RAJAN v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD

HCAL 449/2025

[2026] HKCFI 40

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 449 OF 2025

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D E C I S I O N

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1.  On 12 June 2025 I refused to grant leave to the Applicant to apply for judicial review of a decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) in rejecting/dismissing his non-refoulement claim upon finding that none of the grounds put forward by him reasonably arguable for his intended challenge, that there was no error of law or procedural unfairness in the process before the Director of Immigration (“Director”) or the Board or in their decisions, and that there was no reasonable prospect of success in his intended application.

2.  The Applicant now by a summons issued on 30 June 2025 seeks leave to appeal against that decision out of time, as the 14-day period after the decision within which to file his appeal under Order 53 Rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A expired on 26 June 2025, and hence he was 4 days late with his intended appeal.

3.  In considering whether to extend time for appealing against a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the Court shall have regard to (i) the length of the delay; (ii) the reason for the delay; (iii) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (iv) the prejudice to the respondent if extension of time were granted: see Re MK HCMP 2609/2016, 10 January 2017; Chu On Fong Winter v The Appeal Panel (Housing) HCMP 982/2017, 20 July 2017; Islam Raja Rais v Director of Immigration HCMP 881/2017, 26 June 2017; Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226; and Re Saqlain Muhammad [2018] HKCA 346.

4.  In the Applicant’s case, a delay of 4 days may not be considered as significant, and for which he explained in his supporting affirmation that he never received the decision in the mail and was only so informed later by his immigration officer when he reported on his recognizance, but by then he was already out of time with his intended appeal.

5.  The court record shows that the decision was sent on the same day of 12 June 2025 to the Applicant’s then reported address which is the same as stated in his present application without being returned through undelivered post, and hence in the absence of any further evidence to corroborate his assertions, I am not satisfied that the Applicant has provided a good or valid reason for his delay, but given its relative insignificance, I propose to focus on the prospect of success of his intended appeal.

6.  In his supporting affirmation, the Applicant made the following complaints about the decision:

“I believe that the decision made by Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan was reached unfairly, as I was not given an opportunity to clarify my case and situation in my home country. As a new asylum seeker in Hong Kong, I am unfamiliar with the court’s rules and regulations. Being a litigant in person, illiterate and unrepresented has made me unaware of the relevant time limits.”

7.  All these are however just some bare assertions of the Applicant without any relevant or necessary details or particulars or elaboration as to how it was so, or how he was not given an opportunity to clarify his case when the record shows that he failed to attend the scheduled hearing of his leave application without any explanation, nor did he attend the hearing of his present application again without explanation.

8.  As such, and as the Applicant has failed to put forth any proper or valid draft or proposed grounds of appeal, or any particulars of any error in the decision or why it may reasonably be argued that the decision was unfair or unreasonable either in his summons or his affirmation, and in the absence of any error in the decision being clearly and properly identified by the Applicant, I do not see any prospect of success in his intended appeal.

9.  In the premises, and for the reasons given, it would be futile to extend time for what appears to be a hopeless appeal. Accordingly, I refuse to grant leave to the Applicant to appeal out of time, and dismiss his summons.