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HCAL 342/2026
[2026] HKCFI 2068
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 342 of 2026
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BETWEEN
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Fauziah |
Applicant |
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and |
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Torture Claims Appeal Board/ |
Putative |
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Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office |
Respondent |
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and |
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Director of Immigration |
Putative |
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Interested Party |
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)
Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Leave to apply for Judicial Review be dismissed.
Observations for the Applicant:
THE APPLICATION
1. The applicant applies for leave to apply for judicial review of the Decision dated 27 October 2025 of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board’s Decision”). Her application is late. Her application shall not be later than 3 months from the date of the Board’s Decision[1], which expired on 27 January 2026. Her application was filed on 6 February 2026, which is late for 10 days. This issue will be dealt with below.
2. The applicant did not request an oral hearing.
The applicant
3. The applicant is a national of Indonesia. She is an illegal immigrant. She lodged a non-refoulement claim with the Immigration Department on the basis that, if refouled, she will be harmed or killed by her half-brother over a land dispute. Her half-brother wanted to sell the family house and she refused to sign the transfer deed. Details of her story are set out in the Board’s Decision. See hyperlink https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2026/HCAL000342_2026_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf.
The Director’s Decision
4. The Director considered the applicant’s claim in relation to the following risks:
a. risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115, (“the Ordinance”) (“Torture risk”);
b. risk of violation of the right to life under Article 2 of Section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (“HKBOR”) (“BOR 2 risk”);
c. risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (“CIDTP”) under Article 3 of Section 8 of the HKBOR (“BOR 3 risk”); and
d. risk of persecution by reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol (“Refugee Convention”) (“Persecution risk”).
5. By way of Notice of Decision dated 1 August 2025 (“the Director’s Decision”), the Director dismissed the applicant’s claim on all applicable risks because it was unsubstantiated.
The Board’s Decision
6. The applicant appealed the Director’s Decision to the Board. On 6 October 2025, the Board conducted an oral hearing. The applicant had given oral evidence and answered the Board’s questions.
7. Having considered the applicant’s evidence, the Board made the findings below.
(1) The Board was not convinced that the applicant will be exposed to torture if she returns to Indonesia. [48] & [53]
(2) There was no evidence that the state was involved. [52]
(3) Her claim for non-refoulement was about one-year late. [57]
(4) The Persecution risk is extremely low if she returns to Indonesia. [54]-[58]
(5) BOR 2 risk is simply not engaged. [69]
(6) State protection will be available to her. [63]
(7) Internal relocation is viable. [77]
8. For the above reasons, the Board dismissed the applicant’s appeal and confirmed the Director’s decision.
Application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision
9. The applicant filed Form 86 on 6 February 2026 for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision.
10. In support of her application, the applicant said that she refused to sign the land document because if the family house is sold, they will have no place to live. She refused to marry the man the family chose for her because she did not love him. She loved women. A lesbian is strongly opposed in Indonesia.
DISCUSSION
11. As mentioned in paragraph 1, this application is late. In AW v Director of Immigration and William Lam CACV 63 of 2015, 3 November 2015, §27 the Court of Appeal held that for extension of time for making the application for leave to apply for judicial review, the Court has to consider, inter alia, the prospect of the intended appeal. I shall consider the merits of the applicant’s case.
12. The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Board complied with the public law requirements in coming to the Board’s Decision on the applicant’s appeal. The Court will not usurp the fact-finding power vested in the Director and the Board. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, §14 (1).
13. The Court will bear in mind that the Board’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny.
14. In Re: Kartini [2019] HKCA 1022, 9 September 2019, the Court of Appeal held:
“13. (1) … …Assessment of evidence and COI materials and risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board (and the Director). The court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board.”
15. The reasons raised in paragraph 10 are not valid to challenge the Board’s Decision because the Board had found that she may have state protection in Indonesia and internal relocation is also viable. The issue of her being a lesbian was not raised for the Board’s consideration. She is not allowed to rely on this ground before this Court for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision.
16. The applicant therefore fails to show that she has any realistic prospect of success in her proposed judicial review of the Board’s Decision.
DISPOSITION
17. I refuse to extend time for the applicant to apply for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision. Accordingly, I dismiss her application.
Dated the 21st day of April 2026
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(Joyce Ooi)
for Registrar, High Court
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Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Notes for the Applicant:
If leave has been granted, the Applicant or the Applicant’s solicitors must:
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a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);
b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and
c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).
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Sent to the Applicant
on 21/04/2026
Fauziah
Applicant’s ref. no:
Nil. |
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Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 21/04/2026
Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Putative Respondent’s ref. no.: USM 26938
Director of Immigration
Putative Interested Party’s ref. no.: INCL-32732-2025
Department of Justice,
Senior Assistant Law Officer
(Civil Law)
(Civil Litigation Unit 2) |
Form CALL-1
[1] Delay in applying for relief (O. 53, r. 4)
(1) An application for leave to apply for judicial review shall be made promptly and in any event within three months from the date when grounds for the application first arose unless the Court considers that there is good reason for extending the period within which the application shall be made. (L.N. 356 of 1988)
(2) Where the relief sought is an order of certiorari in respect of any judgment, order, conviction or other proceeding, the date when grounds for the application first arose shall be taken to be the date of that judgment, order, conviction or proceeding.
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