LEUNG KWAI LING v. HK GLORY PROPERTIES LTD

HCA 347/2013

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 347 OF 2013

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D E C I S I O N

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I.  Introduction

1.  This Decision is to be read together with and for the sake of consistency and convenience I shall (subject to the abbreviations used in this Decision) adopt the abbreviations in (a) my Reasons for Decision handed down on 3 May 2013 (“3/5/13 Reasons”), 16 May 2013 (“16/5/13 Reasons”) and 13 August 2013 (“13/8/13 347 Reasons”) and my Decision handed down on 15 July 2013 (“15/7/13 Decision”) in HCA 347/2013, (b) my Reasons for Decision handed down on 13 August 2013 (“13/8/13 432 Reasons”) in HCA 432/2013, and (c) my Decision handed down on 13 August 2013 (“13/8/13 Decision”) in HCA 347/2013 and HCA 432/2013 (“Subject Actions”).

2.  By an inter partes summons dated 19 August 2013 in HCA 347/2013 (“Appeal 347 Summons”), the plaintiff sought leave to appeal against orders “given at the hearings on 1-8-2013, 11-7-2013 + 9/5, [26/4] + 30/4 of 2013”, which I believe referred to the following orders (collectively, “Orders”):

(a) Master J Wong’s order dated 26 April 2013 (“Time Extension Order”);

(b) my order dated 30 April 2013 (“30/4/13 Order”) in respect of the 3/5/13 Reasons;

(c) my order dated 9 May 2013 (“9/5/13 Order”) in respect of the 16/5/13 Reasons;

(d) my order dated 15 July 2013 (“15/7/13 Order”) made pursuant to the 15/7/13 Decision in respect of a hearing on 11 July 2013;

(e) my order dated 1 August 2913 (“1/8/13 347 Order”) in respect of the 13/8/13 347 Reasons;

(f) my order dated 13 August 2013 (“13/8/13 347 Order”) made pursuant to the 13/8/13 Decision in respect of a hearing on 1 August 2013.

3.  By an inter partes summons dated 19 August 2013 in HCA 432/2013 (“Appeal 432 Summons”), the plaintiff sought leave to appeal against:

(a) my order dated 1 August 2013 (“1/8/13 432 Order”) in respect of the 13/8/13 432 Reasons;

(b) my order dated 13 August 2013 (“13/8/13 432 Order”) made pursuant to the 13/8/13 Decision in respect of a hearing on 1 August 2013.

4.  Each of the Appeal 347 and 432 Summonses is supported by three affidavits by the plaintiff filed on 19 August, 15 November and 19 November 2013 in HCA 347/2013 and HCA 432/2013 respectively.  Ms Kiang, solicitor for HK Glory and HK Land, had no objection for the plaintiff to rely on such affidavits for the hearing of the Appeal 347 and 432 Summonses on 20 November 2013.

5.  By an inter partes summons filed on 17 September 2013 in HCA 347/2013 (“Amendment Summons”), HK Glory sought leave to amend the 13/8/13 347 Order pursuant to the slip rule under Order 20 rule 11 of the RHC in the manner marked in red as per the draft order annexed thereto.

6.  The Appeal 347 and 432 Summonses were originally scheduled for hearing before me on 9 October 2013.  The Amendment Summons was also returnable before me on the same day.

7.  By a Memorandum of Notification of an Application for Legal Aid filed on 12 September 2013, the Director of Legal Aid (“DLA”) notified the court that the plaintiff had applied for legal aid.  Due to the legal aid automatic stay, the hearing on 9 October 2013 was vacated and rescheduled to 20 November 2013.  By a Memorandum of Notification that a Party has been Refused Legal Aid filed on 17 October 2013, the DLA informed the court that the plaintiff had been refused legal aid.

8.  For the purpose of the hearing on 20 November 2013, the plaintiff lodged written submissions dated 16 November 2013 (for the Subject Actions) and 19 November 2013 (for HCA 347/2013).  With no objection from Ms Kiang, leave was granted for the plaintiff to rely on her written submissions dated 13 November 2013 for HCA 347/2013 and HCA 432/2013 respectively.  The plaintiff made clear at the hearing on 20 November 2013 that her submissions in respect of HCA 347/2013 were also applicable to HCA 432/2013.

II. Time extension order

9.  On 30 April 2013, the plaintiff filed Notice of Appeal against the Time Extension Order.  But she did not actively pursue the appeal.  By the Order of To J dated 13 June 2013, such appeal by the plaintiff was dismissed for want of prosecution with costs in favour of HK Glory.  There is to date no appeal against the Order of To J dated 13 June 2013, which therefore remains binding on the plaintiff.

10.  In her written submissions dated 19 November 2013, the plaintiff claimed that her appeal against the Time Extension Order should be “restored” because she was absent at the hearing before To J on 13 June 2013.  No or no sufficient reason was offered as to why she was so absent. There is also no formal application by summons before me for leave to appeal against or to set aside the Order of To J dated 13 June 2013.  Anyway, under Order 59 rule 2B(2) of the RHC, “[so] far as is practicable, the application must be made to the judge …… against whose judgment or order leave to appeal is sought”.  Turning back to the Time Extension Order, since the plaintiff’s appeal against such order has been dismissed (and  Order of To J dated 13 June 2013 presently still stands), she is not entitled to seek leave to appeal against the Time Extension Order yet again.  In the circumstances, the Appeal 347 Summons in respect of the Time Extension Order is dismissed.

III. Striking out orders and RAO/RPO

11.  By paragraphs 1 and 4-19 of the 13/8/13 347 Order and by the 13/8/13 432 Order, I (a) struck out the plaintiff’s Statement of Claim as supplemented by the 347/13 Particulars in HCA347/2013 and the plaintiff’s Statement of Claim in HCA 432/2013, (b) dismissed the actions in the Subject Actions, and (c) granted RAO/RPO against the plaintiff (collectively, “Final Orders”).  The plaintiff now applied for leave to appeal against inter alia the Final Orders. For the sake of convenience, the orders in (a)-(b) above are referred to as the “Striking Out Orders” and the orders in (c) above are referred to as the “RAO/RPO Orders” in this Decision.

