RE NARINDER SINGH

CACV 419/2018

[2021] HKCA 235

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 419 OF 2018

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 1081/2017)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Barma JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  On 1 February 2019, this court (Cheung JA, Yuen JA and Barma JA) handed down a judgment dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan (“the judge”) on 17 August 2018 refusing leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review. The applicant had sought to review the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dismissing his appeal from the decisions of the Director of Immigration rejecting his non-refoulement claim.

2.  The facts and issues in the appeal, as well as the court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in our judgment.[1]  We will not repeat them here.

3.  The applicant subsequently applied, by a Notice of Motion dated 27 November 2019, for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal out of time.  The applicant stated in the Notice of Motion that:

“The claims that the judgment has made stated is no substance in the grounds of the application is not true.

On the strength of the grounds not made a complaint about the poor performance of his duty lawyer is due to fearing he will be picked out for misappropriating by the adjudicator.

The applicant gently did not have enough time to address the bundle.

Rest of the grounds I will submit as soon as possible.”

4.  In the affirmation dated 27 November 2019, the applicant explained that he was late in filing the Notice of Motion because he needed time to get advice and help from friends.

5.  In another affirmation also dated 27 November 2019, the applicant deposed that:

“1. The [judges] were wrong in law in holding that there was no state acquiescence or involvement.

2.  The [judges] also failed to find out the clear details of the current situation of India.”

6.  The applicant lodged a written submission in support of the application on 27 December 2019.  In the written submission, the applicant summarized the events leading to his non-refoulement claim.  He referred to the Basic Law and a number of international treaties and authorities.  He submitted in general terms that the Board failed to meet the high standard of fairness or act fairly, without specifying how it was said to have failed in those respects.  Nor did he explain the relevance of the authorities and treaty provisions cited.

7.  Having considered the applicant’s Notice of Motion, affirmations and written submission, we see no reason to depart from the usual practice of determining an application of this kind on the papers. We have, therefore, determined the applicant’s application on the basis of the documents filed.

8.  The matters stated by the applicant do not constitute grounds for granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.  The applicant has failed to identify any question of great general or public importance for the Court of Final Appeal to determine, as required by section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484.  Nor is any such question apparent to us from the matters he has raised.  

9.  All of the grounds advanced by the applicant lack particulars and we are of the view that none of the grounds is reasonably arguable before the Court of Final Appeal.  Further, we have already addressed the issue of state acquiescence at [15] of our judgment.

10.  In our view, these grounds are not reasonably arguable before the Court of Final Appeal. 

11.  We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b).

12.  For these reasons, the Notice of Motion dated 27 November 2019 is dismissed.