Case Details
For Applicant(s):
The Mother applied for legal aid
Listing:
RUBEL RAIF ALTHAF HASAN (a minor) by Wiwin-Winarsih, his next friend v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
RUBEL RAIF ALTHAF HASAN (a minor) by Wiwin-Winarsih, his next friend v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5280 · HCAL 389/2026
Court of First Instance
HCAL 389/2026
[2026] HKCFI 5280
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 389 OF 2026
BETWEEN
| |Rubel Raif Althaf Hasan (a minor) |Applicant |
| |by Wiwin-Winarsih, his next friend | |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|Π|consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the applicant in |
| |open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. On this court’s own motion, “Wiwin-Winarsih” be deleted as the 1st
applicant, the 2nd applicant be changed to be the sole applicant
and his name be amended to “Rubel Raif Althaf Hasan (a minor) by
Wiwin-Winarsih, his next friend”, and the name of the putative
interested party be amended to “Director of Immigration”.
2. The time for the applicant to apply for leave to apply for judicial
review in respect of the Torture Claims Appeal Board’s decision
dated 15 October 2025 be extended to 12 February 2026.
3. Leave granted to the applicant to apply for judicial review in
respect of the Torture Claims Appeal Board’s decision dated 15
October 2025.
4. The applicant is directed to issue an originating summons for the
intended judicial review on or before 30 September 2026 pursuant to
Order 53, rule 5(5) of the Rules of the High Court.
Observations for the applicant:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 12 February 2026, Wiwin-Winarsih
and Rubel Raif Althaf Hasan applied for leave to apply for judicial
review (“the Leave Application”) in respect of the decision of the
Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 15 October 2025 (“the
Board’s Decision”).
2. Wiwin-Winarsih (“the Mother”) is the mother of Rubel Raif Althaf
Hasan, who is a minor. In Form 86, the Mother named both herself and
Rubel Raif Althaf Hasan as the applicants. The Mother, however, filed
her own application for leave to apply for judicial review on 20
November 2024 in HCAL 2200/2024, and hence she should not be an
applicant in the Leave Application.
3. The Mother also confirmed at the hearing before this court on 3
September 2026 that the Leave Application concerns only her son Rubel
Raif Althaf Hasan but not herself.
4. Moreover, the Board’s Decision concerns only Rubel Raif Althaf Hasan’s
appeal/petition against the decision of the Director of Immigration
(“the Director”) dated 22 May 2025 (“the Director’s Decision”). Thus,
Rubel Raif Althaf Hasan should be the sole applicant in the Leave
Application.
5. The Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2026/HCAL00
0389_2026_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
6. The Board found that Rubel Raif Althaf Hasan’s claim for non-
refoulement protection in Hong Kong failed on all the applicable
grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“the USM”). Hence, the
Board confirmed the Director’s Decision, which rejected Rubel Raif
Althaf Hasan’s claim for non-refoulement protection.
Amendments
7. As aforesaid, Rubel Raif Althaf Hasan should be the sole applicant in
the Leave Application. His name should be stated in Form 86 as “Rubel
Raif Althaf Hasan (a minor) by Wiwin-Winarsih, his next friend”.
8. Thus, on this court’s own motion, “Wiwin-Winarsih” is deleted as the
1st applicant, the 2nd applicant is changed to be the sole applicant
and his name is amended to “Rubel Raif Althaf Hasan (a minor) by Wiwin-
Winarsih, his next friend”.
9. In Form 86, the applicant named the Board as both the putative
respondent and the putative interested party, when the Board should
only be named as the putative respondent, and the Director should be
named as the putative interested party.
10. Thus, on this court’s own motion, the name of the putative interested
party is amended to “Director of Immigration”.
Late application
11. By virtue of Order 53, rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap
4A, the applicant had to make the Leave Application within 3 months
when the grounds for the Leave Application first arose, ie when the
Board’s Decision was made.
12. However, the applicant filed Form 86 on 12 February 2026, which was 3
months and 28 days after the Board’s Decision (made on 15 October
2025). The applicant was hence late for 28 days in making the Leave
Application, and this court has to consider whether there is any good
reason to extend the time for the applicant to make the Leave
Application.
13. As held in AW v Director of Immigration [2016] 2 HKC 393, the criteria
for granting an extension of time are:
(i) the length of the delay;
(ii) the reason for the delay;
(iii) the merits of the intended application; and
(iv) any prejudice to the putative respondent and to public
administration.
14. The Mother did not make an application for extension of time when she
filed the Leave Application for the applicant.
15. At the oral hearing before this court on 3 September 2026, the Mother
explained the delay by saying that she only received the Board’s
Decision in February 2026. However, she confirmed that the Board’s
Decision was received by post. The Mother’s explanation as to why she
did not receive the Board’s Decision in October 2025, when it was made
and posted to her address, was that the post was lost in October 2025.
