FRAZ DIL v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD

CACV 1235/2025, [2026] HKCA 320

On Appeal From [2025] HKCFI 6141

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 1235 OF 2025

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 70 OF 2020)

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JUDGMENT

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Hon Chow JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  This is the Applicant’s appeal against the order of Fung J (“the Judge”) dated 22 December 2025[1] (“the Order”) refusing to grant leave to the Applicant to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 3 January 2020, whereby the Board dismissed the Applicant’s appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 6 August 2018.

BACKGROUND

2.  The Applicant is a national of Pakistan.  He claimed that he entered Hong Kong illegally on 9 February 2016.  On 11 February 2016, he surrendered himself to the Immigration Department.  On 13 July 2016, he lodged a non-refoulement claim on the basis that, if refouled, he would be harmed or killed by his neighbours (Mahmood Shah, Ijaz Shah and Tasadq Shah) over a land dispute with them.  Details of the Applicant’s claim have been summarised by the Judge at §2 of the CALL-1 Form.

3.  By a Notice of Decision dated 6 August 2018 (“the Director’s Decision”), the Director dismissed the Applicant’s non-refoulement claim with reference to all applicable risks: the risk of torture^[2], BOR 2 risk[3], BOR 3 risk[4], and persecution risk[5].

4.  The Applicant appealed the Director’s Decision to the Board.  On 3 January 2020, the Board dismissed the Applicant’s appeal, and affirmed the Director’s Decision (“the Board’s Decision”).  The Board’s reasons for its decision were summarised by the Judge at §5 of the CALL-1 Form, as follows:

“The [Board] noted that he basically repeated his case before [the Director], but there were inconsistencies and not recalling the details. The [Board] found that he could settle the dispute by selling the land, and in any case he could relocate to other areas. It was a private dispute, and there was no torture nor prosecution by any official parties.”

THE JUDGE’S DECISION

5.  On 8 January 2020, the Applicant filed a Form 86 to apply for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision.  No ground for seeking relief was given in the Form 86.  In his supporting affirmation of the same date, he repeated his claimed fear upon refoulement, and complained that the Director and the Board did not consider the actual situation in Pakistan.  He also complained that he was not provided with legal or language assistance in his appeal before the Board.

6.  On 22 December 2025, the Judge gave his decision refusing to grant leave to apply for judicial review, for the following reasons:

“[6] The Form 86 did not contain any ground, and his Affirmation simply attached the various decisions and interview documents. They did not contain any particular of errors by the [Director] or [Board]. He was absent at the leave hearing and did not augment his arguments.

[7] Judicial review does not operate as a rehearing of the refoulement claim, but to consider whether the original decision maker(s) has erred in the law, irrationality in the decision(s) or procedural unfairness…

[8] Having looked at the decisions of [Director] and [Board], and there were [no][6] grounds to show they have erred, and that it was unreasonable for the Applicant to relocate elsewhere from his home turf.

[9]     In the event, the leave for judicial review is refused.”

THIS APPEAL

7.  In his Notice of Appeal filed on 29 December 2025, the Applicant states generally that the Director and the Board did not follow the law and did not take into account his problems.

8.  In his written submissions lodged on 6 February 2026, the Applicant alleges, inter alia, that:

(1)     The Judge’s decision was unreasonable.

(2)     The Judge did not apply the principle of irrationality to the decisions of the Director and the Board.

(3)     The Judge did not apply the principle of procedural fairness, as the Director and the Board were required to give reasons to justify their decisions.

(4)     The Judge did not apply high standards of fairness.

(5)     The Judge did not properly consider the problems he would face in his home country.

(6)     The Board failed to give him a sufficient chance to provide evidence.

(7)     The Board relied on unofficial and hearsay materials.

9.  Attached to his written submissions is a one-page document dated 29 January 2026 (“the Document”), which is written in Urdu without any accompanying translation.  At the hearing, the Applicant explained that the Document was a First Information Report made by his father to the local police concerning a recent incident occurring in January 2026 during which his neighbours came to his home in Pakistan and fired gun shots.

10.  The Applicant also informed the Court that he married a Hong Kong permanent resident in 2023, and was waiting for the issue of a dependant visa by the Immigration Department which would enable him to stay in Hong Kong.

DISCUSSION

11.  In an appeal against refusal of leave to apply for judicial review in non-refoulement cases, the Court of Appeal would only examine the decision of the judge in light of the grounds advanced by the applicant.  If no viable ground is put forward to reverse the judge’s decision, the appeal should be dismissed.  The Court of Appeal’s role is not to examine the Board’s decision afresh as if it was a fresh application for judicial review (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, at §14(6)).

12.  Further, the assessment of evidence, country of origin information, risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board and the Director. The court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board: Re Kartini [2019] HKCA 1022, at §13.  No such error of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board is shown in the present case.

13.  The matters raised in the Applicant’s Notice of Appeal and written submissions against the decisions of the Director, the Board and the Judge are general assertions without particulars, and do not constitute valid grounds of appeal against the Order.  The implied allegation that the Director and the Board did not give reasons for their decisions is plainly unjustified, since both the Director and the Board gave full and detailed reasons for their respective decisions.

14.  The Document is new evidence, and the Applicant has not made any application for leave to adduce new evidence for the purpose of his appeal.  In view of the fact that the Applicant is acting in person, we shall consider whether the Document ought to be admitted as new evidence even in the absence of a formal application for leave to do so.  We do not consider the Document which the Applicant seeks to rely upon can have any material impact on the outcome of the appeal, in view of the Board’s finding that the Applicant could safely and reasonably relocated to a different part of Pakistan.  For this reason, we refuse to grant the Applicant leave to rely on the Document for the purpose of this appeal.

15.  The Applicant has failed to raise any viable ground of appeal against the Order.

16.  The Applicant’s appeal has no merits, and is dismissed.

[1] See Corrigendum dated 5 January 2026.

[2] This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115.

[3] This refers to the risk of being arbitrarily deprived of his life under Article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383.

[4] This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383.

[5] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.

[6] See 2^nd Corrigendum dated 13 February 2026.