RE NGUYEN VAN THANG

CACV 161/2023, [2025] HKCA 136

On Appeal From [2024] HKCA 557

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 161 OF 2023

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 137 OF 2023)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Au JA (giving the judgment of the court):

1.  On 2 July 2024, the applicant filed a Notice of Motion to apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against this court’s judgment of 24 June 2024 (“the Judgment”)  ([2024] HKCA 557). In the Judgment, we dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge To (“the Deputy Judge”)  dated 17 May 2023, by which the Deputy Judge dismissed his application for leave to apply for judicial review ([2023] HKCFI 1290).

2.  The facts and issues in the appeal, as well as this court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in the Judgment.  We will not repeat them here.  After reviewing the Notice of Motion, we see no reason to deviate from the usual practice to consider this application on paper pursuant to paragraph 3 of Practice Direction 2.1.

3.  Section 22(1)(b)  of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484 (“the HKCFAO”)  provides that an appeal shall lie to the Court of Final Appeal at the discretion of this court or the Court of Final Appeal if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.

4.  In his Notice of Motion, the applicant reiterated that his life would be seriously threatened as creditors and gangsters would harm or kill him.  He further claimed that as he was not an active person, internal relocation would not be feasible.  He also claimed that the Immigration Department failed to consider his human rights under various legislations.

5.  Contrary to Practice Direction 2.1, the applicant failed to lodge any written submissions.

6.  In our view, the applicant’s application is devoid of merits.  His assertions are all vague, bare and unsupported by any specific particular or evidence.  General assertions of his fear if refouled do not constitute proper grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar [2022] HKCA 627 at [6].  His allegations are essentially a mere regurgitation of those submissions he had previously made before this court in his appeal, which we had already considered and rejected: see [8] - [13] of the Judgment.  More importantly, he has failed to identify any specific error in the Judgment.  It is well established that the Court of Appeal will not allow an application of this nature to be deployed as an occasion for re-arguing the points which had already been canvassed at the appeal: Ho Sin Ying v Chan Yui Ling & Another (unreported, CACV 221/2013, 14 November 2014)  at [2] and [3].  Clearly, his assertions do not constitute proper grounds of appeal.

7.  Further and in any event, even taking his case at its highest, his allegations remain fact-specific and do not relate to any question of great general or public importance.

8.  Accordingly, the applicant has failed to identify any question of great general or public importance, as required by section 22(1)(b)  of the HKCFAO.  We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “or otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b)  of the HKCFAO.

9.  For these reasons, the applicant’s intended appeal has no merit.  Accordingly, the Notice of Motion filed on 2 July 2024 is dismissed.