GAGGA SINGH AND ANOTHER v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE

HCAL 2035/2018

[2021] HKCFI 1733

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 2035 of 2018

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)

Following;

	consideration of the documents only;  or
	consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in open court;

Leave to apply for Judicial Review refused.

Observations for the Applicants:

THE APPLICATION

Introduction

1.  This is the Applicants’ application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration contained in his Notice of Further Decision dated 22 September 2018.  The Applicants are Indian nationals.  The 1^st Applicant is the father of the 2^nd Applicant and the father of the applicant in HCAL 2193/2018.  The applicant in HCAL 2193/2018 withdrew his application shortly before this hearing.

The Background

2.  The 1^st Applicant departed from India on 16 October 2008 and arrived in Hong Kong on 17 October 2008 on the strength of an Indian passport.  He was permitted to remain as a visitor until 31 October 2008.  On 27 October 2008, he was arrested by the police for using an identity card relating to another person, theft and breach of condition of stay.  On 23 December 2008, he was convicted of the offences and sentenced to 15 months’ imprisonment.  On 2 March 2009, he lodged a torture claim with the Immigration Department.  He was released on recognizance on 21 September 2009. On 8 August 2011, he married his present wife in Hong Kong and she gave birth to a daughter on 2 November 2011, ie the 2^nd Applicant and a son on 28 April 2013, ie the applicant in HCAL 2193/2018.

3.  The Applicants first made non-refoulement claims by written representation on 2 March 2009 and then on 2 April 2014.  On 11 June 2014, they made an application to the Director of Immigration (the “Director”) for non-refoulement protection under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”). They were assessed on all three applicable grounds then available under the USM, namely, Torture Risk[1]; BOR 3 Risk[2]; and Persecution Risk[3].

4.  By a Notice of Decision dated 27 November 2014, the Director rejected their application for non-refoulement protection.  They appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board/non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (the “Board”).  Their appeal was dismissed by the Board on 21 November 2016 (the “Decision”).  The Applicants did not pursue their claims further.  That Decision was final.

5.  On 5 January 2017, the Director invited the Applicants to submit additional facts, if any, which they considered relevant to their non-refoulement claims. The Director specifically reminded them of their absolute and non-derogable rights under the Hong Kong Bill of Rights (“HKBOR”), including right to life under Article 2 (“BOR 2 Risk”), in case they had omitted any relevant facts in relation thereto before because of any misunderstanding on what “all applicable grounds” means.  The Director required them to submit additional information, if any, on or before 19 January 2017 and told them that a further written decision on their non-refoulement claims on any other applicable grounds after taking into account any new facts submitted and all fact submitted previously under the USM will be made, even if they did not produce any relevant facts by 19 January 2017.

6.  The Applicants did not respond.  Having further considered the Applicants’ claims under BOR 2 Risk ground on the basis of the information hitherto submitted by the Applicants, the Director refused their application for non-refoulement protection.  By a Notice of Further Decision dated 25 January 2017, the Director informed the Applicants of his decision.  The Director specifically drew the Applicants’ attention to the fact that if they were aggrieved by his further decision, they may lodge a petition to the Board within 14 days from the date of the said Notice of Further Decision.  A copy of the petition form was enclosed with the letter.  The address of the Board was also stated in the letter.  The Applicants did not appeal.  

7.  It must be noted that four years have since lapsed, in the absence of an appeal, the Director’s decision in the Notice of Further Decision rejected the Applicants’ claim based on BOR 2 Risk is also final.  It must also be noted that that Notice of Further Decision is not dated 22 September 2018.  Effectively, the Board’s Decision rejecting the Applicants’ claims under the Torture Risk ground, the BOR 3 Risk ground and the Persecution Risk ground as well as the Director’s decision in the Notice of Further Decision rejecting their claim under the BOR 2 Risk ground are all final.   

8.  Twenty months later, on 26 September 2018, the Applicants applied for judicial review of the Director’s Notice of Further Decision dated 22 September 2018.

