Case Details
Listing:
SUNDARI v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
SUNDARI v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5903 · HCAL 1323/2023
Court of First Instance
HCAL 1323/2023
[2026] HKCFI 5903
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 1323 of 2023
BETWEEN
| |Sundari |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board/ |Putative |
| |Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| |Application for Leave to Apply for | |
| |Judicial Review | |
| |NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord | |
| |53 r 3) | |
Following:
|( |consideration of documents only; or |
| | |
|( |consideration of documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in open |
| |court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Keith Lam:
1. Form 86 be amended, naming the Director of Immigration as the putative
interested party.
2. The application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.
Observations for the Applicant:
Introduction
1. By Form 86 filed on 1 August 2023 (“Form 86”), the Applicant seeks
leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Torture
Claims Appeal Board (“TCAB”) dated 11 August 2022 (“TCAB Decision”),
which refused to allow the Applicant’s late filing of notice of appeal
against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“DOI”) dated 31
March 2022 (“DOI Decision”) pursuant to section 37ZT of the
Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115).
2. The Form 86 incorrectly named the TCAB as the putative interested
party. I therefore amend the Form 86 on my own motion to name the DOI
as the putative interested party.
3. The Applicant requested for a hearing of this application, which was
held on 15 September 2026. When asked, she said she had nothing to
add on the substance of her application.
Background
4. The Applicant is a national of Indonesia. In gist, she fears that she
will be ill-treated or even killed by a man because she refuses to
marry him. The Applicant’s personal background, the relevant facts
and relevant procedural history have been sufficiently set out in the
TCAB Decision, which can be viewed through a hyperlink.[1] There is
no need for me to repeat the same. Unless otherwise specified, the
abbreviations and descriptions used in the TCAB Decision are adopted
herein.
Legal principles
5. The leave application operates as a filtering process and there is no
requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my decision:
Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14 at §23. I therefore set out below brief
reasons for my decision, which I have reached upon considering all the
materials before me.
6. In a judicial review, this court does not provide a further avenue of
appeal. While I remind myself that in non-refoulement cases, I would
adopt an enhanced standard in scrutinising the decision of the TCAB
given the seriousness of the issue at hand, this court would not usurp
the role of the TCAB, which together with the DOI are the primary
decision-makers. A finding of fact is exclusively within the realm of
the TCAB, and this court will not intervene by way of judicial review
unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or
irrationality in the decision of the TCAB: Nupur Mst v Director of
Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at §14(1). There must be a reasonably
arguable case with a realistic prospect of success before leave for
judicial review will be granted: Peter Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung
(2007) 10 HKCFAR 676 at §§14-17.
7. An applicant is required to clearly and succinctly identify the
grounds of judicial review relied upon in the Form 86 and the
supporting affirmation: Ho Loy v Director of Environment Protection,
HCAL 21/2015 (unrep.) 22.12.2016 at §142. He or she is also under a
duty to make full and frank disclosure of material facts: Kan Hung
Cheung v The Director of Immigration [2008] HKC 323 at §§14-17.
8. Given RHC O 53 r 4(1) and s 21K(6) of the High Court Ordinance (CAP
4), where an Applicant applies for leave to apply for judicial review
more than 3 months after the decision:
1) The failure to apply within 3 months constitutes “undue delay”.
To justify an extension of time in which to apply for leave, the
Applicant must show “good reason” to extend time. In deciding
this, certain factors that are likely to be significant are:
(i) the length of the delay; (ii) the explanation for the
delay;[2] (iii) the merits of the substantive application;[3]
(iv) prejudice; and (v) whether the application raises questions
of general public importance.
2) Where the court considers that there is no good reason for
extending the period, it will refuse leave to apply for judicial
review. The refusal of an extension of time is part and parcel of
a refusal to grant leave to apply. It is not the case that the
court refuses the extension of time as a discrete decision and
then makes no decision on the question of leave to apply for
judicial review, treating this as a separate matter entirely.
