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MEJIA HERRERA LEIDY JOHANNA v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
MEJIA HERRERA LEIDY JOHANNA v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5315 · HCAL 522/2023
Court of First Instance
HCAL 522/2023
[2026] HKCFI 5315
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 522 of 2023
BETWEEN
| |Mejia Herrera Leidy Johanna |Applicant |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board / |Putative |
| |Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Intersted Party|
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)
Following;
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|(|consideration of the documents and the Applicant being absent in |
| |open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Andrew Li:
1. The Applicant’s Form 86 be amended to name the Director of Immigration
as the putative interest party; and
2. The application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.
Observations for the Applicant:
INTRODUCTION
1. By a Form 86 filed on 31 March 2023 (“the Form 86”), the applicant
applied for leave to apply for judicial review of a decision by the
Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 20 March 2023 (“the
Board’s Decision”), which affirmed a decision by the Director of
Immigration (“the Director”) dated 25 May 2022 in refusing the
applicant’s non-refoulement protection claim. She named the Board as
both the proposed respondent and interested party in this case.
2. I amended the Form 86 on my own motion to name the Director as the
putative interested party.
3. The applicant requested for a hearing but she was absent at the
scheduled hearing on 14 September 2026. From the court record, the
Notice of Hearing dated 25 August 2026 was sent to an address updated
through the Immigration Department. Such updated address was,
presumably, provided by the applicant to the Immigration Department in
the first place.
4. Bearing in mind what Barma JA held in Re Abdus Salam [2019] HKCA 1091
at [19], i.e. in an application for leave to bring judicial review
proceedings, it is not essential for the applicant to attend an oral
hearing, when the applicant fails to turn up at an oral hearing he/she
had requested, it should be regarded as a decision to forego the right
to the requested oral hearing and the court can deal with the
application on paper. Applying the same logic, if the applicant
failed to provide an updated address to receive notices from the
court, it also signals a disregard of, and indeed a decision to
forego, the right of attending an oral hearing.
5. I therefore decided to proceed to deal with this application on paper
notwithstanding the applicant’s absence at the hearing.
BACKGROUND
6. The applicant is a national of Colombia. She seeks non-refoulement
protection on the basis that if she is refouled, she would be harmed
or killed by a terrorist group. Her personal background, the relevant
facts and relevant procedural history have been sufficiently set out
in the Board’s Decision, which can be accessed through a hyperlink[1].
I shall not repeat the same here.
DISCUSSION
7. In a judicial review, this court does not provide a further avenue of
appeal. Though in non-refoulement case an enhanced standard in
scrutinizing the decision of the Board is required given the
seriousness of the issue at hand, this court should not usurp the role
of the Board, which together with the Director are the primary
decision-makers. This court will not intervene by way of judicial
review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or
irrationality in the decision of the Board (Nupur Mst v Director of
Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, [14(1)]). There must be a reasonably
arguable claim with a realistic prospect of success before leave for
judicial review will be granted (Peter Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung &
Anor (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676).
8. In the affirmation filed in support of the application, the applicant
has specified the following grounds on which the relief is said to be
sought:-
1) It was unreasonable for the adjudicator to say that her
credibility was questionable as she had answered all the
questions;
2) The Board had relied upon information which is not recognized or
simply hearsay or outdated which rendered the Board’s Decision
unfair.
9. In my view, it is clear that the above purported grounds relied on by
the applicant are generic grounds without addressing the specific
findings made by the Board in this case. A closer study of the
Board’s Decision reveals that neither of the purported grounds has any
substance or application to the specific findings and conclusions made
by the Board.
10. Looking at the Board’s Decision, the Board bore in mind the correct
legal principles in respect of each of the four applicable grounds
under the USM.
11. It took into consideration the applicant’s case and evidence,
including the relevant COI and the option of internal relocation.
12. After thoroughly analysing and assessing the above, the Board came to
the findings and conclusions that the evidence of the applicant is
incredible [26, 27 & 41] and none of the grounds was made out [89-92].
13. Having looked at the Board’s Decision carefully, I do not find the
Board has acted unreasonably in reaching its decision regarding her
credibility in the light of all the evidence. Nor do I find it has
taken into account of any documents or information which it ought not
to have taken into account.
14. Despite rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, I cannot find any
errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s
Decision. In my view, the intended challenge of the applicant is not
reasonably arguable and has no realistic prospect of success.
CONCLUSION
15. For the above reasons, I am not satisfied that this court should
intervene by way of judicial review. I therefore dismiss the
application.
Dated the 22nd day of September 2026
| |(Cheung Ho Yat, Annson) |
| |for Registrar, High Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|Applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the Applicant | | |
|or the Applicant’s | | |
|solicitors must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent to the Applicant|Sent to the Putative |
|respondent and such |on 22/9/2026 |Respondent / the Putative |
|interested parties as | |Respondent’s solicitors / |
|may be directed by the |Mejia Herrera Leidy |such Putative Interested |
|Court the order |Johanna |Parties as may be directed |
|granting leave and any | |by the Court / the Putative|
|directions given within|Applicant’s ref. no.:|Interested Parties’ |
|14 days after the leave|Nil. |solicitors on 22/9/2026 |
|was granted (Order 53, | | |
|rule 4A); | |Torture Claims Appeal Board|
| | |/ Non-Refoulement Claims |
|b) issue the | |Petition Office |
|originating summons | |Putative Respondent’s ref. |
|within 14 days after | |no.: |
|the grant of leave and | |USM 20419 |
|serve it in accordance | | |
|with Order 53, rule 5; | |Director of Immigration |
|and | |Putative Interested Party’s|
| | |ref. no.: |
|c) supply to every | |QA T/C 2261/21 (formerly |
|other party copies of | |RBCZ 5000342/21) |
|every affidavit which | | |
|the Applicant proposes | |Department of Justice, |
|to use at the hearing, | |Senior Assistant Law |
|including the affidavit| |Officer |
|in support of the | |(Civil Law) |
|application for leave | |(Civil Litigation Unit 2) |
|(Order 53, rule 6(5)). | | |
____________________________________________________________________________
Form CALL-1
-----------------------
[1]
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2023/HCAL000522_
2023_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf