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CACV 636/2026, [2026] HKCA 1487
On appeal from [2026] HKCFI 3117
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF APPEAL
CIVIL APPEAL NO 636 OF 2026
(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 518/2022)
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| RE: |
IMRAN HUSSAIN |
Applicant |
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| Before: |
Hon Barma JA and Leung J in Court |
| Date of Hearing: |
6 August 2026 |
| Date of Judgment: |
27 August 2026 |
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J U D G M E N T
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Hon Barma JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):
1. This is an appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court
Judge Bruno Chan (“the Judge”) given on 2 June 2026[1] (“the Leave Decision”) refusing to grant leave for the applicant to apply for judicial
review. The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/adjudicator of
the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 1 June 2022 (“the Board’s Decision”) dismissing
the applicant’s appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 8 September 2021 rejecting the
applicant’s non‑refoulement claim.
2. The applicant’s background, the basis of his claim and the
Board’s reasons in reaching the Board’s Decision have been set out therein[2] as well as by the Judge in the Leave Decision at [2]-[5] and [9], which will
not be repeated.
3. After considering the documents filed by the applicant as
well as the oral submissions he made at the hearing of the leave application, the Judge dismissed the
application for the reasons stated at [11]-[15] of the Leave Decision.
Appeal to this court
4. In a Notice of Appeal dated 15 June 2026, the applicant
stated that “the decisions are unlawful” and that they failed to take into account “many things and
issues”. He emphasised that his life would be in danger should he be refouled.
5. In his written submissions dated 20 July 2026, the applicant repeated the factual background to his claim and, insofar as
is relevant to the Board’s Decision, complained that the Board failed to “make sufficient enquiring before
finalising the determination” and that as a torture-claimant he had “limited options at his disposal” to procure
the evidence required by the Board.
6. We heard the appeal on 6 August 2026, at which the applicant
appeared in person. At the hearing, the applicant had nothing further to add to the matters and
submissions already set out in the documents lodged with the court.
Discussion
7. As this court has often stated, an appeal to the Court of
Appeal is not a fresh application for judicial review. It is necessary to identify some error on the part
of the judge that would justify this court in intervening: see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14]. The court will not intervene by way of judicial review
unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board. An
appeal is not the occasion for regurgitating arguments advanced and rejected by the judge or for running
arguments which could and should have been raised but were not raised before the judge. In the
determination of an appeal, the Court of Appeal focuses on the decision of the judge and the court will only
reverse that decision if an appellant could demonstrate that the judge made errors of law or failed to take
account of relevant matters already placed before the court or was otherwise plainly wrong.
8. The applicant has failed to identify any error on the part of
the Judge and thus failed to raise any viable ground of appeal. The points advanced by the applicant were bare
assertions unsupported by particulars or evidence.
9. In the present case, the Board found that there were
inconsistencies in material parts of the applicant’s evidence which fatally undermined his claimed fear or risk
of harm. There was no evidence in support of his fear of harm by Sunni Muslims, who, as the Board found,
had no intention to seriously harm or kill the applicant. In any event, the Board took the view that
suitable options of internal relocation and adequate state protection were available to the applicant in order
to minimise the risk of harm, if any. These were factual findings open to the Board on the evidence, and
were sufficiently canvassed and considered by the Judge in the Leave Decision at [9]-[15]. We see no basis
to interfere.
10. The applicant has accordingly failed to demonstrate how
the Board had acted unlawfully or procedurally unfairly in reaching its Decision, or how such Decision could be
said to be Wednesbury unreasonable.
11. As we have noted, the applicant advanced no viable grounds
of appeal against the Judge’s decision. There is therefore no merit in the appeal and we dismiss the
appeal accordingly.
(AARIF BARMA) Justice of Appeal |
(SIMON LEUNG) Judge of the Court of
First Instance |
The applicant, unrepresented, appearing in person
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