3) If the court is satisfied that there is good reason for extending
the period, it does not follow that leave to apply for judicial
review will automatically be given. While the court might grant
leave, it retains a discretion to refuse to do so and the
existence of a good reason for undue delay is only one facet of
the question, others including sufficiency of interest and the
need to satisfy the arguability test. Leave may also be refused
on the basis that the granting of the relief sought would be
likely to cause substantial hardship to, or substantially
prejudice the rights of, any person or would be detrimental to
good administration.
See: Thing Sunil v TCAB [2025] HKCFI 4366, at §9, citing AW v Director
of Immigration & anor. [2016] 2 HKC 393 (CA) at §§23-36 and Thomas Lai
[2014] 6 HKC 1 at §§43-45; H v Director of Immigration (2020) 23
HKCFAR 248 at §§17-22, 36-44.
Discussion
9. The application by the Form 86 was out of time by more than 8.5
months, which is a lengthy delay.
10. Having considered the matters below, applying the principles
summarised above, I would not grant any extension of time.
11. I note that the Applicant has not explained the delay on paper. When
asked about this in Court, her answer was that she did not know the
procedure earlier and did not know the time limit for making the
application of judicial review. This does not appear to me to be a
good reason for the delay.
12. In any event, I am not satisfied that the Applicant’s intended
application for judicial review of the TCAB Decision is reasonably
arguable with any realistic prospects of success, and I would have
dismissed the present application even if it had been brought within
time.
13. The Applicant stated the following grounds of judicial review in the
supporting affirmation: -
1) “Procedural Impropriety) Failure to properly apply para 2 of the
UN committee against Torture General Comment No 2 whereby
satisfaction of a National states obligations to conduct
sufficient due diligence requires that reforms and means of relief
introduced must be effective in any event, cf, the TCAB and the
Director Decision which focused on whether such reliefs showed
merely signs of positive improvement (see also JKF CACV 103
/2014)[4]”. (“Ground 1”)
2) “Procedural Impropriety) Failure to conduct sufficient inquiry
into the relevant country of origin conditions. The TCAB Failure
to consider that I would face serious risk from my enemies who
will harm me because of my dispute against them, the TCAB failure
to consider the facts that why I would not return to my country of
origin because of fear from my enemies.” (“Ground 2”)
3) “Procedural Impropriety / Irrationality) Failure to reasons for
assessment of Lack of BOR 2risk and / or sufficient basis to
support conclusion of lack of BOR 2 risk and BOR 3 risk. It’s
seems May be my claim is personal dispute but the risk I will face
is beyond imagination, because of the risk I would face terrific
risk upon refoulement.” (“Ground 3”)
4) “Error/ Misdirection in law) Failing to take into account the
considerations of psychological strain and threats to me
personally or threats to me directly to kill me.” (“Ground 4”)
5) “Procedural Impropriety) The TCAB Failure to consider our fear
that my enemies still fear for me, I could no return to my country
in this circumstance, therefore there are genuine risk awaiting
for me, and I could not relocate other places because they could
easily trace me wherever I hide in my country.” (“Ground 5”)
6) “The TCAB gave decision only said my claim is not established,
failed to consider why I would t fear or harm by my enemies if I
return to my country.” (“Ground 6”)
7) “No sufficient basis to conclude that I and my family members
would not to be at risk of being subjected to torture and or /
CIDTP upon refoulment.” (“Ground 7”)
14. I do not consider any of the above grounds meritorious.
15. The TCAB Decision was a decision not to allow the late filing of the
Applicant’s notice of appeal to the TCAB under section 37ZT of the
Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115). Under section 37ZT(2) as amended on
1 August 2021, the TCAB had to decide, as a preliminary decision
without a hearing, whether to allow the late filing of the Applicant’s
notice of appeal to the TCAB. In doing so, the TCAB may only take
account of the statement of reasons stated in the application for late
filing of the notice of appeal and the evidence relied on in support
of such reasons.
16. In particular, after the amendment on 1 August 2021, section 37ZT no
longer requires the TCAB to consider the merits of the applicant’s non-
refoulement claim - nor did the TCAB Decision discuss the same. As
such, Grounds 1-7 above, all of which pertain to the merits of the
Applicant’s non-refoulement claim, have no relevance to the TCAB
Decision.
