HO SAI MING 及另一人 對 譚汝海

LDPE 1034/2012

香港特別行政區

土地審裁處

申請編號 LDPE 2012 年第1034宗

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覆 核 判 決 書

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1.  申請人在2013年3月22日根據《土地審裁處條例》第11A 條要求審裁處覆核本席於2013年3月4日判决撤銷申請人收回本案處所的管有的申請。

2.  申請人的代表周大律師在其2013年3月21日的陳詞詳列支持申請覆核的理由，答辯人沒有作出回應。

覆核申請

3.  申請人申請覆核的理由如下:

本席判决終止租約通知書無效在法律論點上錯誤

4.  周大律師認為申請人於2012年6 月4 日的終止租約通知書:

“…we hereby give you notice to quit and deliver up vacant possession of the Property within one month from the service upon you of this notice.”

5.  周大律師認為《高等法院規則》第3號命令第2(2)條規則:

“凡規定有關作為須在某指明日期後的一段指明的期限內作出或由某指明日期起計的一段指明期限內作出，該段期限在緊接該日期後開始。”

6.  周大律師亦引述Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2013 Volume 1 Part A 3/2/7的有關詮釋支持這方面的陳詞。

7.  周大律師亦引述Manorlike Ltd v Le Vitas Travel Agency and Consultancy Services Ltd [1986] 1 All E.R. 573, CA:

“Kerr LJ. ...

... The tenancy ... contained a break clause, cl 7 ... as follows:

‘IF the Landlord requires possession of the demised premises at any time during the said term the Landlord shall have the right to determine this Lease by giving to the Tenant not less than 3 months’ previous notice in writing at any time so as to determine the same...'

On 22 May 1985 the plaintiff landlord gave a notice of which the relevant terms are as follows:

‘WE ... hereby give you notice that we require possession of the ... premises ... and in accordance therewith [that is a reference to cl 7 of the lease] we require you to vacate the said premises within a period of three months from the date of service of this notice.’

Effectively the issue is whether a requirement to vacate the premises ‘within a period of three months’ is a shorter period of notice than the period of notice to which the tenant was entitled under cl 7, which was a period of ‘not less than 3 months’ previous notice’. In that connection it is common ground that the notice given on 22 May 1985 expired at midnight on 22-23 August 1985.

Counsel for the tenant submitted that there is a material difference between the words ‘not less than’ and the word ‘within’ when used in the context of a period of time, in this case three months. ...

Counsel for the tenant accepted (I think rightly) that if this notice had required the tenants to leave the premises by or at midnight on 22-23 August it would be a good notice. He referred ... to ... one on which the judge relied, Eastaugh v Macpherson [1954] 3 ALL ER 214, ... in which it was held that a requirement to vacate by a certain date means on or before that date and therefore includes the last day.

It is clear that the tenant was entitled to a period which included the stroke of midnight of 22-23 August, because he was entitled to not less than three months’ notice. ... counsel for the tenant conceded that a notice expiring precisely at midnight on 22-23 August would have been a good notice.

Accordingly, all that one is left with is the question whether the words used in this notice, to vacate the premises ‘within a period of three months’, excludes the stroke of midnight on 22-23 August. To my mind the word ‘within’, used in the context of a period of time, is capable of meaning ‘before or at the expiry of’ that period, as counsel for the landlord submits; it is not necessarily shorter than the period itself. Counsel for the landlord derives some assistance for that submission from one of the definitions of the word ‘within’ in the Oxford English Dictionary, where ... the word ‘within’ is defined as follows: ‘In the limits of a period of time; (most usually) before the end of, after not more than.’ ... However, what emerges from the illustration of the meaning of the word ‘within’ by the expression ‘after not more than’ is that in common parlance ‘within’ is capable of including the final moment of a period of time. If a person is required to do something within a week, or in a week, he has the full week to do it, as it seems to me, including the last moment of that week, and he is not required to complete the task in less than a week. To construe the wording of this notice so that it connotes a period of less than three months, because possession must be given ‘within’ three months with a consequent failure to allow a full period of three months, appear to me to strain the language in a hair-splitting and wholly artificial manner. ...

This is a notice to quit a commercial premises, ... if the appeal were allowed on this point (...) I think that the reasoning of the court in cases of this kind would rightly be regarded as wholly artificial, if not absurd. I fully accept the principle that a notice to quit is a highly important legal document which requires to be strictly construed. But, even bearing that in mind, I cannot bring myself to conclude that there is any sensible difference between the terms of this lease and the words used in the notice to quit, either as a matter of ordinary English or common sense. Accordingly, I would dismiss this appeal.”

8.  周大律師陳詞，在本案中，終止租約通知書送達的日期是2012年6月4日。一個月的計算，由2012年6月4日後即時生效開始計算。引用《高等法院規則》第3號命令第2(2)條規則及Manorlike，終止租約通知書的一個月內，由2012年6月5日午夜緊接2012年6月4日至6月5日的終結開始，至2012年7月4日的終結而結束，包括2012年7月4日的最後時刻。一個月的通知期在2012年7月4日至5日午夜結束。因此，答辯人有一個完整的一個月通知期。此點與周大律師在原審時的陳詞，終止租約通知書在2012年7月4日終止一致。

9.  因此周大律師陳詞本席在原審時判決，終止租約通知書在2012年7月3日終止，在法律觀點上錯誤。

10.  本席認同周大律師的陳詞，及引述的案例。

判決

11.  本席判決將本席在2013年3月4日的決定作廢。

12.  本席亦判決申請人由於已經經其律師送達答辯人遷出通知書要求答辯人遷出，申請收回處所的管有及追收租金/中間收益得直，答辯人須將本案處所的空置管有權交還申請人，答辯人須支付未有繳付租金/中間收益，以每月4,800元計算，至將本案處所的空置管有權交還申請人的日期。

13.  就訟費事宜，由於本席裁定申請人勝訴，答辯人須支付申請人本案的訟費，本席認為在這次的聆訊，雖然申請人的大律師引述案例支持申請人的申請，但本席認為，案例並非特別深奧，毋須大律師協助，因此本席不頒發大律師證書。由於申請人在原審時並未能提供法律意見支持他的申請，因此本席認為申請人在原審時只可以得到律師準備文件的費用，不頒發大律師證書。本席認為本案適當的訟費，以簡易形式評定，為3,000元。此訟費命令為暫准令，除非任何一方在14天內以傳票方式申請更改，此暫准令則成為絕對命令。