues that the Husband has put forward no evidence to support the claim that the Wife has dissipated such sums in a reckless and wanton manner.

79.  The law in relation to add-backs has recently been summarised in the judgment of HH Judge T. Kwan in KKSR v CLH also known as ZL [2024] HKFLR 24 at §§159-162. Of particular relevance is the Two Stage Approach quoted from LCC v LTLA [2024] HKCA 406 per Madam Justice B. Chu (as she then was) therein at §160:

“We find the Two Stage Approach helpful in cases where conduct is an issue in ancillary relief claims and we set out the Two Stage Approach (slightly modified) as follows -

Stage (1)

A party asserting conduct must prove:

(i) the facts relied upon; and if established,

(ii) those facts meet the conduct threshold, which has consistently been set at a high or exceptional level; and

(iii) that there is an identifiable (even if not always easily measurable) negative financial impact upon the parties which has been generated by the alleged wrongdoing. A causative link between act/omission and financial loss is required. Sometimes the loss can be precisely quantified, sometimes it may require a broader evaluation, but it is doubtful that the quantification of loss can or should range beyond the financial consequences caused by the pleaded grounds.

Stage (2)

If Stage (1) is established, the court will go on to consider how the misconduct, and its financial consequences, should impact upon the outcome of the financial remedies proceedings, undertaking the MPPO section 7 exercise which requires balancing all the relevant factors.”

80.  The Wife’s evidence of her lapse of memory on the transactions in question handicaps the Husband’s case for add-back. The failure to give any explanation means there is no established fact on which the conduct threshold can be met. If the Wife shall succeed on this argument, this is the “cheat’s charter” that the cases warn against.

81.  Nonetheless, the quality of the Wife’s evidence must be scrutinized. This boils down to an assessment and analysis of whether the Wife’s explanation of “forgotten” is credible. Having considered the issue holistically, I do not accept the Wife’s case. My considerations include the following:

(1)  First, as mentioned above, the Wife’s case is that her income comes to about HK$15,840. In the context of unexplained (or “forgotten”) withdrawals amounting to HK$372,750, this equates to nearly two years’ worth of her declared income. More concerning still, she withdrew the said amount within a mere ten-month period. This is a significant sum given the context. I find it incredible that someone in the Wife’s position would simply have “forgotten” about such significant transactions.

(2)  Second, the subject transactions span from about September 2019 to July 2020. The Husband’s Questionnaire was administered on 19 April 2021, and the Wife’s 1st Answer is dated 17 June 2021. Thus, by April 2021 at the absolute latest – being roughly 9 months after the most recent transaction or about 22 months since the initial transaction – the Wife would have notice of the Husband’s request for particulars concerning these withdrawals. Given the amount in context, I find it incredible that the Wife would have absolutely no recollection as to any of these transactions in such a short lapse of time.

(3)  Third, per the Wife’s own case, Parties separated in October 2019. The proximity in time between the Wife’s withdrawals and the downturn of the Parties’ relationship raises legitimate suspicion in itself.

82.  Having found her to be incredible on this point, the Wife’s hollow evidence thus amounts to a refusal to answer, constituting a breach of her positive duty of full and frank disclosure. This duty falls squarely on the Wife to explain her finances in a full, frank and clear manner. In saying she has “forgotten”, the Wife attempted no explanation on the purpose and/or destination of her withdrawals. The Wife cannot prevail by obscuring her own breach of duty through conflating it with the Husband’s evidentiary burden to establish wantonness and recklessness.

83.  I thus draw the adverse inference that the Wife has deliberately concealed the details relating to the subject sums. I find that she is still in possession of the HK$372,250. This amount is to be attributed to the Wife’s financial portfolio.

W’s Loans

84.  The Wife claims that she has three outstanding loans: two owed to friends and one to her younger sister. I shall deal with these in turn.

85.  The first among these is a loan of HK$350,000. According to the Wife, she borrowed this sum from her friend, Madam Lai, in September 2022. The Wife contends that Madam Lai originally agreed to lend her HK$450,000 and transferred this amount to the Wife’s bank account, but Madam Lai subsequently decided that she would only lend the Wife HK$350,000. Therefore, the Wife immediately withdrew HK$100,000 and repaid Madam Lai. The net outstanding amount is, per the Wife’s case, HK$350,000.

86.  I do not accept that this should be a loan that should be taken into account in the ancillary relief exercise for the following reasons:

(1)  First, I have doubts as to the authenticity of this loan. In the Wife’s 2nd Form E (which post-dates this loan), no such loan of HK$350,000 was declared. In fact, the Wife declared herself to be loan-free save and except a small credit card bill. Had this loan been genuine – particularly given that HK$350,000 is a very significant amount in the context of the Wife’s financial portfolio – it is improbable that such loan would have been omitted inadvertently.

(2)  Second, the Wife claims that HK$100,000 was immediately repaid to Madam Lai. However, the relevant bank statement shows that it was withdrawn in cash, whilst the original loan amount, i.e. HK$450,000, was a transfer deposit. The Wife has provided no acceptable justification for why it had to be withdrawn in cash rather than simply transferring the HK$100,000 back to Madam Lai. There is also no evidence that this HK$100,000 cash was indeed paid to Madam Lai beyond the mere say-so of the Wife.

(3)  Third, there is no documentary evidence on the loan. Not only is there no loan agreement, but even chat records were also not produced.

(4)  Fourth, during cross-examination of the Husband, he was able to give detailed evidence on the HK$350,000. He stated that it was not a loan but rather a commission payment for a client referral, as Madam Lai was the Wife’s insurance business partner. After thorough consideration, I accept the Husband’s evidence. This is also something that relates to the Wife’s income and earning capacity, to be addressed below.

(5)  Thus, for the above reasons, I do not accept that there is an outstanding loan of HK$350,000.

87.  The second of these loans is a loan of HK$70,000. The Wife claims that in June 2024, she borrowed HK$70,000 from her friend, Madam Chu for legal fees. In this case, I take the view that legal fees are to be dealt with under costs of the ancillary relief suit. Should this loan be deducted from the Wife’s side of the portfolio in computing the ancillary relief award, this would mean that the Wife could recover (or be reimbursed) part of her legal fees regardless of the costs order to be made. I find this unfair, especially in the context of this case where the Husband has not taken out any loan for his legal fees. I thus do not accept that this loan should be taken into account in ancillary relief.

