KWONG WAN KAU v. YUEN WING HONG

HCPI 142/2002

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

PERSONAL INJURIES ACTION NO. 142 OF 2002

______________________

______________________

___________________________

ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES

___________________________

Introduction

1.  By the Statement of Claim filed on 22 February 2002, the Plaintiff claimed against the Defendant for damages for personal injury, loss and damages arising out of the negligent driving of a motor vehicle bearing registration number FN9057 by the Defendant on 6 March 1999.

2.  Interlocutory judgment on liability was obtained on 4 July 2002 with damages to be assessed.

The Plaintiff’s case

3.  The Plaintiff was born on 20 October 1957.  He was just over 41 by the time of the accident.  He was 49 at the date of the assessment.

4.  After the accident, the Plaintiff was sent to the Queen Elizabeth Hospital (QEH) for treatment.  X ray films revealed compound fracture of the right distal fibula.  Emergency operation was performed and the fracture was fixed with metal implants.  The Plaintiff was hospitalized for 11 days and was discharged home on 16 March 1999 with crutches to assist walking.

5.  Thereafter, the Plaintiff received regular out patient follow up treatments at the Orthopaedic Department of QEH.  He also received physiotherapy for more than one year and occupational therapy treatment from QEH until May 2000.

6.  On 7 October 1999, the Plaintiff received a second operation to have the metal implants removed.  By reason of persistent infection, the wound at the Plaintiff’s right ankle took about 10 months to heal up.

7.  The Plaintiff was granted sick leave from the date of accident to 13 May 2002 and from 4 June to 30 June 2002.

8.  On 5 February 2002, the Medical Assessment Board of QEH came to the conclusion that the Plaintiff was incapable of performing his previous duties, as a Workman II of the Food and Environmental Hygiene Department (FEHD), including pushing heavy iron cart, sweeping the street, collecting rubbish from rubbish bins and collecting bulky garbage dumped by people.  The Plaintiff retired with effect from 18 July 2002.

9.  The Plaintiff complained that owing to the injury on his right ankle, he cannot stand or walk for long hours, nor can he climb, squat or lift heavy things.  He experienced weakness on his right lower limb and has difficulty in climbing staircases or walking along slopes.  He persistently experienced gross stiffness over his right ankle due to extensive scar resulted from the accident.  The Plaintiff is still attending regular follow up at QEH.

10.  The Plaintiff was the only witness.  He adopted the contents of his witness statement as his evidence.  He further told the court that he was entitled to hardship allowance on a monthly basis and mentioned something about “shift duty” and “overtime” allowances. On 8 July 2006 and in the course of final submission, leave was granted to the Plaintiff to add a claim for “hardship” and “shift duty” allowances by amending paragraphs 15 and 23 of the Revised Statement of Damages.  I also granted leave to the Defendant to amend paragraphs 21, 26 and 50 of his Answer to Revised Statement of Damages to argue that the Court should take into account the annual pension of HK$24,631.92 received by the Plaintiff since 18 July 2002.  By reason of this, I granted leave to the Plaintiff to make further written submission within 14 days from 8 July 2006.  No further submission was received by the Court.

Pain, Suffering and Loss of Amenities

11.  The Plaintiff claimed HK$400,000 under this head.  Mr. Harris, SC, Counsel for the Plaintiff, submitted that the injuries sustained by the Plaintiff placed him at the lower end of the serious injury scale.  He particularly drawn the Court’s attention to the fact that the medical experts were in virtual agreement as to the Plaintiff’s percentage of disability of the whole person; both experts found that there was muscle wasting; and the surveillance video shown that the Plaintiff experienced difficulty in climbing stairs.  Ms. Lau, Counsel for the Defendant, submitted that the award under this head should be HK$350,000.

12.  I have considered the authorities cited by both Counsel.  They are good yardsticks.  Nevertheless, the award made under this head must be made in the light of the background of this case.  I am of the view that the reasonable amount to be awarded under this head is HK$350,000.

