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HCPI 425/2003
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
PERSONAL INJURIES ACTION NO.425 OF 2003
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BETWEEN
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LI TAK |
Plaintiff |
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and |
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EVERBEST LOGISTICS COMPANY LIMITED |
1st Defendant |
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W.L. TRANSPORTATION COMPANY LIMITED |
2nd Defendant |
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Before : Hon Suffiad J in Court
Dates of Hearing : 22-24 March 2005
Date of Judgment : 3 August 2005
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J U D G M E N T
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1. The plaintiff brings this claim for damages for personal injuries sustained by him on 2 May 2000 in the course of his employment with the 1st defendant as a rigger at Area No.6 of the Rambler Channel Public Cargo Working Area in Kwai Yue Street.
2. The 2nd defendant is sued as the party who provided the barge mounted with a crane and who was engaged by the 1st defendant to load bags of cement from the barge onto the platform of a lorry by using the crane mounted on the barge.
The accident
3. The plaintiff was engaged as a rigger by the 1st defendant. His work involved him hooking and/or detaching loads of cargo loaded or unloaded by cranes.
4. On the day of the accident, the plaintiff was instructed by the foreman of the 1st defendant, Hui Tin Yau, to assist in unloading bags of cement from a barge onto the platform of a lorry. He was told to stand on the loading platform of the lorry and was responsible for guiding bags of cement lifted by the crane from the barge onto the loading platform of the lorry. He had to unhook the bags of cement from the hook of the crane. He did this work with a colleague, Ah Chung.
5. When the last load of such bags of cement was being lowered towards the lorry platform, the load struck him causing him to fall onto the loading platform of the lorry. His head struck the vertical board of the loading platform of the lorry and his back landed on the floor of the platform.
The plaintiff’s case
6. The plaintiff’s case is that he started work with the 1st defendant as a rigger on a part time basis only in April 2000 when he was paid on a casual daily basis. After working part time with the 1st defendant for some two weeks on a part time basis, he was taken on by the 1st defendant as a full time worker at $8,500 per month. Before working for the 1st defendant in April 2000 he had never done any work as a rigger and had no experience in that work.
7. He was not given any proper training by the 1st defendant as to the safety aspects of hooking and unhooking loads from or onto a crane, in particular a crane loading or unloading cargoes from a barge on the sea. The only training he was given when he started work with the 1st defendant was being shown a video tape involving industrial safety on a construction site but which did not cover cranes used to load or unload cargoes from a barge. He was also given a manual to read himself in his own time.
8. It is also the plaintiff’s case that on the day of the accident, the crane operator was some 200 to 300 feet away from the platform of the lorry onto which the cement bags were being loaded and that there was no signalman giving signals to the crane operator, nor was he or his colleague Ah Chung supplied with a walkie talkie to communicate with the crane operator.
9. Furthermore, the barge being moored alongside the pier on the water was moving with the movement of the sea, swaying from side to side and that caused the load being unloaded onto the platform of the lorry to swing about. There was no rope tied to the load being lifted by the crane onto the platform of the lorry to allow him and Ah Chung to steady the load as it was descended onto the platform of the lorry. Instead he had to grab the load by hand to steady it as the load was descended onto the platform of the lorry by the crane.
10. When the last batch of the goods was being lifted over to the lorry by the crane, Ah Chung had gone off to fetch a sheet of canvas to cover the bags of cement that had been loaded onto the lorry because it had been drizzling all day and that the bags of cement cannot be wet.
11. The plaintiff was therefore left on his own to retrieve that last load lifted over by crane. He was standing on the top of the bags of cement which had already been loaded onto the platform of the lorry. This last load swung towards him at a much greater speed than the previous ones that day. He tried to use his hands to grab this last load but the force was such that it knocked him backwards down onto the platform of the lorry some five feet lower than the top of the cement bags he was standing on. When he fell, his head hit the side of the platform and his body fell onto the platform of the lorry. He was dizzy and lost consciousness for some ten minutes or so. Then he was helped down from the lorry by Ah Chung and police and ambulance was called for. He was taken to the Accident and Emergency Department of Yan Chai Hospital by the ambulance. On the way in the ambulance he was given oxygen by the ambulance men.