9.  In response to the enquiries from the Registrar, the Board informed the Registrar that it had only made one decision on 21 November 2016 relating to the Applicants confirming the Notice of Decision of the Director dated 27 November 2014.  Thus, the Applicants never appealed the Director’s Notice of Further Decision dated 25 January 2017, not to mention the one allegedly dated 22 September 2018.  The decision of the Director in his Notice of Further Decision is final.

10.  Out of an abundance of caution as to the subject matter of the intended judicial review, the Registrar wrote to the Director shortly before this hearing to specifically enquire about any Notice of Further Decision dated 22 September 2018.  On 29 March 2021, the Director confirmed that there is no record of any such notice having been issued to the Applicants.  In summary, there is no Notice of Further Decision of the Director dated 22 September 2018 for the court to review.

The application was not bona fide made

11.  An attempt was made at the hearing on 20 April 2021 to clarify with the Applicants what decision they are seeking judicial review.  The 1^st Applicant was adamant that there was a Notice of Further Decision dated 22 September 2018, but he could not produce a copy of the decision.  He handed up a bundle of documents.  The bundle included the Decision of the Board dated 21 November 2016, but no document dated 22 September 2018, whether by the Director or the Board.

12.  The Applicants sought leave to apply for judicial review of a very specific document, a Notice of Further Decision dated 22 September 2018 made by the Director.  In fact, there was never any such decision by the Director.  The 1^st Applicant had a copy of the Decision of the Board dated 21 November 2016.  If it was his intention to apply for judicial review of that Decision, he should have stated that on the notice of application for leave to appeal for judicial review (ie Form 86).  There was no room for such a triple mistake about the identity of the decision-maker, the name and date of the document evidencing the decision sought to be reviewed.  The decision sought to be reviewed is a fictitious decision.  The irresistible inference from the circumstances is that the Applicants invoked the judicial proceedings in order to delay their refoulement process triggered by the Decision.  An application for leave to apply for judicial review of a fictitious decision is a clear abuse of legal process and a waste of judicial resources which must be dismissed.

Conclusion

13.  For the above reasons, the Applicants’ application was dismissed. 

A POSSIBLE APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPLY IN RESPECT OF THE DECISION

Introduction

14.  While for some untold reasons the Applicants launched an application for leave to apply for judicial review of a fictitious decision, the decision they wished to review should be the Decision of the Board dated 21 November 2016.  Thus, the Court went the extra mile to consider whether there was any merit to amend the application to one for leave to apply for judicial review of the Decision.  To do so, the Applicants’ first hurdle is to apply for extension of time to apply for leave to apply for judicial review.

The applicable legal principles on extension of time to apply for leave

15.  The court’s leave is required in making an application for judicial review.  Section 21K (6) of the High Court Ordinance provides that where the Court of First Instance considers that there has been undue delay in making an application for judicial review, the court may refuse to grant leave for the making of the application; or any relief sought on the application, if it considers that the granting of the relief sought would be likely to cause substantial hardship to, or substantially prejudice the rights of, any person or would be detrimental to good administration.

16.  Order 53, rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court provides that an application for leave to apply for judicial review shall be made promptly and in any event within three months from the date when grounds for the application first arose unless the Court considers that there is good reason for extending the period within which the application shall be made.  An application made after three months is deemed to have been made with undue delay.  To obtain extension of time for making an application, the applicant has to satisfy the court that there are credible valid explanations for the delay. 

17.  In AW v Director of Immigration and William Lam[4], the Court of Appeal held that what may constitute a good reason for extending time cannot be defined.  In most cases, this would be a “multi-faceted question” the answer to which would depend on the circumstances of each case.  The following factors, which are not exhaustive, are likely to be of significance:

(1)  length of delay;

(2)  explanation for the delay;

(3)  merits of the substantive application;

(4)  prejudice to the applicant if time is not extended, and the prejudice to the respondent and to public administration if a challenge is allowed to proceed out of time; and

(5)  whether the application raises questions of general public importance, and whether those questions are likely to have to be resolved by the courts in any event.

