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HCAL 913/2021
[2021] HKCFI 2214
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 913 of 2021
BETWEEN
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SK Asgar Ali |
Applicant |
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Director of Immigration |
Putative Respondent |
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)
Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
1. Leave to apply for Judicial Review be refused; and
2. A Restricted Proceedings Order (RPO) be made against the applicant.
Observations for the Applicant:
THE APPLICATION
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to file the application for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 15 June 2021 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his application for a subsequent claim of HCAL 739 of 2017 (the “original claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).
2. The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process.
The procedural history
3. The applicant is an illegal immigrant from India. He raised non-refoulement claim with the Immigration Department on 9 December 2015 on the grounds of Torture risk under the Ordinance; BOR 2 risk, Right of Life risk under Article 2 of the Bills of Right Ordinance; the BOR 3 risk under Article 3 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance and Persecution risk under the Refugee Convention.
4. His claim was rejected by the Director by Notice of Decision dated 23 January 2017.
5. He appealed to the Torture Claim Board (the “Board”). By its Decision dated 29 September 2017, the Board rejected his appeal.
6. He applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision and the application was rejected by the Court by its Order dated 19 June 2018 (the “Court’s Order”).
7. He appealed against the Court’s Order to the Court of Appeal and his application was refused by the Court of Appeal on 31 October 2018.
8. His application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 26 February 2019.
9. His application for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Final Appeal on 6 January 2020.
10. He applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection under the unified screening mechanism by letter dated 15 January 2020.
11. By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused his application.
The subsequent claim application
12. The factual basis of his claim is that if he is refouled to India, he will be harmed or killed by her wife’s former schoolmate, Akbar, who wanted her to divorce the applicant and marry him and his creditor because he was unable to repay the loan of 300,000 Indian Rupees for his business. The Director found that the level of risk of him being harmed or killed by Akbar or his creditor, if he returned to India, was low; that there was no evidence that the state was involved; that there was no evidence showing that state protection would not be available to him and that internal relocation was an option open to him.
13. The Board had cross-examined his evidence and it did not accept his evidence that he and his wife was married; that Akbar had requested her to divorce the applicant and marry him; that there was a loan drawn from the creditor for his business. In a nutshell, the Board rejected his factual evidence in support of his claim.
14. Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realist prospect of success.
15. The applicant relies upon 6 documents showing that he was an Executive Member of All India Trinamool Congress (“TMC”); that his wife was harassed by the ruling party Hindu Nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (“BJP”); that BJP was suppressing the minority Muslims by passing the Citizenship Amendment Act (“CAA”); that there were killings in India because of the CAA; and that the creditor was harassing and intimidating his wife in India and because of he was a member of TMC, he would be arrested and harmed by police if he returned to India.
16. The Director accepted that there were significant changes of circumstances in India, but those changes would not give him a realist prospect of success in his subsequent claim. [19] He therefore rejected the applicant’s application for subsequent claim.
17. The Director had given his reasons for his conclusion above. He considered that originally, his claim was based upon risks from Akbar and his creditor. Now Akbar had already married. This risk was non-existent. The creditor’s risk was originally based upon his inability to repay his debt. Now, he claimed that the creditor caused harassment to his wife because of his political background. He was unable to give a satisfactory explanation to the immigration officer for such a change. Nevertheless, the creditor did not cause physical harm to his wife in India. The Director did not accept that the creditor would harm or kill him on political reasons. The risk of his inability to pay his debt had been dealt with in the original claim.
The application for leave to file judicial review application
18. The applicant has filed an affirmation. But he did not specify any grounds in support of his application.
19. The Court will bear in mind that the Board’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny.
20. In Re Kartini [2019] HKCA 1022, 9 September 2019, the Court of Appeal held:
“13. (1) … …Assessment of evidence and COI materials and risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board (and the Director). The court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board [the Director].”
21. The Board’s Decision had been tested by the Court, the Court of Appeal and the Court of Final Appeal in the original claim and was upheld.
22. I consider that the Director was entitled to find the facts as he did above. Moreover, the Board had found that the applicant had no factual basis in support of his claim in the original claim. In my view, the new information submitted by the applicant will not change the Board’s finding of the facts and the Director’s finding that internal relocation is an option open to him. The applicant should be aware of these points and should not bring up his case for his application for subsequent claim.
23. The Court does not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the Director’s Decision. The Director’s finding of the facts is not in any respect open to challenge as Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational.