12.  The starting point is section 14(1) of the High Court Ordinance Cap 4 (“HCO”), which provides that “[subject] to subsection (3) and section 14AA, an appeal shall lie as of right to the Court of Appeal from every judgment or order of the Court of First Instance in any civil cause or matter”. Section 14AA of the HCO provides as follows:

“(1) Except as provided by rules of court, no appeal lies to the Court of Appeal from an interlocutory judgment or order of the Court of First Instance in any civil cause or matter unless leave to appeal has been granted by the Court of First Instance or the Court of Appeal.

(2) Rules of court may specify a judgment or order of any prescribed description to which subsection (1) does not apply and accordingly an appeal lies as of right from the judgment or order.

(3) Leave to appeal for the purpose of subsection (1) may be granted—

(a) in respect of a particular issue arising out of the interlocutory judgment or order; and

(b) subject to such conditions as the court hearing the application for leave considers necessary in order to secure the just, expeditious and economical disposal of the appeal.

(4) Leave to appeal for the purpose of subsection (1) shall not be granted unless the court hearing the application for leave is satisfied that—

(a) the appeal has a reasonable prospect of success; or

(b)   there is some other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard.”

13.  In respect of the Striking Out Orders, Order 59 rule 21 of the RHC provides as follows:

“(1) Judgments and orders to which section 14AA (1) of the Ordinance (leave to appeal required for interlocutory appeals) does not apply and accordingly an appeal lies as of right from them are as follows –

(a) a judgment or order determining in a summary way the substantive rights of a party to an action;

……

(2) Without affecting the generality of paragraph 1(a), the following are judgments and orders determining in a summary way the substantive rights of a party –

……

(b) an order striking out an action or other proceedings or a pleading or any part of a pleading under Order 18, rule 19 or under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court; ……”

In the circumstances, notwithstanding contrary suggestion by Ms Kiang, no leave of this court is required for appeal against the Striking Out Orders.

14.  In respect of the RAO/RPO Orders, paragraph 16(a) of Practice Direction 11.3 (High Court and District Court Restricted Application and Restricted Proceedings Orders) (“PD11.3”) provides that:

“Litigants in the High Court who are subject to a restrictive order have a right of appeal from the Court of First Instance to the Court of Appeal:

(1) against the making of the restrictive order;

……

Note in contrast that, where the Court of First Instance refuses leave to institute or continue proceedings to a person who is subject to a restrictive order made under to HCO, section 27(1), there is no automatic right to appeal to the Court of Appeal. Leave to appeal against the refusal of leave must first be obtained from the Court of First Instance. See HCO, section 27A (2).”

Although it is not expressly spelled out in PD11.3 whether leave of the court is required for appeal to the Court of Appeal against RAO/RPO granted by the Court of First Instance, Ms Kiang conceded that such leave was probably unnecessary.  In my view, this must be correct because the nature of RAO/RPO is to determine in a summary way the substantive rights of a party to an action, ie such party will no longer be free to pursue applications/claims within the ambit of the RAO/RPO unless the designated judge grants leave.  Such view is also bolstered by the Note in paragraph 16 of PD11.3 which seems to suggest that the lack of automatic right to appeal in respect of a restrictive order made under section 27 of the HCO is to be contrasted to RAO/RPO made under common law and PD11.3.

15.  In my view, the Final Orders are plainly not interlocutory orders, and no leave for appeal to the Court of Appeal is required. Consequently, not only are the Appeal 347 and 432 Summonses in respect of the Final Orders redundant, I have no jurisdiction to grant leave to appeal sought in such summonses in respect of the Final Orders.

16.  Indeed, pursuant to written enquiry by the plaintiff dated 27 August 2013, this court on the same day directed in writing as follows:

“In respect of HCA 347/2013:

1. The Decision given and handed down by the court on 13/8/13 [ie the 13/8/13 Decision referred to in paragraphs 1(c) and 2(f) above] in respect of the hearing on 1/8/13 concerns the defendant’s summons dated 15/4/13 [ie D’s 347 Summons].

2. No leave is required to appeal against such decision referred to in paragraph 1 above.

……

In respect of HCA 432/2013:

1. The Decision given and handed down by the court on 13/8/13 [ie the 13/8/13 Decision referred to in paragraphs 1(c) and 3(b) above] in respect of the hearing on 1/8/13 concerns the defendant’s summons dated 16/7/13 [ie D’s 432 Summons].

2. No leave is required to appeal against such decision referred to in paragraph 1 above.

……”

17.  On 1 September 2013, the plaintiff again enquired with the court in writing for permission to issue ex parte summons for leave to appeal in place and stead of the Appeal 347 and 432 Summonses.  This court on 4 September 2013 directed in writing as follows:

“……

3. The court draws the plaintiff’s attention to the court’s written directions dated 27/8/13 which provide inter alia that the decision handed down by the court on 13/8/13 in respect of the hearing on 1/8/13 [ie the 13/8/13 Decision] that concerns the defendant’s summons dated 15/4/13 [ie D’s 347 Summons in HCA347/2013], no leave is required to appeal against such decision.

4. The request to issue ex parte summons for appeal against the decision handed down on 13/8/13 [ie the 13/8/13 Decision] that concerns the defendant’s summons dated 15/4/13 [ie D’s 347 Summons in HCA347/2013] is unnecessary. ……”

(my emphasis)

The above observations are equally applicable to the plaintiff’s written application for leave to issue ex parte summons for leave to appeal against the Final Orders made in respect of D’s 432 Summons in HCA 432/2013.

18.  Still later on 20 October 2013, the plaintiff again enquired with the court in writing for permission to issue ex parte summonses for leave to appeal in respect of the Subject Actions.  On 18 November 2013, this court directed in writing inter alia that such matter had been dealt with by the court’s directions on 4 September 2013.

19.  In conclusion, leave to appeal against the Final Orders whether by way of ex parte or inter partes summons is unnecessary, and I have no jurisdiction to grant such leave.  Since the plaintiff did not apply to withdraw the Appeal 347 and 432 Summonses for leave to appeal against the Final Orders, such applications fall to be dismissed.

20.  There is therefore no need for me to consider the merits of the plaintiff’s intended appeal against the Final Orders. But in case I am wrong, I have considered the plaintiff’s arguments in Part VI below.  Suffice to state here there is nothing that persuades me to grant leave to appeal against the Final Orders should such leave be required (which I disagree).  Further, if leave to appeal against the Final Orders is required (which I disagree), Order 59 rule 2B (5) of the RHC makes it quite clear that such application “must be made inter partes if the proceedings to which the judgment or order relates are inter partes”.  Since all proceedings in the Subject Actions were inter partes, there is no basis for the plaintiff’s suggestion of substituting the Appeal 347 and 432 Summonses with ex parte summonses for leave to appeal.