16. The Mother’s explanation for the delay is not satisfactory. The fact
that she received the Board’s Decision by post means that the address
used for sending the Board’s Decision was correct, and there is simply
no reason why she did not receive the Board’s Decision in October
2025. However, as discussed below, this court finds that the
applicant’s case does have merits and is therefore arguable. In view
of the high standards of fairness required in the handling of cases
concerning non-refoulement claimants, this court will not take issue
on the delay of less than one month. Extension of time is therefore
granted for the applicant to file the Leave Application on 12 February
2026.
Legal representation of the applicant
17. The applicant is a minor born on 6 May 2024 in Hong Kong out of
wedlock to a Bangladeshi father and is represented by the Mother in
the Leave Application.
18. The Mother applied for legal aid for the applicant but her application
was refused by the Director of Legal Aid on 28 July 2026.
19. At the hearing before this court on 3 September 2026, the Mother
confirmed that she would not engage a private lawyer to represent the
applicant.
20. As the applicant was legally represented before the Director and the
Board, and no new evidence would be advanced in the Leave Application,
this court considered that the lack of legal representation in the
Leave Application was a mere irregularity and it would not prejudice
the applicant. Hence, this court waived the irregularity and
proceeded to deal with the Leave Application.
The applicant’s case
21. It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the
applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s
Decision, which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.
22. In sum, the applicant’s claim for non-refoulement protection was based
on the Mother’s risk upon return to Indonesia. The applicant claimed
that he would be harmed and killed by the Mother’s creditor JAJO due
to the Mother’s inability to continue to repay a loan. The applicant
also claimed that he would be killed by his maternal grandfather (“the
Grandfather”) because he was born out of wedlock.
23. As to the child-specific risks faced by the applicant, the Mother
claimed that she feared JAJO might hold hostage, kidnap and subject
the applicant to child trafficking or other forms of exploitation, or
even kill the applicant as a means to demand loan repayment. The
Mother also firmly believed that the Grandfather would carry out his
threats against and even kill the applicant and herself.
24. Since the Mother was still legally married to her husband ASLANI in
Indonesia, her giving birth to the applicant was out of wedlock, and
the applicant himself would be a big insult to ASLANI. The Mother
believed that ASLANI would be very furious and would kill both the
applicant and herself if they returned to Indonesia.
25. Further, the Mother was also worried about obtaining documentation,
such as a birth certificate or household registration for the
applicant, without which it could severely limit the applicant’s
access to education, healthcare, and other social welfare services.
The Mother also feared that the applicant would face discrimination in
Indonesia due to religious factor. Since the applicant was born out
of wedlock, it was likely that Indonesian society would not accept
him, and he might face bullying, harassment, or even hate crimes at
school or in other social settings. It was also possible that the
applicant would be discriminated because he was of mixed race.
Therefore, the health and growth of the applicant would be adversely
affected under such circumstances.
26. The applicant also produced several pieces of medical records relating
to the treatments he received in Hong Kong for consideration by the
Board.
Oral hearing
27. The Mother’s own application for leave to apply for judicial review
(HCAL 2200/2024) was heard together with the Leave Application on 3
September 2026. When this court asked the Mother for the applicant’s
grounds of the intended judicial review, the Mother said that the
applicant was born out of wedlock in Hong Kong with a Bangladeshi
father who was also a non-refoulement claimant. The Mother claimed
that the applicant would face dangers and racism if he were refouled
to Indonesia due to his mixed race ethnicity.
28. The Mother also said that the applicant would not go back to
Bangladesh with his father, and she was not sure if the applicant’s
father could take the applicant with him.
Grounds for judicial review
29. The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the
intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of
Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).
30. The Mother and the applicant did not advance any grounds for the
intended judicial review in Form 86, nor in the Mother’s supporting
affirmation dated 12 February 2026.
31. As aforementioned, at the oral hearing before this court, the Mother
claimed that the applicant who was born out of wedlock would face
dangers and racism if he were refouled to Indonesia due to his mixed
race ethnicity.
Discussion
32. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-
refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for
non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the
evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters
allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm,
availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation.
The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way
of judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness, or
irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA
524).
33. Thus, although this court will not re-assess the applicant’s non-
refoulement claim, this court will scrutinize the Board’s Decision for
any errors of law, procedural unfairness, or irrationality as
aforesaid.
34. From what the Mother said at the oral hearing, it seems that she was
challenging the Board’s assessment of the applicant’s risk mainly due
to his mixed race ethnicity.
35. As can be seen from the Board’s Decision, the Board was fully aware of
the Mother’s worries and claims which were specific to the applicant
including that he was a child of mixed race (see paragraph 14(xvi) of
the Board’s Decision).
