SAFITRI KURNIA SARI v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD

HCAL 1324/2025

[2026] HKCFI 2814

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 1324 OF 2025

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BETWEEN

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D E C I S I O N

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Background

1.  By way of summons filed on 2 March 2026 (“the Summons”), the applicant applies for an extension of time to appeal against my order made on 14 January 2026, which dismissed the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board dated 27 March 2025.

2.  Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, stipulates that “Where an application for leave is refused by a judge …, the applicant may appeal against the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days after such order”.

3.  In Re Li Jing [2015] 2 HKLRD 933, it was held that the time for lodging an appeal against the refusal of granting leave to apply for judicial review started to run from the date of the making of the order, not from the date when the sealed order was issued, nor from the date when the sealed order was mailed, and no account should be taken of the fact that the applicant received the sealed order late (see also Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226).

4.  As my order was made on 14 January 2026, the last day for the applicant to lodge an appeal was on 28 January 2026. Thus, the time for appealing against my order has expired, and the applicant requires leave from this court to appeal out of time.

The applicable law

5.  In considering whether to extend time for appealing a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the court will take into account: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted (see Jagg Singh v Torture Claims Appeal Board and another [2020] HKCA 844).

6.  However, the crucial consideration in such an application is whether the applicant can show that there is a reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur, supra), and the court will not grant extension for a hopeless appeal to be pursued (see Re Adumekwe Rowland Ejike [2019] HKCA 702).

Discussion

7.  In the Summons, the applicant stated that she failed to submit her application because she could not arrange money.

8.  At the hearing of the Summons on 7 May 2026, when I asked the applicant why she would have the money to pay for the Summons and not the money to pay for the appeal, the applicant gave two explanations. The first one was that she did not receive the letter to do the appeal, nor the court’s decision. When I pointed out to her that she in fact stated in the Summons that she got the High Court Judgment on 14 January 2026, she then admitted that she did receive the court’s decision but not the letter to do the appeal.

9.  The second explanation was that she obtained the money to pay for the Summons from her girlfriend but her girlfriend had the money only when she received her salary on the 27^th day of each month.

10.  Both explanations were unsatisfactory. There was no such letter to inform her to do the appeal. If she did receive the court’s decision on 14 January 2026, it was for her to take initiative to lodge the appeal within time. Ignorance of the court’s procedures is generally not an excuse. If her girlfriend would receive her salary on the 27^th day of each month, she should have the money on 27 January 2026. The last day for the applicant to lodge the appeal was on 28 January 2026. Hence, there was still one day left for the applicant to lodge the appeal.

11.  The applicant did not give any ground for her intended appeal in the Summons, nor in her supporting affirmation dated 2 March 2026. What she stated in her affirmation were simply that she did not want to go back to Indonesia because her brother would kill her as she was a lesbian, and her loan sharks would also kill her as she could not pay the debt. In fact, the allegations concerning the loan sharks were not raised to the Torture Claims Appeal Board. In any event, these allegations are not grounds for appeal at all.

12.  When the applicant was asked for her grounds of appeal at the hearing of the Summons, she merely said that she did not want to go back home as she had received violence from her brother and she had borrowed money from loan sharks.

13.  Thus, the applicant did not provide any valid ground of appeal at the hearing of the Summons either.

14.  For this application to be successful, the applicant must demonstrate that this court had made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant matters already placed before this court or was otherwise plainly wrong (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).

15.  The applicant failed to demonstrate any of the above. Hence, there is simply no valid ground for the intended appeal or the intended judicial review.

16.  In the circumstances, there is no proper excuse for the applicant’s delay in lodging the appeal and there is no reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review. I am not prepared to grant any extension of time for the applicant to pursue such a hopeless appeal.

Conclusion

17.  For reasons aforesaid, the Summons is dismissed.