Length of the delay and explanation for the delay

18.  As at the time of the application, there was already a 19-months’ delay in seeking to review the Decision.  The delay was by any standard inordinate.  At the hearing on 20 April 2021, the Court explored the reasons for the delay with the 1^st Applicant.  His immediate response was that the Board did not send him the Decision and it was only when he made his regular reporting to the Immigration Department and to report his change of address that he was informed of the Decision.  Based on his account, the possible reasons for such a scenario are misdirection by post and change of address.  It is noted that the address to which the Decision was sent and the address of the Applicants as shown in their application for leave are different.  Thus, if indeed the Applicants had not received the Decision, their change of address was the possible cause for the delay.  With the view to further assist the Applicants to establish the possibility that they made the application within a reasonable time after they were informed of the Decision, the 1^st Applicant was asked when did he report to the Immigration Department and when did he change his address.  He said he could not remember.  He made no attempt to relate these incidents with any events which could possibly remind him of the dates.  Accordingly, the Court gave directions for him to file the following information within 14 days:

(1)  all addresses of the Applicants with dates since November 2016;

(2)  evidence in support of the above, such as tenancy agreement, rental receipts or letters received from the government; and

(3)  the Applicants’ dates of reporting to the Immigration Department.

The Court also gave further direction that the application will be adjourned for hearing if the Court is satisfied with the explanation; and if not, the application will be determined on paper.

19.  On 3 May 2021, the Court received a letter written in Hindi by the 1^st Applicant enclosing a copy of the Decision. The directions were given in simple language and properly interpreted to the 1^st Applicant by a qualified interpreter.  The 1^st Applicant made sensible response and asked questions indicating that he understood the directions.  He gave no indication that he had difficulties complying with the directions.  The letter does not purport to provide any addresses with dates.  It has no enclosures other than a copy of the Decision.  It therefore does not contain evidence of their various changes of address and dates of change.  The letter, not being written in either of the official languages cannot be entertained by the court and may not be treated as compliance with the directions of the Court.  The questions raised by the Court were not answered.  

20.  In Re Karamjit Singh[5], the Court of Appeal held that it is the duty of an applicant to give the relevant authorities an address to which correspondence or notice can come to his attention in a timely manner.  If he does not, the consequence of any delay occasioned by the ineffectiveness of such an address would fall on his shoulder.  In the circumstances, the Court concluded that the Applicants could offer no explanation for the inordinate delay of 19 months.

The Applicants’ case

21.  To consider the merits of this possible application, it is necessary to examine the Applicants’ case, the Decision of the Board and their grounds of review.

22.  The Applicants’ case is as follows.  The 1^st Applicant’s father bought a piece of land from his uncle and neighbour, Surjit Singh before the 1^st Applicant was born.   His father built a house on the land in which his parents, two siblings and the 1^st Applicant lived.  The 1^st Applicant inherited the land when his father passed away in around 2006.  There were no documents evidencing the purchase or the inheritance.

23.  Less than a year after the father’s death, Surjit Singh started pressurizing the 1^st Applicant to transfer the land to him.  One day, Surjit Singh and his two sons went to the 1^st Applicant’s home and told his mother that the land the 1^st Applicant was occupying was theirs and they wanted it back.  They threatened to kill her eldest son, ie the 1^st Applicant, who is the owner of the land, if the land is not returned.  The 1^st Applicant made a report to the police but there was no follow up. 

24.  The 1^st Applicant was in fear and sought refuge from his friend, Bansa Singh.  Once, when Bansa Singh was away, the 1^st Applicant went to stay with another friend, Mandeep Singh for two days.  During that period, he met Surjit Singh in the street and was assaulted by Surjit Singh with a knife leaving a scar on his hand.

25.  Then, the 1^st Applicant returned to stay with Bansa Singh.  While staying there, he received threats from Surjit Singh. 

26.  One day, Surjit Singh and his sons armed with a ceremonial dagger and metal rod arrived at the 1^st Applicant’s home and drove his mother and siblings out.  Thereafter, they took possession of the land.  The 1^st Applicant made a report to the police.  Again, there was no follow up.

27.  About 10 days later, his mother and Manpreet Singh went back to their house.  Surjit Singh refused to leave and repeated the threat to kill the 1^st Applicant.

