SUINDRAWATI AND ANOTHER v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 6170 · HCAL 997/2026
Court of First Instance
HCAL 997/2026
[2026] HKCFI 6170
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 997 OF 2026
BETWEEN
| |Suindrawati |1st Applicant |
| |Sabir Ayzal Shahbaz (a minor) |2nd Applicant |
| |by Suindrawati, her next friend | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|Π|consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the applicants in |
| |open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. On this court’s own motion, the name of the 2nd applicant be amended
to “Sabir Ayzal Shahbaz (a minor) by Suindrawati, her next friend”.
2. The 1st applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
in respect of the Torture Claims Appeal Board’s decision dated 20 May
2026 be dismissed.
3. Leave granted to the 2nd applicant to apply for judicial review in
respect of the Torture Claims Appeal Board’s decision dated 20 May
2026.
4. The 2nd applicant is directed to issue an originating summons for the
intended judicial review on or before 18 November 2026 pursuant to
Order 53, rule 5(5) of the Rules of the High Court.
Observations for the applicants:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 1 June 2026,
the 1st and 2nd applicants applied for leave to
apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”)
in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims
Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 20 May 2026 (“the
Board’s Decision”). The Board’s Decision can be
viewed in the following hyperlink:-
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2026/HCAL00
0997_2026_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The 1st applicant is the mother of the 2nd
applicant, who was just an infant, about one year
old, when her case was heard by the Board on 15 May
2026. The 2nd applicant was not legally represented
before the Board, and was only represented by the
1st applicant.
3. The Board found that both the 1st and 2nd applicants
had not made out a case for non-refoulement
protection on any of the applicable grounds under
the Unified Screening Mechanism (“the USM”). Thus,
the Board dismissed the applicants’ appeal/petition
and confirmed the decision of the Director of
Immigration (“the Director”) dated 4 March 2026,
which rejected the applicants’ non-refoulement
claims.
Amendment
4. As aforesaid, the 2nd applicant is represented by
her mother, the 1st applicant, in the Leave
Application. Thus, the 2nd applicant’s name should
be stated as “Sabir Ayzal Shahbaz (a minor) by
Suindrawati, her next friend” in Form 86. The 2nd
applicant’s name is therefore amended accordingly on
this court’s own motion.
Legal representation of the 2nd applicant
5. The 2nd applicant is a minor born in Hong Kong on 16
May 2025 and is represented by the 1st applicant in
the Leave Application.
6. The 1st applicant applied for legal aid for the 2nd
applicant but her application was refused by the
Director of Legal Aid on 15 September 2026.
7. At the hearing before this court on 29 October 2026,
the 1st applicant confirmed that she would not
engage a private lawyer to represent the 2nd
applicant.
8. As the 2nd applicant was legally represented before
the Director and no new evidence would be advanced
in the Leave Application, this court considered that
the lack of legal representation for the 2nd
applicant in the Leave Application was a mere
irregularity and it would not prejudice the 2nd
applicant. Hence, this court waived the
irregularity and proceeded to deal with the Leave
Application.
The applicants’ case
9. It is not necessary for this court to repeat the
details of the applicants’ case here as the same
were set out in the Board’s Decision, which can be
viewed in the hyperlink above.
10. The 1st applicant is an Indonesian. She was
divorced in 2022 with her ex-husband, Agung Santoso
(“Santoso”). The 1st applicant married Sabir
Mohammad Shahbaz (“the Father”), an Indian non-
refoulement claimant, in Hong Kong in 2025 and gave
birth to the 2nd applicant. Thus, the 2nd applicant
is the legitimate child of the 1st applicant and the
Father.
11. The 1st applicant was to be returned to her home
state Indonesia if her claim for non-refoulement
protection failed; while the 2nd applicant, as a
child of an Indonesian mother and an Indian father,
could be returned to either Indonesia with the 1st
applicant or to India with the Father, if the Father
was to be returned to his home country.
12. The applicants claimed for non-refoulement
protection because if they were refouled to
Indonesia, both of them would be harmed or even
killed by Santoso and/or the debt collectors, who
were staff of a bank from which Santoso borrowed
money (the “Debt Collectors”) and demanded the 1st
applicant to repay the debt for Santoso.
13. The 1st applicant also claimed that if the 2nd
applicant was to be returned to India with the
Father, she would be harmed or even killed by the
Father’s business clients, namely Yadav, Lala and
Gupta.
