吳春綠 對 李富平及另二人

DCCJ 1261/2023

[2025] HKDC 567

香港特別行政區

區域法院

民事訴訟2023年第1261號

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判決理由書

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引言

1.  第三被告人（下簡稱「中信銀行」）於2024年8月28日發出傳票，就其針對原告人的反申索，作出簡易判決的申請，要求法庭（1）宣布他們與第一及第二被告人就本案物業訂立的按揭契中的銀行的按揭權益，是優先於原告人所聲稱她在該物業中的實益權益，以及（2）撤銷原告人就該物登記在土地註冊處的「待決案件」。

2.  原告人有出席2025年1月9日的聆訊，反對中信銀行的申請。

3.  有關傳票也有派遞給第一及第二被告人。第一被告人有出席當天的聆訊，第二被告則缺席。在聆訊前，他們二人均沒有存檔任何文件就中信銀行的申請作出任何陳述。另外，本庭觀察到無論該傳票及反申索只是針對原告人而並非第一及第二被告人作出。因此，第二被告人選擇不參與聆訊是可以理解，本庭亦認為可讓第一被告人退席，以減省聆訊所涉的訟費及時間。

4.  經小心考慮過雙方的陳詞及證據後，本庭認為該傳票應被撤銷，就訟費方面不作任何命令；在當天聆訊中，亦已作出相關命令，現下達書面理由如下。

背景

5.  原告人是第一被告人的母親，第二被告人是第一被告人的妻子。第一及第二被告人於2013年向中信銀行申請「置業按揭」貸款，購入位於Flat C, 6/F, 17 Kat On Street的物業（「該物業」）。

6.  因兩名被告人拖欠還款，中信銀行於2023年11月8日向他們提起按揭訴訟（DCMP 5215/2023）（「DCMP 案」），其後於2024年3月28日獲缺席判決及取得該物業的管有權，再於2024年9月26日在執達吏的協助下收回該物業。

原告人的案情

7.  原告人於2023年3月24日在本法院提出此訴訟（DCCJ 1261/2023），指稱於2013年年初與第一及第二被告人協議合資以港幣276萬元購入該物業：原告人出資105萬元，第二被告人出資40萬元， 餘款則向中信銀行申請按揭貸款，並以兩名被告人為該物業的登記業主，但原告人實為該物業75%的受益人，第一被告人為10%的受益人，第二被告人則為15%的受益人。在2013年2月18日，成功購入該物業，第一被告人及第二被告人成為該物業的聯權共有人。

8.  原告人一直安排以出租該物業獲得的租金，用作支付按揭供款。原告人亦一直負責支付該物業的管理費、差餉等費用。

9.  其後，原告人發現自2020年起第一及第二被告人在沒有獲得她的同意前，違反早前協議，向多間財務公司申請了按揭貸款。

10.  依據「共同意圖構定信託」（common intention constructive trust）的法律原則，原告人指稱第一人及第二被告人為其信託持有物業權益，在其申索書中，要求法庭宣告其權益及兩名被告人以該信托形式替她代為持有，以及頒令其他相關的濟助。

11.  原告人並於2023年3月29日在土地註冊處登記其傳訊令狀，即本案中的 「待決案件」。

12.  雖然於2023年4月11日第一及第二被告人，均有存檔認收書爭議原告人向他們提出的法律程序，但其後一直卻沒有呈交任何抗辯書。

中信銀行的案情

13.  中信銀行在DCMP案中，於2024年3月針對第一及第二被告人取得金錢判決及該物業的管有令後， 便於2024年4月24日，申請加入本案作為第三被告人，於2024年5月27日，獲聆案官批准。其後，於2024年9月26日收回該物業。

14.  在2024年8月19日，中信銀行（以第三被告人的身份）存檔抗辯書及反申索書，要求法庭頒令宣布他們作為該物業的承按人，其按揭權益依法優先於原告人的權益，並根據《土地註冊條例》（香港法例第128章）第19條，要求法庭撤銷原告人的「待決案件」。

15.  但值得留意的是，原告人從沒有在其申索書作訴，去爭議中信銀行在該物業中的按揭權益，是優先於原告人的權益。

簡易判決申請的相關法律原則

16.  《香港民事訴訟程序2025》第一冊第14/1/5、14/4/2、14/4/3、14/4/9、14/4/10、14/4/16段，撮要了法庭處理簡易判決申請的相關指導性原則。基本而言，反對簡易判決申請的一方需要證明他的抗辯是存有可信的可爭拗議題。

17.  至於申請人方面，法庭只會依據申請方在其申索書中所作訴的申索及事實而作出簡易判決。換句話說，申請方須要證明其申索是自足且完整的 （good and complete in itself）。《香港民事訴訟程序2025》第一冊，第14/1/5有如下的法律闡釋：

“...

Summary judgment will only be granted on the claims set out, and facts pleaded, in the statement of claim: Wong Chow Hoi Sze Elsie v. Crown Wine Cellars Ltd (CACV 262/2015, [2016] HKEC 867), [10]; Chu Wen Jing Jennifer v. Sin Hon Wai (HCA 10, 6 and 121/2016, [2016] HKEC 2474), [23]-[26].

The statement of claim must be complete and good in itself; any defect or omission (eg omission to state an agreement to pay interest) cannot be corrected or supplemented by the plaintiff’s affidavit (Gold Ores Reduction Co Ltd v. Parr [1892] 2 QB 14; Lai Yuen Wah v. Hoi Kwong Printing Co Ltd [2003] 1 HKC 447; Tan Khay Chuen v. Ko Ping Shun Benson (CACV 238/2015, [2016] HKEC 1496), [23]–[25]). If the defect is one of substance, the application for summary judgment will be dismissed (Sheba Gold Mining Co Ltd v. Trubshawe [1892] 1 QB 674).” （強調後加）

18.  上述法律原則同樣適用於就反申索所作出的簡易判決申請。見：區域法院規則第14號命令第5（1）條。

法庭頒令宣布（Declaration）的相關法律原則

19.  一般而言，當與訴雙方對所聲稱的權利存有爭議時，法庭才適宜行使酌情權考慮作出有關權利的宣布。見：《香港民事訴訟程序2025》，第一冊，第15/16/1：

“... The jurisdiction of the court to make a declaration of right is confined to declaring contested legal rights, subsisting or future, of the parties represented in the litigation before it ... However, in In re S (Hospital Patient: Court’s Jurisdiction) [1995] 3 W.L.R. 78, Millett LJ was of the view that Lord Diplock’s dicta in Gouriet can no longer be taken to be an exhaustive description of the circumstances in which declaratory relief can be granted; provided that the legal right in question is contested by the parties, and that each of them would be affected by the determining of the issue, the court should not be astute to impose the further requirement that the legal right in question should be claimed by either of the parties to be a right which is vested in itself ... Note, however, that in Kao, Lee & Yip (a firm) v. Midland Realty International Ltd, (HCA 2153/2007, [2009] H.K.E.C. 506), the court, after considering the post-Gouriet authorities above, held that:

