HKSAR v. ACOSTA LYNIE BIBAL

DCCC 1479/2024

[2026] HKDC 160

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CRIMINAL CASE NO 1479 OF 2024

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REASONS FOR SENTENCE

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A. Charges

1.  The Defendant (“D”)  was convicted after trial of 3 charges of dealing with property known or believed to represent proceeds of an indictable offence, contrary to s25(1)  and (3)  of the Organized and Serious Crimes Ordinance, Cap 455. The particulars are that she, in Hong Kong, together with Jane Corpuz and other persons unknown, knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe that property, in whole or in part directly or indirectly represented any person’s proceeds of an indictable offence, dealt with the said property. The other particulars are as follows:

Charges	Dates	Accounts	Amount (HKD[1])
1	26 March to 9 May 2023	Mox Bank Limited (“MB”), account number 389-74961515645 (“Charge 1 Account”)	$8,597,833.36
2	26 to 31 March 2023	Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong)  Limited (“SCB”), account number 959-8-670206-1 (“Charge 2 Account”)	$92,940.08
3		The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited (“HSBC”), account number 166-872887-833 (“Charge 3 Account”)	$45,100.78

B.  Facts

B.1.  Online scams

2.  On 3 April 2023, Pw1 saw an online post placed by a scammer posing as a genuine seller, stating that a PlayStation 5 games console, two controllers, and two games were for sale for $2,800. Pw1, acting on the scammer’s instructions, transferred a total of $2,800 to 2 personal accounts, of which $2,000 to Charge 1 Account on 4 April 2023. Pw1 never received the goods and reported the case.

3.  On 6 May 2023, Pw2 saw an online post placed by a scammer posing as a genuine seller, stating that concert tickets were for sale. Pw2, acting on the scammer’s instructions, transferred a total of $24,645.10 to various personal accounts, of which $3,960.46 to Charge 1 Account. Pw2 never received the tickets and reported the case.

B.2. Charge 1 Account

4.  Charge 1 Account, held in D’s name, was opened on 26 March 2023. In setting it up, her identity card and face were scanned as proof.

5.  Between 28 March and 9 May 2023, $8,597,833.36 was credited to that account through 4,787 deposits, and $8,565,738.10 was debited from it through 1,407 withdrawals.

6.  The deposits were made by 2,312 individuals; of these, 313 made deposits into that account more than 3 times. There were 958 deposits between $2,000 and $50,001.58, including those made by Pw1 and Pw2. Money credited into that account was commingled and disposed of through outward transfers on a daily basis. 959 individuals received money from that account.

7.  On 9 May 2023, that account had a closing balance of $32,095.26, which was entirely withdrawn on 9 August 2023.

B.3.  Charge 2 Account

8.  Charge 2 Account, held in D’s name, was opened on 26 March 2023. In setting it up, her identity card and face were scanned as proof.

9.  On 31 March 2023, $92,940.08 was credited into that account through 70 deposits, and $92,800 was debited from it through 10 withdrawals. The deposits, made by 64 individuals, were between $100 and $10,000.87. Money credited into Charge 2 Account was commingled and transferred to 9 other accounts on the same day.

B.4. Charge 3 Account

10.  Charge 3 Account, held in D’s name, was opened on 26 March 2023. In setting it up, her identity card and face were scanned as proof.

11.  On 31 March 2023, $45,100.78 was deposited into that account by 3 individuals, of which $10,000 was transferred to another individual.

B.5.  D

12.  D had been employed to work in Hong Kong as a foreign domestic helper since 14 July 2017. Her monthly salary was $4,630 between 14 July 2021 and 13 July 2023, and $4,730 between 14 July 2023 and her arrest on 27 November 2023.

13.  For the years of assessment 2020/21 to 2022/23, no tax return or Employer’s Return of Remuneration and Pensions in respect of D was filed.

14.  On 11 June 2020, D opened an account with AliPayHK, registering with the phone number 5644 7664.

C. Cautioned statements

15.  Under arrest and caution, D stated, ‘In March 2023, a Filipino friend approached me in Tseung Kwan O and asked me to do some facial recognition process on her phone. She also took photos of my Hong Kong ID card. She claimed it was for a game. As a return, she paid me 400 dollars in cash.’[2]

16.  In video-recorded interview, D stated the followings:[3]

(a)  She was born in the Philippines, 38 years old, and a widow. She had tertiary education and spoke Tagalog and English.[4] She had a child aged 14 who lived with her mother-in-law.[5]

