M, DA v. M, VD formerly known as KSH

FCMC 4687 /2023

[2026] HKFC 37

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 4687 OF 2023

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Judgment
Legal Costs Provision

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The Applications

1.  In this Judgment, for the ease of reference, I shall refer to the petitioner husband as “H”, and to the respondent wife as “W”.

2.  At the beginning, before this court were 2 applications, both taken out by W. The first is a summons dated 15 October 2024 (“MPS Summons”) for maintenance pending suit in favour of herself and the parties’ younger daughter whom I shall refer to as “JY”. The second is a summons dated 13 January 2025 (“LCP Summons”) for legal costs provision.

3.  The parties settled the MPS Summons within the first few hours of the hearing on 16 June 2025, leaving the costs issue to be determined.

Background

4.  H and W are currently 53 and 49 years old respectively. They were married in Hong Kong in February 1996. They have two daughters. The elder daughter whom I shall refer to as “VD” is 25 years old. She has graduated from a university in the United States and is currently living there. The younger daughter JY is 16 years old; she is attending an international school in Hong Kong.

5.  On 3 May 2023, H petitioned for divorce on the ground of 2 years’ separation. He pleaded that the parties separated from each other as from February 2021. Hence, on H’s own case, it was a marriage of 25 years long.

6.  On 19 January 2024, by consent, the custody of JY has been granted to H and W jointly, with care and control to W and reasonable access to H.

7.  Decree nisi was granted on 9 February 2024.

8.  On 4 June 2024, Master J Chow granted an interim-interim maintenance of $10,000 per month in favour of W.

9.  Then, there came W’s MPS Summons which was originally fixed for argument on 7 April 2025 (“MPS Argument”).

10.  On 1 April 2025, H undertook to pay directly or reimburse certain expenses up to a further sum of $102,627 per month on the top of $10,000; hence a maximum sum of $112,627 per month.

11.  On 13 January 2025, W took out the LCP Summons.

12.  On 10 March 2025, H applied to have the MPS Argument to be adjourned (“the Adjournment Summons”).

13.  Two days later, on 12 March 2025, H sought an extension of time for parties to file their skeleton submissions on the MPS Summons (“the EOT Summons”).

14.  H’s application under the Adjournment Summons and the EOT Summons were granted by Master WH Ho on 25 March 2025, with costs reserved to be dealt with at the MPS hearing. On the same date, the Master fixed the MPS Summons and the LCP Summons for argument on 16 June 2025.

15.  As referred to above, the parties settled the MPS Summons on 16 June 2025. In her submissions, W initially sought a monthly sum of $187,800. The settlement was a combination of undertakings to pay by H and direct payment of $63,036.70 per month to W for the benefit of W and JY. I am told the package is roughly about $123,755 per month.  Though the parties were able to settle on the MPS payable, they were not able to agree on the costs of the MPS Summons.  Thus, this court has to deal with (1) the LCP Summons and (2) the costs of the MPS Summons, inclusive the costs of the Adjournment Summons and the EOT Summons.

Current Situation of the Parties

16.  W was a housewife during most of the time of the relationship. She  and JY are currently living at the former matrimonial home (“FMH”), a 1,650 ft² apartment at the Ho Man Tin area. This property was purchased in the joint names of H and W way back in about 2003. H, in his 1^st Form E of 8 April 2024, estimated its net value at about $14,490,000.

17.  H was the breadwinner of the family. He is a businessman and owns and controls a series of offshore and onshore private companies, including in Dubai, Singapore, Spain, UK, BVI, USA, India and Hong Kong. His business includes fast moving consumer goods (FMCG) trading, landed property investment, car park management, co-working spaces, and storage. It seemed it is not in dispute that H’s business was built during the marriage.

18.  H has been staying in a leased apartment in Hung Hom since moving out the FMH.  

The Wife’s Case

19.  Mr Marwah’s main challenge is on H’s financial disclosure which, so submitted, is wholly inadequate. H simply adopted a “catch me if you can” approach. H’s disclosure only served to confuse his true financial position. Mr Marwah invited the court to draw a robust adverse inference as to H’s means.