Pre-trial Loss of Earnings

13.  There was no dispute that the Plaintiff received his salary under Model Scale 1 Pay Scale Point 8.  According to the letter from the Government dated 25 May 2006 (Bundle DII/196), the following rates of salary/allowances apply:-

	Period	Salary	Hardship Allowance	Shift Duty Allowance
(a)	1 March 1999 to 31 March 2001	$10,175	$656	$440
(b)	1 April 2001 to 30 September 2002	$10,420	$671	$451
(c)	1 October 2002 to 31 December 2003	$10,260	$661	$444
(d)	1 January 2004 to 31 December 2004	$9,938	$640	$430
(e)	1 January 2005 onwards	$9,615	$619	$416

14.  It should be noted that the said letter set out two types of Shift Duty Allowance: Type A and Type B respectively.  A simple cross-checking with the pre-accident payroll slips (Bundle B/94 to B/95) would enable one to find that the Plaintiff did receive Shift Duty Allowance (Type A) at $440 for November 1998 (paid in December 1998).  At pp 94 to 95 of Bundle B, there were the copy payroll slips of the Plaintiff for the period from September 1998 to February 1999.  During these 6 months, the Plaintiff received Shift Duty Allowance on one occasion only.  He, however, received “overtime allowance” on 3 occasions: $1090.13 for 15 hours (October 1998); $545.06 for 7.5 hours (December 1998) and $1090.13 for 15 hours (January 1999).

15.  In my judgment, I can only take into account the hardship allowance in calculating the monthly income of the Plaintiff.  There was insufficient evidence to support the claim of Shift Duty Allowance.  In the light of the evidence available, the Plaintiff only received the same once.  It should be noted that the Plaintiff did explain the mechanism of the payment of Shift Duty Allowance and Overtime Allowance.  However, his explanation was very confusing.  In fact, during the examination in chief, I had expressed my concern that I did not understand his evidence in this regard.  The Plaintiff cannot simply throw something to the Court and claim his entitlement.  He has to prove the same.  In my judgment, he has failed to do so in respect of the Shift Duty Allowance and Overtime Allowance (even if the Court can take the claim of Shift Duty Allowance to include Overtime Allowance).

16.  In other words, the monthly income of the Plaintiff is as follows:-

	Period	Basic Salary	Hardship Allowance	Total
(a)	1 March 1999 to 31 March 2001	$10,175	$656	$10,831
(b)	1 April 2001 to 30 September 2002	$10,420	$671	$11,091
(c)	1 October 2002 to 31 December 2003	$10,260	$661	$10,921
(d)	1 January 2004 to 31 December 2004	$9,938	$640	$10,578
(e)	1 January 2005 onwards	$9,615	$619	$10,234

17.  According to the letter from the FEHD to the Plaintiff dated 26 February 2002, the Plaintiff was granted an extension of 12 months full pay sick leave from 6 March 2001 to 5 March 2002 (Bundle B/172).  Further, by another letter dated 4 March 2002, the FEHD accepted the Plaintiff’s application to substitute his no pay work injury leave by Paid Leave for the period from 6 March 2002 to 3 June 2002.

18.  It is common ground that although the Plaintiff retired as from 18 July 2002, he should be able to take up a job with lighter duties.  In the Amended Statement of Damages, the Plaintiff accepted that he only suffered partial loss of earnings as from 18 “June” 2002 which I believe should mean 18 “July” 2002: the retirement date.  In the light of this and also the evidence before me, I accept the submission of Ms. Lau that the median figure $5,200 ($5,300 in 6/02 and $5,100 in 12/05) be adopted as the monthly salary and that the Plaintiff can earn such income as from 18 July 2002 but not from January 2003 as contended by the Plaintiff.

19.  In his final submission, Mr. Harris, SC, submitted that the figures appeared in the Amended Statement of Damages were inaccurate as the allowances claimed were not included.  He submitted that the Court should award $421,023.58 to the Plaintiff under this head.  His calculation is this:

(I)	Pre-retirement			Amount
	(a)	Hardship Allowance (3/99-18/6/02)		$25,458.5
	(b)	Shift Duty Allowance (3/99-18/6/02)		$5,695.5
	(c)	Sick leave payment (6/3/01-17/6/01: $10,175 x 3 months 12 days)		$34,595.0
	(d)	Sick leave payment (6/3/02-17/6/02: $10,420 x 3 months 11 days)		$35,080.0
(II)	Post-retirement			Amount
	(a)	Loss of basic salary
		(i)	18/6/02-31/9/02 (3.5 months):	$36,470
			$10,420 x 3.5
		(ii)	1/10/02-31/12/03 (15 months):	$153,900
			$10,260 x 15
		(iii)	1/1/04-31/12/04 (12 months):	$119,256
			$9,938 x 12
		(iv)	1/1/05-1/7/06 (19 months):	$182,685
			$9,615 x 18
	(b)	Hardship allowance (18/6/02-1/7/06)		$31,704.5
	(c)	Shift Duty Allowance (18/6/02-1/7/06)		$10,547.08
				$635,391.58
	LESS
(III)	Earnings from probable employment			($214,368)
	(1/03-1/7/06: $5,104 x 42 months)
				$421,023.58
				===============