17. In any event, given the seriousness of the issues at hand, I have
scrutinised the TCAB Decision carefully, and I do not find any error
of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality on the part of the
TCAB Decision.
18. Section 37ZT(3) of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115) provides that
the TCAB may allow the late filing of the notice of appeal if the
person filing the notice provides sufficient evidence in writing to
satisfy the TCAB that the person: (a) had exercised all due diligence
to file the notice within the specified period; but (b) failed to file
the notice within the period because of circumstances beyond the
person’s control.
19. As recorded in the TCAB Decision:
1) The deadline for filing was 19 April 2022, but the Applicant filed
the appeal on 26 April 2022 and was late by 7 days. The only
reason given by the Applicant for the late filing was because she
“lost Notice of Appeal / Petition Non-Refoulement Claim form”, so
she went to the Kowloon Bay Immigration Centre again to take her
form. The Applicant did not submit further evidence despite a
request by the TCAB to do so. See: §§7-9.
2) The TCAB considered that there was no evidence to show that there
was any delay on the part of the DOI in the dispatch of the DOI
Decision to the Applicant: §10.
3) The TCAB then took into account the provisions of section 37ZT,
and considered the Applicant’s stated reasons for the delay, and
came to the view that there was nothing in the claimed reasons to
suggest that the Notice could not have been filed within time, or
that the loss of the Notice was due to circumstances beyond the
Applicant’s control, and thus was not satisfied that the Applicant
had exercised all due diligence: §§11-14.
20. In my view, the TCAB was entitled to come to this conclusion. I do
not find any error of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in
its decision.
21. Further, an extension of time for an unmeritorious application such as
the present one would result in further undue delay, prove
prejudicial, and undermine the orderly conduct and progress of the
refoulement process.
Conclusion
22. In light of the foregoing, no extension of time is granted and the
application for leave to apply for judicial review is dismissed.
Dated the 30th day of October 2026
| |(Joyce Ooi) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|Applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the Applicant | | |
|or the Applicant’s | | |
|solicitors must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent to the |Sent to the Putative |
|respondent and such |Applicant |Respondent / the |
|interested parties as |on 30/10/2026 |Putative Respondent’s |
|may be directed by the | |solicitors / such |
|Court the order |Sundari |Putative Interested |
|granting leave and any | |Parties as may be |
|directions given within|Applicant’s ref. no:|directed by the Court / |
|14 days after the leave|Nil. |the Putative Interested |
|was granted (Order 53, | |Parties’ solicitors on |
|rule 4A); | |30/10/2026 |
| | | |
|b) issue the | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|originating summons | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|within 14 days after | |Claims Petition Office |
|the grant of leave and | |Putative Respondent’s |
|serve it in accordance | |ref. no.: USM |
|with Order 53, rule 5; | |20199/22/4/96/I2653 |
|and | | |
| | |Director of Immigration |
|c) supply to every | |Putative Interested |
|other party copies of | |Party’s ref. no.: QA T/C|
|every affidavit which | |2878/21 (formerly |
|the Applicant proposes | |RBCZ/5000110/21) |
|to use at the hearing, | | |
|including the affidavit| |Department of Justice, |
|in support of the | |Senior Assistant Law |
|application for leave | |Officer |
|(Order 53, rule 6(5)). | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
Form CALL-1
-----------------------
[1]https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2023/HCAL0013
23_2023_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
[2] In that the presence of a credibly valid explanation for the delay
will strengthen, and the absence of an acceptable explanation will weaken,
the Applicant’s request for what is an indulgence to be granted in the
court’s discretion.
[3] Although where an applicant is many months out of time, leave may be
refused however strong the complaint might otherwise be, and an applicant
who sleeps upon his rights may be barred from pursuing them in a judicial
review even though he may have a meritorious case (AW v Director of
Immigration & anor. [2016] 2 HKC 393 (CA) at §27(iii) as approved in the
other cases cited below, in particular H v Director of Immigration (2020)
23 HKCFAR 248 at supra at §37(2)).
[4] This is apparently a reference to the decision in Re JKF (unreported,
CACV 103/2014, 25 November 2014).