88.  Likewise for the alleged loan from her younger sister of HK$60,000, which the Wife also claims are for legal fees. For similar reasons as above, I do not accept that this should be a loan that should be deducted from the Wife’s side of the portfolio.

W’s Gold Pieces

89.  It is common ground that the Husband has gifted the Wife pieces of gold, weighing a total of 5 taels. On the Wife’s case, she has gifted 2 pieces to her Mother in mid- 2019 and the remaining 3 pieces were sold in early- 2023 for HK$42,000. The Wife claims she used the sale proceeds for her living expenses.

90.  I am unpersuaded by the Wife’s case. On her case, she held at least the remaining 3 pieces of gold until early- 2023. However, by the Wife’s Form E dated 15 October 2020, no such valuable was declared. This is non-disclosure. Then, amidst these ancillary relief proceedings, she alleges to have sold the same while producing no documentary evidence in support. This failure is particularly notable given her legal representation throughout.

91.  Further, in early- 2023, the Wife was still working as an insurance agent. Until June 2024, she received full rental income from the 1/F and 2/F Shops. In other words, there has been no major change in her income. Having considered the relevant circumstances, I find the contention that the Wife had to sell the gold pieces to cover her living expenses to be unconvincing. I also find that it is justified in the circumstances to draw an adverse inference that the Wife still holds the 3 pieces of gold, worth HK$42,000. This is to be attributed to her financial portfolio.

Electronic Wallets

92.  In cross-examination, both the Wife and the Husband admitted to having electronic wallets. Neither Party made disclosure of their electronic wallets. This is obviously a component of their financial disclosure that ought to have been done.

93.  For the Wife, her case is that she receives rental payments from tenants through her WeChat wallet. For the Husband, he says that the funds in his WeChat wallet are for his use in Mainland China.

94.  I take note that a significant portion of the Wife’s income has been the rental income of the 1/F and 2/F Shops. Given her evidence that these are received in her WeChat wallet, I take the view that she would have accumulated a significant sum there.

95.  Contrastingly, the Husband does not receive his income through the WeChat wallets. His income is paid and received in Hong Kong, and his rental income can be seen in his Mainland bank statements. I take the view that the Husband’s balance in his WeChat wallet would be relatively less than the Wife’s.

96.  I am however unable to come to any specific quantum given the lack of evidence in this regard. Therefore, whilst I draw no specific adverse inference on the amount, I will bear the above in mind in deciding the outcome of this ancillary relief suit.

Other Conduct and Adverse Inferences Sought by the Wife

97.  In addition to the above, the Wife sought to attribute further assets to the Husband’s side of the financial portfolio in her closing submissions. I shall deal with them as follows.

98.  First, the Wife disagrees with the booked depreciation of HK$905,319 for a car in the financial statement of the Unlimited Company. In cross-examination, the Husband admitted that this is in fact his own car.

99.  However, as mentioned above, the subject company is an Unlimited Company. It is not a separate legal entity. Moreover, it had not been disputed that the car indeed depreciated by HK$905,319. If this was disputed and proven, I would agree that this has an effect on the valuation of the Unlimited Company, or the Husband’s side of the financial portfolio. It was not. I therefore see no reason to attribute or make any adjustment under this item. I see no impropriety in such accounting exercise.

100.  Second, based on the Husband’s payment records and cross-examination evidence, the Wife contends that the Husband has hidden insurance policies.

101.  Central to the Wife’s argument is the alleged excess of payments over the number of insurance policies. However, the Husband was not cross-examined on whether each insurance policy would only require a single payment per month. Further, under cross-examination concerning the allegedly concealed policies, the Husband remained unshaken in his account. In the circumstances, I do not find that the Husband has undisclosed insurance policies.

102.  Third, the Wife contends that the Husband had previously given an inaccurate valuation of the Limited Company in his Form E. I agree. Nevertheless, I find this of little relevance to the current ancillary relief exercise, since the Parties eventually agreed on the very figure the Wife herself proposed as accurate.

103.  Fourth, the Wife requests the Court to draw the adverse inference that the Husband has concealed income and/or assets connected to the two transactions he could not recall. These are (1) a deposit of RMB¥1,218,231.67, and (2) a withdrawal of RMB¥1,210,000, in the Husband’s China Construction Bank account.

104.  The evidence clearly shows these transactions, both the deposit and withdrawal, were effected on the same day through the same bank account. According to the bank statement, the payor and the recipient is the Husband himself. In other words, this was an internal transfer. I thus do not agree that the Husband’s failure to recall these transactions warrants an adverse inference.

105.  Given the above, there is no basis to infer that the Husband has concealed or has any hidden funds.

E3.  Total Pot Size

106.  In light of the analysis above, the following assets are to be attributed to the Husband’s portfolio:

(1)  Value of the 1/F and 2/F Shops: HK$4,400,000.

(2)  Value of the Prudential Brokerage Account: HK$777,087.55.

(3)  Value of Hang Seng Bank Investments: HK$311,440.

(4)  Value of the Hang Seng Bank Life Insurance Policy: HK$538,560.

(5)  Value of the AIA Insurance Policy: HK$186,000.

107.  For the Wife:

(1)  The sum of HK$372,250 is to be attributed to her portfolio.

(2)  Pieces of gold with value of HK$42,000 is to be attributed to her portfolio.

(3)  The loans of HK$350,000, HK$70,000 and HK$60,000 are not taken into account in this ancillary relief exercise.

108.  The Pot thus becomes HK$42,891,402.82. Of this, the Husband’s share is HK$41,899,404.59, and the Wife HK$991,998.23.

HUSBAND
Asset	Amount (in HK$)
Landed Properties (excluding 1/F and 2/F Shops)	$31,408,452
Bank Accounts	$2,606,883.62
Business and Companies	$267,193.42
Others (including insurance policies and valuables)	$1,403,788
1/F and 2/F Shops	$4,400,000
Prudential Brokerage Account	$777,087.55
Hang Seng Bank Investments	$311,440
Hang Seng Bank Life Insurance Policy	$538,560
AIA Insurance Policy	$186,000
TOTAL	$41,899,404.59

WIFE
Asset	Amount (in HK$)
Landed Properties	$440,000
Bank Accounts	$5,589.07
Others (including insurance policies and valuables)	$132,159.16
Dissipated sum	$372,250
Pieces of gold	$42,000
TOTAL	$991,998.23

F.  STEP 2: PARTIES’ FINANCIAL NEEDS

109.  As mentioned above, Parties agree that this is a sharing case and that Parties’ financial resources are sufficient to meet their reasonable needs. Parties ask for a clean break settlement. The analysis hereunder will therefore focus on the headline disputes, given that these were argued by the Parties.

