JOYEL RAJAN v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION

HCAL 1571/2025

[2026] HKCFI 2471

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1571 OF 2025

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D E C I S I O N

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A.  Introduction

1.  By my Decision dated 2 March 2026, [2026] HKCFI 1179, I dismissed the Applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review so as to challenge the Deportation Order issued against him on 19 March 2025 under section 20(1)(a) of the Immigration Ordinance Cap 115 (“Ordinance”).

2.  The full reasons for the dismissal are set out in the Decision and will not be rehearsed here. I shall again adopt the definitions and abbreviations used by me in the Decision.

3.  The Applicant is dissatisfied with the Decision, and wishes to appeal against it. It seems that on 16 March 2026 the Court of Appeal received documents sent by the Applicant, including his Notice of Appeal together with other supporting documents. The Notice of Appeal suggested that this Court had given leave to appeal on 2 March 2026 (which was obviously incorrect). In any event, the documents were returned to him by the Court of Appeal Registry under cover of a letter dated 20 March 2026 as they were lodged inappropriately, and the Applicant was informed that he might seek legal advice if necessary.

4.  In an affirmation dated 15 April 2026, the Applicant stated as follows:

1.  I am the Applicant in this matter and I make this affirmation in support of my summons for an extension of time to file and serve a Notice of Appeal against the decision of the Honourable Mr Justice Coleman dated 2 March 2026.

2.  I attempted to file the Notice of Appeal on 16 March 2026 by post. However, the documents were returned by the Registry as they were not properly lodged (not filed in person). As I was outside Hong Kong, I was unaware of the specific procedural requirements.

3.  Furthermore, my spouse is suffering from a serious medical condition (Chronic Hepatitis B). The urgency of her medical care and the potential risk of progression to liver cirrhosis or cancer have caused me extreme emotional distress and difficulty in managing legal procedures.

4.  The delay in filing was not intentional, and I respectfully request this Honourable Court to grant an extension of time.

5.  I believe that my appeal has merit and should be considered by the Court.

5.  Attached to the affirmation are documents including the (draft) Notice of Appeal, which identifies that the Applicant seeks (1) an order to set aside my Decision, (2) leave to apply for judicial review to be granted, (3) the lifetime Deportation Order be quashed or its execution stayed, and (4) that the Applicant be permitted to return to Hong Kong to serve as the primary caregiver for his critically ill HKPR spouse. The stated grounds of appeal are set out as follows:

Failure of Anxious Scrutiny: the lower court erred by failing to conduct a rigourous “Anxious Scrutiny” of objective medical evidence (HBsAg $>2500$ IU/mL) proving a life-threatening risk to a Hong Kong Permanent Resident Spouse.

Breach of Article 37 (Basic Law): The lifetime deportation order constitutes an unconstitutional interference with the resident spouse’s right to “raise a family freely” in her home territory.

Irrationality & Proportionality: A lifetime ban is manifestly disproportionate for a non-violent, 10-month regulatory conviction, failing the fair balance test required under QT v Director of Immigration.

Procedural Unfairness: The court failed to address the breach of Natural Justice caused by the denial of a Malayalam interpreter to a detainee with limited English proficiency (documented C+ grade).

6.  I am satisfied that it is appropriate to deal with this application on the papers. This is my decision.

B.  Applicable Principles

7.  In order to decide whether or not to grant an extension of time for an application for leave to appeal or for an appeal, it is settled that the Court will take into account the circumstances including (1) the length of the delay, (2) the explanation for the delay, (3) the merits of the intended appeal, and (4) issues of prejudice which might be caused by the grant or refusal of the extension of time.

C.  This Case

8.  I accept that the delay in this case is not very significant. The Decision from which the intended appeal arises was made on 2 March 2026, and the period for appeal expired on 16 March 2026. The present application was made a month or so later on 15 April 2026. Though the delay is almost double the period allowed for the appeal, the Applicant had in fact sought to take the steps for an appeal on 16 March 2026. Therefore, I accept that the delay in filing was not intentional. Unfortunately, perhaps in part (as he says) because the Applicant acts in person and from overseas, the documents were lodged inappropriately and returned by the Court of Appeal Registry. In the overall circumstances, I would not refuse the extension of time on the basis that there was excessive or insufficiently explained delay.

9.  However, I do not accept that the proposed appeal has any real merit. Indeed, the apparently intended grounds of appeal are largely based upon a misconception or misunderstandings.

10.  The intended judicial review challenge dismissed by my Decision was the intended challenge to the making of the Deportation Order. It was made on the basis that: (1) it was issued despite the fact that he was not sentenced to a period of imprisonment exceeding two years, which is the statutory threshold for such action; (2) he was not given a chance to explain his marriage or family situation, and his right to family life was violated; (3) he was not provided with a Malayalam interpreter and he was forced to sign documents without understanding them; and perhaps (4) he was coerced into agreeing to be removed from Hong Kong.

11.  As I pointed out in my Decision, the offence for which the Applicant was convicted was sufficient to trigger the possible exercise of the power to make the Deportation Order, and there was no reasonably arguable unlawfulness in making it. Further, the relevant judicial scrutiny was as to the decision-making process, not to the underlying merits of the decision to make the Deportation Order, which was a matter for the Director and/or Secretary.

12.  Secondly, it is not reasonably arguable that the making of the Deportation Order – in the form of order which is usually for life – is a breach of Article 37 of the Basic Law.

13.  Thirdly, it is also not reasonably arguable that the Deportation Order for life – again in its standard form – was irrational or disproportionate in the public law sense. As I pointed out in the Decision, (1) it is trite that there is no policy of family union or reunion applicable to immigration, removal/deportation or security matters in Hong Kong, and (2) where the Secretary did in fact take the representations as to humanitarian and compassionate factors or circumstances into account, the weight to be given to those factors was a matter for the Secretary and/or Director. I remain of the view that there is no reasonably arguable irrationality in the making of the Deportation Order.

14.  As to the claimed procedural unfairness in the alleged denial of a Mayalam interpreter, I pointed out in my Decision that it was plainly reasonably open to the Director and the Secretary to proceed on the basis that the Applicant was well able to communicate in and understand documents in the English language, for the numerous reasons which I set out. I again note that the materials filed on this application – including a notarised affirmation, and lengthy intended appeal submissions – are in at least very competent English, with no identification that they have been the product of any necessary interpretation for the benefit of the Applicant.

15.  Further, insofar as the Applicant wishes to adduce fresh evidence, essentially seeking to update medical records, I respectfully do not think that identifies any merit in the intended appeal from my Decision.

16.  I do not need to consider matters of prejudice.

D.  Conclusion

17.  In the circumstances, where there ultimately seems to be no merit in the intended appeal, there is no purpose in granting an extension of time for an appeal to be pursued.

18.  The Applicant’s application is dismissed, with no order as to costs.