20.  In the light of my rulings hereinabove, I accept the claim of hardship allowance (under I(a) & II(b)) but reject that for shift duty allowance (under (I) & (II)) subject to a minor adjustment.  The amount under II(b) should be $31,085.5 instead of $31,704.5 (the last claiming period, 1/1/05 – 1/7/06, covers 18 months instead of 19 months).

21.  The evidence shows that the Plaintiff was granted sick leave with full payment of basic salary from date of the accident to 5 March 2002.  The copy of Salary Statements (Bundle B/80-83) for the period from March 2001 to June 2001 further support the fact that the Plaintiff had received payment of his basic salary.  For this reason, I reject the claim under I(c).

22.  I accept the claim under I(d).  As stated above, the Plaintiff was in fact utilizing his Paid Leave.  The Plaintiff is therefore entitled to recover the same from the Defendant.

23.  Basically, there was no dispute as to the claim under II(a) and I allowed it subject to a minor adjustment.  The amount under II(a)(iv) should be $173,070 instead of $182,685 (the claiming period 1/1/05-1/7/06, covers 18 months instead of 19 months).

24.  As I ruled hereinabove, credits should be given to what the Plaintiff could have earned after retirement in the sum of $5,200 x 47.5 months (18/7/02 to 30/6/06) = $247,000.

25.  The Defendant further submitted that credit has to be given for the annual pension in the sum of $24,631.92 received by the Plaintiff since 18 July 2002.  Following the decision in Cheung Man Fai v To Yu Bun [2005] 4 HKLR 16, I accept such submission.  From 18 July 2002 to 30 June 2006, the Plaintiff received pension in the sum of $24,631.92/12 x 47.5 months = $97,501.35.

26.  The net pre-assessment loss of earnings is therefore $635,391.58 – $5,695.5 (I(b)) – $34,595 (I(c)) – $9,615 (II(a)(iv) adjustment) – $619 (II(b) adjustment) – $10,547.08 (II(c)) – $247,000 – $97,501.35 = $229,818.65.

Future Loss of Earnings

27.  I found that the normal retirement age for the Plaintiff from the FEHD would have been 60 and not 65 (Bundle B/182).

28.  Although the Plaintiff had on diver occasions from 1994 to 1999 took sick leaves, the Plaintiff only suffered from urinary tract infection, epigastria pains and gastroenteritis, bronchitis and flu.  These problems would not in my view present any real risk of preventing the Plaintiff from work till his normal retirement age.  In other words, but for the accident, the Plaintiff could have worked for another 11 years (from now) before retirement.

29.  Bearing the above in mind, the pre-accident job nature, the Table prepared by Pearson Royal Commission and the following authorities:

(i)	Yu Shee Pui v Urban Council (HCA 252/79; Liu J; 19/5/1981); public light bus driver; 49 at trial; multiplier 8.
(ii)	Lobo Helena George v Bhagwandas K Kripalani (HCPI 1286/96; Seagroatt J; 23/1/98); domestic assistant; 50 at trial; multiplier 8.
(iii)	Chan Yan Nam (HCPI 1169/2000; Deputy Judge Muttrie; 8/7/03); plumber and electrician; 51 at trial; multiplier 8.
(iv)	Ho Sik Tung v Lau Kin Sun (trading as E & J Engineering Company) (HCPI 408/1999; Master H C Wong; 12/9/02); caisson worker and driller; 50 at assessment; multiplier 9.

I am of the view that a multiplier of 8 is reasonable in this case.

30.  The future loss of earnings is therefore [$10,234 (basic salary + hardship allowance) – $5,100 – $24,631.92/12 (monthly pension)] x 12 x 8 = $295,808.60.