110.  Pursuant to the Agreed Table of Income and Expenditure dated 24 January 2025 (the “I&E Table”), Parties’ respective positions can be summarised as follows:

(1)  The Husband has monthly income of about HK$57,785 per month. His monthly expenses come to HK$79,521.37.

(2)  The Wife has monthly income of about RMB¥9,300 (about HK$10,230) per month. Formerly, as insurance agent, she also earned an average monthly income of HK$5,610. In total, the Wife’s income was about HK$15,840. Her monthly expenses come to HK$36,348.

111.  On the figures therefore, neither Party maintains a sustainable financial position. For reasons to be set out below, I find that the Wife has hidden income and/or financial resources, and that the Husband, too, has under-reported his income.

F1.  The Wife’s Income / Earning Capacity / Financial Resources

112.  As a matter of background, the Wife is currently 48 years old. On her case, she was an insurance agent until January 2025, when she tendered her resignation. Since then, she has relied on the reported rental income of RMB¥9,300.

113.  I harbour doubts regarding the Wife’s motive for resigning in January 2025. The Wife claims that she resigned because the Husband had lodged a complaint with the Wife’s insurance agency and the Insurance Authority. Under cross-examination, she explained that she felt it was embarrassing to stay in the same insurance agency and therefore tendered her resignation.

114.  Upon closer examination of the evidence, it appears that whilst the Husband did indeed lodge a complaint against the Wife, this was done back in August 2024. By October 2024, the relevant Market Conduct Committee had already concluded that the Husband’s claims were unsubstantiated.

115.  The Wife’s resignation in January 2025 – three months after the complaint was found to be unsubstantiated – lacks credible justification. Had genuine embarrassment been the Wife’s motivation, she would have resigned immediately in August 2024 when the complaint was filed, or, in any event, prior to the Market Conduct Committee’s determination exonerating her.

116.  Given inter alia the timing of the Wife’s resignation, I take the view that the Wife tendered her resignation with an ulterior motive, namely, to artificially reduce her income for the purposes of this ancillary relief trial, thereby potentially inflating her ancillary relief claim.

117.  Second, I find that the Wife could in any event resume working as an insurance agent going forward. The Wife’s skillset as an insurance agent would not have perished in this short span of time. She has, until her resignation, worked in Hong Kong as an insurance agent for around 9 years. I find that the Wife could resume working as an insurance agent and earn a similar income as she did prior to her resignation.

118.  Third, apart from the “forgotten” transactions amounting to HK$372,250 as analysed above, the Wife has frequent and significant withdrawals. These come to HK$407,000 between the months of October 2023 and May 2024.

119.  The Wife explains that this HK$407,000 relates to her assisting friends with currency exchange. Her evidence is that she would at times receive Renminbi cash from her friends and subsequently withdraw the Hong Kong Dollars equivalent from her bank account in Hong Kong.

120.  I do not accept such currency exchange arrangement for the following reasons:

(1)  The Wife has produced no documentary evidence relating to such currency exchange arrangement(s) with her friends.

(2)  The evidence reveals that the Wife would place these funds in fixed deposits. This does not sit well with her case of currency exchange. The Wife explains that such fixed deposits were on the instructions of her friends, yet produced not a shred of documentary evidence on such instructions.

(3)  Further, the Wife claims to have corresponded with her friends on such arrangements via electronic means, yet still produced nothing.

(4)  In several instances, the funds received were in fact already in Hong Kong Dollars. There is therefore no need or no point in “currency exchange”.

(5)  Despite the significant withdrawals of HK$407,000, there are no corresponding deposits matching the amounts withdrawn. The frequent deposit and withdrawals could just as well be the Wife’s undisclosed income and expenses.

121.  Having considered the whole course of events and lack of evidence, I find the “currency exchange arrangement” highly suspicious and do not accept such claim(s).

122.  I further maintain consideration of the Husband’s evidence regarding the Wife’s business partnership with Madam Lai, which I have accepted above.

123.  The circumstances justify the drawing of an adverse inference against the Wife. I find that these deposits and withdrawals represent the Wife’s income and expenses. Alternatively, I draw the adverse inference that the Wife possesses hidden financial resources sufficient to maintain her monthly expenditure.

F2.  The Wife’s Expenses

124.  Pursuant to the Joint Table of Income and Expenditure, the Wife’s declared monthly expenses are as follows:

General Expenses
Rent	$16,000
Utilities	$1,200
Food	$3,700
Household expenses	$800
Sub-Total	$21,700
Personal Expenses
Meals out of home	$1,600
Transport	$2,300
Clothing/Shoes	$800
Personal grooming	$500
Holiday	$2,000
Medical/Dental	$100
Tax	$32
Insurance premia	$4,316
Contribution to parents	$3,000
Sub-Total	$14,648
Grand Total	$36,348

125.  The Husband disputes the Wife’s declared expenses for (1) rent, and (2) holiday. For these items, the Husband counter-proposes HK$3,000 and HK$800 respectively.

126.  First, as to rental expenses, the Husband contends that this does not represent the Wife’s actual expenditure, but merely the Wife’s prospective housing budget. In the Wife’s evidence, she accepts that since she moved out of the FMH in 2020, she has been residing at a rented accommodation costing HK$3,000 per month and that this has been the case for the past four years. During cross-examination, the Wife also stated that the budget of HK$16,000 was for a 3-bedroom flat, which would serve, too, as her Mother’s accommodation. It was argued on behalf of the Wife that she “should not be criticised for her preference to rent a more spacious flat…”.

127.  I do not agree that the Wife is simply “renting a more spacious flat”. It is entirely unfair for the Wife to attempt to factor into the rental budget her Mother’s share of such expenses. After all, never during the marriage did Parties reside with the Wife’s Mother, and the Wife provided no justification for why the Husband should bear responsibility for the Wife’s obligations towards her Mother upon divorce.

128.  Whilst I do not agree that the proposed budget of HK$16,000 is reasonable in the circumstances, given my finding at Section F1 above that the Wife can financially sustain herself, I nevertheless take the view that if she can afford to “rent a more spacious flat”, then she can by all means do so. It remains her own decision, but this is not to affect the Husband in ancillary relief. For the avoidance of doubt, I find HK$3,000 for rent to be reasonable. This has been the case for four years already.