IV. Interlocutory orders: application for leave to appeal made out of time

21.  Order 59 rule 2B(1) of the RHC provides that:

“Subject to paragraph (4) and any other enactment, an application for leave to appeal against –

(a) an interlocutory judgment or order of the Court;

(b) a judgment or order of the Court specified in section 14(3)(e) or (f) of the Ordinance; or

(c) any other judgment or order of the Court against which an appealmay be made with leave of the Court or the Court of Appeal,

may only be made to the Court in the first instance within 14 days from the date of the judgment or order.” (my emphasis)

22.  Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2014 states as follows:[1]

“An application is treated as “made” when the relevant document, is lodged with the Appeals Registry. It is not necessary for the application to be considered before the expiration of the time limit.

 The power to extend time under O.3, r.5(1) or (2) should not apply to an application for leave to appeal, a construction which is consistent with the underlying objective in O.1A, r.1(b); per Chu J. (as she then was) in Wynn Resorts (Macau) SA v. Mong Henry [2009] 5 H.K.C. 515, para.13. the phrase “may only be made” in O.59, r.2B (1) is unequivocal, indicating that an application to the court below for leave to appeal against its judgment or order may only be made within the stipulated 14-day period. In the absence of express provision giving the court below power to grant extension of time to apply for leave to appeal, it must necessarily follow that the court below does not have such power: per To J., Menno Leedert Vos v. Global Fair Industrial Ltd & ors (unrep., HCA4200/1995, 23 April 2010), para.6”

23.  By the 30/4/13 Order in HCA 347/2013, I (a) dismissed paragraph 2 of P’s 2^nd Summons for default judgment against HK Glory as being premature and unnecessary,[2] and (b) adjourned paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 of P’s 2^nd Summons to be heard together with D’s 347 Summons.[3]  Full reasons for decision in respect of the 30/4/13 Order were given in the 3/5/13 Reasons.

24.  By the 9/5/13 Order in HCA347/2013, I dismissed P’s 3^rd Summons filed on 6 May 2013[4] without prejudice to P’s 1^st Summons and paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 of P’s 2^nd Summons.  I also granted case management directions for affidavit evidence to be filed, and for skeleton submissions and hearing bundle to be lodged for the substantive hearing of D’s 347 Summons.  Full reasons for decision in respect of the 9/5/13 Order were given in the 16/5/13 Reasons.

25.  By the 15/7/13 Order in HCA 347/2013, P’s 4^th, 5^th and 6^th Summonses filed on 3, 5 and 8 July 2013 respectively were dismissed.  By P’s 4^th Summons, the plaintiff sought (a) “further and better particulars with supporting exhibits” to verify the contents of affidavits filed by HK Glory in HCA 347/2013 and “previous cases”, and (b) copies of specified documents, failing which she applied to strike out the contents of all HK Glory’s affidavits.  By P’s 5^th Summons, the plaintiff sought “further and better particulars with supporting exhibits” about certain contents of HK Glory’s affidavits, and further applied for leave to file more affidavits.  By P’s 6^th Summons, the plaintiff sought an order to avoid the assignment of the Old Unit, an injunction against HK Glory to stop D’s 347 Summons, an order that HK Glory and their solicitors be liable for contempt of court and for obstructing the course of justice, a freezing order be placed on all assets of HK Glory for the total amount of her claim, and an order for summary judgment against HK Glory.  Full reasons for decision in respect of the 15/7/13 Order were given in the 15/7/13 Decision.

26.  By the 1/8/13 347 Order in HCA 347/2013, I granted the following orders with provisions on costs:

(a) P’s 7^th Summons filed on 19 July 2013 and P’s 9^th Summons filed on 26 July 2013 be dismissed;

(b) save that retrospective leave be granted for the plaintiff to file and serve her two affidavits filed on 19 July 2013 (comprising 2 pages and 5 pages respectively) and to rely on such affidavits to oppose D’s 347 Summons, P’s 8^th Summons filed on 24 July 2013 be dismissed;

(c)  no leave be granted for the plaintiff to rely on any other affidavits filed in July 2013 to oppose D’s 347 Summons.

27.  P’s 7^th Summons was an application for leave (a) to add Lee as the 2^nd plaintiff in HCA347/2013 to be represented by the plaintiff, (b) to amend the Writ of Summons in HCA 347/2013 according to the draft annexed thereto, and (c) for the plaintiff to represent Lee in HCA 347/2013 and at all hearings.  Full reasons for my dismissal of P’s 7^th Summons were given in the 13/8/13 347 Reasons.  I note there was no written consent from Lee and the so-called authorisation letter dated 28 May 2010 (which predated the commencement of HCA 347/2013 by more than 2½ years) did not specifically authorise the plaintiff to bring legal proceedings in Lee’s name and on his behalf. Such alleged authorisation was also not verified by Lee by affidavit or personal appearance in court, and Lee did not personally apply to the court for the plaintiff to represent him.

28.  P’s 8^th Summons was an application for the following reliefs:

(a) to adjourn the hearing of D’s 347 Summons or to restore her previous requests for leave to file more affidavits;

(b) alternatively, to re-apply for leave to file her three affidavits all dated 19 July 2013 of 1 page, 2 pages and 5 pages respectively (with exhibits) and any other of her affidavits filed in July 2013;

(c) “the 2^nd + 3^rd director” of HK Glory to give affidavits to confirm whether the contents of HK Glory’s affidavits/exhibits were true or false, especially the parts which the plaintiff alleged were false and untrue;

(d) to allow two months for the plaintiff to adduce expert evidence to show that the compensation of $400,000.00 and the profit share as provided in the Development Agreement dated 1 May 2001 were seriously low, undervalued, wrong, unfair and fraudulent;

(e) to deal with all the plaintiff’s summonses first before dealing with D’s 347 Summons.