Loss of Earning Capacity

31.  For this head, the Court has to consider the risk of the Plaintiff being disadvantaged in the labour market by reason of his injury.  It should be noted that the Plaintiff is still unemployed up till now.  In my ruling, it has nothing to do with the disability suffered by the Plaintiff but related to the effort paid by the Plaintiff in looking for a job: he did not register with the Labour Department and, according to the Plaintiff’s evidence, his only attempts to look for a job were making enquiries from the security guards of his residence and his two friends who were a plumber and an electrician respectively.  There is no satisfactory evidence to enable the Court to conclude that the Plaintiff will be at a disadvantage in the labour market and thus I make no award under this head.

Allowance under Home Purchase Scheme

32.  The Plaintiff’s case is that had he not retired, he would have been entitled to receive around $2,100/month under the Home Purchase Scheme sooner or later.  His evidence was that one of his colleagues who joined the Government at a date later than him had become eligible for such allowance.

33.  Information from the Government shown that both the Plaintiff (before his retirement) and his wife were eligible to apply for the allowance though under separate queues.  All eligible officers were allotted a priority number.  The Plaintiff’s number was 039773 and his wife number was 035355.  A number of around 2000 quota were provided each year.  Up to this assessment, both the Plaintiff’s and his wife’s number had not been reached.

34.  It should be noted that one must have purchased a property before he would be entitled to such allowance.  There was no evidence before the Court that the Plaintiff had the ready means to purchase a property though it was his evidence that he was entitled to apply for a down payment loan, around $240,000, for such purpose.  It is not clear whether this sum is sufficient to purchase a flat which suits the Plaintiff: 400 sq. ft at Hunghom area.  There was simply no evidence on this.

35.  It should also be noted that the wife earned more than the Plaintiff.  In other words, the wife is entitled to allowance of a higher rate than the Plaintiff.  Since only one of them is entitled to actually enjoy and receive the allowance, one would expect they will utilize the wife’s quota rather than the Plaintiff’s.  On this, the Plaintiff did not accept that there was such a planning.

36.  I found that it is more likely than not that the wife’s quota be utilized in order to get higher allowance.  Taking this together with the absence of evidence concerning the financial means to purchase a property that suits the Plaintiff’s need into account, I made no award under this head.

Loss of Pension

37.  According to the information given by the FEHD as per their letter dated 30 October 2002 (Bundle B/182), the Plaintiff was paid commuted lump sum $344,846.88 upon his retirement and entitled to annual pension at $24,631.92.  Had the Plaintiff not retired and confirmed his service until his normal retirement age, the Plaintiff would have been entitled to commuted lump sum at $582,231.44 and annual pension at $41,587.96.

38.  The gross loss of commuted lump sum is $582,231.44 – $344,846.88 = $237,385.  Following the approach adopted in Cheung Man Fai , certain discount should be given to reflect the fact of accelerated receipt of the sum.  In Cheung Man Fai, the Plaintiff, a policeman, was 35 at trial and his normal retirement age was 55.  A discount of 50% was adopted.

39.  In the present case, I found that a discount of 35% is appropriate.  Therefore the award for loss of commuted lump sum is $237,385 x 65% = $154,300.

40.  The gross loss of annual pension is $41,587.96 – $24,631.92 = $16,956.  Following the life expectancy of 73 years as adopted in Cheung Man Fai, and further applying the aforesaid discount, the net loss is $16,956 x 13 x 65% = $143,278.

41.  The total award for loss of pension is $154,300 + $143,278 = $297,578.

Loss of Wife’s Overtime

42.  The Plaintiff no longer pursued this head based directly on the wife’s loss of overtime.  Instead, the Plaintiff claimed for the value of the wife’s service.  The Plaintiff’s case was that his wife assisted him three times a day in cleaning his wound.  Mr. Harris, SC, further submitted that common sense suggested the wife must have rendered other services or assistance to the plaintiff until the Plaintiff had dispensed with the aid of the crutches.  The Plaintiff claimed $24,000.

43.  The Plaintiff’s evidence under this head is not satisfactory at all.  In his witness statement, the Plaintiff’s claim was not based on the premises as pursued now.  There was such a change because the original claim simply cannot get off the ground.  However, it must also be the case that, as submitted by Mr. Harris, SC, the wife must have rendered some services.  In the light of all these, I am of the view that an award of $20,000 is reasonable.