12. This was the evidence given by the plaintiff himself.
The defence case
13. In the defence of the 1st defendant, negligence was denied by the 1st defendant and contributory negligence of the plaintiff was relied upon. However, no witness was called by the 1st defendant.
14. The 1st defendant relies only on the cross examination of the plaintiff to attack the credibility of the plaintiff’s evidence given in this case. Moreover the cross examination was also directed at the plaintiff’s failure to dodge or to jump away when he saw that last load swinging towards him at a great speed.
15. The rest of the plaintiff’s evidence in relation to the plaintiff’s lack of training in hooking or detaching hooks from a crane, the lack of a signalman and/or lack of proper means of communication with the crane operator, the unsafe method of the swinging load caused by the movement of the barge on the water was not even contradicted by any evidence of the 1st defendant.
16. The 2nd defendant was not legally represented at the trial but appeared by its director, Chung Wai Fong.
17. There was no formal Defence filed by the 2nd defendant in this matter. However, by a letter dated 24 September 2003, from the 2nd defendant addressed to the Court, the 2nd defendant denies any association with the barge, the crane operator, the lorry as well as the “working arrangement and working environment” relating to the plaintiff’s claim herein.
18. The 2nd defendant did not call any witness or adduce any evidence at the trial, nor did he see fit to even cross examine or in any other way challenge the plaintiff’s evidence given in court.
Assessment of the evidence and findings of fact
19. Firstly, the court was invited by counsel for the 1st defendant to disbelief the plaintiff as to the cause of this accident. In this respect it was pointed out that the plaintiff had stated in his declaration given to the Labour Department when it investigated this accident, that the plaintiff had said in that declaration that he had lost his footing thereby falling from the top of the bags of cement which had already been loaded onto the lorry.
20. Based on this, counsel for the 1st defendant submitted that there is a major discrepancy in the plaintiff’s evidence as to whether the plaintiff was actually hit by the load causing him to fall from the top of the cement bags on the lorry.
21. However, when the actual declaration made by the plaintiff is looked at, it can at once be seen that there is absolutely no merit in this point submitted by counsel for the 1st plaintiff. In that declaration what the plaintiff said was as follows :
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On the day of accident, I was responsible for unhooking and hooking on the lorry. At some time after 2 in the afternoon, I was on the lorry, standing on top of the cement, and was lifting the last two bags of cement onto the rear part of the lorry. At that time, I was adjusting the position of the cement. Suddenly I lost my footing, two bags of cement were moving towards me. I guided the movement of them with my hands. I lost my balance, it was mainly because those bags were moving towards too fast, so I lost my balance.” |
22. There is no question that what the plaintiff was saying in his declaration was that this accident happened because the load of cement bags were swinging towards him quite fast and he was trying to guide the swinging bags of cement with his hands. That was how he fell.
23. I can see no discrepancy in what was stated by the plaintiff in his declaration and the evidence given by him in court or in his witness statement.
24. In the absence of any evidence adduced by either defendant to dispute or challenge the plaintiff’s evidence, I have little hesitation in accepting the evidence given by the plaintiff. His version as to what happened at the time of the accident remained consistent throughout and he was not dented in the least by the cross examination conducted by counsel for the 1st defendant.
Liability of the 1st defendant
25. The system of work employed in this case of unloading the bags of cement onto the loading platform of the lorry by the use of the crane from the barge can only be described as a woefully unsafe system.
26. From the evidence of the plaintiff which I have accepted, it would appear that the operator of the barge was in no position to see the cement bags being loaded onto the platform of the lorry, yet there was neither a signalman nor any form of communication between him and those receiving the cement bags lowered onto the platform of the lorry from the crane. It can be no better than a haphazard operation.