20.  As regards W’s means, there are no assets that she can reasonably deploy.  There are 3 properties that were purchased in the joint names of H and W, viz the FMH (and its car parking space) which is still under mortgaged and being occupied by W and JY. The other two properties are in the UK, which I shall refer to as “the Landmark Property” and “the Tryon Apartments”. These 2 properties are being rented out and are lightly mortgaged.

The Husband’s Case

21.  H has two grounds of opposition.

22.  The first is H’s ability to pay, in particular, liquidity to pay. H’s business is highly leveraged, he relies heavily on banking facilities secured against properties owned by him or his companies. His business has been on the decline at least since 2017 and W was fully aware of it at the relevant time.  He has had cash flow shortage from time to time, as a result of which he had to liquidate some of his assets, including a property in UK owned by one of his companies in the name of FG Limited in August 2024.  H has made full and frank disclosure to the best he could; this must be seen in light of the fact that he was for a period of time acting in person. There is therefore no merit in the non-disclosure allegation.

23.  The second ground is W fails to satisfy the requirements set out in Currey v Currey (No 2) [2007] 1 FLR 946; specifically, W has interest in the Landmark Property and the Tyron Apartments that could be liquidated for funding her litigation.

Applicable Legal Principles

24.  Turning to the principles under which litigating funding may be ordered, the English Court of Appeal in Currey v. Currey (No 2), set out certain guiding principles on how legal funding as MPS may be granted. The principles set out there have been adopted by the Court of Appeal in HJFG v KCY [2012] 1 HKLRD 95 and has since been cited and relied upon in the courts of Hong Kong.  Hon B Chu J helpfully summarised these principles in WGL v ASB (Decision (Litigation Funding)) HCMP 489/2013 (date of judgment: 30 November 2017) at paragraph 6 of the Judgment,

6.  …

(i)  A fundamental requirement is that the applicant has to supply a sufficiently detailed breakdown of anticipated costs;

(ii)  The overarching enquiry is into whether the applicant for a costs allowance can demonstrate that he/she cannot reasonably procure legal advice and representation by any other means, and the enquiry will include:

•  To the extent that the applicant has assets, the applicant has to demonstrate that they cannot reasonably be deployed, whether directly or as the means of raising a loan, in funding legal services;

•  Whether the applicant cannot reasonably procure legal services by the offer of a charge upon ultimate capital recovery;

•  Whether there is public funding available to the applicant as would furnish the applicant with legal advice and representation at a level of expertise apt to the proceedings.

(iii)  In the broad exercise of discretion, satisfying the above condition alone may not be sufficient, and a judge may consider that other factors must come into play, including that :

•  The subject matter of the proceedings;

•  The reasonableness of the applicant’s stance in the proceedings, insofar as it can safely be assessed at so early a juncture;

•  The period over which an allowance for legal costs is to be paid, and that applicants should not therefore expect that an order that the allowance be paid until the final determination of all proceedings will be the inevitable order.

Discussion – H’s Ability to Pay

25.  I shall start by dealing with H’s ability to pay.

26.  To illustrate his point that H failed to give a full and frank disclosure of his financial situation, Mr Marwah drew a long list in greatest details he could of H’s failure in compliance of his duty. For the present purpose, it is only necessary to list out the major complaints:

1.  H failed to provide most of the audited and management accounts of his companies.

2.  H did not provide a complete list of his companies’ bank accounts.

3.  H failed to disclose his ownership in a number of landed properties and companies, especially the company incorporated in Spain. These assets only came to light after W had engaged investigators in Spain.

4.  H denied his ownership in 2 companies incorporated in India.

5.  H inflated his liabilities with debts owed by his companies.

6.  H plainly exaggerated his liabilities and expenses.

7.  H’s figures of his income are simply inaccurate. By way of an example, H reported the dividends of one of his companies in the name of T.O. Dubai that he had received in 2023 were $275,341; it turned out that the dividends were actually as much as $5.625 million or $469,000 per month.

8.  In addition, H’s companies paid for his expenses outside his salaries/dividends.

27.  I consider that for the purpose of the present application, it is only necessary to focus on the Form Es filed by H.