28.  The 1^st Applicant was afraid and fled to Hong Kong on 17 October 2008.  He stated in his non-refoulement claim form and his record of the screening interview that he was told by his mother while he was in Hong Kong that his friend, Gaji Singh who had earlier tried to persuade Surjit Singh not to create trouble and not to threaten him, was murdered by Surjit Singh. His mother told him that Surjit Singh was convicted of murder and sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment but was able to get bail out from prison from time to time.  However, in his evidence given at the oral hearing, the 1^st Applicant told the Board that Gaji Singh was killed by Surjit Singh when trying to intervene and separate Surjit Singh from the 1^st Applicant during a fight at his home. Gaji Singh died on the spot while the 1^st Applicant escaped.

The finding of the Board

29.  In view of the two drastically different versions of the murder of Gaji Singh on which the Applicants’ fears and risks were founded, the Board could not attach any weight to the 1^st Applicant’s evidence stated in his non-refoulement claim form and record of the screening interview or his evidence before the Board.  The Board also felt sceptical about the 1^st Applicant’s failure to lodge a torture claim until he was arrested five months after his arrival in Hong Kong.  Such conduct was inconsistent with that of a genuine claimant seeking refuge in Hong Kong.  As the 1^st Applicant has abandoned his land in India and Surjit Singh has taken possession of the land, there is no longer any cause for Surjit Singh to harm the Applicants. 

30.  Principally for the above reasons, the Board did not accept that the assault on the 1^st Applicant resulted in his suffering any severe pain or suffering; that he has shown any grounds for the existence of real risks of torture; that he would be persecuted because of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; that the evidence showed a reasonable possibility that his life or freedom would be threatened, if returned to India.  Further, having consulted the available Country of Origin Information (“COI”), the Board was satisfied that the Applicants could avert the risk, if there were any, by internal relocation within India. 

31.  Accordingly, the Board confirmed the decision of the Director in his Notice of Decision dated 27 November 2014 and dismissed the Applicants’ appeal.

The Applicants’ application for leave and grounds

32.  The Applicants’ grounds for application as stated in the 1^st Applicant’s affirmation filed in support of their application are that they disagree with the decision of the Director; they wanted to re-open their case; and that the 2^nd Applicant’s safety is at risk.  In his written skeleton submission lodged with the court on 25 February 2021, the 1^st Applicant advanced the following three riders as his arguments in support of their application: 

Rider (A):  He disagreed with the finding of the Director in that “the same level of threat still exists”.  In addition, “there has been a new change of circumstances that has not previously been taken into [his] account”.  He gave no particulars.

Rider (B):  The adjudicator failed to make sufficient enquiry, in particular, in failing to inquire from the Indian authorities.  The Director had not considered the circumstances set out in section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance.  He repeated his fear that his life will be at risk if he went back to India and he had no faith in the protection afforded by the Indian government.  He would like to request for his claims to be assessed with legal and interpretation assistance provided by the Duty Lawyers Service, but he was denied of such service.

Rider (C):  He repeated that his life is would be in danger in India, otherwise he would not have run away from India to seek protection in Hong Kong.

With the exception of his complaint about lack of legal and language assistance under Rider (B), all of his arguments contained in these riders revolve around the findings of facts by the Board.

Challenge of the Board’s finding of fact

33.  In essence, the Applicants disagreed with the Board’s findings, particularly about the murder of Gaji Singh on which the Applicants’ fears were founded and the COI about state protection and viability of internal relocation.  The Court found that all these grounds and evidence have been considered and rejected by the Board in its finding of fact.  The Board clearly set out the evidence of the 1^st Applicant and the Board’s assessment of his credibility.  It found the 1^st Applicant’s account of primary facts on which his fears were based was not proven.  Having rejected the 1^st Applicant’s evidence, on which the 2^nd Applicant also relied, there was no factual basis to support their claim for non-refoulement protection under any of the four applicable grounds under the USM.  In addition, the Board had also considered the COI and was satisfied that if the risks were real, internal relocation is a viable option.

34.  For Rider (A), the 1^st Applicant gave no particulars of the changes in circumstances.  In any event the Board had no opportunity to consider those changes and had made no decision.  There is no decision to review.