(b)  D came to Hong Kong in 2017 to work as a domestic helper, earning a salary of $6,000 payable by cash, with no other income source.[6] She had no assets, company, or bank account in Hong Kong. She was not a director or shareholder of a company. She did not file any tax return in Hong Kong. She had a bank account in the Philippines with $4,000 therein which she received upon her husband’s death, and she had no investment.[7]

(c)  During D’s holiday on a Sunday in March 2023 in Popcorn Mall, Tseung Kwan O (“TKO”), her sister introduced her friend, a Filipino woman called Jane Corpuz, to D. Jane asked if D would like to earn ‘instant cash’ for which D only had to register her HKID card and scan her face. D agreed to register by having her facial recognition taken and her HKID card photographed. This was the only time D saw Jane whom D could contact only on Facebook.[8]

(d)  The facial recognition and photo-taking, lasted about 30 to 45 minutes, were done by one of two Chinese men who were present.[9] D did not know their names, did not see them again, and had no means to contact them.[10]

(e)  D was paid $400 the next day through her Alipay account which she registered with her mobile phone number, name, and HKID number.[11] She had no other ‘stored value facilities’.[12]

17.  After trial, I found that:

(a)  D must have known that the face scanning and photo-taking were done for opening the accounts in the 3 charges;

(b)  she must have known that the 3 accounts were opened for deposits and withdrawals of funds; and

(c)  during all the Charges periods in Hong Kong, D together with Jane and other persons unknown must have dealt with the respective property in those charges; and

(d)  any reasonable person who shared D’s knowledge would be bound to believe that, during all the Charges periods, the property stated in all the charges was tainted; thus, she must have known or had reasonable grounds to believe that such property in whole or in part directly or indirectly represented any person’s proceeds of an indictable offence.

D.  Enhancement

18.  Prosecution (“P”)  apply for enhancement of sentence under s27 of Cap. 455.

19.  Defence object, relying on HKSAR v Fong Chi Yam [2020] 2 HKLRD 700 in which the Court of Appeal held that enhancement of sentence for money laundering on the basis of the prevalence of telephone deceptions is erroneous.[13] This is, however, inapplicable in the present case because P’s basis is precisely the prevalence of money laundering which D was convicted of.

20.  If the Court allows the application, Defence ask for an enhancement by 1/5. P do not object.

E.  Mitigation

21.  D is aged 40 with a clear criminal record. She completed a diploma program in hotel and restaurant management. D is a widow and her son aged 16 is in the Philippines under her mother-in-law’s care. She was a domestic helper in Hong Kong and is highly regarded by Dw who was her ex-employer.

22.  Defence cited the following cases. In Secretary for Justice v Wan Kwok Keung [2012] 1 HKLRD 201, the Court of Appeal held:

‘12. “Money laundering” is a serious offence for not only does it encourage criminal activities indirectly, but also attempt to legitimize the proceeds of crime. In order to crack down on serious crimes, to prevent offenders from getting financial gains, it is necessary to deter the commission of the “money laundering” offence …

13. Generally, the sentence for “money laundering” offence should mainly reflect the amount of “black money” laundered and not the benefit obtained by the defendant or others. The reason being that it is very difficult to prove the benefit concerned, and in most “money laundering” cases, there may not be evidence to show from what indictable offence the “black money” are in fact derived. Of course if there is information to prove that the “black money” is originated from serious crimes, including drug trafficking, kidnap and blackmail, illegal human trafficking, other organized crimes, etc. or the defendant’s benefit is huge, then the sentence should be adjusted upward.

14. This Court has … listed others factors relevant to the sentence to be imposed including the number of offences, the length of time the offence lasted, the degree to which the defendant participated in the offence involving “black money” and whether or not it was an organised and sophisticated crime, etc.

15. In HKSAR v Hsu Yu Yi [2010] 5 HKLRD 536, Cheung JA set out the amounts of money involved and the sentences passed in a number of “money laundering” cases. The sentencing starting point is 3 years or so where the “black money” involved is between 1 million and 2 million dollars, 4 years or so where it is between 3 million and 6 million dollars, and could be over 5 years where it is above 10 million dollars.’

23.  The Court also held that the starting point ‘should not be lower than 4 years’ for the defendant who laundered 14 million dollars for thousands times over 7 years.[14]

24.  In HKSAR v Boma [2012] 2 HKLRD 33, the Court of Appeal held that the sentencing judge should engage his ‘feel’ for the case,[15] and that the amount of money laundered is a ‘significant’ feature but not ‘be-all and end-all’[16]. It also identified other obvious factors of sentencing:[17]

‘(1)  The nature of the predicate offence, if known, and the penalty available for the predicate offence …

(2)  … the person who knows the nature of the predicate offence is more culpable than the person who does not …

(3)  An international dimension will always be a significant aggravating feature; and by international dimension we include money laundered from, or for those operating in, the Mainland.