28.  H filed his Form E on 8 April 2024 (“the 1^st Form E”) when at that time he was represented by another firm of family specialist.  In the 1^st Form E, he reported that:

1.  He was the shareholder of 12 companies.

2.  He had beneficial interest in a total of 12 properties, covering 4 jurisdictions.

3.  He jointly owned with W a total of 3 properties, being the FMH, the Landmark Property and the Tyron Apartments in the UK.

4.  He solely owned a total of 6 properties, 3 of which in Hong Kong, one in Dubai and the other two in India.

5.  He owned 50% interest in 2 properties, one in India and the other in Dubai.

6.  He owned 25% interest in an Indian property.

7.  He maintained 65 bank accounts worldwide, totalling about $25,024,900.

8.  He had beneficial interest in 12 private companies worldwide, estimated at $20,412,000.

9.  He held stocks, bonds and other securities valued at $9,864,00 and insurance valued at $5,047,000.

10.  H’s assets were worth $93,345,000 and his liabilities were $17,762,000; hence, his net assets were worth $75,583,000.

29.  In his Affirmation dated 10 March 2025 in support of the Adjournment Summons, H said there were inaccuracies in the documents he had filed and there had been material changes to his financial circumstances since the 1^st Form E in March 2024. In his Affirmation dated 22 May 2025 he also emphasized there were critical errors and inaccuracies in the 1^st Form E that necessitated adjustments to be made.

30.  Leave was granted for H to file an updated Form E, which was affirmed on the 22 May 2025. I shall refer it as “the Updated Form E”.

31.  I have carefully read H’s 6^th affirmation of 22 May 2025 against the Form Es he filed.

32.  I accept that the balance of $6,775,000 in his Citibank Singapore Investment Fund Account was double-counted; hence this sum should be deducted from the final figure.

33.  Though I do not follow why H claimed in his 6^th affirmation dated 22 May 2025 that his investments of $9,864,00 (item no 6 of Table A below) should be $3,089,000, for the purpose of the present exercise, I am prepared to accept that was the case. Similarly, I am also prepared to accept H’s assertion that the funds in his Citibank Singapore Fixed Income Securities Account in the amount of $13,779,000 belonged to his uncle.  I must, however, emphasize that these are not my findings, which have yet to be determined at the trial of parties’ ancillary relief.

34.  The Updated Form E contains the following significant changes.

1.  Instead of being the shareholder of 12 companies, he is the shareholder of 13 companies.

2.  Instead of having beneficial interest in 12 landed properties, H has beneficial interest in 5 more landed properties, making a total of 17 worldwide, the reason being these 5 properties are being owned by his companies which he solely owns.

3.  Significantly, instead of following what he did in the 1^st Form E by reporting the value of his companies by referring to the relevant audited financial statements, H said the value of these companies were “To Be Determined” (“TBD”).

4.  The bank accounts he maintained worldwide dropped from 65 to 59.

5.  Instead of having beneficial in 12 private companies, the numbers went up to 16, including 2 subsidiaries owned by a company in Spain.

6.  H’s investments in stocks, bonds and securities decreased to $9,191,000 and his insurance’s value also decreased to $232,189.

7.  The most striking part is his liabilities, which went up from 17,762,000 to $78,980,000, the reason being the liabilities of all his companies were also included instead of just including his own liabilities.

35.  The net result is that his net assets plummeted to a humble figure of $420,100, with the value of his companies “TBD”.  I set out in the Table below (Table A) showing the corresponding changes.