29.  Full reasons for my dismissal of P’s 7^th Summons were given in the 13/8/13 347 Reasons.  It was held there was no material change of circumstances that justified the plaintiff’s repeated application for leave to put in further affidavit evidence to oppose D’s 347 Summons that had been dismissed previously.  As regards her application for leave to rely on her three affidavits all filed on 19 July 2013 to oppose D’s 347 Summons, I disallowed reliance on (a) her 1-page affidavit filed on 19 July 2013 for P’s 7^th Summons, and (b) her affidavits filed on 24 and 26 July 2013 for P’s 8^th and 9^th Summonses respectively, but I allowed her to rely on her two other affidavits filed on 19 July 2013.  As regards the plaintiff’s application to require HK Glory to file verifying affidavits, it was held that she could not dictate the scope of HK Glory’s evidence. Her application for leave to adduce expert evidence was also rejected as being premature and unnecessary, but there was no stopping her from raising such request at an appropriate stage of the proceedings if her claim survived D’s 347 Summons.

30.  P’s 9^th Summons in HCA 347/2013 was an application for the following reliefs:

(a) all affidavits and exhibits filed by HK Glory in HCA347/2013 and her previous cases be ruled inadmissible under Order 18 rule 19(2) of the RHC for the purpose of D’s 347 Summons insofar it relied on Order 18 rule 19(1)(a) of the RHC;

(b) the false/forged documents in the exhibits to the affidavits filed by HK Glory in HCA347/2013 (including the Deed of Assignment and memorial, document concerning payment of auction proceeds to HK Glory, attendance lists of two annual general meetings of the owners of the Old Building in 2006-2007, documents concerning HK Glory for obtaining vacant possession of the Old Unit, and the Confirmation by Owner signed by the plaintiff and Lee) and her previous cases be ruled inadmissible for the purpose of D’s 347 Summons insofar as it relied on Order 18 rule 19(1)(c)-(d) of the RHC;

(c) all judgments/orders that struck out her previous cases and all orders/appeals that dismissed her claims against HK Glory, the trustees, the guarantor and the solicitors be ruled inadmissible for the purpose of D’s 347 Summons since they were obtained by fraud and lies by HK Glory;

(d) the Statement of Claim be amended (if required) and not be struck out;

(e) all requests by HK Glory for court orders to strike out the plaintiff’s claim and/or for RAO/RPO be dismissed because HK Glory’s hearing bundle and skeleton submissions for the hearing of D’s 347 Summons had not been served;

(f) HK Glory do file affidavit of service in respect of their hearing bundle for the hearing of D’s 347 Summons.

31.  Full reasons for my dismissal of P’s 9^th Summons were given in the 13/8/13 347 Reasons. It was held that the provision in Order 18 rule 19(2) of the RHC was a matter of law such that a court order was unnecessary, but HK Glory was entitled to rely on affidavit evidence in support of their striking out application made on grounds other than Order 18 rule 19(1)(a) of the RHC.  The plaintiff’s application for an order that certain exhibits to Mr Wong’s affidavits be ruled inadmissible was a repeated application that amounted to collateral challenge against previous dismissals of similar applications under other guises.  For such reason and since I found there was no basis to restrict HK Glory’s affidavit evidence before the substantive hearing for argument in respect of D’s 347 Summons, such application was dismissed. I also saw no basis to order that judgments/orders made in the plaintiff’s previous cases, which had not been overruled on appeal, be inadmissible.

32.  As regards the complaint of late service of the hearing bundle and skeleton submissions in the 13/8/13 347 Reasons, I traced HK Glory’s efforts in effecting service of the same, and found they were not to be faulted for the refusal by the building caretaker at the plaintiff’s address for service to allow them access.  HK Glory through JSM took immediate remedial steps to serve such documents by post, and the plaintiff collected such documents from the Post Office before the hearing. In any event, the hearing bundle comprised documents which the plaintiff already had in her possession, and she was able to prepare her written skeleton submissions in time for the hearing.  It was further observed that she could not complain against the lateness of HK Glory’s supplemental skeleton submissions when she herself issued P’s 7^th, 8^th and 9^th Summonses shortly before the hearing on 1 August 2013.

33.  As regards her request for the Statement of Claim in HCA 347/2013 to be amended (if required) and not be struck out, such application was considered to be premature and inappropriate pending the hearing of D’s 347 Summons, but the dismissal of such application was without prejudice to the court’s discretion, if it saw fit, to consider granting leave to amend in the course of D’s 347 Summons.

34.  By the 1/8/13 432 Order in HCA 432/2013, I dismissed P’s 1^st Summons filed on 24 July 2013 in HCA432/2013.  By that time, HK Land had already filed D’s 432 Summons on 16 July 2013 that sought inter alia to strike out the plaintiff’s Statement of Claim, and to apply for RAO/RPO against her. P’s 1^st Summons in HCA 432/2013 sought to refuse all requests for court orders by HK Land, to dismiss D’s 432 Summons, to grant injunction to stop D’s 432 Summons and future applications for similar reliefs, or alternatively to issue RAO against HK Land from pursuing D’s 432 Summons and future applications for similar reliefs.

35.  At the hearing on 1 August 2013, I dismissed P’s 1^st Summons in HCA 432/2013 on the basis that the reliefs therein essentially sought to challenge D’s 432 Summons and to prevent HK Land from pursuing such summons.  I was of the view that D’s 432 Summons should be heard, and the plaintiff should raise her criticisms against D’s 432 Summons by relying on her affidavits in opposition, written submissions, chronology of events and list of authorities that she filed/lodged in HCA 347/2013 which she wished to adopt[5] and not by way of a pre-emptive summons to ward off D’s 432 Summons.  Full reasons for the 1/8/13 432 Order were given in the 13/8/13 432 Reasons.  In fact, at the hearing on 1 August 2013, the plaintiff was given opportunity to and she did make submissions to oppose D’s 432 Summons in HCA 432/2013.

36.  Plainly, the 30/4/13, 9/5/13, 15/7/13, 1/8/13 347 and 1/8/13 432 Orders were interlocutory orders for which leave to appeal is required (collectively, “Late Interlocutory Orders”).  But Order 59 rule 2B (1) of the RHC[6] requires the plaintiff to apply for leave to appeal within 14 days of the respective dates of the relevant interlocutory orders.  The plaintiff’s applications for leave to appeal against the Late Interlocutory Orders by way of the Appeal 347 and 432 Summonses filed on 19 August 2013 were out of time, and in respect of some of the earlier orders she was months out of time.  As explained in paragraph 22 above, this court has no power to extend time for the plaintiff to apply for leave to appeal against the Late Interlocutory Orders, so her applications in the Appeal 347 and 432 Summonses insofar as they seek leave to appeal against such orders must be dismissed.