“[h]owever, in any particular case, the Court does not approach the questions as to whether there is a real and present dispute between the parties as to the existence or extent of a legal right or whether a legal right is contested by the parties and whether each of the parties to the case would be affected by the determination of the issue without some degree of pragmatism and without being mindful of the harsh consequences of expense and inconvenience that may flow from one being unnecessarily joined in proceedings. The Court should not allow a plaintiff to pick a fight against a defendant where there is none between them”.”（強調後加）

亦参見：《香港民事訴訟程序2025》第15/16/2段

20.  假如與訟另一方並沒有爭議申請方所要求宣布的權利，申請方實質上是要求法庭就一個假設性的議題作出宣布。一般而言，法庭不會應這類的要求行使酌情權作出宣布的，即使申請方覺得值得花費金錢，希望把他本身與另一方之間的法律情況盡早弄清楚。

21.  Zamir & Woolf：The Declaratory Judgment（第4版）第4-60段對這方面的法律議題有如下的闡述：

“4-60

Where there is no dispute in existence

A claim for a declaration of right is most hypothetical when that right is not disputed by the defendant. However, even in such a situation a person may be genuinely anxious in case his right will be challenged or infringed at some later date. Consequently, he may think it worthwhile incurring the expense and bother of litigation in order to ascertain his legal position as early as possible. But, as Bailhache J. said 49:

“a declaration would not be made merely because the person asking for it feared that at some time or other he might be liable to an action, and desired to put an end to a position of uncertainty or of suspense and anxiety.”” （強調後加）

22.  第4-69及4-70 段更有進一步的闡釋如下：

“4-69

A more recent example of the same approach is provided by the decision of the Court of Appeal in Midland Bank Plc v Laker Airways Ltd. In that case the Midland Bank sought a declaration that they were not liable under the laws of England for or in connection with the collapse of Laker Airways. The judge at first instance had refused to strike out the claim. However, the Court of Appeal reversed his latter decision. Lawton L.J., in a judgment with which, on this point, the other two members of the court agreed, said:

“As the liquidator has never threatened to take proceedings against either bank in the English courts, on the authority of Re Clay, Clay v Booth [1919] 1 Ch. 66 there is no jurisdiction in the court to make the declaration asked for. The claim for it should be struck out.”

4-70

Although Lawton L.J. indicated there was “no jurisdiction” to make the declaration, this should be treated as an example of a court saying that there was no jurisdiction to make a declaration when what is meant is that the circumstances are such that the court would invariably exercise its discretion by refusing to make a declaration. The decision of Re Clay was considered by the House of Lords in a case not cited to the Court of Appeal and regarded by the House of Lords as dealing with a question of discretion and not jurisdiction. It is also now clear that in cases where there is a current dispute and the declaration will be of utility, the courts can grant negative declarations. ” （強調後加）

撤銷待決案件的相關法律原則

23.  根據《土地註冊條例》（第128章）第19條，法庭有權命令撤銷待決案件：

“ 在法庭或法官席前尋求約束任何財產的訴訟中，凡該法庭或法官信納該訴訟是並非真正進行檢控，或並非是為了所表明的其他充分理由的可在裁定待決案件時，或在該案件待決期間，作出命令，將該待決案件在土地註冊處的註冊撤銷而無須得註冊該案件的一方同意，並可指示被代為作出註冊的一方支付所有因註冊或撤銷該註冊而引致的費用及開支，包括申請撤銷的費用，或可就該等費用或其中的任何部分費用，作出該法庭或法官認為是公正的其他命令。”（強調後加）

24.  在本案中，第三被告人並非以「訴訟並非真正進行檢控」為由，要求法庭撤銷案中的「待決案件」。

25.  根據中信銀行的代表大律師費朗倫所援引的案例Hundred Gain International Holding Ltd v Cheng Mei Holdings Ltd [2023] 5 HKLRD 528，高等法院原訟法庭特委法官黃繼明資深大律師，就《土地註冊條例》第19條之下的「其他充分理由」，有如下的闡釋：

“67. Thus, if the underlying claims in the lis pendens are not arguable, then the registration of the registrable writ ought to be vacated under s.19 of the LRO. For the same reason, if the prima facie registrable writ is not yet registered but is pending registration, the Court ought to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to order its removal from the pending section if the claims are unarguable.

68. ... What Mr Yu SC and Mr Manzoni SC disagree is where the action is on its face a lis pendens and is found to be arguable, whether the Court should or can then undertake a balance of justice exercise in considering whether any writ registered or pending registration ought to be vacated or removed (or to make any appropriate declaration), similar to an application for interlocutory injunction. Relying on authorities in the United Kingdom on the registration system there, Mr Manzoni SC submits that the answer is yes. Mr Yu SC says no: on the basis that the underlying action is a lis pendens, he submits that since the LRO has its own provision for removal in s.19, one should not go beyond that provision and to follow the overseas authorities which were based on the inherent jurisdiction of the Court.

69. While I agree with Mr Yu SC that where one has a lis pendens and the writ is registered, one should go to s.19 of the LRO to consider the question of removal, in my judgment, under s.19, the balance of justice is a factor which the Court can and should take into account in deciding whether to vacate the registration.

70. This is because the existence of good cause to remove under s.19 is not confined to where the underlying lis pendens is not arguable. Thus, while in an application under s.19 to vacate the Court should consider the arguability of the lis pendens, even if it is arguable the Court may still vacate if a good cause is shown. What constitutes good cause is unrestricted by the LRO and whether a good cause to remove is shown must depend, in my view, on all the circumstances of the case, primarily the respective positions and consequences of the registered writ being removed or otherwise. In Ho Yau-kong, Bokhary J said:

“If the case of a plaintiff is weak, and the harm that would be done to a defendant if a registration is maintained on the basis of such case only to be ultimately defeated after a long delay is great, then the court must consider very carefully what is the right thing to do.

The formula ‘other good cause shown’ in s. 19 is unrestricted by any words of the statute. It seems to me that the courts may, and should, approach it by reference to what they normally do when dealing with interlocutory injunctive relief, subject to this. The position of somebody with a lis penden which he or she can register is stronger than that of someone seeking or seeking to maintain such relief. First of all, the registration may be made without reference to a court and without the burden of having first to make out a case. Secondly, I think it is right to be even more reluctant to vacate a registration than to refuse or discharge an injunction which would have similar effect. That is my approach here.”

71. Subject to the two matters referred to by his Lordship, it is clear that Bokhary J adopted the interlocutory injunction approach which considers not just the merits of the lis pendens but also all the circumstances of a pending action so as to decide “what is the right thing to do”, and to see what “the justice of the case requires”. This is very much a balance of justice approach.

72. A similar approach was taken recently by Cheng J in Wong Ching Hoi v Chan Sau Man. There, in an application to vacate under s.19 of the LRO, her Ladyship, after citing Ho Yau-kong, found that no good cause had been shown to vacate the registration by considering factors for and against vacation, balancing the protection afforded by the registration, and the harm which might be caused if the registration was maintained. Again, this is very much a balance of justice approach.