24. Since there is no reasonable prospect of success in his subsequent claim, I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision.
The Restricted Proceeding Order
25. In accordance with Practice Direction 11.3, RPO should be made under the following circumstances:
“8. In accordance with Ng Yat Chi, an RPO should only be made if the person to be subjected to the order has abused, and is likely to continue abusing, the Court's process by seeking persistently to re-litigate in fresh proceedings, without viable legal grounds, matters which have already been determined by the Court, in circumstances where an RPO would be a proportionate response.”
26. As shown by the procedural history above, it is plain that the applicant refused to accept the unfavourable decisions made by the Director, the Board and the courts.
27. The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of his claim for a subsequent claim, categorically fitting in the description of
“the vexatious litigants typically acts in person and characteristically refuses to accept the unfavourable result of the litigation, obstinately trying to re-open the matter without any viable legal basis.”[1]
The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) and the extended order against him.[2]
28. RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretarty for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2002] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129.
29. In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as his intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. The Court should take preventive measures against any abuse.
30. For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why a RPO should not be made against him. The applicant has been explained the proposed RPO by the court interpreter outside this court before hearing.
31. Upon being requested to show cause why the Court should not make the RPO against him, the applicant asked the Court to consider his case carefully as his life was in danger.
32. Having considered the applicant’s explanation, I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings on the same facts for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
(1) The Applicant be prohibited from commencing any fresh proceedings by whatever originating process, or continuing any existing legal proceedings, relating to any non-refoulement claim of the Applicant in the High Court, without leave of the Court of First Instance.
(2) All applications for leave under paragraph (1) shall be made to the Judge in charge of the Constitutional and Administrative Law List or such other Judge as may be designated by the Chief Judge of the High Court to hear cases in the Constitutional and Administrative Law List.
(3) At least 7 days before filing any application for leave under paragraph (1), the Applicant do notify in writing each intended defendant or respondent of his intention to make such application, enclosing a copy of the draft document by which the fresh proceedings are intended to be commenced, and if any response is received by the Applicant from any such intended defendant or respondent, that the Applicant do file a copy of each such response together with the said application for leave.
(4) Any intended defendant or respondent having notice of such intended proceedings be entitled but under no obligation to place before the court written representations regarding the same.
(5) All applications made pursuant to this order and all ancillary matters be dealt with by the court on paper and without any oral hearing unless the designated Judge should otherwise direct.
(6) If the Applicant should issue fresh proceedings falling or which may fall within the terms of paragraph (1) without first seeking the court’s leave, and if such fact should come to the notice of the Registrar of the High Court or any Master or Judge, such fresh proceedings be referred to the designated Judge for a decision as to whether they should be permitted to continue or should be dismissed.
(7) Notice of each decision by the designated Judge made pursuant to this order be given in writing to the Applicant and to each intended defendant or respondent named in the fresh proceedings.
(8) Whether or not any fresh proceedings are brought to the notice of the designated Judge, if a defendant or respondent is served with such proceedings without the relevant documents being accompanied by either an order granting leave to commence such proceedings or a direction that leave to commence such proceedings is not required, such defendant or respondent be entitled to make no response to such service pending notification of the court’s decision in relation to those proceedings; and that time for acknowledging service or for otherwise responding to such proceedings be deemed extended accordingly.
(9) No more than one leave application under paragraph (1) may be made by the Applicant within any period of 3 months.
(10) This order shall cease to have effect at the end of 5 years from the date of this order.
(11) A copy of this Order shall be sent to the Registrar of the High Court.
DISPOSITION
33. The applicant’s application is dismissed.
34. A RPO Order in terms of paragraph 32 be made against the applicant.
Dated the 4th day of August 2021
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(M.O. WONG)(Ms) |
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for Registrar, High Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Notes for the Applicant:
If leave has been granted, the Applicant or the Applicant’s solicitors must: |
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a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);
b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and
c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)). |
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Sent to the Applicant
on 4 August 2021
SK Asgar Ali
Applicant’s ref. no:
Nil. |
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Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 4 August 2021
Director of Immigration
Putative Respondent’s ref. no.: L/M (20551) in ImmD RA 7/37/C (formerly RBCZ 10015/16)
Department of Justice,
Senior Assistant Law Officer
(Civil Law)
(Civil Litigation Unit 2) |
Form CALL-1
[1] Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (1997-1998) 1 HKCFAR 72, §48
[2] Ibid §§7 & 8
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