37.  However, in case I am wrong, I have also carefully considered the merits of the plaintiff’s intended appeal against the Late Interlocutory Orders in Part VI below.  Suffice to state here that such consideration does not persuade me to grant leave to appeal against the Late Interlocutory Orders even if I have jurisdiction to do so (which I disagree).  I also reiterate that even if I have jurisdiction to grant leave to appeal against the Late Interlocutory Orders made pursuant to inter partes proceedings (which I disagree), Order 59 rule 2B(5) of the RHC does not allow such application to be made by ex parte summons.

38.  In coming to the above views, I have borne in mind the threshold to be met for granting leave to appeal as set out in paragraph 42 below.  I also bear in mind that many of the Late Interlocutory Orders involved case management rulings and/or exercises of discretion. I note the observations by Kwan JA on intended appeals against case management decisions and/or exercises of discretion in Mimi Kar Kee Wong Hung v Severn Villa Limited & ors[7] as follows:

“31. It must also be borne in mind that the orders made by the Judge in the intended appeal are case management decisions in the exercise of the discretion of the trial judge. Case management decisions are only subject to appeal in rare circumstances. The appellant faces a “very high hurdle” and must show that the judge “has gone clearly wrong and made orders which will clearly involve an injustice or an inability for the trial court to carry out its task”, or if the judge “erred in principle or the order was irrational having regard to the issues that had to be resolved”. It need hardly be emphasised that generally, an appellate court will not interfere with a judge’s exercise of discretion unless the judge has misunderstood the law or the evidence or the exercise of his discretion was plainly wrong such that it was outside the generous ambit within which a reasonable disagreement is possible.”[8]

In the circumstances, leave to appeal against case management decisions and/or exercises of discretion is not lightly granted.

V.  Interlocutory orders: Application for leave to appeal made within time

39.  By the 13/8/13 347 Order in HCA347/2013, I inter alia dismissed (a) P’s 1^st Summons filed on 19 April 2013 and (b) paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 of P’s 2^nd Summons filed on 26 April 2013 with costs.

40.  P’s 1^st Summons in HCA347/2013 was an application for default judgment against HK Glory.  Full reasons for my dismissal of P’s 1^st Summons were given in the 13/8/13 Decision. It was held that since (a) Master J Wong by the Time Extension Order granted extension of time until 9 May 2013 for HK Glory to file/serve their Defence, (b) on 9 May 2013 I further extended time until 14 days after the final disposal of D’s 347 Summons for HK Glory to file/serve their Defence, and (c) on 13 August 2013 I struck out the plaintiff’s Statement of Claim as supplemented by the 347/13 Particulars and dismissed the action in HCA 347/2013, HK Glory was not at any time “in default” in the filing of their Defence, and hence P’s 1^st Summons in HCA 347/2013 fell to be dismissed.

41.  Paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 of P’s 2^nd Summons in HCA 347/2013 sought dismissal of D’s 347 Summons, issuance of RAO/RPO against HK Glory to stop their current and future RAO/RPO and striking out applications against the plaintiff and her court cases, and dismissal of all HK Glory’s requests for court orders.  Full reasons for my dismissal of paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 of P’s 2^nd Summons were given in the 13/8/13 Decision.  In summary, since I struck out the plaintiff’s claim and dismissed the action in HCA 347/2013 under the 13/8/13 347 Order, paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 of P’s 2^nd Summons being the converse of D’s 347 Summons necessarily fell to be dismissed.  Further, since I also found the plaintiff’s claim in HCA 347/2013 to be frivolous and vexatious and an abuse of the court’s process, there was no basis for making any RAO/RPO against HK Glory.

42.  The aforesaid orders referred to in paragraph 39 above are plainly interlocutory orders, and it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to persuade this court to grant leave to appeal.  It is trite law that leave to appeal against interlocutory decisions under section 14AA of the HCO[9] will not be granted unless the court is satisfied that the appeal has a reasonable prospect of success or there is some other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard. In SMSE v KL,[10] Le Pichon JA pointed out that such leave to appeal is not lightly granted. The test of reasonable prospects of success involves the notion that the prospects of succeeding must be reasonable and therefore more than fanciful without having to be probable. As the leave requirement was introduced largely to address satellite litigation, so for the court to be satisfied that the appeal does have “reasonable prospects of success”, merely showing that the appeal is “arguable” and “not fanciful” would not be sufficient.[11]  Furthermore, it is pertinent to bear in mind that even if there is a reasonable prospect of success on appeal, the court still retains a discretion whether to grant leave to appeal, although the fact that there is, ex hypothesi, a reasonable prospect of success would heavily influence the court’s exercise of discretion.[12]

43.  I refer to my discussion in Part VI below in respect of the merits of the plaintiff’s intended appeal.  I am not persuaded that the plaintiff’s intended appeal against the interlocutory orders as referred to in paragraph 39 above has reasonable prospects of success. In my view, she has also failed to demonstrate the existence of some other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard. Leave to appeal against the orders referred to in paragraph 39 above is refused.

VI. Plaintiff’s arguments

44.  In her affidavits filed on 19 August 2013 and 15 and 19 November 2013 in the Subject Actions and in her written submissions dated 13 and 19 November 2013, the plaintiff claimed that:

(a) the Orders, which contained major errors of law and fact, were against the weight of the evidence contained in over ten affidavits filed by her with documents exhibited thereto;

(b) the reasons for decision and the decisions given for the Orders were erroneous in that they relied on assertions in affidavits filed by HK Glory and HK Land that contained untrue lies (which she denied), eg HK Glory’s false claim that the DA Deal was negotiated at arm’s length, HK Glory’s false claim to the auction proceeds for the Old Unit and her profit share of “$80M (assessed)”, the illegal transfer of the Old Unit to HK Glory without payment of consideration, the withholding of the auction proceeds by the trustees, etc;

(c) the reasons for decision and the decisions given for the Orders failed to adopt some parts of her affidavits which were not traversed by HK Glory and HK Land, eg wrong interpretation of “Residue” in the Development Agreement;

(d) the 13/8/13 Decision included many matters which were not part of her case,

and as a result the Orders as well as the reasons for decision and the decisions therefor were incompetent, biased and unfair, and caused serious and grave injustice to her.