27. The 1st defendant admitted in its defence that the 2nd defendant was engaged by it to unload the bags of cement from the barge and by the use of the crane to load those cement bags onto the platform of the lorry.
28. However, there is no evidence, nor the least suggestion that the 1st defendant, as the employer of the plaintiff, had divested itself of authority to control the plaintiff’s work or the unloading operations. Instead there is evidence from the plaintiff that it was the foreman of the 1st defendant, Hui Tin Yau, who had instructed him to perform that work on the day of the accident.
29. Accordingly, the 1st defendant must take responsibility for the defects of such an unsafe system in so far as the plaintiff, its employee is concerned. Even if the instructions to the plaintiff to perform the work in that way was given by the 2nd defendant or the crane operator, the 1st defendant was still under a non-delegable duty to take reasonable care that the plaintiff would be reasonably safe when working for the purposes of the 2nd defendant. (See Morris v. Breaveglen Ltd [1993] PIQR P295.)
30. Furthermore, it must also have been reasonably foreseeable that the barge being on the water, the movement from the water may cause the load suspended from the crane to swing since the crane was mounted on the barge. The risk of such an accident happening was therefore a foreseeable risk.
31. In all the circumstances of this case, I find that the 1st defendant was in breach of its non-delegable duty of care to the plaintiff and was negligent.
Liability of the 2nd defendant
32. The 2nd defendant has denied any involvement with the barge, the crane, the lorry and the unloading operation in this matter.
33. Although the 1st defendant in its Defence has admitted that the 2nd defendant was instructed by it to unload the bags of cement from the barge mounted with crane, such admission does not bind the 2nd defendant.
34. In so far as the 2nd defendant’s involvement in this matter is concerned, the plaintiff has adduced in evidence a written agreement in Chinese dated 25 August 1999 entitled “Agreement for the Unloading of Packs of Cement”. That agreement was entered into between the 2nd defendant and one Wealth Bridge Trading Company Ltd (“Wealth Bridge”) pursuant to which the 2nd defendant was to receive $30,000 per month as “monthly cargo management fee” for agreeing to let Wealth Bridge use Berth No.6 (the Chinese wording for “Berth No.6” being the same Chinese wording used for “Area No.6” in the plaintiff’s witness statement) as well as agreeing to provide a barge and unloading imported cement from the cargo hold of vessels onto vehicles on shore for Wealth Bridge for the period from 1 July 1999 to 31 January 2001.
35. Furthermore, there is also evidence from the plaintiff that Wealth Bridge is a subsidiary of the 1st defendant and that the written Agreement between the 2nd defendant and Wealth Bridge was made by Wealth Bridge on behalf of the 1st defendant.
36. In the absence of any evidence from the 2nd defendant to contradict this evidence, I am able to and do infer that the unloading operation of the cement bags in this case was undertaken by the 2nd defendant on behalf of the 1st defendant using a barge and crane.
37. Although the 2nd defendant may not owe the precise duty towards the plaintiff as the 1st defendant in his capacity as an employer, however, for the 2nd defendant to undertake the unloading operation in such a haphazard manner, without a signalman or proper means of communication between the crane operator and those workers (including the plaintiff) receiving and unhooking the cement bags on top of the loading platform of the lorry, particularly when it must also have been reasonably foreseeable to the 2nd defendant that movement of the sea water on which the barge floated may cause the load, transported by the crane mounted on the barge, to swing and thus pose a danger to the workers receiving or unhooking such load, the 2nd defendant is just as much liable to the plaintiff for negligence on its part in the accident to the plaintiff herein.