Table A

No	Item	The 1st Form E   (HK$)	Updated Form E (HK$)	Difference (HK$)
1	Part 2.1 Matrimonial Home	7,244,800	6,627,000	(-) 617,800
2	Part 2.2 Other landed properties	25,554,000	58,305,000	(+) 32,751,000
3	Part 2.3 Bank Accounts	25,024,900 (but should be 11,246,000)	3,081,800	(-) 21,943,100 (but should be (-) 8,164,200)
4	Part 2.4 Private Companies	20,412,000	TBD	(-) 20,412,000
5	Part 2.6 Businesses	N/A	N/A	0
6	Part 2.7 Investments	9,864,000 (but should be 3,089,000)	9,191,400	(-) 672,600 (but should be (+) 6,102,400)
7	Part 2.8 Insurance	5,047,000	232,200	(-) 4,814,800
8	Part 2.9 Monies Owed	0 (but should be 2,800)	2,800	0
9	Part 2.10 Personal Items	196,300	182,360	(-) 13,940
10	Part 2.11 Other Assets	N/A	N/A	0
11	Part 2.12 MPF	TBC	1,777,400	(+) 1,777,400
12	Asset: Total (as recorded in First Form E)	93,347,000	79,400,000	(-) 13,947,000
13	Assets: Total (Adjusted to take into account the obvious calculation errors above)	72,793,200	79,400,000	(+) 6,606,800
14	Part 2.13 Liabilities	-17,761,600	-78,979,900	(-) 61,218,300
15	Net Assets & Liabilities (Adjusted)	55,031,600	420,100	(-) 54,611,500

36.  As for H’s income and expenses, I adopt the tables (being Table B and Table C respectively below) he set out in his 6^th affirmation dated 22 May 2025. I have not verified the figures nor is it necessary for the present purpose.

Table B: Income

No.	Item	1st Form E (HK $)	Updated Form E (HK $)	Difference (HK $)
1	Part 3.1 Earned income	207,800	116,300	(-) 91,466.21
2	Part 3.2 Additional income	N/A	119,600	(+) 119,600
3	Part 3.6 Other Income	192,400	89,400	(-) 103,000
	Income: Total	400,200	325,300	(-)74,900

Table C: Expenses

No.	Item	1st Form E (HK $)	New Form E (HK $)	Difference (HK $)
1	Part 4.1 General Expenses	187,300	192,200	(+) 4,900
2	Part 4.2 Personal Expenses	190,500	747,800	(+) 557,300
3	Part 4.3 Children Expenses	135,300	55,0000	(-) 80,300
	Expenses: Total	513,100	995,000	(+) 481,900

37.  I reckon that H’s income has dropped roughly by 18.70% while at the same time his expenses have skyrocketed 98%.

38.  H tries to paint a picture that his financial situation has deteriorated. I am not able to come to this conclusion. In my view, H is just playing with figures. The way in which H presented his financial situation is not only pregnant with problem, but also a defiance of common sense. Below are my reasons.

39.  H claimed his net assets are worth a humble figure of $420,100 plus the value of his companies “TBD”. He explained that in the 1^st Form E, he had used the book values (ie assets less liabilities) taken from the financial statements and the balance sheets of his companies as the statements of the values of his interests in these companies. He claimed that as some of his companies are active trading companies, this method, especially since all the landed properties and liabilities have been taken out, may not be appropriate and cannot provide an accurate reflection of the value of his companies. As he is not able to give any rough estimate of these values, in the meantime, he put these at “TBD”.  

40.  At the same time, H treated all the landed properties (5 in total) owned by his companies as his and all the debts and liabilities of his companies as his own. He gave the explanation that he arranged his finances through his personal assets and/or accounts as well as through these companies. They are inter-mingled. The corporate loans taken out by his companies which solely owned by him are therefore also taken as his own liabilities, the reason being that he has provided personal guarantees for securing these loans.

41.  It would appear that the quantum of personal guarantees that H has given for securing loans in favour of his companies is about $62 million. However, it must be right for Mr Marwah to have pointed out that these are merely contingent or potential liabilities; and most importantly, H did not say any of his companies had been or would be in default of repayment.

42.  For the same reason, H also treated all the expenses of his companies and the landed properties as his own.  This explained why his expenses have surged.

43.  Clearly, H regarded himself as the alter ego of his companies; hence, the landed properties and liabilities of his companies are considered as his. Following H’s logic, the natural question are: what about the other assets of his companies such as bank balances and stocks, and account receivables, should they also be included? If all these are to be included, what would be the basis or approach for valuing his companies or would there be any double-counting? It is hard to believe that H was oblivious to these practical questions.