45.  In my view, the above is nothing more than a repetition of the plaintiff’s arguments at previous hearings of the Subject Actions, including the hearings on 30 April, 9 May, 11 July and 1 August 2013.  Such arguments included allegations in her written submissions dated 13 and 16 November 2013 that referred to alleged falsities/lies in the affidavits filed by HK Glory and HK Land in the Subject Actions (eg allegedly false assertions that (a) the plaintiff and Lee had to pay the Residue to HK Glory, (b) the plaintiff and Lee had no right to claim their profit share of “$80M (assessed)”, and (c) the assignment of the Old Unit to HK Glory was valid and completion had taken place), and alleged forged documents exhibited to such affidavits (eg the Deed of Assignment, Confirmation by Owner and records showing the plaintiff’s attendance at various annual/extraordinary general meetings of the Majority Owners).  The plaintiff claimed she was therefore entitled to claim under the Misrepresentation Ordinance Cap 284 and Unconscionable Contracts Ordinance Cap 458.

46.  But in my view, even though the plaintiff in her written submissions dated 19 November 2013 argued that her claims were based on allegedly concrete facts spelled out in her affidavits with exhibits thereto and she firmly believed in the righteousness of her own case, her claims and allegations were mere assertions that fail to raise any arguable basis let alone one with reasonable prospects of success for challenging the analysis (with reference to documentary materials) in Parts IV and VI of the 13/8/13 Decision.

47.  In her affidavit dated 19 November 2013 and her written submissions dated 13 November 2013, the plaintiff claimed the Development Agreement was unfair to her and Lee, and the DA Deal was not the result of lengthy arm’s length negotiations because they were not involved and no reports were made to them by the Owners’ Committee or HK Glory.  In my view, such arguments conveniently forget that the plaintiff and Lee were all along legally represented, and DHCJ Lok had held in HCA 366/2012 that the Development Agreement was made at arm’s length.[13]  There is no merit to this argument.

48.  In her written skeleton submissions dated 16 and 19 November 2013, save for directions granting leave for the parties to file/serve affidavits, the plaintiff asked the court to set aside the Orders (including the 1/8/13 347 and 432 Orders and the 13/8/13 347 and 432 Orders) due to unfair court procedure, abuse of court process, and fraud, lies and forgeries by HK Glory and HK Land.  But in light of the analysis in Parts IV and VI of the 13/8/13 Decision, I am not persuaded the plaintiff’s mere assertions even begin to demonstrate any arguable basis for suggesting fraud and/or other improprieties on the part of HK Glory and HK Land.

49.  In her affidavits filed on 15 November 2013 in the Subject Actions, the plaintiff claimed that she wrote to HK Glory and HK Land on 13 November 2013 to traverse and reject JSM’s letters to her dated 10 December 2012 and 25 March 2013 respectively, which she said contained untrue lies.  She also reiterated that the contents of the affidavits filed by HK Glory and HK Land contained untruths, which she and Lee denied.  In my view, the plaintiff’s letter of 13 November 2013 is a self-serving letter sent long after the 13/8/13 347 and 432 Orders were made and the 13/8/13 Decision was handed down, and it does not add to her case.  It also does not detract from the analysis in paragraphs 82-83 of the 13/8/13 Decision in relation to JSM’s letters dated 10 December 2012 and 25 March 2013 respectively.

50.  In her written skeleton submissions dated 13, 16 and 19 November 2013, the plaintiff complained that the court adopted the wrong procedure in granting the Striking Out Orders.  She argued that the court should have examined her Statements of Claim filed in the Subject Actions alone because affidavit evidence was inadmissible for applications to strike out pleadings under Order 18 rule 19(1)(a) of the RHC,[14] and she claimed that such examination would reveal she had reasonable causes of action against HK Glory and HK Land.

51.  In fact, the relevant law has been stated in paragraphs 101-102 of the 13/8/13 Decision, and it is accepted that no affidavit evidence is allowed if the striking out application is premised on Order 18 rule 19(1)(a) of the RHC alone. But as explained in paragraphs 104-105 of the 13/8/13 Decision, “even without considering any affidavit evidence”, mere assertions by the plaintiff do not make out any reasonable cause of action.  The fact that she alleged fraud, illegality, misrepresentation, theft, oppression, dishonesty, misappropriation, forgery and other improprieties in her pleadings do not of themselves constitute material facts that make up any reasonable cause of action. More significantly, D’s 347 Summons and D’s 432 Summons do not rest on Order 18 rule 19(1)(a) of the RHC alone.  HK Glory and HK Land also sought to strike out the plaintiff’s claims and actions in the Subject Actions on the alternative grounds that her claims were frivolous or vexatious or her claims were abuse of the court’s process.  When relying on these grounds, it is permissible for HK Glory and HK Land to rely on affidavit evidence.[15]  There is no merit to the plaintiff’s suggestion that if she were able to establish a reasonable cause of action then HK Glory and HK Land would not be able to rely on the grounds for striking out in Order 18 rule 19(1)(b)-(d) of the RHC and/or under the inherent jurisdiction of the court.  In my view, as plainly set out in the rule, the grounds in Order 18 rule 19(1) of the RHC can be used alternatively or cumulatively:

“ The applications may be made on any and all of the grounds set out in O.18, r.19, but the grounds should be clearly stated. If, as is frequently the case, an application is made both under O.18, r.19 and the court’s inherent jurisdiction, this should also be clearly stated……”[16]

In my view, there is no merit to this argument.

52.  In her written submissions dated 13 November 2013, the plaintiff complained that the court failed to apply the laws of equity (which should prevail over common law) given the grave injustice to her, and she further complained that the court had ignored the five “authorities” she cited in her list of authorities.  In my view, I do not see how the principles of equity come into the picture, and the so-called authorities, being largely newspaper extracts and, in my view, irrelevant and/or case-specific, cannot aid the determination of the various applications.

53.  The plaintiff went on to say in her written submissions dated 16 November 2013 that should this court decline to set aside the 1/8/13 347 and 432 Orders and the 13/8/13 347 and 432 Orders, this court should amend the RAO/RPO Orders to limit their applicability to HK Glory and HK Land and not to other parties.  I disagree since the purpose of granting RAO/RPO is to ensure there will not be any collateral attack made outside proceedings covered by RAO/RPO or any unjustified re-litigation in substance of proceedings covered by RAO/RPO. Paragraph 14 of PD11.3 provides as follows:

“Attention is drawn to paragraph 121 of Ng Yat Chi where, in relation to the interpretation of RAOs and RPOs, the Court has stated that regard should be had to the substance of the proposed applications or proceedings and not merely to their form. Accordingly:

(1) Collateral attacks made outside the proceedings covered by an RAO may in substance be merely a device to re-open without justification some matter already determined in those proceedings or otherwise an abuse of the process in respect of those proceedings and, if so, may be treated as applications within those proceedings, caught by the RAO.