129.  Second, regarding holiday expenses, the Wife declared the amount of HK$100 as her monthly holiday expense in both her 1st and 2nd Form Es. Only in the Joint Table of Income and Expenditure had this expense been adjusted to HK$2,000.

130.  The Wife has put forward no acceptable justification for this twenty-fold increase in expense. In the Wife’s evidence, she conceded that her travel would be restricted to Mainland China. The Husband’s proposed budget of HK$800 would provide the Wife with an annual budget of around HK$9,600. I consider this a fair amount.

131.  In summary, I find that the Wife’s reasonable expenses come to HK$22,148 per month.

F3.  The Husband’s Income / Earning Capacity / Financial Resources

132.  The Husband claims to have monthly income of about HK$57,785. At closing, the Husband revised this to HK$76,215.17. The Wife takes issue with the Husband’s declared level of income. She says that the Husband instead earns (or could earn) HK$125,000 for the following reasons.

133.  First, the Wife contends that despite the Husband’s case of having retired in 2019 or 2020, he remains to be involved in the operations of the Limited Company. The Wife refers to the Husband’s involvement in the movement(s) of funds between the Unlimited Company and the Limited Company.

134.  On this, I take note that the Limited Company was incepted by the Husband. The majority of shares in the Limited Company had, since 2020, been transferred to the Husband’s son. It is evidently a family company. Despite having transferred 99% of shares in the Limited Company to his son, the Husband remains to be a 1% shareholder and a director. By reason of the aforesaid, I do not find it helpful for the Wife to point to certain participation and/or involvement on the part of the Husband to be automatically in conflict with the Husband’s case that he has retired. On the evidence, the Husband provides assistance to his son in operating the Limited Company, and managed some transfer(s) of funds on the instructions and/or at the request of the son. This does not necessarily mean the Husband has not retired. There is no evidence that he has active involvement which could approximate to working in the Limited Company. Moreover, it is not the Husband’s case that he has ceased all work and completely retired. The Husband remains to operate the Unlimited Company. With the said context in mind, I do not accept the Wife’s contention.

135.  Second, the Wife claims that the Husband receives an income from the Unlimited Company. This is in fact accepted by the Husband but to a lesser extent. By the Wife’s case, the Husband’s income from the Unlimited Company should be calculated by averaging the revenue earned between 2019 and 2023, i.e. HK$33,167. The Husband, on the other hand, relies solely on the latest accounting document to say that his income from the Unlimited Company is HK$29,090.17 per month. This figure is a combination of the Husband’s salary and the profit made by the Unlimited Company.

136.  I prefer the Husband’s case. After all, the Unlimited Company has its operating expenses. It is therefore unfair to simply average the revenue. Moreover, it is the Husband’s case (and I accept) that he has retired since 2019 or 2020. The Wife’s reliance on accounting documents dating back to 2019 and 2020 straddles the period when the Husband was retiring. To use these documents to depict the Husband’s current income would therefore be unreliable and unfair. I therefore find that the Husband’s income from the Unlimited Company is HK$29,090.17 per month.

137.  Third, the Wife claims that the Husband receives rental income from the SW Property, a property defined and analysed in greater detail hereinbelow. Suffice it to say for the present purposes, this is a nine-storey property, and it is agreed that the 1st to 8th Floors are let out as commercial premises to generate rental income.

138.  The Husband’s case on this is that he receives RMB¥40,000 rental income from the SW Property. The Wife says that the Husband in fact receives around RMB¥57,334.32 per month. In so computing, the Wife refers to the Husband’s bank statements. Referring to the relevant tenancy agreements, the Wife submits that the Husband should be receiving RMB¥60,000 per month.

139.  Having gone through the documentary evidence, I prefer the Wife’s case. From the evidence, however, some fluctuations can be seen in the amount received by the Husband month by month. I find that the Husband has rental income of about RMB¥60,000 (or HK$66,000) from the SW Property. I shall take note of the said fluctuations where relevant.

140.  Fourth, the Wife contends that, given the Husband claims that he is the beneficial owner of the 1/F and 2/F Shops, the Husband will be receiving rental income going forward, which should be factored in. This accounts for RMB¥18,000 (or HK$19,800).

141.  I do not agree this to be is fair. Upon the ancillary relief determination herein, the 1/F and 2/F Shops may have to be sold to create liquidity. Thus, such rental income may not exist going forward. Whilst I will not ignore the possibility of such rental income, I will not take such income as a matter of course in considering the Husband’s monthly income.

142.  Fifth, the Wife contends that the Husband’s Mainland property (十里銀灘) could be let out for RMB¥1,250 (or HK$1,375) per month. I do not accept this. In the Husband’s evidence, he has marketed the property for rent for many months and has been unable to let it out. The reality of the situation is obvious. In these circumstances, I do not find it fair to attribute this rental income as the Husband’s income going forward.

143.  It is not disputed that the Husband receives (1) old age allowance of HK$1,570 per month, and (2) HKMC annuity of HK$3,125 per month.

144.  Summarising all the above, I find that the Husband has monthly income of HK$99,785.17.

F4.  The Husband’s Expenses

145.  Pursuant to the Joint Table of Income and Expenditure, the Husband’s declared monthly expenses are as follows:

General Expenses
Utilities	$6,000
Food	$5,000
Household expenses	$15,000
Domestic helpers x2	$12,000
Vehicle expenses	$15,000
Sub-Total	$53,000
Personal Expenses
Meals out of home	$6,000
Transport	$500
Clothing/Shoes	$1,000
Personal grooming	$500
Entertainment/presents	$3,000
Holiday	$3,000
Medical/Dental	$3,000
Tax	$1,300
Insurance premia	$4,221.37
Others (golf)	$4,000
Sub-Total	$26,521.37
Grand Total	$79,521.37

146.  The Wife disputes the Husband’s declared expenses for (1) vehicle expenses, and (2) insurance premia.

147.  First, on vehicle expenses, the Wife’s position is that since the Husband parks his car at home, the declared amount of HK$15,000 would be just for fuel – an amount which the Wife contends is excessive. When cross-examined, the Husband testified that fuel costs account for around HK$10,000 to HK$11,000 of the HK$15,000 budget. The Husband further explained that his car is a 4-wheel drive with a large capacity engine, and as a consequence, higher fuel consumption. The remainder of the budget was for tolls and repairs.

148.  Although I see reason in the Husband’s contentions, I find the Husband’s budget to be on the high side. Further, the Husband has failed to produce evidence substantiating the above expenses. Doing the best I can on the available evidence, I adopt a figure of HK$10,000 for this item of expenditure.