14. Apart from the risks arising from the 1st
applicant’s and the Father’s circumstances, both the
1st applicant and the Father, who acted as a witness
for the applicants at the Board’s hearing, confirmed
to the Board that the 2nd applicant faced no other
risks.
Oral hearing
15. The applicants requested for an oral hearing of the
Leave Application and their case was heard on 29
October 2026.
16. When this court asked the applicants for their
grounds of the intended judicial review, the 1st
applicant told this court that she would not say the
Board’s Decision was wrong. She only requested to
be allowed to stay in Hong Kong as she was worried
for the safety of the 2nd applicant. The 1st
applicant said that her ex-husband planned to attack
the 2nd applicant.
17. The 1st applicant confirmed that the Father is also
a non-refoulement claimant in Hong Kong. Although
his own application for leave to apply for judicial
review[1] had been refused on 7 May 2024, he is
still in Hong Kong and living with the 1st and 2nd
applicants. The 1st applicant and the Father were
legally married in Hong Kong on 24 February 2025 and
the 2nd applicant was born after their marriage.
18. The 1st applicant said that if she were returned to
Indonesia, she would not bring the 2nd applicant
along and would give the 2nd applicant to the
Father, who would bring the 2nd applicant back to
India.
19. The 1st applicant indicated that she did not know
that the Father’s own application for leave to apply
for judicial review had been refused.
Grounds for judicial review
20. The applicants are required to identify clearly the
grounds for the intended judicial review (see Ho Loy
& Another v Director of Environmental Protection,
HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).
21. However, the 1st applicant did not advance any
ground for her own and the 2nd applicant’s case in
Form 86, nor in her supporting affirmation dated 1
June 2026.
22. As aforesaid, at the oral hearing before this court
on 29 October 2026, the 1st applicant did not
advance any grounds for judicial review for her own
case either. In fact, she admitted that there was
nothing wrong with the Board’s Decision.
23. In respect of the 2nd applicant, the 1st applicant
only asked that she and the 2nd applicant be allowed
to remain in Hong Kong as she was worried about the
safety of the 2nd applicant. The 1st applicant
claimed that her ex-husband planned to attack the
2nd applicant. However, this court notes that the
1st applicant confirmed with this court that if she
were returned to Indonesia, she would not bring the
2nd applicant along.
Discussion
24. This court will first deal with the 2nd applicant’s
Leave Application.
25. The 2nd applicant was an infant about one year old
when her case was heard by the Board on 15 May 2026.
She was not legally represented at the Board’s
hearing and was only represented by his mother, ie
the 1st applicant. Thus, with the lack of legal
representation, it was possible that the 2nd
applicant’s own case might not have been properly
presented to the Board for its consideration.
26. This court notes from the Board’s Decision that the
Board was fully aware of the principles for the
assessment of a minor’s case (see paragraph 10 of
the Board’s Decision). The Board was cognizant that
it should consider the 2nd applicant’s case with
reference to her specific circumstances instead of
merely considering the 1st applicant’s case in the
appeal/petition.
27. The 2nd applicant’s risks arising from the 1st
applicant’s situation if she were returned to
Indonesia, and her risks arising from the Father’s
circumstances if she were returned to India, had
been assessed by the Board.
28. However, the Board was fully aware of the fact that
the 2nd applicant is a child of mixed race.
Although the risks that the 2nd applicant might face
as a child of mixed race ethnicity was not brought
up by the 1st applicant and the Father when the 2nd
applicant’s case was assessed, the Board did not
separately consider the difficulties and/or
discrimination the 2nd applicant might face upon
refoulement as a child of mixed race.
29. As held in Re Shahul Hameed Beer Mohamed and Others,
08/04/2026, CACV 77/2024, [2026] HKCA 632 and Re
Bantigue Susan Banes and Another, 29/09/2025, CACV
234/2024, [2025] HKCA 853, the Board should have
considered the 2nd applicant’s unique situation as a
child of mixed race, which might be a cause for
discrimination. It is therefore arguable that the
Board had failed to give adequate consideration to
the 2nd applicant’s claim under the principles as
set out in the aforesaid cases.
30. Thus, it is this court’s view that the 2nd
applicant’s case for the intended judicial review is
arguable and leave should be granted to the 2nd
applicant to apply for judicial review in respect of
the Board’s Decision concerning her own case.
31. As to the 1st applicant’s case, her danger arising
from Santoso and the Debt Collectors had been duly
assessed but rejected by the Board. If the 1st
applicant intends to challenge the Board’s finding
of facts, it is not permissible in an application
for judicial review unless there were errors of law,
procedural unfairness or irrationality in the
Board’s Decision.
