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HCAL 933/2021
[2026] HKCFI 1417
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 933 of 2021
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BETWEEN
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Ali Saqib |
Applicant |
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and |
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Torture Claims Appeal Board / |
Putative |
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Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office |
Respondent |
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and |
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Director of Immigration |
Putative |
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Interested Party |
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)
Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Levy:
The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.
Observations for the Applicant:
Introduction
1. By a “Notice of application for leave to apply for judicial review” in the prescribed Form 86 filed on 2 July 2021, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“Leave Application”). The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“Board”) dated 22 April 2021 (“Board’s Decision”) dismissing the applicant's appeal against the decisions of the Director of Immigration (“Director”) dated 11 October 2018 (“Director’s Decision”) rejecting the applicant's non-refoulement claim on all applicable grounds[1]. The Board’s Decision can be viewed at the following hyperlink: -
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2021/HCAL000933_2021_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The basis of the applicant’s claim was that, if refouled to Pakistan, he would be harmed or killed by the family of her lover as they were from two different castes. The Board’s reasoning and findings were set out in detail in the Board’s Decision and it is not necessary for me to repeat them. Unless otherwise specified, I shall also adopt the Board’s abbreviations and descriptions stated in the Board’s Decision.
3. At the applicant’s request for a hearing of the Leave Application, this court scheduled a hearing on 26 February 2026. The applicant attended the hearing in person. After having heard from him, this court informed him that the decision would be reserved, and be sent to his updated address.
Discussion
4. The Leave Application operates as a ‘filtering’ process and there is no requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my decision.[2] It is sufficient to state my observations after considering the Board’s Decision and the applicant’s materials adduced.
5. In a proper Form 86, an applicant is required to identify the grounds of judicial review clearly and succinctly[3], and further to make full and frank disclosure of all material facts to be verified by an affidavit. The Form 86 and the supporting affirmation provided no such grounds.
6. At the hearing, the applicant stated that the documents relating to his case had been destroyed and he would require more time to find new documents. When the court clarified from him if he wanted to seek an adjournment to enable him to do so, he said he did not need an adjournment. He only wanted to let the court know that he in fact had proof of his claims. When the court asked him if he wanted to advance any grounds to support the Leave Application, he said he had nothing to say despite having been reminded that he had provided no written grounds at all.
7. As the Courts have repeatedly stated, a finding of fact is exclusively within the realm of the Board, which a court in a judicial review will not interfere with unless such finding involved an error of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality.[4] In the present case, while the Board accepted the general story line of the applicant, it however found that there were a significant number of discrepancies, which suggested that the applicant was not truthful. The Board did not find that he had proved that he had a relationship with Nayab and was assaulted and threatened by her family. The Board therefore rejected the centerpiece of the applicant’s case. The Board found that there was no foundation on which to find that the ill-treatment the applicant would face if refouled would attain a minimum level of severity. The Board found that the applicant would not face any risk of harm if refouled. It further found that state protection and internal relocation were reasonably viable. These are findings of fact, which the court in a judicial review will not interfere with, subject to there being any public law errors.
8. Bearing in mind the enhanced standard that should be adopted in scrutinizing the Board’s Decision, this court is satisfied that the Board correctly applied the law relating to all the grounds and observed a high standard of fairness. The applicant provided no grounds at all, whether written or oral, to support the Leave Application. The applicant has not shown any errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The applicant’s intended challenge to the Board’s Decision is not reasonably arguable with realistic prospects of success such that would enable this court to grant leave[5].
Order
9. The application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.
Dated the 19th day of March 2026
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(Alfred Chan)
for Registrar, High Court
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Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Notes for the Applicant:
If leave has been granted, the Applicant or the Applicant’s solicitors must:
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a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);
b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and
c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).
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Sent to the Applicant
on 19/3/2026
Ali Saqib
Applicant’s ref. no:
Nil. |
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Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 19/3/2026
Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Putative Respondent’s ref. no.:
USM 14038/18/10/380/P2786
Director of Immigration
Putative Interested Party’s ref. no.: QA T/C 3803/18 (Formerly RBCZ 10838/16) (PSO)
Department of Justice,
Senior Assistant Law Officer
(Civil Law)
(Civil Litigation Unit 2) |
Form CALL-1
[1] The applicable grounds are risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance (“torture risk”) , BOR 2 risk (this refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under Art. 2 of s.8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (“HKBOR”), BOR 3 risk (this refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Art 3 of HKBOR) and persecution risk (This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Art. 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol) under the USM (This refers to the Hong Kong Government’s Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”) implemented since 3 March 2014 to process claims for non-refoulement protection. For a detailed description of the USM, see the judgment of Zervos J in HKSAR v Vu Thang Duong & Anor [2015] 3 HKC 293.
[2] Re Zunartyah [2018] HKCA 14 at [23].
[3] Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21/2015, 22 December 2016 at [142].
[4] Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328; Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524.
[5] Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676
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