73. In my judgment, while the two matters stated by Bokhary J must always be borne in mind when one is considering an application under s.19 of the LRO, the approach advocated by his Lordship, and applied for example by Cheng J, is in substance the same approach when one is considering an interlocutory injunction application, as Bokhary J himself suggested. That includes the consideration of the balance of justice when the injunction is or is not granted, or, under the LRO, whether the registration is vacated or not. It is now accepted that in an interlocutory injunction application, what the Court is looking for is a course which will carry the lower risk of injustice. This is very much the approach of Bokhary J in Ho Yau-kong.” （強調後加）

討論

26.  費大律師從多角度向本庭呈述，原告人就中信銀行在該物業中的優先權益，實為無可爭拗的議題。

27.  但本庭認為，中信銀行加入此案作為第三被告人，對原告人作出反申索，要求法庭頒令宣布的濟助，實為判斷上的失誤（misconceived）。因為，原告人在其申索書中，根本沒有質疑過中信銀行的有關優先權益。

28.  反而，從申索書整體來看，原告人實質上在多處都確認了中信銀行與第一及第二被告人所訂立的按揭契的有效性，也承認該按揭對她來說是具約束力的。而且，根據原告人本身作訴的案情，向中信銀行申請按揭貸款實為她與第一及第二被告人投資在該物業的協議的重要一環。上述的觀察皆可見於申索書以下的段落：

“2. In or about early 2013, the Plaintiff discussed with the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants her wish to purchase the property situated at FLAT C ON 6TH FLOOR 17 KAT ON STREET HONG KONG （“the Property”） in the consideration of HK$2,760,000.00 jointly with them with the following common intention and/or agreement amongst the Plaintiff, 1^st and 2^nd Defendants (“common intention and/or agreement”):-

(a) the Plaintiff would pay and contribute a sum of HK$1,050,000 for part of the down payment of the Property;

(b) the 2^nd Defendant would pay and contribute a sum of HK$400,000 for part of the down payment of the Property;

(c) although the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants would be registered as the Joint Tenants of the Property, the beneficial interest of the Property shall be held by the 1^st Defendant and 2^nd Defendant as Trustees for and on behalf of the Plaintiff, the 1^st Defendant and 2^nd Defendant in the following proportions:

(i) Plaintiff: 75/100 shares;

(ii) 1^st Defendant: 10/100 shares; and

(iii) 2^nd Defendant: 15/100 shares.

(d) the balance of the purchase price of the Property shall be paid with the assistance of mortgage loan (“China CITIC Mortgage”) of China CITIC Bank International Limited (“China CITIC”) over the Property;

(e) the Property shall be rented out and the rents received from the Property would be utilized to pay and settle the instalment loans of the China CITIC Mortgage; and

...

7. ... The Plaintiff avers that:-

7.2 Between February 2013 and November 2020, the rents of the Property were deposited into the Plaintiff’s husband account held with China CITIC on behalf of the Plaintiff which were then deposited into the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants’ mortgage loan account held with China CITIC for payment of the instalment loans of the China CITIC Mortgage.

7.3 For a period of time from December 2020 to July 2022, the tenant of the Property was requested by the Plaintiff’s husband on behalf of the Plaintiff to deposit the rent directly into the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants’ mortgage loan account held with China CITIC. However, it was later found out that the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants still defaulted to settle monthly instalment of mortgage loan owed to China CITIC.

7.4 In view the above said matter, since August 2022, the tenant of the Property was then requested by the Plaintiff’s husband on behalf of the Plaintiff to deposit the rent into the joint account of the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff’s daughter held with China CITIC which were then deposited into the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants’ mortgage loan account held with China CITIC for payment of the instalment loans of the China CITIC Mortgage.” （強調後加）

29.  在其要求法庭所頒令的濟助，也看不出原告人有質疑中信銀行在該物業的權益是優先於她的權益；反而，原告人要求法庭作出的其中一項宣布時，表明她可收取該物業在出售後的樓款的75%前，是要受限於之前的產權負擔的解除。

“AND THE PLAINTIFF CLAIMS AGAINST THE 1^ST AND 2^ND DEFENDANTS JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY:-

...

(3) A declaration that the Plaintiff is entitled to 75/100 shares in the proceeds of sale in the event of the Property being sold, subject to payment of costs of such sale and the discharge of any prior encumbrance;” （強調後加）

30.  事實上，原告人在其反對誓章（日期為2024年11月27日）[1]中，亦清楚表明她一直以來對銀行所指的優先權都沒有爭議。費大律師在其陳詞大綱中第26段亦提及此點：「原告人已確認她對銀行的優先權「沒有爭議」：見反對誓章第5段。」

31.  因此，基於上文所述的法理原則，在原告人根本沒有爭議銀行在該物業的權益的優先權的情況下，本庭認為實無需要，亦不適宜頒令第三被告人所要求的宣布濟助。

32.  其實，在聆訊當天開始前，本庭事先給予雙方就上述《香港民事訴訟程序2025》第15/16/1段的影印本，第三被告人在聆訊中才第一次向法庭表示，原告人有爭議中信銀行在該物業中的優先權益。在這方面，費大律師向法庭引述原告人在2024年8月2日向中信銀行發出的信函[2]：

“

嚴正警告函

本人吳春綠於2013年出資百分之七十五與兒子李富平，媳婦盧珊如共同投資購入灣仔吉安街大德樓單位作為長線投資，因她們都是本人兒媳。購人該物業由他們作業主登記。雙方另立《集資買樓協議書》內容清楚列明。自從購入該物業一切事務收租每月入數供樓，由其父親管理。他們夫妻都沒權插手。但李富平盧珊如沒有經過本人同意私自向財務公司借錢是他們最大的錯誤。與本人集資買樓完全沒有任何關係。本人沒有犯錯具理實說。尚若中信銀行在沒有任何理由野蠻橫行強拍大德樓單位。本人將保持法律追究。謹此特發出嚴正警告。此致中信銀行代表律師行。” （強調後加）

33.  本庭不接納費大律師的呈述。本庭認為不應單看這封信，而忽略了早前雙方的往來信函，去詮釋「尚[3]若中信銀行在沒有任何理由野蠻橫行強拍大德樓單位。本人將保持法律追究。」這句話。

34.  在較早前，即分別在2024年1月22日及2024年2月19日[4]，中信銀行透過其律師向原告人發信，要求原告人撤銷她在土地註冊處登記的「待決案件」，其後又在2024年5月加入此案，要求有關的濟助。客觀來看，這些舉動是會延長了原告人向第一及第二被告人所作出的訴訟的時間，亦加重了她的訟費負擔或潛在的負擔。因此，從原告人的角度來看，她對中信銀行這些行為表示十分不滿，是不難理解的，更何況，依原告人的申索書來看，她一直以來都沒有爭議中信銀行在該物業中的按揭權益的優先權益。

35.  另外，原告人最初聘用了律師替她草擬了申索書[5]，清楚列明其訴訟因由，解釋為何她在該物業中擁有75%的實益權益；本庭亦觀察到中信銀行並沒有提出任何證據證明原告人並非真正進行檢控。假若要原告人在這情況下撤銷其「待決案件」，在她看來，銀行是沒有任何理由，且屬「野蠻橫行」的行為，是可以想像得到的（雖然她用了較為「激動」的言詞去表達），尤其是，當她從沒有阻礙中信銀行行使按揭的權利去收回及出售該物業，銀行仍不容許她在土地註冊處登記有關「待決案件」，以保障她自身的法律權益。其中，原告人在其反對誓章第5段這樣說到：