44.  By combining all his personal assets and liabilities and expenses with those of his companies, and, most importantly, by including all his contingent liabilities under personal guarantees as if the same were immediately due and payable, the upshot is it is virtually impossible for any reasonable reader to have a rough idea of what H’s financial situation is. H, a seasoned entrepreneur and being advised by a specialist family law firm, must have understood that these liabilities are merely potential. The value of his companies as originally set out in the 1^st Form E were simply swept away by one stroke of sentence, as I see it, an excuse, that the method “may not be appropriate”. I am sure the bottom line is his companies are his most valuable assets; yet he stated they are “TBD”. Further, if one is to accept the Updated Form E, the corollary must be that the 1^st Form E could not be relied upon, this is indeed what H wanted the court to accept. If H were successful, there would not even be a rough picture of what H’s financial situation is.  Further, one is not able to tell if there was any material change in H’s financial situation since the filing of the 1^st Form E. I consider this is important since in the 1^st Form E, H reported that he had already been paying $128,000 for the maintenance of W and JY, and if the living expenses of VD were also included, this amounted to $213,000 per month and his total expenses were as much as $513,000; whereas in the Updated Form E, the corresponding figures are confusing, if not illusory, due to the combination of all personal and companies’ items.

45.  It is significant to note that H settled with W on her MPS Summons at the monthly sum of $123,755: see [15]. If H really lacks the ability to pay, the question must be how he could possibly afford the payment on a monthly basis. There was no answer when the court raised this query at the hearing.

46.  I also need to mention that in the Petition (when the Petition of 3 May 2023 was taken out H was acting in person), H proposed to make the following financial provision for W upon divorce, viz, (1) to give FMH to W; and (2), to quote his exact words, “HKD 7.8 M in form of Bonds/Cash/Equities/Assets to the wife”. If H was able to make such a proposal, the only assumption is that he had the ability to pay, at least back in May 2023.

47.  H just mentioned vaguely that there was a drop in the total income “due to the growing cash flow problem of my companies, which has been affected by slower client payments, higher operational costs, and ongoing economic instability across some of the international markets where we operate. Additionally, fluctuations in currency exchanges rates and the need to maintain payroll obligations” etc, and that “the business environment remains volatile”.  There was no mention of any particulars or incidents or events since the 1^st Form E in support of the allegation. This is a typical case of mere say-so.

48.  For the above reasons, I reject H’s claim in paragraph 14 of his Affirmation dated 22 May 2025 that the Updated Form E gave “a more accurate picture” of his financial position to better assist the court. To the contrary, I have no doubt that the Updated Form E was aimed at muddling the water, making his financial situation incomprehensible with the intent to defeat W’s claim. All these compel me to draw a conclusion that the Updated Form E was intended to confuse rather than to assist the court.

49.  H’s litigation behaviour reminds me of the caveat given by Lam J (as he then was) at [197] – [200] of L v L [2006] HKFLR 121,

197. I do not wish to rehash all the details set out in the chronology of non-disclosure prepared by the solicitor for the Husband. The manner in which the Wife chose to deal with request for information regarding KH in her answer of 11 May 2004 and then supplied bundles of documents in October 2004 for those advising the Husband to digest was singularly unhelpful. Given the level of professional advice the Wife could have obtained if she so wished, I find it hard to believe that she could not provide a more intelligible and meaningful answer in a timely and orderly manner. The party who gives disclosure also carries the obligation to present the information in a way that could be readily comprehensible to his opponent. Straightforward and direct answers could have been given by the Wife to questions like how much has been invested into a business and what were the sources of fund. A good litmus test for distinguishing a bona fide fulfillment of the duty to give disclosure from an attempt to obfuscate is to ask whether the answer or the material can on its own meaningfully assist in informing others as to the means of that party. I regret to say that having regard to the way in which the Wife had given disclosure of her means throughout the course of these proceedings, it is clear to me that she deliberately chosen not to give meaningful disclosure of her means.

198. It is high time that litigants in matrimonial proceedings and those advising them should appreciate that affirmation of means and answer to questionnaire are not a game of hide and seek. Too much legal costs and judicial time had been spent on such wasteful exercise. As stressed by Mr Mostyn, the onus falls squarely and fairly on a party to give full and frank disclosure of his or her own means. To adopt a wait and see approach with a hope that the opponent might fail to ask the right question is a tactic to be deplored. That by itself is a breach of the positive duty to give disclosure. As Coleridge J put it recently in J v V [2004] 1 FLR 1042, “all cards must be put on the table face up at the earliest stage if huge costs bills are to be avoided.”