36. Although the Board had evaluated the applicant’s risk against all his
enemies arising from the Mother’s case, including the threat from the
Mother’s husband ASLANI, the Mother’s creditor JAJO, and the threat
from the Grandfather, it seems to this court that the Board did not
sufficiently deal with the applicant’s child-specific risks,
especially his risk as a mixed race child.
37. This court observed that in paragraph 43 of the Board’s Decision, the
Board had assessed the applicant’s child-specific risks as raised by
the Mother, namely that the Mother also worried about obtaining
documentation, such as a birth certificate or household registration
for the applicant, without which could severely limit the applicant’s
access to education, healthcare, and other social welfare services.
The Mother also feared that the applicant would face discrimination in
Indonesia due to religious factor. Since the applicant was born out
of wedlock, it was likely that Indonesian society would not accept
him, and he might face bullying, harassment, or even hate crimes at
school or in other social settings. It was also possible that the
applicant would be discriminated because he was of mixed race.
Therefore, the health and growth of the applicant would be adversely
affected under such circumstances.
38. However, the Board’s assessment on the above fears was limited to the
second half of the same paragraph, which were reproduced as follows:-
“The available evidence did not show that the Appellant would be
subjected to discrimination, bullying, or, still less, persecution
upon returning to the Indonesian community. In fact, it is the
Appellant’s case that he has not been present in Indonesia since
birth. Also, discrimination was not a basis for seeking non-
refoulement protection. The assessment was that the Appellant’s
alleged fear of being discriminated did not constitute persecution.”
39. Although the Board had gone through country of origin information
concerning Indonesia in paragraph 53 of the Board’s Decision, its
discussion in the said paragraph only covered the problem of
corruption and incompetence in government authorities, the Indonesian
government’s efforts in curbing corruption, the applicant’s
eligibility for Indonesian citizenship, and the provision of
assistance to women and children in need by various organizations.
The Board did not consider the difficulties and/or discrimination the
applicant might face upon refoulement as a child of mixed race
ethnicity at all.
40. As held in Re Shahul Hameed Beer Mohamed and Others, 08/04/2026, CACV
77/2024, [2026] HKCA 632 and Re Bantigue Susan Banes and Another,
29/09/2025, CACV 234/2024, [2025] HKCA 853, the Board should have
considered the applicant’s unique situation as a child of mixed race,
which might be a cause for discrimination.
41. It is clear from the authorities cited above that discrimination
against a child of mixed race could be a cause for non-refoulement
protection. It was wrong for the Board to state that “discrimination
was not a basis for seeking non-refoulement protection”. The Board
should have considered whether the discrimination faced by the
applicant due to his mixed race ethnicity, if any, was severe enough
to warrant international protection.
42. It is therefore arguable that the Board had failed to give adequate
consideration to the applicant’s claim when he is a child of mixed
race.
43. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung
(2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for
judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which
enjoys realistic prospects of success. The Board could have committed
an error of law in its assessment of the applicant’s claim when it
failed to consider the applicant’s risk as a child of mixed race
ethnicity. Hence, leave should be granted to the applicant to proceed
with the intended judicial review.
Conclusion
44. For reasons aforesaid, leave is granted to the applicant to apply for
judicial review in respect of the Board’s Decision.
45. The applicant is directed to issue an originating summons for the
intended judicial review on or before 30 September 2026 pursuant to
Order 53, rule 5(5) of the Rules of the High Court.
Dated the 16th day of September 2026
| |( Gladys LEE ) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the applicant| | |
|or his solicitors | | |
|must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent/Handed to the |Sent/Handed to the |
|respondent and such |applicant/the |putative respondent / the|
|interested parties as |applicant’s |putative respondent’s |
|may be directed by the|solicitors |solicitors / such |
|Court the order |on: 16/09/2026 |putative interested |
|granting leave and any| |parties as may be |
|directions given | |directed by the Court / |
|within 14 days after |Applicant’s ref. no: |the putative interested |
|the leave was granted |Nil |parties’ solicitors on: |
|(Order 53, rule 4A); | |16/09/2026 |
| | | |
|b) issue the | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|originating summons | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|within 14 days after | |Claims Petition Office |
|the grant of leave and| |Putative respondent’s |
|serve it in accordance| |ref. no.: |
|with Order 53, rule 5;| |USM 26404 |
|and | | |
| | |Director of Immigration |
|c) supply to every | |Putative interested |
|other party copies of | |party’s ref. no.: |
|every affidavit which | |QA T/C 2513/24 (formerly |
|the Applicant proposes| |RBCZ 5002171/24) |
|to use at the hearing,| | |
|including the | |Department of Justice, |
|affidavit in support | |Senior Assistant Law |
|of the application for| |Officer |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |(Civil Law) |
|6(5)). | |(Civil Litigation Unit 2)|
Form CALL-1