149.  Second, pursuant to the Joint Table of Income and Expenditure, the Wife challenges the Husband’s insurance expenses on the basis that they are “subject to proof by [the Husband] as this was not raised before”.

150.  The Husband’s Updated Form E indeed contained no declared expenditure for insurance. However, in the Husband’s 1st Form E, he did declare the amount of HK$3,200 as his insurance expenses.

151.  Given that it is undisputed the Husband does hold a number of insurance policies, I accept the amount of HK$4,221.37 as now declared. In any event, pursuant to my findings at Section F3 above as to the Husband’s income, whether or not this expense exists does not affect my decision on the Husband’s financial sustainability.

152.  In summary, I find that the Husband’s reasonable expenses come to HK$74,521.37 per month.

153.  On the above analysis, I find that both Parties’ financial resources are sufficient to meet their needs.

G.  APPLICATION OF THE SHARING PRINCIPLE / DEPARTURE FROM EQUALITY

154.  Having concluded as above, I proceed to consider the appropriate division of assets. In doing so, I bear in mind all the core principles in the relevant cases, including but not limited to the following.

155.  As is trite, the duration of the marriage is a major factor in the section 7 exercise. In LKW v DD (2010) 13 HKCFAR 537, Ribeiro PJ stated at §§108-109 that:

“108. Section 7(1)(d) specifies duration of the marriage as a factor which the court must consider when exercising its discretionary powers. This is potentially of great importance to the question whether the court should depart from an equal division. While the sharing principle applies to both long and short marriages, it is clear that when a short marriage comes to an end, fairness may dictate that one party should exit the relationship with less than half of the total assets.

109. In Lord Nicholls’s words, this “reflects the instinctive feeling that parties will generally have less call upon each other on the breakdown of a short marriage”. Viewing marriage as a partnership of equals, the fruits of the partnership are likely to be less substantial after a short marriage. Mutual commitment being shorter-lived, the extent of any disadvantage brought about by separation may well be less profound. Moreover, as we have seen after a short marriage, the court may well treat property acquired by one of the parties before marriage or during the marriage by way of inheritance or gift or from some other wholly external source as excludable non-matrimonial property. We have also noted that Baroness Hale held that following a short marriage, unilateral assets in the sense explained above might be excluded. Accordingly, the duration of the marriage is highly relevant and an equal division is more likely to be sustained after a long, rather than a short, marriage.”

156.  Likewise, in WLK v TMC (2010) 13 HKCFAR 618 per Ribeiro PJ:

“84. The better approach is to regard the sharing principle as always applicable when there are assets surplus to needs but accepting that, as part and parcel of that principle, an equal division should indeed be departed from if good reason exists for so doing. The shortness of a marriage, the absence of marital acquest and similar matters can all be considered as possible reasons for such a departure. The circumstances of a particular case may lead the court to decide, for example, that equal division should be departed from to the extent of restricting the award to a sum sufficient to meet one of the parties’ needs. But that is not to say that the sharing principle has been “displaced”.”

157.  In PW v PPTW CACV 224/2013 (unrep., 12 March 2015), Kwan JA (as Kwan V-P then was) stated that:

“72. Thus, in applying the telescoped approach regarding non-matrimonial property, and in deciding to what extent equal division should be departed from where needs have been satisfied, according to the guidance given by the courts relevant factors may include: the duration of the marriage; the nature and value of the non-matrimonial property; the way the parties organized their financial affairs; their standard of living and the extent to which it has been afforded or enhanced by drawing on the non-matrimonial assets; the way the non-matrimonial property was preserved, enhanced or depleted during the marriage.

73. Similarly, in applying the two-step approach, in deciding whether it is fair and just that the existence of non-matrimonial property should be reflected, as stated in N v F at §14, this “depends on questions of duration and mingling”. And if it does decide that reflection is fair and just, in considering how much of the pre-marital property should be excluded, the court would be looking at factors such as the historic sum, the extent of mingling, springboard effect and passive economic growth, not dissimilar to some of the relevant factors considered in the telescoped approach. In any event, the fairness of the award in applying the two-step approach is to be tested by the “overall percentage technique”.”

158.  Counsel for the Wife referred to the case of E v L (Financial Remedies) [2022] 1 FLR 952, in which Mostyn J, on the topic of sharing of matrimonial property, stated inter alia that:

“45. … For my part I would say (as I have said before when talking about the rarity of sharing of non-matrimonial property) that a case where there can be a legitimate non-discriminatory unequal sharing of matrimonial property earned [original emphasis] in a short marriage will be as rare as a white leopard. I have said ‘earned’ to draw a distinction between money generated during a marriage and an asset brought into a marriage which has been ‘matrimonialised’, such as a dwelling used as a matrimonial home. I accept that the law recognises the possibility of unequal sharing of such an asset…”

159.  The above is consistent with the approach adopted in Hong Kong.

160.  The judgment of HH Judge I. Wong in SSLT v SMFC [2019] HKFLR 458 is also instructive. Of particular relevance are the following principles:

(1)  Even where an asset is identified to be “non-matrimonial”, there is no hard and fast rule that such asset should be excluded. It is a matter within the discretion of the judge having taken account of all the circumstances of the particular case.

(2)  In Hong Kong, in applying the sharing principle where there are non-matrimonial assets, the “telescoped approach” is the favoured approach. This refers to an adjustment of the percentage from 50% to take into account non-matrimonial assets.

(3)  Regardless of whether the “telescoped approach” or the “two stage approach” is applied, the factors considered by the Court in approaching an adjustment or exclusion would be the same. The factors include inter alia the duration of marriage; the nature and value of the non-matrimonial property; the extent of mingling, springboard effect and passive economic growth.

(4)  “96. Thus, the fact that a property being non-matrimonial would not automatically lead to the conclusion that it should be ring-fenced and excluded from distribution. It is only a factor that the court may consider when deciding whether to depart from equal division. As has been pointed out by Riberio PJ in LKW v DD, there is no hard and fast rule as to whether any property should be excluded. It is very much a matter within the judge’s discretion to be exercised taking account of all the circumstances of the case. Apart from the fact that a property being ‘non-matrimonial’, the court may also consider other facts such as the duration of the marriage, the extent of intermingling, springboard effect and passive economic growth. Ultimately, it is a question of fairness whether non-matrimonial asset or the extent of which ought to be excluded from the sharing principle.”

