RE CORONEL HILDA DIAZ

CACV 580/2026, [2026] HKCA 1389

On Appeal From [2026] HKCFI 3111

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 580 OF 2026

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 1325 OF 2023)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Au JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  This is the applicant’s appeal against the order of Deputy High Court Judge Michael Wong (“the Judge”) dated 27 May 2026 ([2026] HKCFI 3111) (“the Leave Decision”) refusing her application for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 25 July 2023 (“the Board’s Decision”), whereby the Board dismissed her appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 4 February 2022, refusing her subsequent non‑refoulement claim.

2.  The appeal was listed to be heard on 21 July 2026.  By the directions made by the Registrar of Civil Appeals on 3 June 2026, which were received by the applicant in person on the same day, she was directed to lodge two sets of skeleton argument on or before 7 July 2026, failing which, she would be deemed to have waived her right to have an oral hearing for the appeal and the hearing date would be vacated with the appeal being determined on paper.  However, she did not lodge any skeleton argument in support of her appeal by the stipulated time.

3.  As the applicant failed to lodge any skeleton argument by the stipulated time, she was deemed to have waived her right to have an oral hearing and elected to have her appeal disposed of on paper.  The hearing date was thus vacated on 8 July 2026 and this was communicated to the applicant by post on the same day.

4.  Subsequently, on 9 July 2026, the applicant lodged written submissions in support of her appeal.

5.  The applicant’s background, the basis of her claim and arguments advanced before the Board as well as the Board’s reasons for rejecting her appeal are all set out in the Board’s Decision: see [2] of the Leave Decision.  The Judge has also set out in detail his reasons for refusing the Leave Application at [8] ‑ [38] of the Leave Decision.  We will not repeat the details herein.

6.  By the Notice of Appeal filed on 3 June 2026, the applicant stated:

“I am disagree with the decision maker authorities. The Judgment given by the Court of First Instance and the decision made by the both Respondent’s. The Respondent’s were totally relied on some web names which officially not recognized. Previously I gave birth to my child who is Hong Kong resident and being a mother I should need to care and rise my child in Hong Kong. So I am requesting to this respected court to reconsider my case.” (sic)

7.  As mentioned above, the applicant lodged written submissions on 9 July 2026.  In those submissions, she complained that the Director had failed to appreciate or give proper importance or weight to the presence of state acquiescence.  She also complained that the Board acted unreasonably and was procedurally unfair by placing too much reliance on Country of Origin information and that the Boards Decision was unreasonable, irrational and procedurally unfair as there was no proper investigation in her claims.

DISCUSSION

8.  The relevant legal principles governing appeals in non‑refoulement cases are set out in Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14].

9.  In particular, in an appeal against refusal of leave to apply for judicial review in non-refoulement cases, the Court of Appeal will only examine the decision of the judge in light of the grounds advanced by the applicant.  If no viable ground is put forward to reverse the judge’s decision, the appeal should be dismissed.  The Court’s role is not to examine the decision maker’s decision afresh as if it were a fresh application for judicial review.  See Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14(6)].

10.  We see no merit in her contentions.  Her assertions are mainly directed that the Director’s and the Board’s respective decisions and nowhere in her Notice of Appeal did the applicant identify any error committed by the Judge with specific particulars.  All her assertions are in any event general and bare allegations unsupported by specific particulars or evidence.  General assertions of fear if refouled do not constitute proper grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar [2022] HKCA 627 at [6]. They do not constitute viable grounds of appeal.

11.  For the above reasons, the applicant’s contentions are clearly without substance.  We see no basis to interfere with the Leave Decision.

12.  Accordingly, the applicant’s appeal against the Leave Decision has no merit and is dismissed.