“5. 我除了委託前代表律師發出本案的傳訊令狀和註冊登記在土地註冊處保障我的利益外，我並沒有阻止或反對第三被告（中信銀行）在DCMP 5215/2023收回這物業向外進行售賣以價款抵消償還欠銀行的按揭貸款，我不明白為何第三被告（中信銀行）要耗費申請加入本案和反申索我，它的銀行按揭早已註冊登記在土地註冊處，當時我仍未發出並註冊登記本案的傳訊令狀，自然不會比第三被告（中信銀行）的權益優先，我不同意其說法指因我註冊登記本案傳訊令狀便阻止它執行按揭契權力售賣這物業，我根本沒有在本案中否定或質疑第三被告（中信銀行）的按揭優先權利，所以完全不明白它為何需要反申索聲明它的按揭比我申索這物業的75%權益優先，這點我從來沒有爭議過，我也不知道為何第三被告要取消我的傳訊令狀在土地註冊處的註冊登記，我不認為我的傳訊令狀會影響第三被告的銀行按揭權益，也不會阻止它執行按揭權力出售這物業，我更否認我需要負責賠償第三被告（中信銀行）任何損失或利息或訴訟費，正如其2024年8月19日存檔的答辯及反申索第20段所指，第三被告有權出售這物業而我的權益只限於還清銀行根據2024年3月24日區域法院聆案官在DCMP 5125/2023案中頒佈的判決命令之欠款後的淨餘價款，但我絕對不同意第三被告（中信銀行）因我註冊登記傳訊令狀導致它不可出售處置這物。”（強調後加）

36.  若從上述的角度來看，「倘若中信銀行在沒有任何理由野蠻橫行強拍大德樓單位，本人將保持法律追究」 這句話是可被客觀合理解讀為：原告人並非爭議中信銀行根據有關按揭是有權拍賣大德樓單位；她所不能接受的反而是中信銀行所使用的方法：即「強要」她撤銷她認為合法合理在土地註冊處登記以保障其自身權益的「待決案件」，否則她便要背上沉重的訟費負擔與銀行對訟。因此，從上述的事實背景整體看來，本庭認為原告人在2024年8月2日向中信銀行發出的信函，並不應被解讀為原告人爭議中信銀行在該物業的優先按揭權益。

37.  換句話說，就算假設這句話，與發出該信函以前的文件及事情一併考慮時，仍會令人合理地產生「歧義」的解讀的話（雖然本庭並不這樣認為），原告人在其反對誓章中已清晰表明其立場，依聆訊中的證據作整體考慮後，本庭接納原告人在其誓章第5段的說法，並認為本庭在上文第36段對該話所作出的詮釋是合理的。

38.  其次，假如在中信銀行的意識中，原告人有哪些作為或不作為，真的構成了爭議銀行的優先權益，他們理應在其反申索書中清楚作訴，指明原告人如何爭議其按揭權益的優先權，但卻沒有這樣做。反而，只是在其反申索書第7段第12(a)段，含糊其詞地說，他們否認原告人在申索書第5段及第10(a)及(b) 段只限於該些段落「提議」原告人的權益是沒有受限於任何產權負擔。

39.  上述的段落分別如下：

申索書第5段及第10(a)及(b) 段

“5. By reason of the matters pleaded hereinabove:[6]

(a) the Plaintiff, 1^st and 2^nd Defendants have at all material times shared the common intention (whether express, by reason of the matters pleaded in paragraphs 2 to 4 above) that the Plaintiff is the beneficial owner of the title, interest and benefit of 75/100 shares of the Property and the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants are holding the title, interest and benefit of 75/100 shares of the Property on trust for the Plaintiff; and

(b) the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants have at all material times been holding the title, interest and benefit of 75/100 shares of the Property as trustees on a common intention constructive trust for the Plaintiff. ”（強調後加）

“10. By reason of the matters pleaded hereinabove,[7] the Plaintiff is entitled to and seeks the following reliefs:-

(a) A declaration that the title, interest and benefit of 75/100 shares of the Property is held by the l^st and 2^nd Defendants as trustees on a common intention constructive trust for the Plaintiff at all material times;

(b) A declaration that the Plaintiff is holding and owning the title, interest and benefit of 75/100 shares of the Property as beneficial owner at all material times;”（強調後加）

反申索書第7段及第12 (a)段

“7. Paragraph 5 is denied insofar as it is suggested that the Plaintiff has any unencumbered title, interest and/or benefit of75/100 shares of the Property. Save as aforesaid, Paragraph 5 is not admitted. It is averred that, even if the Plaintiff has any interest in the Property (which is not admitted), such interest in the Property (if any) is subject to the 3^rd Defendant's interest as mortgagee under the Mortgage which has priority. The 3^rd Defendant repeats paragraphs 4 to 6 above.”（強調後加）

“12. By reason of the matters aforesaid, subject to the specific pleas below. Paragraph 10 is denied and the Plaintiff is not entitled to the reliefs sought in her SOC. Specifically:

(a) Paragraphs 10(a) and 10(b) are denied insofar as it is suggested that the Plaintiff has any unencumbered title, interest and/or benefit of 75/100 shares of the Property. It is averred that, even if the Plaintiff has any interest in the Property (which is not admitted), such interest in the Property (if any) is subject to the 3^rd Defendant’s interest as mortgagee under the Mortgage which has priority. The 3^rd Defendant repeats paragraphs 4 to 6 and 9 above.”（強調後加）

40.  但從上文的分析，可清楚看到原告人的申索書根本沒有「提議」原告人在該物業中的實益權益是不受限於中信銀行的優先按揭權益，反而在多處已確認中信銀行的相關權益。

41.  如果當中信銀行的律師團用「只限於該些段落提議」（insofar as it is suggested (in those paragraph(s)) that）這句話去作訴時，實際上是想說：「假如」申索書有關段落有這樣的含意的話，本庭認為他們根本不應這樣作訴，因法庭是不會考慮這樣的假設性議題。

42.  為完備起見，本庭或需指出，中信銀行的反申索書並沒有作訴：原告人沒有應他們的律師早前信函的要求，把登記在土地註冊處的「待決案件」撤銷，更遑論去作訴原告人沒有這樣做，便構成爭議銀行的優先權益。

43.  雖然，蔡在其第二份誓章第18段，看似有隱晦地提出這樣的主張，但這並不足以彌補其反申索書的缺陷。（見：上文第17段） 在是次聆訊中，中信銀行亦沒有申請修訂其反申索書去作訴：原告人沒有應銀行的要求撤銷其「待決案件」的登記，或原告人在2024年8月2日向中信銀行發出的信函，已構成了爭議中信銀行在該物業中的優先權益。

44.  中信銀行只是在其反申索書第21段作訴：因原告人把「待決案件」登記在土地註冊處，所以他們不能把該物業賣出，因而蒙受損失。

45.  但是，本庭並不認為原告人把「待決案件」登記在土地註冊處，或不把「待決案件」撤銷，便等同爭議中信銀行在該物業的優先按揭權益。本庭在下文會進一步討論，為何基於是次聆訊中的證據，原告人在土地註冊處保留有關「待決案件」的登記，是合理和所需的；而中信銀行亦未能提供可信、可靠的證據，去證明該「待決案件」登記在土地註冊處，在因果關係上，會導致中信銀行不能出售該物業，更遑論因而蒙受損失。

