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1996
M.P. No. 2037
IN THE SUPREME
COURT OF HONG KONG
HIGH COURT
MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS
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BETWEEN
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VAN
CAN ON and others
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Applicants
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and
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(1) THE DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION
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Respondents
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(2) THE DIRECTOR OF LEGAL AID
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(3) THE
REFUGEE STATUS
REVIEW BOARD |
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Before : The Hon. Mr. Justice Keith
in Chambers
Dates of Hearing : 16th and 17th July 1996
Date of Delivery of Judgment : 17th
July 1996
[In
determining whether to exercise his power under section 13E(1) of the Immigration
Ordinance (Cap.115) to order the removal from Hong Kong of Vietnamese migrants
who are in the course of (a) applying for legal aid, or (b) appealing against
the refusal of legal aid, to enable them to challenge the refusal of the
Refugee Status Review Board to accord them refugee status, the Director of
Immigration is not obliged to consider the merits of such a challenge. His
policy not to treat the lodging of such an application or appeal as a reason
for postponing the Applicants’ removal from Hong Kong is not an irrational one:
Do Manh Tuan v. The Director of Immigration (HCMP 803/96)
followed and applied.]
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JUDGMENT
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INTRODUCTION
1. The
Applicants in these proceedings for judicial review are Vietnamese migrants.
They sought asylum in Hong Kong. They were all refused refugee status by the
Refugee Status Review Board (“the Board”). They wished to challenge those
decisions. They therefore applied for legal aid to enable them to do so.
2. In
order to enable the Director of Legal Aid to determine those applications,
various documents conerning the migrants were supplied to her by the Director
of Immigration. Copies of them were not supplied to the migrants by the
Director of Immigration. He was only prepared for the Director of Legal Aid to
see them. Nor were they supplied to the migrants by the Director of Legal Aid,
because they had been supplied to her on terms that they were for her use only.
3. In
due course, the migrants’ applications for legal aid were refused by the
Director of Legal Aid. The migrants lodged appeals against the refusal of leagl
aid with the Registrar of the Supreme Court. In order to enable the Registrar
to determine the appeals, the Director of Legal Aid supplied the various
documents to the Registrar. When one of the appeals was heard by Master Jones,
the migrant’s solicitors complained that they had not seen the documents on the
basis of which Master Jones was being asked to decide the appeal. Master Jones
adjourned the hearing of the appeal, and recommended to the Director of
Immigration that such papers which the Director of Legal Aid wished to refer to
on the appeal, or which would otherwise be relevant, be released to the migrant’s
representatives. The Director of Immigration refused to provide the migrants
with copies of documents relating both to the appeal pending before Master
Jones and similar appeals, as did the Director of Legal Aid, and their refusal
to do so are the decisions challenged in these proceedings.
THE
APPLICATION FOR LEAVE
4. At
first, 49 migrants applied for leave to apply for judicial review of those
decisions. Their application was placed before me on 25th June. I
was not prepared to grant leave without a hearing, and the application for
leave was heard by me on 11th July. The hearing was attended by
counsel for the Applicants, for the Director of Legal Aid and for the Director
of Immigration. After hearing brief argument on the topic, I granted the 49
Applicants leave to apply for judicial review of the decisions challenged.
However, between the filing of the Notice of Application on 25th
June and the hearing on 11th July, a further 10 Vietnamese migrants
whose cases were said to be identical to the original 49 Applicants were
discovered. I gave leave for the Notice of Application to be amended so that
they could be applicants in the proceedings, and I ordered that the leave which
I had granted to the original 49 Applicants applied to them as well.
THE APPLICATION FOR A STAY
5. At
the conclusion of the hearing, after I had granted the 59 Applicants leave to
apply for judicial review, Mr Philip Dykes on their behalf applied for a stay
on their removal from Hong Kong pending the substantive hearing of the
application for judicial review. Ever since the refusal of the Board to grant
the Applicants refugee status, the Director of Immigration has had the power,
under section 13E(1) of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap. 115), to order their
removal from Hong Kong. Upon ascertaining from Miss Dale Watson for the
Director of Immigration that the Director of Immigration was not prepared to
undertake that the Applicants would not be removed from Hong Kong in the
meantime, I granted such a stay. I did not hear argument on the issue, and I
therefore gave no reasons for granting the stay. However, Mr Matthew Gold for
the Applicants has correctly identified my unarticulated reason for granting
the stay. It was because if the Applicants were removed from Hong Kong, there
would be no point in their appeal against the refusal of legal aid being
maintained. It would be a dead letter, because even if the ultimate outcome was
the quashing of the decisions of the Board, that would come far too late if the
Applicants had already been repatriated to Vietnam.
THE 9 ADDITIONAL APPLICANTS
6. That
is the background to the application which came before me yesterday. It related
to 9 further Vietnamese migrants whose applications for legal aid to challenge
the decisions of the Board refusing them refugee status were refused, and who
have lodged appeals against the refusals with the Registrar. I gave leave for
the Notice of Application to be re-amended so that they can be applicants in
the proceedings, and I ordered that the leave which I had granted to the 59
previous Applicants should apply to them as well. However, the real bone of
contention was whether there should be a stay on their removal from Hong
Kong pending the substantive hearing of the application for judicial review.