38. Accordingly I find the 2nd defendant to be also negligent and therefore liable to the plaintiff for this accident.
Contributory negligence
39. The 1st defendant submits that the plaintiff was himself guilty of contributory negligence by reason of the fact that the plaintiff failed to dodge the load of cement bags coming at him at high speed but instead attempted to grab and hold it singlehandedly. In so doing the 1st defendant says that the plaintiff disregarded his own safety and was therefore contributorily negligent.
40. I have no hesitation in rejecting outright such submission by counsel for the 1st defendant.
41. Contributory negligence is based on fault. In this case, on the facts as I have found them, there is no fault on the part of the plaintiff. The plaintiff was put in the most difficult of situation by his employer doing what he was instructed to do when the entire system of the work was woefully lacking in proper safety measures.
42. Because it was drizzling, he and his co-worker were told to hurry up with their work since the bags of cement cannot afford to be wet from the drizzle.
43. Moreover, as this was the last load of cement bags from the barge, the co-worker had run off to fetch some canvas to cover up the cement bags in order to prevent them from being wet. This left the plaintiff by himself to tackle the last load being unloaded from the barge. Unfortunately it swung at him faster than the other loads and caused him to lose his balance when he tried to steady it with his hands all by himself.
44. The plaintiff was, as instructed by the foreman, simply trying to get on with his employer’s work. There can be no question that the plaintiff was either taking a short cut for his own convenience, nor was he in any way disobeying any order of the employer. In short, the plaintiff was left with little or no choice to do what he did.
45. In such circumstances where the employer was in fact the party at fault in not providing a reasonably safe system of work for his workers, it lies ill in his mouth to turn around in an attempt to suggest that the plaintiff had failed to take care of his own safety when he, the employer, totally disregarded it despite such duty being on the employer.
46. For these reasons, I find that the plaintiff was not himself at fault and therefore there is no contributory negligence on his part.
Quantum
47. I turn now to deal with the question of quantum of damages.
Injuries and treatment
48. After the accident, the plaintiff was admitted to the Department of Orthopaedic and Traumatology of Yan Chai Hospital. On examination the plaintiff was found to have local tenderness over the lower back without any neurological deficit. The diagnosis was back contusion and mild head injury.
49. He was discharged from hospital 10 days later still with persistent back pain. He was referred to physiotherapy for six to seven months.
50. During follow up on 2 August 2002 there was still residual back pain.
51. The plaintiff attended the Accident and Emergency Department of Tseung Kwan O Hospital on seven occasions up to 5 October 2003.
Psychiatric condition
52. The plaintiff attended the Yung Fung Shee Psychiatric Centre as from 14 October 2003 under a referral.
53. After the accident, the plaintiff developed symptoms of headache, dizziness, irritability, depressive mood and vague suicidal ideas.
54. His frequent bad temper had caused his second wife to leave him after the accident.
55. On assessment on 29 November 2003 the plaintiff had depressive and irritable mood with suicidal ideas and was admitted into the psychiatric ward of Pamela Youde Nethersole Eastern Hospital. Dr Lo Man Kwong, the treating doctor, diagnosed his psychiatric condition as being Post Concussional Syndrome and was of the view that it was precipitated by the injury to the plaintiff at work in May 2000 when he fell from height.
56. On 10 February 2004, there was predominantly low and irritable mood. Dr Lo Man Kwong opined that the residual mood symptoms would likely persist for a considerable time into the future.
The orthopaedic experts
57. The plaintiff was examined by Dr Lau Hoi Kuen, the orthopaedic expert instructed by the 1st defendant on 20 December 2001.
58. Dr Lau noted that there was a complaint of low back pain, disturbing sleep and dizziness. There was poor relief from physiotherapy. The plaintiff could not squat fully and there was tenderness and spasm over the lower end of the left paraspinal muscles at L5/S1 level.
59. Dr Lau opined that the plaintiff should have some residual pain in his lower back, but thought that this should not be severe.
60. The plaintiff was also examined by Dr Richard Poon, the orthopaedic expert instructed by the plaintiff, on 26 August 2002.
61. Dr Poon noted that the plaintiff complained of pain in the lower back and numbness from both buttocks down both legs, worse on the right side. Sitting was limited to 15-20 minutes and coughing increased the back pain. There were frequent headaches resulting in irritability and ill temper, on and off dizziness and sexual dysfunction.
62. On examination, Dr Poon noted marked para-lumbar muscle spasms bilaterally, tenderness from L3/S3, maximum at L4/S1, limited range of movement of the spine due to pain, sensory loss, and significantly there was negative result for axial compression and trunk rotation tests which goes some distance towards dismissing any suggestion that the plaintiff was exaggerating.
63. Dr Poon opined that the accident in May 2000 aggravated the plaintiff’s asymptomatic pre-existing condition and the source of the back and lower limb symptoms was probably both discogenic and from the posterior spinal column. He further opined that the plaintiff had not had proper treatment for his lower back for one and a half years after the accident. Further the physical symptoms and the severe headache and dizziness seriously compromised his job performance.
The neurological experts
64. The plaintiff was examined by Dr Robert Ho, the neurological expert of the plaintiff, on 4 November 2002.
65. Dr Ho found the plaintiff to be depressed and not very co-operative and opined that the plaintiff had sustained a mild to moderate closed head injury and his condition consistent with post traumatic syndrome. Dr Ho also took the view that the plaintiff was severely disabled by his persistent severe headaches which were not adequately treated and clearly there were significant residual symptoms.
66. Dr Ho was further of the view that the plaintiff was at that time not suited for any form of employment. The disabilities were “potentially treatable” but the prognosis depended on efficacy of the treatment.
67. On 10 January 2003, the plaintiff was examined by Dr Edmund Woo, the neurological expert appointed by the defendant.
68. Dr Woo noted that the plaintiff was rude, menacing, verbally abusive and non co-operative.
69. Dr Woo concluded that the plaintiff had a mild head injury and it is therefore most unlikely that he should have a significant degree of residual cognitive dysfunction.
70. In a supplemental report dated 5 May 2004, Dr Woo stated that with a mild head injury, the usual history is of gradual recovery.
71. In Dr Robert Ho’s last report dated 23 August 2004, Dr Ho states that the plaintiff’s complaints are fairly typical of post concussional syndrome and that his prognosis is poor since his condition has in fact worsened since the first examination. He also concluded that the plaintiff’s social life was severely affected.
Pain suffering and loss of amenities
72. The main dispute between the parties goes to the seriousness of the plaintiff’s injuries and disabilities, in particular his psychiatric impairment.
73. There is no dispute that orthopaedically the plaintiff had sustained a mild head injury and lower back injury.
74. He was diagnosed by the government doctors to have sustained post concussional syndrome which manifested itself in headaches, dizziness, depression, insomnia as well as his mood and personality changes. It was also the opinion of the government doctors that the post concussional syndrome of the plaintiff resulted from his fall in this accident which occurred in May 2000.
75. That view by the government doctors including Dr Lo Man Kwong, is largely in line with the opinion expressed by the plaintiff’s neurological expert, Dr Robert T. K. Ho.
76. On the other hand, the neurological expert of the defendant, Dr Edmund Woo dismisses the plaintiff’s complaints as being not genuine, exaggerated and the plaintiff as malingering due to the fact of the doubtful results of his examination because the plaintiff was rude and non co-operative with Dr Woo during the examination.
77. In the circumstances, I have little difficulty coming to the conclusion that Dr Woo had failed to properly consider the plaintiff’s case as a whole and in particular to consider whether the plaintiff’s rudeness, non co-operation and being argumentative during the examination was as a result of the severity of the post concussional syndrome affecting his mood and general behaviour which resulted from the accident.
78. I have no hesitation therefore in accepting the opinion of Dr Robert Ho and those of the government doctors, in particular Dr Lo Man Kwong, being the treating doctors of the plaintiff.