46.  換句話說，中信銀行的反申索亦非自足且完整，以支持他們以簡易判決的方式，向法庭申請頒令有關宣布的濟助。

47.  相反，按費大律師本身的呈述，根據衡平法，即使原告人真的擁有其所聲稱的權益（無論是以書面或口頭協議產生），由於中信銀行是有付出代價的真誠購買人，亦對原告人在該物業中所聲稱的權益並不知悉（bona fide purchaser for value without notice），因此，銀行的按揭權益仍然是優先於原告人的權益，原告人亦從沒有爭議中信銀行這立場。

48.  因此，即使原告人把有關「待決案件」登記在土地註冊處，但由於該傳訊令狀並沒有指稱在訂立按揭前，中信銀行是知悉她的衡平法權益，更沒有說銀行的權益在她所聲稱的衡平法權益之後，所以就算第三者看了該傳訊令狀的內容，在法理而言，亦不能合理地認為中信銀行的按揭權益，會在原告人所要求宣布的衡平法權益之後。

49.  更何況，該傳訊令狀的第3段所申索的，亦有如上文第29段所列出的宣布濟助一樣，表明該物業的出售是須受限於之前的產權負擔的解除；換句話說，原告人只能在該物業出售的樓價款項扣除了出售的相關費用及清還該物業的按揭貸款後，收回餘款的75%。 因此，原告人實已承認了中信銀行在該物業中的優先按揭權益，這一點在申索書第10(c) 段亦有重申，中信銀行在其反申索書第12(b)段回應時，亦有承認這點（雖然中信銀行否認原告人在該物業（或在出售後的樓款）擁有所聲稱的75%的實益權益）：

申索書第10(c) 段

“10. By reason of the matters pleaded hereinabove, the Plaintiff is entitled to and seeks the following reliefs:-

...

(c) A declaration that the Plaintiff is entitled to 75/100 shares in the proceeds of sale in the event of the Property being sold, subject to payment of costs of such sale and the discharge of any prior encumbrance;”（強調後加）

反申索書第12(b) 段

“12. By reason of the matters aforesaid, subject to the specific pleas below. Paragraph 10 is denied and the Plaintiff is not entitled to the reliefs sought in her SOC. Specifically:

...

(b) Paragraph 10(c) is denied, save that it is admitted that the sale of the Property is subject to the discharge of any prior encumbrance, including the Mortgage. It is specifically denied that the Plaintiff is entitled to 75/100 shares in the proceeds of sale. The 3^rd Defendant repeats paragraphs 4 to 6 and 9 above and paragraph 20 below.” （強調後加）

50.  事實上，第三者從土地註冊處的查察中，可看到中信銀行就有關物業的按揭契，與第一及第二被告人買入該物業的樓契，是同日簽訂，其後亦在同日登記在土地註冊處。根據費大律師引用「置業按揭」承按人（acquisition mortgagee）的法律原則，中信銀行的權益必然優先於該物業的所有法定（legal）及實益（beneficial）擁有人。

51.  根據Goo & Lee on Land Law in Hong Kong (第5版) 第13-146段：

“Even where the beneficial owner does not know that the mortgage has been taken to finance the purchase of the mortgaged property, if the purchase of the mortgaged property is wholly or partly funded by the mortgage, the mortgagee will still have priority. This is because when the property is acquired, the legal owner of the mortgaged property owns nothing more than an ‘equity of redemption’. The beneficial owners likewise cannot own more than an ‘equity of redemption’. There is no scintilla temporis between the completion of the purchase and the creation of the mortgage. This means that such a mortgagee will always have priority over the legal as well as the equitable owners. ”（強調後加）

52.  綜合上述的分析，本庭認為，實不應行使酌情權，頒令中信銀行所要求的宣布濟助。

「待決案件」應否被撤銷的議題

53.  首先，在本聆訊中，本庭觀察到中信銀行並沒有提出爭議，原告人的「待決案件」是與土地權益有關的訴訟，可在土地註冊處登記。

54.  根據《土地註冊條例》第1A條，“待決案件”（lis pendens）是指：

“(a) 任何與土地或與土地的任何權益或押記有關的訴訟或程序，而該等訴訟或程序是在法院或審裁處待決者；及

(b) 一項破產呈請；”

55.  其次，雖然中信銀行在其抗辯書中否認原告人在該物業有其指稱的75%實益權益，但在本簡易判決申請中，他們卻沒有要求法庭裁斷，原告人就該指稱並沒有爭辯的空間；反而，中信銀行在其支持誓章附件了一份日期為2013年2月18日由原告人及第一及第二被告人簽訂的「集資買樓投資協議書」。該文件表面看來能支持原告人所作訴的案情，其中提及：

“由母親吳春綠，子李富平媳婦盧珊如三人集資於2013年2月18日買入灣仔吉安街17號大德樓6樓C室，樓價276萬元，其母親吳春綠出資壹百零伍萬元，李富平夫婦兩人出資肆拾萬元，股份分配，吳春綠佔百分之七十五（75%），盧珊如佔百分之之十五（15%），李富平佔百分之十（10%），由李富平夫婦持有該物業代為業主，如出售該物業須三人商量同意方可出售，假若日後出售該物業，所獲得之收益以每人出資之百分比分賬，蝕本同樣以每人出資之百分比計算，該協議書一式共四份，各保留一份為證，此協議具有法律責任保證。”

56.  因此，原告人針對第一及第二被告人，要求法庭宣布她在該物業擁有所聲稱的75%的衡平法權益，仍需要經過審訊，由法庭來決定其是非曲直。在法庭就其申索作出判決前，原告人在土地註冊處登記有關「待決案件」，以保障其自身權益，表面看來是無可厚非。

57.  因《土地註冊條例》第16條訂明，凡沒有在土地註冊處登記的「待決案件」，對擬受此影響的產業的任何買方或承按人均無約束力。亦参見《土地註冊條例》第3及14條。

58.  換句話說，假如原告人在入稟其傳訊令狀後，沒有在土地註冊處登記有關「待決案件」，而第一及第二被告人在之後，再與其他的財務公司就該物業訂立新的按揭貸款，這則意味著，表面上，在土地註冊處登記的新訂立按揭的承按人，並不會受到原告人在該物業的權益所約束，這明顯對原告人不利。 因此，原告人在土地註冊處登記「待決案件」，依本聆訊的證據來看，是有其需要。

59.  本庭留意到第一及第二被告人並沒有還款給中信銀行，導致該物業被收回，他們與中信銀行訂立按揭後，亦曾向多間財務公司借貸。另外，原告人於2024年5月10日發給中信銀行的律師的信函中，也提及第一及第二被告人曾在某些時段向財務公司借錢時沒有工作或收入。