35.  For Rider (B), the 1^st Applicant had mentioned about his worries that he would not receive police protection.  Those worries had been considered by the Director and rejected on the basis of the COI suggesting availability of avenues for complaint against police corruption and abuse and state protection generally.  It seems that those worries had not been repeated before the Board.  As his fears and risks are not proven, police corruption and abuse is a non-issue.  In any event, the Board had considered the relevant COI and concluded that internal relocation is a viable option to avert the risk, if the risks were genuine.

36.  Rider (C) is just a repetition of his challenge of the Board’s finding of fact.

37.  The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-refoulement claim afresh.  The primary decision-makers in a claim for non-refoulement are the Director and the Board.  They alone assess the evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm, availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation.  The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision, and intervene by way of judicial review, only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality:  see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration[6].

38.  The Court had rigorously scrutinized the Board’s Decision, the papers, grounds of application and the Applicants’ submissions.  The Court was satisfied that the Board had correctly set out the law and key legal principles relating to the four applicable grounds under the USM.  The Board concluded that there was no factual basis to support the Applicants’ claim for non-refoulement protection under any of the four applicable grounds. 

Procedural fairness: legal and language assistance

39.  As for the 1^st Applicant’s complaint about lack of legal and language assistance, in fact, he had legal representation by the Duty Lawyer Service and interpretation services of a qualified interpreter at the screening interview when presenting his case to the Director.  In Re Zafar Muazam[7], Re Zunariyah[8], Re Zahid Abbas[9], Re Tariq Farhan[10], and Re Lopchan Subash[11], the Court of Appeal held that neither the high standard of fairness laid down in Sakthevel Prabakar v. Secretary for Security[12] nor the judgment of FB v. Director of Immigration[13] prescribes that a  claimant of BOR 2 or BOR 3 or persecution risks has an absolute right to free legal representation at all stages of the proceedings.  The real question is whether the claimant is prejudiced for want of legal and language assistance.

40.  The Applicants had the benefit of legal representation in presenting their case to the Director.  They were not legally represented before the Board.  However, all the benefits that legal representation could have afforded them were contained in their written submissions, non-refoulement claim form and answers in the screening interview given under legal advice.  All these had been presented to the Director, which were then presented to the Board.  Despite they were not legally represented at the oral hearing before the Board, all the benefits which legal representation could have afforded them were before the Board.  Taking a global view of the circumstances, nothing amiss arose from the non-availability of legal representation in the process before the Board.  The Applicants suffered no prejudice due to lack of legal representation before the Board. Nothing amiss arose from the non-availability of legal representation or interpretation in the process before the Board.

41.  In Re Karamjit Singh[14], the Court of Appeal adopted the rationale of the Court of First Instance that it could not have been the intention of any authority laying down the principle of a high standard of fairness that the principle would include provision of interpretation service at any time a claimant desired or required.  It must be borne in mind that it was the Applicants choice to come to Hong Kong where the official languages are Chinese and English.  In the circumstances, they have to live with or cope with their language disability.  They cannot expect to have the luxury of any documents to be fully translated into their first language for their benefit.  They have to find assistance themselves from among their friends and their ethnic community.  Indeed, the Applicants were able to file an adequately well written Form 86 in English themselves.

42.  Besides, the appeal bundle is basically made up of their non-refoulement claim form, the record of their screening interview, the Notice of Decision and the COI.  The 1^st Applicant knew what was contained in the non-refoulement claim form which was filled in by him with the assistance of an interpreter and the Duty Lawyer Service.  He knew what was contained in the record of screening interview which he attended with the assistance of interpreter and legal representation.  The record had been read back to him and he signed to acknowledge that he understood and agreed with the contents and that no amendment was necessary.  Recognizing the limitation in his foreign language ability and the importance of their claim, he ought to have taken notes, at least very brief ones, to remind him of what he had said or written rather than relying on the host country to provide them the convenience of interpretation at his fingertips.   

43.  Under the circumstances, the Court found that the Applicants had failed to demonstrate any procedural irregularity in the proceedings before the Director and the Board, or any arguable basis to challenge the fairness of the process.