32. In assessing the appeal/petition by the 1st
applicant, the Board took into consideration all the
facts presented by her.
33. With regards to the 1st applicant’s fear of Santoso,
the Board found that even assuming that the 1st
applicant had been threatened by Santoso as she
failed to repay the loan for him, the evidence
adduced by the 1st applicant did not support her
claim that Santoso was minded to cause her serious
injury or even to kill her. Santoso only threatened
to kill her over phone since 2017 after she left
Indonesia and she had never seen him again since
2017. There was no evidence that Santoso had
attempted to locate her or to find her either. The
Board found that Santoso had no real intention to
track her down and cause her serious injury.
34. The Board found that apart from the 1st applicant’s
bare assertion that Santoso had made such threats to
her, the 1st applicant was not able to adduce any
corroborative evidence in support of her claim that
Santoso was indeed minded to kill her.
35. As to the 1st applicant’s fear of the Debt
Collectors, the Board also found no evidence that
the Debt Collectors were minded to cause her serious
harm or even to kill her. Although the 1st
applicant had met them in about April/May 2016
before she left Indonesia to work in Hong Kong, the
Debt Collectors had never inflicted any harm on her
on any of those occasions. Although the 1st
applicant said that the Debt Collectors still
attended her place every two weeks to demand
repayment and asked about the whereabouts of
Santoso, they never harmed any of the 1st
applicant’s family members. The Board considered it
clear that the Debt Collectors were not minded to
inflict any serious harms on her family members so
as to pressurize the 1st applicant.
36. Moreover, the Board found that the 1st applicant
could safely relocate within Indonesia or even
relocate to India with the Father to further lower
or negate the perceived risk she faced. The Board
had given full and justified reasons for such
finding in paragraphs 158 to 168 of the Board’s
Decision, and it is not necessary to repeat the same
here. The 1st applicant in fact admitted to the
Board that there would be no problem for her to move
to India with the Father (see paragraph 106 of the
Board’s Decision).
37. Thus, the Board was satisfied that the 1st applicant
had failed to establish a case for non-refoulement
protection on any of the applicable grounds under
the USM.
38. This court finds no flaw in the Board’s finding that
the 1st applicant was not at risk of any of the
proscribed forms of harm under the USM.
39. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan
v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court
to grant leave to apply for judicial review, the
claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which
enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the
view of this court that the 1st applicant has failed
to establish such a claim in respect of her own case
and hence leave must be refused regarding her own
application.
Conclusion
40. For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application in
respect of the 1st applicant’s application in
respect of the Board’s Decision is dismissed. Leave
is granted to the 2nd applicant to apply for
judicial review in respect of the Board’s Decision.
41. The 2nd applicant is directed to issue an
originating summons for the intended judicial review
on or before 18 November 2026 pursuant to Order 53,
rule 5(5) of the Rules of the High Court.
Dated the 4th day of November 2026
| |( Gladys LEE ) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the applicant| | |
|or his solicitors | | |
|must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent/Handed to the |Sent/Handed to the |
|respondent and such |applicants/the |putative respondent / |
|interested parties as |applicants’ |the putative |
|may be directed by the|solicitors |respondent’s solicitors |
|Court the order |on: 04/11/2026 |/ such putative |
|granting leave and any| |interested parties as |
|directions given | |may be directed by the |
|within 14 days after |Applicants’ ref. no: |Court / the putative |
|the leave was granted | |interested parties’ |
|(Order 53, rule 4A); | |solicitors on: |
| | |04/11/2026 |
|b) issue the | | |
|originating summons | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|within 14 days after | |Board/ Non-refoulement |
|the grant of leave and| |Claims Petition Office |
|serve it in accordance| |Putative respondent’s |
|with Order 53, rule 5;| |ref. no.: |
|and | |USM 28281-28282 |
| | | |
|c) supply to every | | |
|other party copies of | |Director of Immigration |
|every affidavit which | |Putative interested |
|the Applicant proposes| |party’s ref. no.: |
|to use at the hearing,| |QA T/C 2152/25 (formerly|
|including the | |RBCZ 5000343/25) & |
|affidavit in support | |QA T/C 2153/25 (formerly|
|of the application for| |RBCZ 5002023/25) |
|leave (Order 53, rule | | |
|6(5)). | | |
| | |Department of Justice, |
| | |Senior Assistant Law |
| | |Officer |
| | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
Form CALL-1
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[1] HCAL 1447/2019