Again, the Director of Immigration was not prepared to undertake that they
would not be removed from Hong Kong in the meantime. Having heard the
arguments, I reserved judgment on the issue until today.
THE RECENT LEAGAL AID APPEALS
7. Three
of the 9 new Applicants only lodged their appeals to the Registrar on 13th
July, i.e. after my order of 11th July staying the removal of the 59
original Applicants from Hong Kong. I do not wish to stifle genuine appeals,
but it would not be right to grant a stay if the lodging of an appeal was
simply an opportunistic response to my order of 11th July, and a
device to use my order of 11th July as a means of prolonging their
stay in Hong Kong and postponing their repatriation to Vietnam.
8. The
lodging of the appeal by one of them has all the hallmarks of such a device. In
his case, legal aid was refused as long ago as 25th October 1995. In
these circumstances, I can be forgiven, I think, for being extremely sceptical
about his motives for lodging an appeal so late in the day. The circumstances
of the other two are not so clear-cut. Legal aid was refused in their cases on
18th June and 24th June respectively. The time limit for
lodging an appeal is 14 days from the refusal of the legal aid: see section
26(2) of the Legal Aid Ordinance (Cap. 91). The Registrar has power to allow
further time, and no doubt he will do so if there is any delay in informing a
migrant or his representatives of the refusal of legal aid. It follow that
these 3 appeals are all out of time.
9. There
is no evidence before me as to when the refusal of legal aid was brought to the
attention of these three Applicants or their solicitors, nor is there any
evidence as to the reason for the delay. Mr Gold told me that he had no
instructions on those matters, and I suspect that that is simply a function of
the speed with which this application had been brought to court. In the
circumstances, without giving the Applicants an opportunity to explain the
delay, I am not prepared to characterise their appeals (whatever my suspicious
may be) as a mere device to use my order of 11th July as a means of
staying in Hong Kong. For these reasons, I am prepared to treat the 3
Applicants as being in the same category as the other 6 new Applicants, all of
whom lodged their appeals prior to 11th July.
SHOULD A STAY BE GRANTED?
10. Mr
Gold submits, rightly, that their cases are indistinguishable from the cases of
the 59 Applicants to which the stay of 11th July applied. For some
reason, their names were simply omittd from the original 49 names and the
subsequent 10. It follows that my refusal to grant the 6 new Applicants a stay
would be tantamount to an acceptance on my part that the stay should not have
been granted to the original 59 Applicants. With her customary realism which
will be missed in Hong Kong, Miss Watson did not flinch with that.
11. The
basis on which it is said that a stay is wholly inappropriate is my decision in
Do Manh Tuan v. The Director of Immigration (HCMP 803/96). That
case also concerned a Vietnamese migrant to whom the Board had refused to
accord refugee status. He applied for legal aid to challenge that decision. Before
the Director of Legal Aid had decided whether to grant him legal aid, the
Director of Immigration made an order for his removal from Hong Kong. When his
solicitors realised that his removal from Hong Kong was imminent, he applied
for leave to apply for judicial review of the order for his removal. I refused
him leave, and the order for his removal took effect on the day after I had
informally notified the parties of my decision.
12. The
case of Do Manh Tuan is factually distinguishable from the
current case in two significant respects:
(i) Do Manh Tuan
had not been refused legal aid at the time when the Director of Immigration
made the order for his removal. That is to be contrasted with the present case
where all the Applicants have been refused legal aid. If a stay on the removal
order was not appropriate in Do Manh Tuan, all the more so is it
inappropriate in the Applicants’ cases.
(ii) The underlying
decisions which both Do Manh Tuan and the present Applicants wish to cahllenge
are the decisions of the Board not to accord them refugee status. In Do
Manh Tuan, I had sufficient materials to decide whether to grant him
leave to apply for judicial review of that decision if that application had
been before me. In concluded that I would not have granted him leave to apply
for judicial review of that decision. I do not have those materials before me
in the present cases. To that extent, Do Manh Tuan was far less justified in
having his removal from Hong Kong postponed than are the present Applicants.
13. In Do Manh Tuan , I was told that it was the Director of
Immigration’s policy not to treat an application for legal aid by a Vietnamese
migrant to challenge the refusal to accord him refugee status as a reason for
postponing his removal from Hong Kong. That that remains the Director of
Immigration’s policy today is borne out by a letter dated yesterday from the
Attorney-General’s Chambers to the Applicants’ solicitors. Leaving aside for
the moment the legality or therwise of that policy, one thing is plain: the
Director of Immigration cannot be expected to stay his hand indefinitely while
an attempt is being made to challenge those decisions which triggered his power
to order the removal of the Applicants from Hong Kong, however remote a
successful challenge to those decisions might be. On more mature
consideration, that is the answer to the point that, if the Applicants were
removed from Hong Kong, the issue as to whether they should have been granted
refugee status will never be
decided.