79. I further find that the psychiatric condition of the plaintiff was as a result of the accident from the evidence and view expressed by the government doctors.
80. The plaintiff was 40 at the time of the accident, and 45 at trial.
81. I take into account his loss of amenities in that he now has to forego his leisure pursuits of running, hiking and playing soccer because of his symptoms.
82. I also take into account the fact that two marriages have broken down due to his changed personality.
83. In all the circumstances, the award for pain suffering and loss of amenities will be assessed at $450,000.
Loss of earnings (pre-trial)
84. Under this head there is no dispute that before the accident, the plaintiff was earning a basic monthly salary of $8,500. In addition to that basic monthly salary, all the other additional allowances (including overtime and bonus) comes to $480 per month. In all, this gives a mean monthly earnings of $8,980.
85. A total of 63 months have elapsed since the date of the accident.
86. It is the plaintiff’s case that he has not been able to work mainly because of the psychiatric condition and/or his post concussional syndrome which has brought about his headaches, dizziness and personality and behavioural changes.
87. The defendant says that the only disability caused to the plaintiff by the accident was his orthopaedic injuries and disability therefrom and from which the plaintiff ought to have sufficiently recovered at most one year after the accident. On that basis the defendant says that loss of pre-trial earnings should not be assessed at more than one year’s loss.
88. The alternative scenario painted by the defendant is that even if there is partial loss of earnings in that the plaintiff cannot resume his pre-accident work thereby returning to full pre-accident earnings one year after the accident, he should at least be able to take up some form of alternative employment and should only be assessed partial earnings one year after the accident.
89. Having accepted the opinions expressed by Dr Robert Ho, it is the view of Dr Ho when he examined the plaintiff in November 2002 that the plaintiff, in the condition he was in then, was not suitable for any form of work. This was confirmed in a supplemental report given by him in August 2004 in which he assessed the plaintiff’s loss of earnings capacity to be 100%. Dr Ho further added that the plaintiff’s psychiatric morbidity has actually deteriorated since his last examination.
90. In his first report given in November 2002, Dr Ho was of the opinion that the plaintiff’s persistent headache had not been adequately treated and that with proper treatment, the plaintiff’s loss of earnings capacity can be reduced from 100% down to 30%.
91. This opinion of Dr Ho which I accept will therefore have an impact on pre-trial loss of earnings, future loss of earnings as well as future medical expenses. I shall deal with those latter two items later in this judgment.
92. As for the pre-trial loss of earnings, I am of the view that there will have to be assessed full loss of earnings for the pre-trial period of 63 months in the light of Dr Ho’s opinion that until properly treated, the plaintiff’s loss of earnings capacity will be 100%.
93. Accordingly, his pre-trial loss of earnings is assessed as :
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For the first seven months (before MPF became mandatory in December 2000) $8,980 x 7 = $62,860. |
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| (b) |
For the remaining 56 months, taking into account the loss of MPF as well, it will be [($8,500 x 105%) + ($480)] x 56 = $526,680. |
The total sum adding them will give $589,540.
Future medical expenses
94. There is a claim for future medical expenses of $77,600 based on the advice of Dr Robert Ho for the psychiatric treatment of the plaintiff.
95. Having accepted the advice and opinion of Dr Ho, I also take into account that in his view, Dr Ho considered that the plaintiff, treated in the public sector, had not been adequately treated for his headache from the post concussional syndrome.
96. In the light of the above, I consider it reasonable to allow this claim for medical expenses in full.
Future loss of earnings
97. The plaintiff claims for full future loss of earnings and asks that a multiplier of 12 be applied for the calculation of such claim in view of the age of the plaintiff.
98. Having acceded to the claim for future medical expenses, and having accepted Dr Ho’s opinion as to the plaintiff’s loss of earnings capacity, it follows that I must also give effect to the view held by Dr Ho that with proper treatment, the plaintiff’s loss of earnings capacity can be reduced down to 30% from the original 100%. That can and should be given effect to in the assessment of future loss of earnings.