(2) Where new proposed proceedings involve new elements or parties not found in the concluded proceedings referred to in the RPO, but are nevertheless in substance merely an unjustified attempt to re-litigate those proceedings, such proposed proceedings mat be treated as falling within the RPO.”

54.  In her affidavits filed on 19 November 2013 and her written submissions dated 13 and 19 November 2013, the plaintiff claimed the Final Orders and the striking out orders made in previous cases against her were obtained by fraud/lies and abuse of the court’s process, so the court should have dismissed D’s 347 Summons and granted default judgment against HK Glory in HCA 347/2013 pursuant to P’s 1^st Summons at the hearing on 30 April 2013 or earlier.  It was further suggested that notwithstanding her written submissions submitted for the purpose of the hearings on 9 May and 11 July 2013, the court should have let her read out her Statement of Claim in HCA 347/2013 at the hearing to explain her causes of action in order to persuade the court to dismiss D’s 347 Summons.

55.  In my view, this is quintessentially an exercise of case management discretion. Prior to the hearing on 1 August 2013, the plaintiff had issued various summonses in HCA 347/2013 all with a view to arrest D’s 347 Summons to prevent it from reaching a substantive hearing and to prevent HK Glory from relying on affidavit evidence that they wished to adduce in support of such summons.  This is procedurally and substantively inappropriate, and such argument has no merits as an intended ground of appeal.  In any event, notwithstanding full submissions by the plaintiff at the hearing on 1 August 2013, the plaintiff was still unable to persuade the court that D’s 347 Summons ought to be dismissed.

56.  In her affidavits filed on 19 November 2013, and in her written submissions dated 13, 16 and 19 November 2013, the plaintiff claimed that only three years or so had lapsed since the accrual of her claims against HK Glory and HK Land upon discovery of the fraud, lies, misrepresentations and other improprieties against her.  She claimed that her causes of action were not time-barred because the applicable time limit under the Limitation Ordinance Cap 347 was 12 and not 6 years since her claim concerned sale of land and proceeds from sale of land.  The plaintiff also claimed that HCA 432/2013 was not time-barred because time would not start to run until the last New Unit was handed over to the Majority Owners, and she and Lee did not take possession of the New Unit.  She further claimed the court had power to override any limitation period.  However, such contentions fail to address the matters discussed in paragraph 44 of the 13/8/13 Decision.  In any event, even if the plaintiff’s claims in the Subject Actions were not time-barred, I have found they were liable to be struck out on their merits.  These arguments do not raise any arguable ground of appeal let alone one with real prospects of success.

57.  In her affidavits filed on 19 November 2013 and in her written submissions dated 16 and 19 November 2013, the plaintiff claimed that the Subject Actions were substantially different from and not re-litigation of her previous cases.  She asserted HK Glory’s and HK Land’s affidavits falsely asserted that her previous cases and claims were frivolous or vexatious and/or that she was a vexatious litigant.  But such arguments are belied by the analysis in Parts V and IX of the 13/8/13 Decision, which the plaintiff has failed to undermine.  The plaintiff went on to claim that her previous cases did not proceed to trial so there was no judgment against her by a court of competent jurisdiction to render her claims in the Subject Actions to be unwarranted re-litigation.  No authority was cited for such proposition. Under the principles of res judicata and/or issue estoppel, the striking out orders made on the merits in the previous cases (some of which were affirmed on appeal) were final orders that were binding on her.[17]  There is no merit to this argument.

58.  In her affidavits filed on 19 November 2013 and her written submissions of the same date, the plaintiff claimed that her previous cases were irrelevant because some important new evidence was included in the Subject Actions, which demonstrated that she had viable claims:

(a) three notices given by the plaintiff to HK Glory, HK Land and JSM respectively in December 2012;[18]

(b) letter from the solicitors for the trustees to the plaintiff and Lee setting out the apportioned net sale proceeds of the Old Unit payable to the plaintiff and Lee;[19]

(c) two notices issued by the plaintiff to HK Glory in March 2013 giving notice of “re-entry and re-possession”;[20]

(d) Mr Yip’s case against HK Glory in the Lands Tribunal;[21]

(e) notice given by the plaintiff in November 2013 (ie after the 13/8/13 Decision was handed down) to HK Glory and HK Land.[22]

But such so-called new evidence has been canvassed and dealt with in paragraph 109 of the 13/8/13 Decision and in paragraph 49 above.  Apart from repeating her arguments raised at previous hearings in the Subject Actions, the plaintiff has been unable to demonstrate with any reasonable prospects of success how the analysis in the 13/8/13 Decision erred.

59.  In her affidavits filed on 19 November 2013, the plaintiff protested that HK Glory and HK Land failed to disclose various important documents in the Subject Actions.  However, such argument has been considered in paragraphs 73, 78 and 80 of the 13/8/13 Decision, and the plaintiff has been unable to demonstrate how the analysis therein has erred.

60.  In her affidavit filed on 19 August 2013 in the Subject Actions, the plaintiff claimed that Ms Leung, solicitor for HK Glory and HK Land, spoke in a low voice at the hearing on 1 August 2013 that she could not hear.  However, at the hearing on 1 August 2013, upon the plaintiff raising such issue, the court did ask Ms Leung to speak up.  Indeed, the court had no and/or no further difficulty in hearing Ms Leung’s oral submissions.  More significantly, the plaintiff was able to make full submissions herself at the hearing on 1 August 2013.  However, in her written submissions dated 13 November 2013, she expanded her complaint of not being able to hear clearly at the hearings on 9 May and 11 July 2013 and criticised the court for not interfering by asking the solicitor appearing for HK Glory to speak up.  The court had no difficulty in hearing oral submissions made at those hearings, and the plaintiff did not in her submissions dated 13 November 2013 suggest that she had made protest at such hearings.  There is no merit to such argument.