Prejudice to the respondent

44.  As for prejudice to the proposed respondent, it is unlikely that this issue would be explored in an ex parte application for extension of time.  But it would take little to persuade the court the prejudice to the proposed respondent and to public administration if a challenge is allowed to proceed after such a gross inordinate delay of 19 months.  The delay is by itself an abuse of the process of the court and the non-refoulement protection arrangement.  To allow the challenge to proceed would encourage other claimants to indulge in such abuse.  It would cause unnecessary waste of judicial and public resources and delay the genuine non-refoulement claimants’ access to the court.  It would render it difficult for the Director to perform his duty of maintaining immigration control.  Above all, it would make it difficult or unduly burdensome for Hong Kong to honour its international obligations under the various conventions to protect people from persecution, torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.  This application does not raise any questions of general public importance.  It may subject the whole system of non-refoulement protection to serious abuse to the prejudice of Hong Kong.

No questions of general public importance

45.  The application does not raise any questions which are likely to have to be resolved by the courts in any event.

Disposition

46.  In summary, the delay of 19 months in making this application is inordinate and by any standard undue.  The Applicants could offer no credible valid explanation for the delay.  If a challenge is allowed to proceed so grossly out of time, it would cause prejudice to the public administration.  The delay is by itself an abuse of the process of the court and the non-refoulement protection arrangement.   To allow the challenge to proceed would encourage other claimants to indulge in such abuse.  It would cause unnecessary waste of judicial and public resources and delay the genuine non-refoulement claimants’ access to the court.  It would render it difficult for the Director to perform his duty of maintaining immigration control.  Above all, it would make it difficult or unduly burdensome for Hong Kong to honour its international obligations under various conventions to protect people from persecution, torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.  This application does not raise any questions of general public importance.

47.  On the question of merit of the substantive application, the court cannot find any ground that shows there was an error of law by the Board or irrationality in its fact findings.  There was no procedural unfairness.  Indeed, the court is of the view that the Board adhered to a high standard of fairness.  The Board’s Decision did satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test.  It was not Wednesbury unreasonable.  The Applicants’ claims are not reasonable arguable.  There is no realistic prospect of success in the intended judicial review. 

48.  The 2^nd Applicant is nine years old now.  She is of tender years.   Her application was considered separately from the 1^st Applicant’s.  The 1^st Applicant had not advanced any reasons on her behalf to support her contention that she might be harmed if returned to India.  The 2^nd Applicant’s fears and risks are premised on the 1^st Applicant’s.  In view of the Board’s findings that there were no genuine fears or risks, the 2^nd Applicant’s life and freedom could not be at risk, if returned to India.  The court agrees with such finding.

49.  Even on an application properly made, no extension of time will be granted.  It would therefore be futile to amend the application to facilitate the Applicants to apply for a judicial review of the Board’s Decision, which is bound to fail. 

CONCLUSION

50.  The Applicants’ application was made in respect of a decision which does not exist.  The application is an abuse of legal process and a waste of judicial resources.  Accordingly, the application was dismissed.  The Court also comprehensively reviewed the merits of a possible application for extension of time to apply for leave to review the Decision of the Board dated 21 November 2016, but concluded that there is no merit.  The Court therefore did not find it necessary to amend the application to enable the Applicants to apply for leave to apply for judicial review of that Decision.

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1

[1] risk of torture as defined in Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115; the definition being the same as that found in Article 1 of the Convention against torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

[2] risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of Section 8 of Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383 and Article 7 of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”)

[3] risk of persecution by reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 and 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention relating to the status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol

[4] CACV 63/2015 (unreported) 3 November 2015

[5] CACV 78/2018; [2018] HKCA 460, at para 14

[6] [2018] HKCA 524 at para 14(1)

[7] CACV 2/2018, (unreported) 23 March 2018

[8] [2018] HKCA 14

[9] [2018] HKCA 15

[10] [2018] HKCA 17

[11] [2018] HKCA 37

[12] (2004) 7 HKCFAR 187

[13] HCAL 51 of 2007, (unreported) 5 December 2008

[14] Supra