Medical Expenses

44.  The updated amount for the pre-assessment medical expenses was $236,552 (Bundle D) (Medical consultation etc $149,918; other expenses $86,634).

45.  Ms. Lau has very carefully analysed how the Plaintiff incurred such expenses.  A total of 6 medical practitioners were involved.

(i)	Dr. Tang, general practitioner (128 occasions; 13/10/99-3/3006; $72,780)
(ii)	Dr. Lau, Orthopaedic Specialist (51 occasions; 28/2/00-3/06; $30,600)
(iii)	Dr. Pak, general practitioner (2 times; 5/2000; $500) (for chest infection and bronchitis)
(iv)	Dr. Poon, Orthopaedic Specialist (1 time, 30/5/00, $450)
(v)	Dr. Fang, Orthopaedic Specialist (1 time, 4/10/00, $800)
(vi)	Dr. Kwok, general practitioner (11 times, 27/4/02-7/03, $7,056) (ulcer problem)

46.  As for Dr. Tang, I do not allow the following consultations:

(i)	Diagnosis (Duodenal ulcer with GI bleedings) (Bundle C/66-69 and C/71) ($430 + 320 + 430 + 430 + 600 = $2,210);
(ii)	Diagnosis (Duodenal ulcer) (Bundle C/74, 77, 79, 80, 82, 86, 88, 89, 91, 92, 94, 96, 97, 99, 101, 102, 104, 106, 107, 109, 110, 112, 114, 115, 117, 119, 122, 124, 126, 127, 129 x 2, 131, 136, 137, 138, 140, 142, 143, 144, 146 x 2, 147, 148, 150, 151, 152, 155) ($680 x 46 + $850 x 2) = $32,980;
(iii)	Diagnosis (Duodenal ulcer and erectile dysfunction) (Bundle C/121, 124, 125, 128, 130, 131, 133, 134, 135, 141, 142, 149, 153) $1,000 x 2 + $1,380 x 8 + $1,250 + $1,300 + $1,200 = $16,790;
(iv)	Diagnosis (erectile dysfunction and insomnia) (Bundle C/138; $420).

47.  On three occasions, the diagnosis were Duodenal Ulcer and right foot injury (Bundle C/75, 83 and 85).  The total amount involved is $680 + 680 + 680 = $2040.  The consultation fee is the same as that for Duodenal Ulcer alone.  Bearing in mind that the Plaintiff also consulted Dr. Lau for his leg injury at the same period, I also disallow these claims.

48.  Ms. Lau submitted that the pathological cause for the ulcer was the Helicobacter Pylori infection which was in fact the most common cause of duodenal ulcer.  The burden is on the Plaintiff to establish that the ulcer and epigastric problem was caused by the continuous intake of Dologesic.  Dr. Tsoi opined that the problem “might” be triggered by the continuous intake of Dologesic while Dr. Lam viewed such relationship a very remote one.  I find that the Plaintiff had failed to establish the causal linkage as required.  There is also no evidence or sufficient evidence to link up the chest infection, bronchitis, erectile dysfunction and insomnia with the accident.  For these reasons, I disallow the claims as aforesaid and that for consulting Dr. Pak ($500) and Dr. Kwok ($7056).

49.  In other words, I only allow $72,780 – $54,440 ($2,210 + $32,980 + $16,790 + $420 + $2,040) = $18,340 as medical expense for consulting Dr. Tang.

50.  For the other consultations (Dr. Lau, Dr. Poon & Dr. Fang),  they all related to the foot injury.  Ms. Lau submitted that on 5 May 2000, Dr. Lau had explained to the Plaintiff that the stiffness in his right ankle was due to the excessive scar tissue and nothing could be done to improve the condition.  Further, the Plaintiff refused to continue with Occupational Therapy beyond 4 May 2000.  Therefore, at the most, the Plaintiff may recover medical expenses prior to that day but not thereafter as any further expenses were caused by the failure on the part of the Plaintiff to mitigate his loss.

51.  The Plaintiff had explained why he consulted the doctors.  I accepted his explanation and found that the medical consultations and treatments (except otherwise dealt with hereinabove) he sought were reasonable and recoverable. I allow the claims for consulting Dr. Lau, Dr. Poon and Dr. Fang. There is no dispute in relation to the other items grouped under this head. Therefore I award $149,918 - $54,440 - $500 - $7,056 = $87,922  under this head.