199. Although the financial affairs of the Wife were complex involving accounts relating to a number of businesses, there is all the more reason for her to give clear and meaningful disclosure of her affairs as early as possible. Understandably, she needed to engage the services of professional advisers to assist her in the exercise. But she should appreciate that the primary duty rested on her to see to it that the exercise was done properly and satisfactorily in a timely fashion. She should have enlisted the necessary help from the professionals and supply them with all the necessary information soon after the commencement of ancillary relief proceedings. It is no excuse, as the Wife had tried to mitigate in the witness box, to say one had no idea as to how such an unsatisfactory state of disclosure has arisen because the job had been left to others.

200. If the court shall come to the conclusion that a litigant has been recalcitrant in failing to come clean in giving full and frank disclosure of his or her means, it should not hesitate to draw adverse inference against such a litigant, see Baker v Baker [1995] 2 FLR 829.

50.  For the above reasons, I consider it is appropriate to draw an adverse inference against H on his ability to pay and this is what I am going to do. I consider that the 1^st Form E is more reliable as H’s financial profile and I shall disregard the Updated Form E. According to his “adjusted” 1^st Form E, his net assets as at 8 April 2024 were still worth as much as $55,000,000.  H definitely has the ability to pay a monthly sum of $50,000 for W’s legal costs. That said, to be fair to H, on evidence, it seemed to be the case that before W disclosed the investigator’s report, H had already disclosed the business in Spain. This, however, does not alter my conclusion regarding H’s ability to pay.

51.  With the conclusion I have come to, I do not have to deal with other grounds advanced by Mr Marwah. In this connection, I have to say for the present purpose, it is unnecessary nor is it possible for the court to conduct a minuscule examination on H’s extent and manner of financial disclosure that Mr Marwah attempted to invite me to do. Many of the grounds relied upon cannot be determined without a close examination of evidence including oral evidence which could not be carried out at this interlocutory stage.  The court should not have been given 20 box files with over 4,000 pages of documents for applications of this nature. This is a waste of costs and time.

Quantum

52.  W set out her budget including the breakdown of costs up to FDR in approximately 18 months at [82] – [92] of her 8^th affirmation dated 23 May 2025. The costs were estimated to be round 1 million, in 18 months’ time; so roughly $55,555 per month. It is estimated that specific discovery application are $253,000 and Joinder application are $439,000. At the hearing, Mr Marwah confirmed W is just asking for $50,000.  If $50,000 is to be paid over 18 months, this is $900,000; this sum is exclusive of the costs of valuation on H’s private companies mainly in Hong Kong, Spain and Singapore that are likely to be significant.   

53.  Ms Lee submitted that H, being represented by a specialist firm, has been open and frank in making his disclosure. I take what Ms Lee meant was the Updated Form E that featured prominently yet negatively in this Judgment. Ms Lee said $600,000, to be payable over 18 months is reasonable, so roughly $33,333 per month.

54.  This is a particularly complicate matter, involving numerous private companies, obviously deficient disclosure by H, and likely disputes over third party ownership. There are two companies bearing similar names but H said they belonged to his mother and brother. I have come to a conclusion that H failed to give a full and frank disclosure of his financial situation, this would necessitate the need on the part of W to incur more costs on disclosure on which I have to give due regard when I consider the issue of quantum. I acknowledge W has some earning capacity. It is more likely than not that when reaching the agreement in respect of the MPS, at least some of W’s earning capacity has been taken into account. Taking a board brush approach, I agree with Mr Marwah that $900,000, spreading over 18 months at $50,000 monthly, is a reasonable sum. This is to be backdated to 1 February 2025.

Costs

55.  The relevant provision is in Order 62, rule 3(2A), Rules of the High Court. It states,

“If the Court in the exercise of its discretion sees fit to make any order as to the costs of or incidental to any interlocutory proceedings, it may, subject to this Order, order the costs to follow the event or make such other order as it sees fit.”