60.  但是，依現有的證據看來，本庭並不能斷言第一及/或第二被告人再也沒有償還或安排償還債務的可能。由土地註冊處的查冊看到，除了向中信銀行作出一按的抵押之外，第一及第二被告人至今就該物業，向財務公司作出抵押的只剩長雄財務有限公司（「長雄」），但本聆訊中，沒有證據顯示他們仍欠長雄未清還的借貸是多少。而早前於2024年3月28日中信銀行在另一宗案件向第一及第二被告人所獲得的判定債項只有港幣92萬多元連同利息及訟費[8]。如上所說，該物業在12年前購入時，表面上也值276萬元。

61.  費大律師在庭上呈述，由於原告人在土地註冊處登記了「待決案件」，導致中信銀行不能賣出該物業。但中信銀行只是在其反申索書第21段，作出這樣的指稱，卻沒有提供相關詳情，以說明該「待決案件」的登記，實際上怎樣會令銀行在出售該物業時，遇到什麼具體的困難。在上述第34段提及致原告人的兩封信函中，中信銀行的代表律師當時也作出類似的空泛指稱，即同樣沒有說明該「待決案件」的登記，為何會阻礙了中信銀行強制執行其按揭和出售該物業。

62.  直至到了中信銀行的回應誓章，蔡才說根據他們的律師意見，他相信有關有關「待決案件」會構成該物業的「潛在產權負擔」，而當潛在買家在土地註冊處做查察時，看見這「待決案件」便會因而卻步。蔡又籠統地說：「銀行目前尚未找到任何願意購買該物業的潛在買家，除非該「待決案件」的登記被撤銷。」

63.  蔡的第二份誓章第11及12段這樣說：

“11. I was advised by the Bank’s legal representatives and verify believe that the Writ constitutes a potential encumbrance on the Mortgaged Property and its registration in the Land Registry affects the Bank’s exercise of its rights over the Mortgaged Property, including the power to sell the same. I was advised and verify believe that:

(a) Any potential purchaser(s) of the Property will conduct a land search prior to completion and discover the Writ registered against the Property;

(b) The Writ constitutes a potential encumbrance on the Property and its registration in the Land Registry poses a hurdle for the Bank in selling the Property subject to the Writ, since it indicates potential claim(s) against the Property and/or potential challenge of the Bank’s right to sell the same;

(c) The Writ registered in the Land Registry thus deters any potential purchaser(s) from purchasing the Property.

12. Therefore, with the continued registration of the Writ in the Land Registry, the Bank shall face considerable difficulties in selling the Property. To date, the Bank have yet to secure any potential purchasers who are unwilling (sic) to purchase the Property unless the registration of the Writ is vacated. As a result, the Bank could not make any meaningful attempt to sell the Property given the inherent difficulties. ”（強調後加）

64.  本庭認為蔡的說法：「銀行目前尚未找到任何願意購買該物業的潛在買家，除非該「待決案件」的登記被撤銷」，實為空泛的指稱（bare assertion），看來是純粹建基於銀行律師給予他們的意見，而非有可信、可靠的實質證據所支持。其中，本庭留意到，中信銀行譬如可以但卻沒有向法庭提供資料以說明，他們何時就該物業開始在市場上放售（銀行在2024年9月26日才收回該物業），用哪種形式放售，放售價是多少，與市價差距多遠，以令法庭可清楚看到真的是因爲他們所聲稱的「待決案件」的登記問題，而非市場或其他人為因素，以致該物業還未售出。

65.  就算根據中信銀行本身的立場，原告人指稱在該物業的衡平法權益，毋庸置疑是受限於中信銀行的按揭權益，以及有關按揭契賦予銀行執行其權益時所擁有的權利，包括按揭人在未能償還按揭貸款，銀行可單方面出售該物業的權利。而任何有興趣購買該物業的潛在買家，在土地註冊處作查察時，都可以查看到有關按揭契及相關執行按揭的條款。

66.  而且，就樓宇買賣的成交，一般都交由事務律師處理。本庭難以看到，一位合理的潛在的買家，諮詢過恰當的法律意見後，會認為銀行的按揭權益，反而受限於原告人所聲稱的權益，或銀行沒有良好的產權把該物業賣出。換句話說，中信銀行當然不能依賴他們的回應誓章所引述其律師給予的錯誤法律意見（基於本判決理由的分析而說），作為申請撤銷有關「待決案件」登記的有效理由。從這角度來看，上文第62 段所提及蔡的指稱更顯得空洞、不可靠，不為本庭所接納。

67.  中信銀行已於2024年9月26日收回該物業，原告人一直都沒有作出任何阻攔。在法理上，費大律師在本聆訊中亦再三強調中信銀行在該物業的抵押權益，是優先於也不受限於原告人指稱她在該物業中的實益權益。事實上，中信銀行根據其反申索書中第20段作訴的案情：即使假設原告人在本案所指稱的權益能成立，中信銀行仍然有權出售該物業，而原告人的權益只是限於出售該物業後扣除DCMP案中的法定債項而剩下的餘款：

“20. Even if the Plaintiff has any interest in the Property (which is not admitted), the Plaintiff's alleged interest (if any) in any event ranks after the 3^rd Defendant s interest under the Mortgage and the Order. The 3^rd Defendant is entitled to sell the Property, and the Plaintiffs alleged interest (if any) should be limited to the surplus of the net sale proceeds after satisfying the money judgment under the Order. ” （強調後加）

68.  同樣值得注意的是，有關「待決案件」全無提及中信銀行與第一及第二被告人訂立按揭時，是知悉原告人在該物業的權益（無論是實際上或法律構定上的知悉 - actual or constructive notice）。費大律師在其陳詞大綱第40段亦清晰申述中信銀行不會有這方面的知悉。原告人的申索書亦已承認中信銀行與第一及第二被告人之間所訂立的按揭契的有效性。

69.  更何況，費大律師引用「置業按揭」承按人（acquisition mortgagee）的法律原則，呈述中信銀行的權益必然優先於該物業的所有法定（legal）及實益（beneficial）擁有人。（見：上文第50段）

70.  因此，無論從法理上或實質證據上作考量，本庭難以看到，不撤銷有關「待決案件」的登記，如何在法律認可的因果關係上，會導致中信銀行蒙受到任何真正的損害。

71.  在這方面，本庭亦參考了高等法院原訟庭法官鄭蕙心在Wong Ching Hoi 對 Chan Sau Man 一案[9]，就拒絕撤銷該案的「待決案件」所作的分析，尤其是該判詞第23(i) 及 (iii)(a)-(c) 段，現節錄如下:-

“23. In my view, despite the offer of the undertakings, I do not consider there to be good cause to vacate the lis pendens against the 835 Property.

(i) The starting point is that, as Mr Chan acknowledged, the 835 Form A affected the 835 Property and as such was properly registrable (subject to the issue of whether it could be said that the Wife’s claim was not viable). The Wife was therefore entitled to the protection afforded by the registration of the lis pendens.

...