52.  The Plaintiff claimed $86,634 for other expenses in relation to nutritional supplements and viagra.  From the invoices produced, $64,233 was for the purchase of principally 4 products: “Vital Tone”, “Stress Formula”, “Complete” and “Vital C Complex”.

53.  There was no medical evidence as to what these products were and how they would benefit the Plaintiff.  In fact, as submitted by Ms. Lau, I have great reservation as to whether these products were purchased solely for the Plaintiff’s own consumption.

54.  The Plaintiff told the Court that he consumed 2 bottles of “Vital Tone” per month.  However, from the invoices (Bundle D/34-86), the pattern of the purchases of “Vital Tone” did not support the regular continual consumption as alleged.  In 1999, the Plaintiff purchased 30 bottles.  There was no record of purchase from January to May in 2000.  However, there were 2 separate purchases for 8 and 13 bottles on 24 June 2000 and 28 June 2000 (D/69 and 70) respectively.  9 bottles were purchased on 14 August 2000 (D/72), 2 bottles in October and 13 bottles in November.  More suspicious purchases were made in January 2001: there was one purchase on 13 January and 3 separate but identical purchases on 17 January.  On 13 January, 3 bottles of “Vital Tone” and 1 bottle of “Stress Formula” were purchased.  On 17 January, there were 3 separate invoices 0774, 0775 and 0776 showing 3 separate purchases of 3 bottles of “Vital Tone” and 1 bottle of “Stress Formula” (Bundle D/79-81).  Similar situation took place in April the same year (Bundle D/82-84).  A total of 10 bottles were purchased in April, May and November of 2003 and 6 bottles were purchased in May, July and November of 2004.  There was no purchase record for “Vital Tone” in 2005.

55.  For these reasons, I refused the claim of $64,233.

56.  As I found there was no causal linkage between the accident and the erectile dysfunction, I also disallow the claim for the purchases of viagra claimed at $5,380.

57.  The Plaintiff further claimed a sum of $17,021.6 for miscellaneous items (Bundle D/103-120).  These include expenses for purchase of a mobile phone, shoes, fax machine, watch repairing, hiking equipment, medicine and bandages and some other items which could not be identified on the face of the receipts.  There was no evidence as to why these expenses were incurred.  I thus disallow them except the sum $1,523.50 for items apparently for medical purposes.

58.  The Defendant did not dispute the claims for traveling expenses at $5,280 and tonic food at $1,737 and thus I allow the same. The total award is $87,922+$1523.5+$5280+$1737=$96462.50

Future Medical Expenses

59.  The Plaintiff claimed for $527,000:

(i)	Medical treatments ($2,500 x 12 x 17)	$510,000
(ii)	X Ray and Checkup ($1,000 x 12 x 17)	$17,000
		$527,000
		=========

60.  I accept that it is reasonable for the Plaintiff to seek continuing medical treatments.  In 2004 and 2005, the Plaintiff spent an average of around $6,000 per year to consult Dr. Lau.  I found that it is the reasonable figure to be awarded under this head with the multiplier of 8.  This together with the annual checkup at $1,000 per year adds up to $7,000 x 8 = $56,000.

61.  The total award in this case is:

(1)	PSLA	$350,000.00
(2)	Pre-assessment loss of earnings	$229,818.69
(3)	Future loss of earnings	$295,808.60
(4)	Loss of Pension	$297,578.00
(5)	Value of the wife’s services	$20,000.00
(6)	Special Damages	$96,462.50
(7)	Future Medical Expenses	$56,000.00
	LESS
(8)	ECC received	$369,672
		$975,995.79
		=========

62.  The Plaintiff is entitled to interests at 2% per annum for general damages for pain suffering and loss of amenities from the date of the writ until judgment and thereafter at judgment rate and interests at half judgment rate from date of accident until judgment and thereafter at judgment rate.

63.  I made an order nisi that the Defendant do pay costs of this Assessment to be taxed if not agreed. The Plaintiff’s own costs be taxed in accordance with the Legal Aid Regulations. This order nisi will become absolute 14 days after the handing down of this Judgment.