RE BUI DINH LAP

CAMP 43/2025, [2026] HKCA 302

On Appeal From [2025] HKCA 704

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 43 OF 2025

(ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 1707 OF 2019)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Au JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  On 27 October 2025, the applicant filed a Notice of Motion to apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal out of time against this court’s judgment of 31 July 2025 (“the Judgment”) ([2025] HKCA 704).  In the Judgment, we dismissed the applicant’s reapplication for extension of time to appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge KW Lung (“the Judge”) dated 6 August 2024, by which the Judge dismissed his application for leave to apply for judicial review ([2024] HKCFI 1911).

2.  The facts and issues in the appeal, as well as this court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in the Judgment.  We will not repeat them here.  After reviewing the Notice of Motion, we see no reason to deviate from the usual practice to consider this application on paper pursuant to paragraph 3 of Practice Direction 2.1.

3.  Section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance (Cap 484) (“the HKCFAO”) provides that an appeal shall lie to the Court of Final Appeal at the discretion of this court or the Court of Final Appeal if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.

4.  Pursuant to section 24(2) of the HKCFAO, an appellant has 28 days from the date of the Judgment to seek leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.  In the present case, taking into account the court’s summer vacation in August 2025, the deadline for the applicant to seek leave to appeal against the Judgment fell on 28 September 2025. Accordingly, the applicant was almost one month late in taking out his application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.

5.  As the applicant did not apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal within time, the Court has a discretion to extend time under section 24(5) of the HKCFAO only if good and sufficient grounds are shown by the applicant: see Re Imran Muhammad [2021] HKCA 482 at [9] and the authorities cited therein.  In deciding whether there are such good grounds, the court is entitled to take into account (a) the length of the delay; (b) the reasons for the delay; (c) the chances of the appeal succeeding if an extension of time is granted; and (d) the degree of prejudice to the respondent if the application is granted: Begum Jahanara v Ian Candy, Esq & Another [2021] HKCA 83 at [4] and the authorities cited therein.

6.  In his Notice of Motion, the applicant alleged that his life would be in danger if he returned to Vietnam and that creditors and gangsters in Vietnam are cruel and violent and are willing to kill people to satisfy their anger and ferocity.  He also alleged that internal relocation would not be feasible because there would be many difficulties and obstacles that he would have to face in the new location.  He further contended that the nationwide social network of gangsters and clandestine connections with corrupt people in the government and police apparatus make it quite possible for those creditors and gangsters to find out his new address.  He also alleged that the Immigration Department did not consider his human rights under various legislations but failed to particularise his complaint.

7.  In his supporting affirmation filed on 27 October 2025, he claimed that the Judgment was reached unfairly and that there was a good ground of appeal that was “not necessarily considered at the stage of applying for leave for judicial review”.  He also claimed that he did not know English and had to ask for help from his friend and thus could not file his application on time.

8.  The applicant lodged written submissions on 10 November 2025.  In those submissions, he reiterated the factual and procedural background of his non-refoulement claim and cited various general proposition and legal authorities on the high standards of fairness and Wednesbury unreasonableness, but failed to particularise how they were relevant to his case.

9.  At the outset, the applicant’s delay of nearly one month was substantial.  He also failed to provide any evidence to support his assertions.  Clearly, he failed to provide good and sufficient reason to justify his substantial delay.

10.  More importantly, his application is plainly devoid of merit.  His assertions are all vague, bare and unsupported by any specific particular or evidence.  General assertions of his fear if refouled do not constitute proper grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar [2022] HKCA 627 at [6].  His allegations are just a mere regurgitation of those submissions he had previously made before this court in his appeal, which we had already considered and rejected in full: see [12] ‑ [23] of the Judgment.  He did not identify any specific error in the Judgment.  It is well established that the Court of Appeal will not allow an application of this nature to be deployed as an occasion for re-running the arguments which had already been canvassed at the appeal: Ho Sin Ying v Chan Yui Ling & Another (unreported, CACV 221/2013, 14 November 2014) at [2] and [3].  Clearly, his assertions do not constitute proper grounds of appeal.

11.  Further and in any event, even taking them at their highest, his allegations remain fact-specific and do not relate to any question of great general or public importance.

12.  Accordingly, the applicant has failed to identify any question of great general or public importance, as required by section 22(1)(b) of the HKCFAO.  We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “or otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b) of the HKCFAO.

13.  For these reasons, the applicant’s intended appeal has no merit.  Accordingly, the Notice of Motion filed on 27 October 2025 is dismissed.