(iii) I balance this consideration against the harm which may be caused to the Husband if the lis pendens were to be maintained. He has stated that he has no intention of selling the 835 Property, so the lis pendens would not affect him adversely in this regard, but he does not want the lis pendens to affect the leasing of the property. He says that the tenant of the 836 Properties raised verbal queries as to the title of the properties, and his lawyers had to explain the situation to the tenant in writing. He says that the lease of the 835 Property is about to end in March 2022 and he wishes to make this application to allay the tenant’s concern and to reduce the risk of not being able to rent out the property. However:

(a) it is not clear what concern was raised by the tenant of the 836 Properties, so it is difficult to assess whether prospective tenants of the 835 Property would have a similar concern. Essence Knitting’s affirmation merely says that there were “verbal queries as to the title of the [836 Properties]”, and the letter from Essence Knitting’s solicitors to the tenant of the 836 Properties did not refer to any query;

(b) in any event, it is not clear why a prospective tenant of the 835 Property might be concerned about the lis pendens, since even if the ownership were to change hands, this ought not to affect the tenancy;

(c) in other words, it does not seem that maintenance of the lis pendens would cause any real harm.”（強調後加）

72.  本庭亦有小心考慮過費大律師所援引的案例，但認為那些案件的案情，與本案有別，實不適用於本案。本庭不需逐一討論，但會就費大律師所依重的其中兩個案例，提出一些觀察。

73.  第一宗案例是Dextra China Ltd v Lam Wing Kit （HCMP 1852/2015, 2017年11月30日）。在該案中，原告人於2014年4月針對被告獲取勝訴判決，有關判定債項為人民幣五百多萬元連利息。於同年7月，針對被告人作為唯一法定業主的物業，原告人從法院獲頒「押記令」。

74.  於2015年11月17日，原告人向原訟法庭成功申請強制出售該物業以清償債務（「該出售令」）。而在該聆訊前一星期，被告人的姐姐及弟弟二人（「林氏姊弟二人」）才入稟區域法院，聲稱擁有該物業約75%的實益權益；其後，在法庭就該案物業批出「管有令狀」（writ of possession) 前約一星期，又在原訟法庭嘗試加入該案作為共同被告及申請暫緩執行該出售令。但於2016年9月，林氏姊弟二人的兩項申請，均被聆案官駁回，理由為其主張缺乏證據支持，僅依賴「空洞的指稱」。之後，林氏姊弟二人與被告人，在區域法院的案件中達成和解，簽定了「Tomlin Order」，協議被告人將轉讓該物業70%權益予其姊弟，並把這「Tomlin Order」登記在土地註冊處。

75.  林氏姊弟二人就聆案官的命令提出上訴，原告人與此同時申請撤銷登記在土地註冊處的「Tomlin Order」。高等法院原訟法官黃國瑛駁回林氏姊弟二人的上訴，亦把該「Tomlin Order」撤銷，該判詞第42段這樣說：—

“42. Nevertheless, I have come to the view that the registration of the Tomlin Order should be vacated from the Land Register pursuant to the court’s inherent jurisdiction to prevent an abuse of its process.

(1) The Judgment has remained unpaid.

(2) The plaintiffs have obtained the Order for Sale with a view to satisfying the Judgment.

(3) The dismissal of the Joinder Application effectively decides the issue of the Sibling’s assertion of beneficial ownership of the Property as between the plaintiffs and the Siblings.

(4) The plaintiffs are entitled to carry out the Order for Sale.

(5) The Tomlin Order was nothing more than an agreement between the defendant and the Siblings. There was no adjudication by the District Court on the beneficial ownership of the Property.

(6) Such agreement was entered into in the District Court Action, to which the Siblings chose not to join the plaintiffs as parties despite knowing that the plaintiffs had obtained a charging order absolute and the Order for Sale over the Property.

(7) It was made after the issue of the summons by which the Siblings made the Joinder Application and while the Joinder Application was due to be heard substantively.

(8) After losing the Joinder Application, they nevertheless proceeded to register the Tomlin Order, which had the (intended) practical effect of blocking or impeding the sale of the Property by the plaintiffs pursuant to the Order for Sale.

(9) I agree with Mr Chain that the creation of the Tomlin Order and the registration of the same could be regarded as a collateral attack on the present proceedings (under which the Siblings made the Joinder Application) and therefore an abuse of process. See Parakou Shipping Pte Ltd v Jinhui Shipping and Transportation Ltd [2011] 2 HKLRD 1 at [87]-[103] per Reyes J.” （強調後加）

76.  從上述黃法官的裁斷看到，林氏姊弟二人把「Tomlin Order」登記在土地註冊處，明顯是要阻撓原告人執行該出售令，這與本案截然不同，因為本案的原告人無論在其申索書或是次聆訊中所作的反對誓章，均沒有反對中信銀行把案中的物業出售，以償還第一及第二被告人所欠銀行的債項。（見：原告人的反對誓章第5段，節錄於上文第35段）

77.  另外，在Dextra China Ltd一案中，該案原告人在該案的物業權益是來自「押記令」，有別於中信銀行在本案物業中的按揭權益。就算有關「Tomlin Order」是在「押記令」之後才訂立及登記，但假如林氏姊弟二人所聲稱的實益權益在法理上能成立的話，其權益仍是會優先於該案原告人透過「押記令」從該案物業所獲得的權益。因為，即使當Dextra China Ltd案的原告人獲法庭頒令「押記令」，他們在該案物業的押記權益，是建基於有關判定債務人在物業中的實益權益 （beneficial interest of the judgment debtor） 之上。假如該案的「Tomlin Order」沒有被撤銷，想透過該出售令購入物業的潛在買家便會卻步，因為他們並不能確定他們買入的物業，會否受限於林氏姊弟二人所主張的實益權益。而該案的原告人作爲判定債權人獲得「押記令」，並不是付出代價的購買人（purchaser for value），因而亦不能（如本案的中信銀行般）引用相關的衡平法原則以獲得優先權。見：Yau Siu Yeung v Wing Sum Lo [1988] HKC 693, 698頁G段至699頁E段。

78.  在Si Tou Choi Kam v Wealth Credit Ltd [2018] 4 HKC 247, 上訴庭在第15段這樣說：

“15. On the facts of the present case and on the assumption that the husband has never had any beneficial interest in the property, the charging orders made simply are not instruments that affect the property, even when giving the word ‘affect’ in s 2(1) ‘a large meaning’: Thian’s Plastics Industrial Co (No 2), p 256. It must be remembered that a charging order is made only as a means to enforce payment of a judgment debt: O 45 r 1(1)(c), the Rules of the District Court (Cap 336H). It is registrable under the Ordinance for that reason: s 52AB(2) of the District Court Ordinance. However, if the judgment debtor has no beneficial interest in the property, the charging order is simply meaningless in terms of aiding enforcement. Such a charging order cannot possibly affect the property. This is quite regardless of s 52AA of the District Court Ordinance discussed above. For that reason alone, the charging orders in question are not registrable and should therefore be vacated. The question of ranking of priority under s 3(1) of the Ordinance simply does not come into play.” （強調後加）

79.  另外，「置業按揭」承按人（acquisition mortgagee）的法理原則，對該案的原告人當然也不適用。

80.  最後，按該案判詞第24及25段，就該案原告人與林氏姊弟二人之間來說，法庭實際上已裁斷，林氏姊弟二人所主張在該案物業的權益，並不能構成可爭拗的真誠申索（arguable bona fide claim）：

“24. I have taken some care in describing in some detail, in paragraphs 10, 11 and 14 above, the evidence put by the Siblings before Master Chow in support of their claim to partial beneficial ownership of the Property. As stated above, the Siblings’ case on evidence before Master Chow consisted entirely of their bare assertions, unsupported by any documentary or other independent or objective evidence. And given the nature and basis of the Siblings’ claim, one would have expected some probative written records to exist, especially documents in proof of some, if not all, of the financial contributions upon which the Siblings rest their case, particularly when such contributions were supposed to be continuing. There was no explanation by the Siblings as to why they could, or would, not adduce any documentary evidence, despite the criticism in paragraph 28(a) of the plaintiffs’ affirmation in opposition.