56.  In the exercise of its discretion in civil cases including family cases, the court will have to take into account, where appropriate in the circumstances, the special matters set out in Order 62, rule 5 of the Rules of the High Court.

57.  As to the approach to be taken, Hartmann J (as he then was) in F v F (No 2) [2003] 3 HKLRD 976 reiterated, in para 22, “the long-established principle that costs are determined not by dividing litigation into quantifiable subjects and figures, like a profit and loss account, but rather by way of overall impression”.

58.  W is entirely successful in her application. The only costs order that is reasonable in the circumstances is to follow the event. Further, H’s failure to give a full and frank disclosure is a litigation misconduct. It is detestable to see that H, being assisted by a specialist firm, would have filed such an illusory Form E.  It is well established that litigation misconduct of this nature could attract costs to be taxed on a full indemnity basis: ML v YJ (No. 2) (Stellar Contribution) [2009] HKFLR 122, Lam J (as he then was) at [19] – [21], and Hashen v Ali Shayif [2009] 2 FLR 896, at [17] – [18].

59.  I am not minded to have the costs to be taxed for the sake of procedural economy. I consider it is appropriate for the costs to be summarily assessed. In doing so, H’s litigation misconduct would certainly be a factor that I need to take into account.

Costs of W’s MPS Summons

60.  Both parties have lodged their submissions on costs.

61.  W seeks costs against H on her MPS Summons including the costs of the Adjournment Summons and the EOT Summons.

62.  H’s case is that there should be no order as to costs; or alternatively, the costs should be in the cause of the ancillary relief proceedings.  The gist of Ms Lee’s argument is that there is only a small difference between the final figure that H has to pay and what was originally sought by W.

63.  It would appear both parties agree that the costs of the Adjournment Summons and the EOT Summons form part and partial of the costs of the MPS Summons.

64.  In considering the costs issue in this particular application, I remind myself of the caveat given by Mostyn QC (as the deputy judge of the English High Court) in GW v RW (Financial Provision: Departure from Equality) [2003] 2 FLR 108 about “Calderbank offer”. I am aware we do not have a “Calderbank offer” here. Nevertheless, I think the same rationale applies. Further, I have no cognizance of the discussions between the parties leading to the compromise. Another point is the compromise is a combination of undertakings to pay and direct payment to W. This arrangement is apparently not the same as the one when W took out her application. Hence, I should refrain from comparing whose figure is closer to the figure eventually agreed.

65.  What should then be the costs order that is just and fair in the circumstances? Since the parties had settled the matter, I did not have the opportunity to examine the reasonable financial needs of W and JY. This is a factor in favour of “no order as to costs” or “costs in the cause of the ancillary relief”. On the other hand, it is important to give regard to H’s bare allegation he has been maintaining all along that he does not have the ability to pay as a defence to both the MPS Summons and the LCP Summons. This allegation has been roundly rejected by this court. I consider this factor should carry more weight. I am persuaded that H should pay the costs of the MPS Summons, inclusive of the costs of the Adjournment Summons and the EOT Summons, to be summarily assessed.

Orders

66.  For the reasons aforesaid, I make the following orders:

LCP Summons

1.  H do pay W a monthly sum of $50,000 as her legal costs provision commencing from 1 March 2026 and thereafter on the first day of each and every month until 1 July 2026.

2.  H do within 14 days of this order pay W a sum of $650,000 being her legal costs provision back-dated to 1 February 2025 (a total of 13 months).

3.  H do pay W the costs of the LCP Summons, to be summarily assessed and to be dealt with by way of paper disposal.

4.  W do lodge and serve her Statement of Costs within 14 days.

5.  H may lodge and serve his List of Objections within a further 14 days.

6.  No further submissions be allowed unless with the leave of the court.

7.  Paragraphs 3, 4, 5, and 6 are by way of order nisi.

MPS Summons, Adjournment Summons and EOT Summons

8.  H do lodge and serve his List of Objections within 14 days.

9.  No further submissions be allowed unless with the leave of the court.

10.  The summary assessment is to be dealt with by way of paper disposal.