(4)  The sophistication of the offence is always relevant. This will include the degree of planning and whether deceit is practised to achieve the objective.

(5)  Where the offence is committed by or on behalf of an organized criminal syndicate, that is an aggravating fact.

(6)  … whether there is one transaction or many and the length of time over which the offence was committed.

(7)  … it will be an aggravating feature where the offender continues to launder funds after he has discovered as a fact that the funds are the proceeds of an offence or after he has discovered the nature of an offence which is serious.

(8)  … the role of the offender and the acts performed by him. In this regard, the director of a laundering operation or scheme should attract a greater sentence than a person engaged by him although sentences should be sufficient to deter those who might be prevailed upon by directing minds. In the case of a person down the chain, the court will wish to have regard to whether a benefit has been received and if so the nature and size of the benefit. But within the category of persons down the chain there will gradations of culpability. So for example the drug addict or petty crook who is paid a small sum to open an account and hand over its operation to another with no more participation and no more knowledge than that it is going to be used for some sort of crime is much less culpable than an offender of a different sort not “used” in that way.’

25.  In HKSAR v Lam Ka Sin [2021] 2 HKLRD 32, the appellant conspired to launder $1.1 million. The Court of Appeal held that a starting point of 2 years was appropriate because:[18]

(a)  she was aged 20 and ‘in a vulnerable state and easily influenced’;

(b)  she was forced to go along with the arrangement; and

(c)  she withdrew after failing to process the subject cheque.

26.  Regarding the present case, Defence submitted that:

(a)  there is no evidence of international element, sophisticated planning, criminal syndicate, or D’s knowledge of the predicate offences or control of the accounts; and

(b)  she was merely stooge account holders for a reward of $400.

27.  Defence ask for a global starting point of less than 2 years for all charges.

F. P’s reply

28.  P submit that the global starting point should not be less than 4 years.

G. Sentence

29.  I have also considered these cases. In HKSAR v Tsang Yiu Kong CACC 77/2022, the Court of Appeal held the followings:[19]

(a)  According to the range of starting points identified in Hsu Yu Yi, $3,000,000 to $6,000,000 normally attracts a sentence of 4 years; where $7,700,000 is involved, the starting point should be ‘no less than 4 years’.

(b)  Where $8,130,000 and no layering exercise were involved, a starting point of 3 years and 6 months is ‘too low’.

30.  In CAAR 4/2024, the Court of Appeal held:[20]

(a)  Sentencing judges should keep firmly in mind the mischief targeted by the relevant legislation, and take note of the maximum penalty for the offence and the need for a deterrent sentence.

(b)  The amount involved is important but not the only factor. Wan Kwok Keung merely summarised the approximate sentencing ranges corresponding to the amounts in the cases listed by Hsu Yu Yi. Sentencing judges should not rely solely on those ranges, nor adopt a purely mathematical approach to sentencing without proper consideration of other case-specific factors. Judges must determine an appropriate term by assessing the particular circumstances of each case, drawing on their own sentencing experience, and their overall impression of the case.

31.  In the present case, I have considered the following features:

(a)  There is no evidence of international element, sophisticated planning or steps, or criminal organisation.

(b)  The predicate offences are online scams, but there is no evidence that D knew about them.

(c)  She was 3 stooge accounts holders for a $400 reward, and there is no evidence that she had further participation in the offences.

(d)  Charge 1 Account had 4,787 deposits and 1,407 withdrawals, Charge 2 Account had 70 deposits and 10 withdrawals, and Charge 3 Account had 3 deposits and 1 withdrawal.

(e)  The total amount involved in all the accounts was about $8.7 million.

(f)  The total period of all charges is 26 March to 9 May 2023.

32.  In view of the foregoing, a global starting point of 4 years (48 months)  is appropriate.

33.  There is no mitigating factor in this case.

34.  Given the information provided by P, I allow the application for enhancement by 1/5, resulting in a global sentence of 57 months.

35.  Accordingly, the sentences are as follows:

(a)  The starting points for Charges 1 to 3 are 4 years (48 months), 1 year (12 months), and 1 year (12 months), respectively.

(b)  They are enhanced by 1/5 to 57 months, 14 months, and 14 months, respectively.

(c)  To achieve the global sentence of 57 months, all the sentences are to run concurrently.

(d)  Hence, D is sentenced to 57 months’ imprisonment for all charges.