25. On such evidence, even leaving aside the other points mentioned by Mr Chain as summarised in paragraph 23 above, I am of the view that the Siblings had fallen fall short of what is required to show an arguable bona fide claim to a beneficial interest in the Property. Any decision otherwise would oblige the court to act on bare assertions.” （強調後加）

81.  換句話說，無論就林氏姊弟二人在該案中所聲稱的權益的可爭拗性，或保留有關「Tomlin Order」在土地註冊處的登記所引申的後果來看，該案與本案的情況明顯都不能相提並論。其中，中信銀行在是次簡易判決申請中，並無主張原告人所指稱在該物業的實益權益是不可爭拗。中信銀行透過費大律師向法庭呈述的立場，只是懷疑原告人在申索書中相關指控的真實性。見：中信銀行的陳詞大綱第40.1段。中信銀行更沒有說2013年2月18日的「集資買樓投資協議書」是虛假文件，反觀，有關協議書與原告人作訴的案情，大體上是一致的；凡此種種，皆指向原告人所聲稱她在該物業的實益權益，是可爭拗的議題。

82.  另一宗案例是Credit One Finance Ltd v Lok Pak Fung [2025] HKCFI 270。該案的被告人於2020年4月購入大埔一個住宅單位，並登記為唯一法定業主。購置資金來自渣打銀行提供的抵押貸款。其後，被告人再向另一財務公司（Konew Capital International Ltd）申請第二筆貸款。2022年2月，被告人向原告人借款600萬港元，並以同一物業作抵押，該筆借款用於清償前兩筆貸款的未償還債務。

83.  後因被告人違約未還款，該案的原告人於2023年4月取得法院缺席判決，獲頒物業管有令，其後，透過執達吏的協助收回物業。此時，被告人的妻子聲稱被告人以信託形式持有該物業（或其部分權益），因而向法院申請加入訴訟，要求撤銷該物業的管有令，並於土地註冊處登記一項名為“擬繼續進行附屬濟助申請通知書經核證真實副本” 的通知（「該通知」），聲稱對物業享有其權利，意圖阻礙原告人出售該物業。

84.  聆案官撤銷了被告人妻子加入訴訟的申請，她不服提出上訴。高等法院原訟庭法官陳嘉信駁回其上訴，所持的理由主要見於其判詞第21段：

“21. From the foregoing, I agree that this court should exercise its discretion on the Joinder Application as follows:

(1) Based on the straightforward application of well-established legal principles of subrogation (Section B above) and priority of acquisition mortgages (Section C above) to the undisputed facts of the present case, Credit One indisputably has a right to possession over the Property superior to the Wife for up to HK$3.5 million odd (see paragraph 18 above).

(2) Any right of the Wife to possession over the Property (even assuming the Wife’s Alleged Beneficial Ownership exists) is overridden by Credit One’s indisputable superior right to possession. The Wife therefore has no basis whatsoever to set aside the Writ of Possession.

(3) As any attempt by the Wife to set aside the Writ of Possession would inevitably fail, there is no prejudice to her to dismiss the Joinder Application.

(4) After refusal of joinder, the Wife’s Alleged Beneficial Ownership can still be asserted through the Wife commencing separate proceedings against Credit One claiming priority over sales proceeds of the Property (beyond the undisputed HK$3.5 million odd).” （強調後加）

85.  由上述的案情撮要及法庭拒絕被告人妻子申請加入訴訟的理由可以觀察到，該案與本案的案情也是南轅北轍。因為Credit One Finance Ltd一案中，被告人妻子申請加入該案及登記該通知在土地註冊處的目的，都是為了要阻止Credit One Finance行使其按揭的權力把案中的物業出售，因此，當該案法官認為被告人妻子不應被批准加入訴訟，該通知在土地註冊處的登記自然應被撤銷，這也是申請加入訴訟的一方所同意的。（見：該判詞第1(3)及(6)段及第22段）。

86.  但本案中的原告人不但沒有申請加入DCMP 案，去爭議中信銀行有權根據按揭契向法庭申請收回該物業，以作出售清還第一及第二被告人所欠的債務。反而是，中信銀行申請加入此案要求法庭頒令宣布（原告人實際上並沒有爭議的）銀行的優先按揭權益。另外，本庭在上文已指出，為何原告人亦有其合理的需要，把有關「待決案件」登記在土地註冊處，以保障其自身的權益，而並非要阻礙中信銀行出售該物業；在法理上，該「待決案件」的登記，亦不會妨礙中信銀行行使其按揭契的權利把該物業出售。

87.  依據上文第23及25段所引述的法理原則，及基於上文的分析，本庭也認為實不應把本案的「待決案件」撤銷。

結論

88.  基於上述的分析，中信銀行明顯不應作出其傳票第1及2項（分別要求法庭頒令宣布及撤銷「待決案件」）的申請，兩項均應被撤銷。

89.  另外，費大律師在聆訊中，向法庭表示中信銀行放棄該傳票第4及5段所要求關於「損害賠償作出評定」及「利息」的濟助，本庭認為這是明智的做法，因為根據上述的分析，中信銀行也明顯沒有所需或可信的證據，及法理基礎，去要求法庭作出這些命令。

訟費

90.  由於中信銀行的傳票被撤銷，在一般情況下，他們應向原告人支付其傳票的訟費，但原告人同意雙方各自負責己方的訟費。

91.  費大律師卻呈述，由於原告人於2024年8月2日向中信銀行發出的信函曾表示「爭議」中信銀行在該物業的優先權，到了其後的反對誓章，才確認實際上沒有爭議。因此，中信銀行在發出其傳票時，要求法庭宣布他們在該物業的按揭權益，優先於原告人的權益，是合理的，所以中信銀行仍應獲得其傳票第1項的相關訟費。

92.  基於上文的分析，本庭拒絕中信銀行的訟費申請，尤其不能接受費大律師的呈述，因本庭已詳細解釋為何該信函，從整體的證據來看，不應被合理解讀為，原告人爭議中信銀行在該物業的優先按揭權益，或爭議銀行可根據按揭契出售該物業。其次，本庭亦已指出，中信銀行並沒有就其反申索申請作出修訂，去作訴有關信函已構成他們在是次聆訊中才第一次提出的所謂「爭議」。因此，就算假設費大律師這呈述有任何爭拗的空間（當然本庭並不這樣認為），中信銀行本身也沒有自足且完整的作訴案情，去支持其傳票的第1項，該項的申請基於這理由亦足以被撤銷，中信銀行因而亦不應獲得相關的訟費。

93.  因此，本庭認為中信銀行的傳票的各項申請，皆應被撤銷，而不應獲得任何訟費。

94.  基於上述，在訟費方面，法庭不作任何命令。