(5)  The English authorities suggest that non-matrimonial assets could be distributed if it is justified by the circumstances of the particular case. It is, however, more common that non-matrimonial assets are distributed to meet the needs of the other party.

161.  In the course of drafting this Judgment, the UK Supreme Court’s judgment in Standish v Standish [2025] UKSC 26 was handed down. Of particular importance for the present case is the Supreme Court’s statement of principle that:

“… the time has come to make clear that non-matrimonial property should not be subject to the sharing principle (though non-matrimonial property can be subject to the principles of needs and compensation). …”

162.  This approach has yet been adopted in Hong Kong. Whilst persuasive, I remain bound to apply the local jurisprudence as set out above.

G1.  Duration of the Marriage

163.  Parties were married for about 3.5 years. It is the Wife’s case that since late 2013 or early 2014, Parties commenced premarital cohabitation and transitioned seamlessly into marriage. On such basis, the Wife asks the Court to approach the present marriage as a marriage of about 6 years.

164.  Pausing here, even with a marriage of “about 6 years”, this is neither long nor short: SSLT v SMFC at §170.

165.  In WLK v TMC (2010) 13 HKCFAR 618, Ribeiro PJ stated that:

“97. … Pre-marital cohabitation is clearly capable of coming within s. 7 as a species of ‘conduct’ or as a fact to be taken into account as a relevant part of ‘all the circumstances’. But, as pointed out by Hartmann J (as he then was) in F v F, the fact of cohabitation per se is not sufficient. It is the nature of the cohabitation which dictates whether it should be taken into account in the exercise of the court’s discretion under s. 7. Thus, in F v F, cohabitation on the parties’ express understanding that it was a trial period made it irrelevant.

98. Pre-marital cohabitation which is taken into account tends to involve the parties living together in circumstances which approximate to cohabitation as a married couple…”

166.  It is the Wife’s case that she met the Husband in about September 2013. Two months later in November 2013, they began cohabiting – first with the Husband moving into the Wife’s residence in the Mainland and subsequently with her moving into to his residence in Tsuen Wan.

167.  In support of the Wife’s case, she refers to how she would drive the Husband to his workplace(s), how she was involved in the Husband’s business and household matters. The Wife says that during the weekends, they would travel together to the Mainland.

168.  The Husband denies any pre-marital cohabitation which approximates to cohabitation as a married couple. He claims that Parties would stay together for 2 to 3 nights a week, yet his own affirmation evidence admits that the Wife moved into (“搬入”) his Tsuen Wan residence in 2014. Under cross-examination, the Husband explained that what he said in his affirmation should be understood as referring to the Wife spending 1-2 nights per week at his Tsuen Wan residence. The Husband denies that the Wife drove him to his workplace(s) or was otherwise involved in his business or his household matters, but accepts that the Wife did go once or twice a month to the construction site(s) at which the Husband worked, and irregularly to his warehouse.

169.  Having considered Parties’ respective evidence, I do not accept that there was pre-marital cohabitation which approximates to cohabitation as a married couple. In so finding, I have considered the following factors:

(1)  The Wife claims the Husband moved into her Mainland residence when they began cohabiting. This was, however, at a time when the Husband was still working and not yet retired. There is no dispute that the Husband worked in Hong Kong. Absent any explanation for why the Parties would choose to cohabit in the Mainland under these circumstances, I find this claim improbable. Instead, I prefer the Husband’s evidence that he only visited the Wife’s Mainland residence during his holidays.

(2)  According to the Wife’s case, the Parties began cohabiting in November 2013. She requests the Court to consider this as the start of the relevant period. However, also by the Wife’s case, this was just 2 months after Parties met. I find it implausible that Parties would have cohabited as a married couple that early on in the relationship, especially given their respective localities as discussed above. More certainly, the Wife would not have participated in the Husband’s work to the extent as claimed at that point in time.

(3)  As to the Wife’s contention that she was involved in the Husband’s business and household matters, the Husband has categorically denied the same. Regarding this aspect – and in fact concerning all cross-examination on pre-marital cohabitation – the Husband gave clear and unequivocal answers. The Wife’s evidence on her assertion was, in comparison, much less robust. I much prefer the Husband’s evidence.

170.  Accordingly, I find the relevant duration of the marriage to be 3.5 years.

G2.  Non-Matrimonial Properties

171.  As found above, the Pot comes to HK$42,891,402.82. This comprises the Husband’s share of HK$41,899,404.59 and the Wife’s share of HK$991,998.23.

172.  Of the Husband’s share, HK$35,808,452 is in landed properties. The remaining comprises of bank balances, companies, and other assets. His liquid assets are mainly in the form of cash in the bank amounting to HK$2,606,883.62.

173.  First, the Wife’s submissions generally advance the proposition that the landed properties acquired or “constructed” (her Counsel’s terminology) during the marriage are marital acquests and are therefore subject to division. She also maintains that the Husband’s other assets, including his bank accounts, companies, and insurance policies, are matrimonial assets.

174.  I have reservations on this line of argument. The Husband married the Wife when he was about 65 or 66 years old. By then, he had already accumulated much of the wealth he now owns. He applied these accumulated wealth in the acquisition of certain landed properties during the marriage. But this alone does not make such properties marital acquest. Absent evidence of the Wife’s monetary contribution, the funds used to acquire landed properties during the marriage would have (at least partly) originated from the Husband’s savings or investments accumulated prior to their marriage. In other words, these landed properties were not entirely the fruits of Parties’ joint efforts or marital acquests. In these circumstances, I do not agree it is fair or just to simply find that landed properties acquired, built (or “constructed”, her Counsel’s terminology) during the marriage to be matrimonial assets and be distributed as such.

175.  This similarly applies to the Husband’s other assets, such as insurance policies, interests in companies, and his bank accounts. I do not find it fair to simply categorise these as marital acquests given the background of this case, the shortness of the marriage, and in particular how the Husband has accumulated his wealth before meeting the Wife.

176.  Notwithstanding the above, it is not the function of the Court to attempt to undertake any form of forensic accounting exercise in pursuit of the precise dividing line amidst these properties. To achieve fairness, I will take the above into account in arriving at the final ancillary relief award, where I will give holistic consideration to all the circumstances of the case.

177.  Second, Parties are in agreement that the following are matrimonial assets:

(1)  The FMH, with a value of HK$6,300,000.

(2)  The 1/F and 2/F Shops, with a value of HK$4,400,000.

178.  There also appears no quarrel between Parties that the following assets are non-matrimonial and are not subject to division:

(1)  Husband’s Tsuen Wan Car Park P92, with value of HK$1,600,000.