61.  The plaintiff complained in her affidavits filed on 19 August 2013 that there were no exhibits to Mr Wong’s affidavit filed by HK Land in HCA 432/2013 in support of D’s 432 Summons.  There is no merit to this argument because in such affidavit filed on 16 July 2013 Mr Wong adopted his affidavits (which necessarily include the exhibits thereto) filed in HCA 347/2013. Indeed, in paragraph 6 of Mr Wong’s affidavit filed on 16 July 2013 in HCA 432/2013, he stated that he relied on his affidavits filed on 15 April and 13 June 2013 in HCA 347/2913 to support D’s 432 Summons. In the circumstances, Mr Wong’s affidavits (and exhibits thereto) filed in HCA 437/2013 were also applicable to HCA 432/2013.

62.  In her affidavit filed on 19 August 2013, the plaintiff said she had laid additional claims against HK Land as guarantor in HCA 432/2013 which were not included in HCA 347/2013 (eg high bill of costs by guarantor in HCA1582/2011) and which were significantly different from the claims in HCA 347/2013 and her previous cases, but the court just blindly struck out her claim and action in HCA 432/2013.  I refer to the 13/8/13 Decision in which the court has made clear that both HCA 347/2013 and HCA 432/2013 (as well as D’s 347 Summons and D’s 432 Summons) were before the court for the hearing on 1 August 2013.  Since the plaintiff has failed to satisfy the court there is any viable cause of action in respect of her claim against HK Glory and/or has failed to resist HK Glory’s application that her claim be struck out for being frivolous or vexatious or an abuse of the court’s process, it follows there is no merit to her claim against HK Land who carried secondary liability as guarantor.

63.  In her affidavits dated 19 August 2013 and her written submissions dated 13 November 2013, the plaintiff argued there was confusion caused by mixing the hearing bundle of the Subject Actions together without separate tabs and mixing the exhibits to her affidavits with those of HK Glory and HK Land, which caused her difficulty in preparing for the hearing on 1 August 2013. I am not persuaded there was any confusion. In the hearing bundle, all affidavits filed by the plaintiff, HK Glory and HK Land were kept in Section B and all exhibits to such affidavits were kept in Section C. This is in compliance with paragraph 2(1) (a) and (b) of Practice Direction 5.4 (Preparation of Interlocutory Summonses and Appeals to Judge in Chambers for Hearing).  Even though the hearing bundle covered both Subject Actions, there was no confusion since every document was expressly identified in the index as being from HCA 347/2013 or HCA 432/2013.

64.  In her affidavits filed on 19 August 2013 and her written submissions dated 13 November 2013, the plaintiff complained that HK Glory and HK Land were late in serving their hearing bundle and written submissions for the hearing on 1 August 2013.  But this matter has already been canvassed in paragraphs 28-33 of the 13/8/13 347 Reasons,[23] and the present repetition of the plaintiff’s complaint does not constitute any reasonable prospects of success to her intended appeal.

65.  In her affidavits filed on 19 August 2013 and written submissions dated 13 November 2013, the plaintiff claimed that (a) the hearing on 1 August 2013 was too short in view of the seriousness of the Final Orders sought by HK Glory and HK Land, the serious impact that such orders could have on her, the volume of the hearing bundle, and the many pages of skeleton submissions, list of authorities and the chronology of events lodged by HK Glory and HK Land, (b) the hearing for D’s 432 Summons was too short, and it was unfair to strike out the plaintiff’s claim and action at the first and only hearing in HCA 432/2013 when the court granted case management directions and gave time for filing affidavit evidence in respect of D’s 347 Summons in HCA 347/2013, and (c) there was confusion caused by hearing the various applications in the Subject Actions at the hearing on 1 August 2013.

66.  I do not agree that the hearing time on 1 August 2013 was too short, especially when the plaintiff’s oral submissions took up the bulk of the hearing time.  In any event, her oral submissions were supplemented by her pleadings, affidavits, written submissions, chronologies of events and list of authorities.[24]  There was also no confusion at the hearing on 1 August 2013 because the court clarified with the parties the relevant applications that were before the court at the beginning of the hearing.

67.  In light of the above analysis, there are no merits to the plaintiff’s various complaints and/or intended grounds of appeal.

VII. Amendment Summons

68.  By the Amendment Summons in HCA 347/2013, HK Glory proposed to amend the preamble to the 13/8/13 347 Order by making clear that the court had considered Mr Wong’s 1^st and 2^nd affidavits filed on 15 April and 13 June 2013 respectively as well as the plaintiff’s two affidavits filed on 19 July 2013 (comprising 2 pages and 5 pages respectively) but not her affidavits filed on 24 and 26 July 2013.

69.  The following matters are of note:

(a) The body of the 13/8/13 347 Order being the orders granted by the court pursuant to the 13/8/13 Decision is left undisturbed by the proposed amendments.

(b) The fact that the court had considered Mr Wong’s two affidavits (which were filed for the purpose of D’s 347 Summons pursuant to the 9/5/13 Order) was made clear in paragraph 6 of the 13/8/13 Decision.

(c) By the 1/8/13 347 Order, this court granted leave for the plaintiff to rely on her two affidavits filed on 19 July 2013 (comprising 2 pages and 5 pages respectively) to oppose D’s 347 Summons, but declined to allow her to rely on any other affidavit filed in July 2013 for the purpose of D’s 347 Summons.[25] I have particularly refused leave for the plaintiff to rely on her affidavits filed on 24 and 26 July 2013.[26]

70.  In the circumstances, the omission/error in the 13/8/13 347 Order for which HK Glory now apply for leave to amend are plainly clerical and not substantive, and the proposed amendments merely seek to correct the clerical omission/error to bring the sealed copy order in line with the 13/8/13 347 Reasons and the 13/8/13 Decision that have been handed down.  The proposed amendments fall squarely within the slip rule under Order 20 rule 11 of the RHC. I have no hesitation in allowing such amendments.

VIII. Conclusion

71.  In the circumstances, the Appeal 347 and 432 Summonses are dismissed. There is no reason why costs should not follow event.  I therefore grant a costs order nisi that the plaintiff shall pay costs of the Appeal 347 and 432 Summonses to HK Glory and HK Land respectively on indemnity basis to be taxed if not agreed.

72.  In respect of the Amendment Summons, I grant an order in terms of paragraph 1 of such summons. I further order HK Glory to file and serve the Amended 13/8/13 347 Order within 7 days from today.  I also grant a costs order nisi that there be no order as to costs of the Amendment Summons.