NUR-ASIAH-BT-MURMIN-DARTIN v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD

HCAL 613/2021

[2026] HKCFI 3304

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 613 OF 2021

_____________

BETWEEN

_____________

_____________

D E C I S I O N

_____________

1.  On 16 December 2025 I refused to grant leave to the Applicant to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration (“Director”) in dismissing her non-refoulement claim upon finding that she had failed to first appeal to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) against the Director’s decision as stipulated by Section 37ZR(b) of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115, that none of the grounds put forward by her reasonably arguable for her intended challenge, and that there was no reasonable prospect of success in her intended application.

2.  The Applicant now by a summons issued on 27 January 2026 (of which was only recently brought to the court’s attention) seeks leave to appeal against that decision out of time, as the 14-day period for her to file her appeal under Order 53 rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap. 4A ended on 30 December 2025, and hence she was some 4 weeks late with her intended appeal.

3.  In considering whether to extend time for appealing against a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the Court shall have regard to (i) the length of the delay; (ii) the reason for the delay; (iii) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (iv) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted: see Re MK HCMP 2609/2016, 10 January 2017; Chu On Fong Winter v The Appeal Panel (Housing) HCMP 982/2017, 20 July 2017; Islam Raja Rais v Director of Immigration HCMP 881/2017, 26 June 2017; Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226; and Re Saqlain Muhammad [2018] HKCA 346.

4.  In the Applicant’s case, a delay of 4 weeks must be considered as very substantial and inordinate, for which she explained in her affirmation that she did receive the decision on 16 December 2025, but she could not arrange money for her intended appeal within the required time, of which I can only assume that either she could not get the money to pay for the filing of her intended appeal or for legal assistance for her intended appeal, but neither of which is good or valid reason or justification for her such serious delay.

5.  The court record shows that the decision was sent on the same day of 16 December 2025 to her then reported address without being returned through undelivered post, and for the reasons stated above, I am not satisfied that the Applicant has provided any good reason for her serious delay.

6.  More importantly, nor did she put forward any proper or valid draft or proposed grounds of appeal, or any particulars of any error in the decision or why it may be reasonably arguable that the decision was unfair or unreasonable either in her summons or her affirmation in which she just repeated her claim as before of her fear of being harmed by her creditor over their monetary dispute, and given her failure to comply with the statutory requirement to first appeal to the Board against the Director’s decision as stipulated by the Immigration Ordinance, I do not find any prospect of success in her intended appeal either.

7.  In the premises, and for the reasons given, it would be futile to extend time for what appears to be a hopeless appeal. Accordingly, I refuse to extend time for the Applicant to file her intended appeal, and dismiss her summons.