99. The claim for future medical expenses was put on the basis of one year’s treatment for his psychiatric impairment. It follows therefore that his reduced loss of earnings capacity should come about after one year’s successful treatment.
100. Taking into account further the fact that the reduced loss of earnings capacity is only a reduction down to 30% and therefore is not a complete cure of his disability, I would assess the plaintiff’s future loss of earnings by adopting a multiplier of 4 and the same multiplicand as used in the calculation of pre-trial loss of earnings :
[($8,500 x 105%) + $480] x 12 x 4 = $451,440.
Loss of earnings capacity
101. In view of the injuries and disabilities to the plaintiff, clearly he will suffer a real handicap or disadvantage in the labour market.
102. However, taking into account the multiplier adopted and the reason for so adopting it, the handicap or disadvantage of the plaintiff in the labour market relating to the future should not be great.
103. Accordingly, I assess a lump sum of $50,000 under this head of claim.
Special damages
104. Medical expenses and tonic food are agreed between the parties at $2,990 and $5,500 respectively and will be allowed.
105. In dispute are bonesetters fees ($9,100) and herbalists fees ($30,000) claimed by the plaintiff. Travelling expenses of $5,600 claimed is also disputed.
106. In so far as the bonesetters fees are concerned, there is nothing to suggest that the plaintiff did not receive proper treatment for his orthopaedic injuries from government doctors or hospitals. There is therefore little or no justification for spending $9,100 on bonesetters. That claim will not be allowed.
107. As for the herbalists fees, I take into consideration the fact that the plaintiff’s headache and dizziness persisted right up to the time of trial and also that the opinion of Dr Robert Ho was that the plaintiff did not receive proper or adequate treatment for his headaches from the public hospitals where he was treated. In those circumstances I am prepared to accede to a reasonable claim for herbalist fees. However, in my view, the amount of $30,000 claimed is excessive and not reasonable. A reasonable sum would be $10,000 and that amount will be allowed for herbalists fees.
108. As for travelling expenses, I am prepared to allow the sum of $5,600 claimed as being reasonable in that it has been over five years since the accident but the plaintiff’s symptoms is still prevalent. In view of the time taken, the travelling expenses for seeking treatment would also be greater than in a normal case.
109. The total amount of special damages therefore comes to $24,000.
Interests
110. Interests on general damages for pain suffering and loss of amenities will be awarded at 2% p.a. from the date of Writ. I make this out to be $38,250.
111. Interests on pre-trial loss of earnings and all special damages will be awarded at 4.122% (being half judgment rate) from the date of the accident. I make this out to be $132,773.
Summary
| PSLA |
$450,000 |
| Pre-trial loss of earnings |
589,540 |
| Future medical expenses |
77,600 |
| Future loss of earnings |
451,440 |
| Loss of earnings capacity |
50,000 |
| Special damages |
24,000 |
| Interests on PSLA |
38,250 |
| Interests on pre-trial loss and specials |
132,773 |
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| Sub-total |
$1,813,603 |
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112. From this sub-total of $1,813,603 will need to be deducted the sums of $244,800 being the ECC payment received by the plaintiff and $100,000 interim payment received by the plaintiff.
113. The final figure arrived at is $1,468,803.
Conclusion
114. There will be judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of $1,468,803 against both defendants.
Costs
115. There will be a costs order nisi that the defendants pay the plaintiff’s costs of this action, to be taxed if not agreed. The plaintiff’s own costs to be taxed in accordance with Legal Aid Regulations.
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( A.R. Suffiad )
Judge of the Court of First Instance,
High Court
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Mr Ashok Sakhrani, instructed by Messrs Simon Si & Co., for the Plaintiff
Mr Patrick Lim, instructed by Messrs Dibb Lupton Alsop, for the 1st Defendant
2nd Defendant, in person
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