14. The
force of that argument was recognised by Mr Paul Harris, Do Manh Tuan’s
counsel. What he argued was that in a case where a Vietnamese migrant has
applied for legal aid to challenge the decision refusing to accord him refugee
status, the Director should consider whether such a challenge has any arguable
ground for success. If it does, he should defer any decision as to whether the
migrant should be removed from Hong Kong until after the application for legal
aid has been determined. By parity of reasoning, that argument should apply in
a case such as the present where Vietnamese migrants have lodged appeals
against the refusal of legal aid to challenge the decisions refusing to accord
them refugee status.
15. I
reject that argument. I quote from my judgment in Do Manh Tuan,
suitably amended to meet the facts of the present case:
“It
is not for Director to second-guess the view which the [Registrar] might take
of the merits of the proposed challenge [assuming that the Registrar is able to
determine that question according to law]. He is entitled to treat the
considered view of the Board as final until such time as the Court says
otherwise. This accords with the director’s own practice. [His counsel] told me
that the Director would not normally order the removal of a migrant once the
Court had granted te migrant leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s
decision to refuse to accord him refugee status.
If
[the Applicants'] argument was correct, two consequences would follow:
(i) Any Vietnamese
migrant could delay his removal from Hong Kong simply by [lodging an appeal
within the time limit from the decision refusing him] legal aid to challenge
the decision refusing to accord him refugee status.
(ii) The Director
would in all such cases have to embark on an examination of the reasons of the
Board to determine whether the challenge to its decision had any chance of
success. For all I know, that might stretch to an unacceptable degree the
manpower and financial resources currently available to the Director.
These
consequences should not, of course, deter me from going along with [the
Applicants'] argument if I thought that it was arguably correct, but where an
elaborate system for determination by the Director as to whether a Vietnamese
migrant ought to be accorded refugee status has been established, and sophisticated
machinery for appeals from his decision to an independent board has been put in
place, I do not believe for one moment that it is any part of the function of
the Director to revisit the question of the legality of the decision relating
to the migrant’s status in order to determine whether the migrant should be
removed from Hong Kong.”
For
these reasons, I confirm the view which I expressed in Do Manh Tuan,
namely that the Director’s policy not to treat an application for legal aid by
a Vietnamese migrant to challenge the refusal to accord him refugee status as a
reason for postponing his removal from Hong Kong is not an irrational one.
16. These
considerations apply particularly where, as here, the immediate challenge is
not to the decisions of the Board, nor even to the decisions of the Director of
Legal Aid to refuse legal aid to challenge the decisions of the Board, but to
decisions which it is alleged prevent appeals against the refusal of legal aid
being determined according to law. The point is that even if the Applicants
succeed in the current proceedings, and the decisions of the Director of Legal
Aid and the Director of Immigration not to provide the Applicants with copies
of the documents they want are quashed, that does not mean that the Applicants
will be granted legal aid. All it means is that the Registrar can consider the
appeals with the benefit of informed representations from the Applicants’
representatives.
17. I
have not overlooked the fact that in Do Manh Tuan the issue was
whether it was arguable that the order for removal should be quashed on the
basis that it was not reached according to law. In the present case, the issue
is whether the Court, in its discretion, should prevent the Director from
exercising his discretionary power of removal. In the end, I have decided that
this is a distinction without a difference. The reasons which led me to
conclude that the Director of Immigration’s policy in relation to migrants who
apply for legal aid is not irrational are the same reasons which lead me today
to conclude that I should not interfere with the exercise by him of his power
of removal.
18. Nor
have I overlooked Mr Gold’s point that the Applicants have been in detention in
Hong Kong for at least 5 years. Since I ordered an expedited hearing of this
application for judicial review, it is said that the Applicants should at least
be allowed to remain in Hong Kong for the couple of months which it would take
for the current proceedings to be concluded. That argument presupposes that if
the Director of Legal Aid or the Director of Immigration was ordered to provide
the Applicants’ representatives with copies of the various documents required
for the legal aid appeals, it would then be appropriate to prevent the Director
of Immigration from ordering the Applicants’ removal form Hong Kong. For the
reasons I have given, it would not.
CONCLUSION
19. It
follows that I decline to order the Director of Immigration not to order the
removal of the 9 new Applicants from Hong Kong pending the substantive hearing
of these proceedings for judicial review. As I have said, I realise that the
reasons for this decision apply to the 59 original Applicants, and had I
permitted the question of the stay to be argued on 11th July, I
doubt whether I would have granted the stay which I did. I leave it to the
Director of Immigration to decide whether he wishes to apply to set aside the
stay granted to the 59 original Applicants. I am not encouraging him to make
such an application, but if he does so, it should be on proper notice to the
Applicants’ solicitors. In the interests of completeness, I note that we should
now be talking only of 53 Applicants, because 6 of the original 49 Applicants
have now withdrawn their applications for judicial review.
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(Brian Keith)
Judge of the High Court
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Mr
Matthew Gold of Messrs Pam Baker & Co for the Applicants
Miss
Dale Watson, Senior Crown Cousel, on 16th July, and Mr Nicholas
Cooney, Senior Crown Counsel, on 17th July, for the 1st
Respondent
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