(2)  Husband’s Tsuen Wan Property, with value of HK$2,960,000.

(3)  Husband’s Mainland property (十里銀灘), with value of HK$900,000.

179.  Third, the Residential Land with the value of HK$2,922,040 was not intermingled with the Pot. Apart from it having been acquired during the marriage, there is no contention that it was put to the family’s use or otherwise generated income which in turn was utilised towards the family.

180.  The Husband however does not quarrel over the matrimonial nature of this property. I accordingly so find.

181.  Fourth, the major point of divide between the Parties is the treatment of the SW Property. This is a property situated at Guangzhou. Its agreed value is HK$16,736,412 (the “SW Property”). The headline facts are as follows:

(1)  The land on which the Property was built was acquired by the Husband prior to marriage, in January 2010.

(2)  The SW Property is a nine-storey tall building (roof excluded), of which the 1st to 8th floors are commercial premises and leased out.

(3)  Construction of the SW Property (the entire building) was completed in or around 2014 or 2015.

(4)  The Husband uses the 9th floor and the roof as a residence. The Wife says that Parties lived there during the weekends and is their 2nd FMH.

182.  Distilling the Wife’s case, her main contention for the inclusion of the SW Property as matrimonial property is that it served as a 2nd FMH for a few years and that she made certain payments related to its construction. On such basis, the Wife asks for the full inclusion of the value of the SW Property or alternatively that, “one-fifth of its value, representing the 9th floor and roof top (i.e. HK$3,347,282.40) should be regarded as matrimonial property available for sharing”. The Husband on the other hand contends that the SW Property should be excluded completely as a pre-marital asset.

183.  My views are as follows:

(1)  First, save a small financial contribution contended by the Wife (to be addressed below), the acquisition and construction funds paid for by the Husband were pre-marital. As mentioned, the land was acquired back in 2010 and construction was roughly complete in about 2015. The key considerations in assessing its matrimonial nature would therefore be other non-financial factors, such as the extent of intermingling, if any, and use of the property.

(2)  Second, on the Wife’s purported financial contribution, it is her case that she paid (1) RMB¥170,000 in June 2016 for “fire engineering fees”, and (2) RMB¥400,000 in October 2016 as construction fees. I note that whilst the RMB¥170,000 was paid to a third-party, the RMB¥400,000 was paid to the Husband.

(3)  The Husband, however, denies that the payments by the Wife were from her own pocket. He alleges that he had previously paid the Wife, and the Wife therefore forwarded and made payments on his behalf. Moreover, the Husband disputes that the RMB¥170,000 was for “fire engineering fees”, claiming this to have been for construction fees instead.

(4)  I do not consider the above dispute regarding the application of the RMB¥170,000 to be significant. Whether it was for “fire engineering fees” or construction fees, the focus is whether the Wife contributed financially towards the SW Property.

(5)  On this point, I prefer the Husband’s case. In cross-examination, the Wife actually accepted that in 2014, the Husband transferred RMB¥2,000,000 to her. She also accepted that she made both the RMB¥170,000 and RMB¥400,000 payments on the instructions of the Husband and did not ask further questions.

(6)  As submitted by Counsel for the Wife, this RMB¥570,000 represents over 6 years of the Wife’s income and is, to her, a significant sum. Given the Wife’s stated case on her financial portfolio and income, I find it unlikely that she would have paid such a significant amount from her own pocket without asking for details, had this RMB¥570,000 been her own money. Notably, the Wife does not say she had forgotten the details. It is her positive evidence that she did not ask and simply acted according to the Husband’s instructions. I therefore find that the Wife’s payment of RMB¥570,000 was not her own financial contribution towards the SW Property.

(7)  Third, the Wife contends that 9th floor and rooftop were utilised as the Parties’ holiday home and therefore has attained the status as the “2nd FMH”.

(8)  I do not accept that the use of the SW Property as the Parties’ holiday home justifies its treatment as a “2nd FMH” and therefore having a central place in the marriage. I do accept, however, that its utilisation as a holiday home means that there is an extent of intermingling with the marriage. In other words, I accept that part of the SW Property has been “matrimonialised”. Under the telescoped approach, I shall take this into account in coming to the ultimate award.

(9)  Fourth, the Wife invites the Court to include the entire value of the SW Property, or alternatively one-fifth of such value, as a matrimonial asset. Insofar as the former proposition is concerned, I find it completely unfair. As is common ground, the 1st to 8th floors of the Property are commercial premises and are let out for rental income which were paid directly to the Husband. Given my rejection of the alleged RMB¥570,000 contribution by the Wife, I see no justification for inclusion of those portions of the Property as matrimonial assets.

(10)  Even if I am wrong on the point of the Wife’s RMB¥570,000 contribution, such sum is incommensurate with a Property worth HK$16,736,412 to be included as matrimonial. It would not in any event materially affect my decision.

(11)  Turning to the Wife’s fallback position, i.e. that the 9th floor and rooftop have a value equating to one-fifth of the total value of the SW Property, I note that there is no separate and/or independent valuation of the 9th floor and the rooftop. If it is the Wife’s case that the value of the 9th floor and rooftop is one-fifth of the Property’s total value, then the Wife ought to adduce appropriate evidence to this effect. Particularly in relation to the rooftop, I am unable to accept that the rooftop has the same value as the 1st to 9th floors in the absence of valuation evidence.

(12)  Doing the best I can in these circumstances, I attach a value of one-ninth of the total value, i.e. HK$1,859,601.33 as the value of the 9th floor and rooftop, to be rounded up to HK$1,860,000.

(13)  However, considering all the other points above, I do not find it fair to simply attribute HK$1,860,000 as matrimonial assets. At the same time, I find it difficult to fairly attribute a precise figure to this. I shall bear this factor in mind when coming to the final award below.

184.  In summary, only the FMH, the 1/F and 2/F Shops, and the 9th floor and rooftop of the SW Property are matrimonial assets.

G3.  Allegations of Conduct against the Husband

185.  The starting point is LKW v DD, in which Ribeiro PJ held that:

“104. Conduct, or more accurately, negative conduct, is therefore only to be regarded as a material factor if it is ‘obvious and gross’ in the sense explained in Wachtel v Wachtel or, which comes to the same thing, if it is such that it would be in the opinion of the court to be inequitable to disregard it”

186.  In CHN v CCY [2023] HKFC 48, HH Judge E. Liu, having reviewed the authorities on point, stated that:

“139. It is well established that the ‘gross and obvious’ test does not carry any moral judgment, and has to be approached broadly. Generally, the misconduct must be extremely serious to justify a departure from the equal sharing principle, and such cases are rare…”

187.  Also instructive is LCC v LTLA [2024] 2 HKLRD 1177, as already cited hereinabove.

188.  Bearing the relevant legal principles in mind, I now consider the Wife’s allegations of conduct against the Husband.

