RE ROBBIAH

CACV 241/2019

[2020] HKCA 88

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 241 OF 2019

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 873 OF 2018)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Bharwaney J (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  On 9 September 2019, the Court (Lam VP and Bharwaney J) handed down a judgment ([2019] HKCA 1029) dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Woodcock (“the Judge”) dated 20 May 2019 ([2019] HKCFI 779). In the latter decision, the Judge refused leave for the applicant to apply for judicial review.

2.  By a notice of motion filed on 20 September 2019, the applicant sought leave to appeal against the Court’s judgment to the Court of Final Appeal.  It was stated in the notice of motion that:

“1) The decision is betray a bias and formula approach unlikely fairly assess the danger of my life and clearly calculate to reject my claim.

2) Procedural unfairness, the Judge did not apply the law properly.

3) The learned Judges were wrong as a matter of law for not having applied the principle of irrationality to the decision made by the Director of Immigration on the 9 September 2019 refusing my application for Judicial Review.

4) The Decision maker just relied on COL information and my previous facts which were in favour on rejecting my claim. Actual life occur different situation than mentioned in COL information. Officer and courts prefers to ignore evidence of the violence towards minorities searching for unrealistic silver lining.” (sic)

3.  Notwithstanding that she was directed to do so, the applicant failed to lodge any written submission in support of this application.

4.  Plainly, nothing in the notice of motion constitutes valid grounds of appeal. Paragraphs 1 – 3 are general assertions without supporting particulars.

5.  The allegation relating to the decision-makers’ handling of the COI materials is a regurgitation of the ground relied on by the applicant in her leave application: see [6(1)] of the judgment.  The Judge had adequately dealt with it at [15] – [16] of her decision (quoted in [8] of the judgment). The applicant did not pursue this point on appeal.  It is not the practice of this Court to grant leave to appeal on new points that have not been canvassed in the substantive appeal:  see Ageas Insurance Co (Asia) Ltd v Lam Hau Wah Inneo CACV 65/2014, 19 May 2015, at [7] – [9]; and The Law Society of Hong Kong v A Solicitor CACV 78/2014, 10 July 2015, at [4] – [7].

6.  In this application, the applicant failed to raise any question of great general or public importance, as required under section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance (Cap 484).  Nor can we see any basis to grant leave on the “otherwise” limb.  Accordingly, the statutory thresholds for granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal are not met.

7.  For these reasons, we refuse to grant leave to the applicant to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. We dismiss the notice of motion accordingly.