189.  First, the Wife says that the Husband’s conduct has led to her loss of rental income in the amount of RMB¥4,300 per month from June 2024 onwards. It is alleged that due to the Husband’s refusal to recognise her beneficial interest in the 1/F and 2/F Shops and his report of the loss of documents relating to the Shops, the Wife has been unable to let out part of the 1/F and 2/F Shops, causing a financial loss to her.

190.  In relation to the Wife’s contention regarding the Husband’s failure to acknowledge her as the beneficial owner of the 1/F and 2/F Shops, I have already found against the Wife hereinabove.

191.  As to the loss of documents, in the Husband’s evidence, he stated that he reported the documents to have been lost after he inquired with the Wife, from whom he understood the documents to have been lost. In these circumstances, I do not find the Husband’s report to have caused any negative impact.

192.  More importantly, even with a loss of RMB¥4,300 per month from June 2024, this in total comes to just HK$38,000 for the entire period up to the trial. In the context of this case, I find it far from the “obvious and gross” threshold required.

193.  Second, the Wife complains that the Husband had lodged a complaint against her to her insurance agency and the Insurance Authority, resulting in her loss of income as an insurance agent since January 2025.

194.  The issue of the Wife’s resignation has been dealt with hereinabove at Section F1. For the present purposes, I reiterate my finding that the Wife’s resignation was not a result of the Husband’s complaint(s) – particularly as these were deemed “unsubstantiated” by the relevant authority months before the Wife tendered her resignation.

195.  The Wife further argues that the Husband’s said conduct “may constitute defamation for being false”. Whilst this Court is not determining the issue of defamation, I have reservations as to whether there is sufficient publication of such “false complaints”. This is a core requirement in defamation. I have not been addressed at all on this.

196.  More importantly, I do not welcome these scattershot points, throwing mud to see what sticks.

197.  In any event, given the conclusion I have reached hereinabove, I do not accept the Wife’s argument.

198.  In conclusion, I do not accept any of the conduct alleged by the Wife to meet the requisite threshold.

H.  DECIDING THE OUTCOME

199.  To summarise, I have found that:

(1)  The total pot size is HK$42,891,402.82. The Husband’s side of the financial portfolio comes to HK$41,899,404.59. The Wife’s side of the financial portfolio comes to HK$991,998.23.

(2)  Parties’ respective income and/or financial resources are sufficient to meet their expenses and needs.

(3)  Parties both have undisclosed electronic wallets.

(4)  This was a short marriage of 3.5 years, with the Husband entering the marriage at over 60 years old and having accumulated much of his wealth prior.

(5)  The Wife does not argue that any part of her side of the financial portfolio is non-matrimonial in nature.

(6)  No conduct meeting the legal threshold needs to be taken into account.

200.  Considering all the circumstances of the case, I consider that a fair division would be a split of 20:80 of the total pot in the Husband’s favour. This means the Wife will exit the marriage with HK$8,578,280.56.

201.  Cross-checking the above with my determination on matrimonial and non-matrimonial assets, this figure produces a 38:62 division, based on my finding that assets subject to division come to HK$22,564,990.8.

202.  Having reconsidered the entire matter holistically, I consider that this to be a fair outcome.

203.  Subtracting the Wife’s own assets from the above, the balancing payment would be HK$7,586,282.34 (the “Balancing Lump Sum”).

204.  In the Wife’s Open Proposal(s), she expressed that she is not opposed to a transfer of the Husband’s Hong Kong properties in satisfaction of the lump sum. However, noting that the Husband’s Hong Kong properties are utilised as his own home and/or otherwise utilised for the use of the Limited and Unlimited Companies, I do not see it appropriate to direct such transfer.

205.  Given the composition of the Husband’s side of the financial portfolio, particularly that most of his assets are illiquid, the Husband will evidently need time to liquidate his assets to come up with the payment.

206.  In the Husband’s latest Open Proposal and insofar as the cash component is concerned, he proposed a payment of HK$5 million in a period of three years. He has not explained why three years is required.

207.  I consider it fair, however, for the Balancing Lump Sum to be paid by instalments over a period of time. The precise structure and timeframe will be spelt out below.

I.  COSTS

209.  I will not recite the Parties’ respective Open Proposals in detail.

210.  Suffice it to say, neither Party was wholly successful, and neither could be said to be a victor in these Proceedings. Given my findings above, in particular on the Wife’s income and the allegations made against the Husband, I also consider that it was fair for the Husband to proceed to trial.

211.  Arguably, in terms of quantum, the Wife has matched her 2nd Open Proposal. However, as I have mentioned above, part of the Wife’s 2nd Open Proposal was for the Husband to pay her costs of this suit, the amount of which was not set out.

212.  Further, by the Wife’s 2nd Open Proposal, she asks for payment of HK$7.5 million within six months’ time. Given the Husband’s portfolio, this would require the Husband to empty his bank accounts, in addition to successfully selling perhaps more than one landed property. This, I consider, is unrealistic and unfair.

213.  I also do not find it fair that the ancillary relief award should be further adjusted by way of a costs order.

214.  Having considered all the circumstances of the case, I make an order nisi to be made absolute in 14 days from the date of the order hereof that there be no order as to costs of and occasioned by the ancillary relief proceedings, including all costs reserved.

215.  For the avoidance of doubt, outstanding but unpaid cost orders do stand.

J.  ORDER

216.  I make the following order:

(1)  The Husband do pay the Wife HK$1 million within 14 days from the date of the order;

(2)  The Husband do pay the Wife a further HK$2 million within 9 months from the date of the order;

(3)  The Husband do pay the Wife a further HK$2 million within 18 months from the date of the order;

(4)  The Husband do pay the Wife a further HK$2 million within 27 months from the date of the order;

(5)  The Husband do pay the Wife the remainder of HK$586,282.34 within 36 months from the date of the order;

(6)  Liberty to apply; and

(7)  There be no order as to costs of and occasioned by the ancillary relief proceedings, including all costs reserved. Outstanding but unpaid cost orders do stand.

217.  I thank Counsel for their assistance.

Representation: