YAU NGAN KWAN v. GOLDEN CHAMPION TRAVEL CO LTD AND OTHERS
[2026] HKCFI 6037 · HCA 1845/2022
Court of First Instance
HCA 1845/2022
[2026] HKCFI 6037
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
ACTION NO 1845 OF 2022
____________
BETWEEN
|yau ngan kwan (游銀君) |Plaintiff |
|and | |
|GOLDEN CHAMPION TRAVEL COMPANY LIMITED |1st Defendant |
|(金恩旅遊有限公司) | |
|CHAN TUNG YEUNG ANDREW (陳東陽) |2nd Defendant |
|WONG NGA LAI (黃雅麗) |3rd Defendant |
____________
Before: Deputy High Court Judge Alan Kwong in Court
Date of Hearing: 27 October 2026
Date of Judgment: 13 November 2026
|JUDGMENT[1] |
A. Introduction
1. This action concerns a dispute arising from the sale and purchase of a
passenger service license in respect of a public bus.
B. Material Background
2. Prior to 16 January 2018, the Plaintiff was the sole shareholder and
sole director of Sun Tak Travel Company Ltd (“Sun Tak”).
3. The only business activity of Sun Tak was to hold (i) a public bus
with plate number PZ 1882 (the “Public Bus PZ 1822”); and (ii) the
passenger service license in respect of Public Bus PZ 1822 (the “PIS
License PZ 1822”).
4. The 1st Defendant is a private company that carries on business under
the name of “Golden Champion Bus Investment Co”.
5. The 2nd Defendant is the husband of the 3rd Defendant.
6. Whilst the 2nd Defendant was a majority shareholder of the 1st
Defendant, he held out himself as a director and/or authorized
representative of the 1st Defendant. Meanwhile, the 3rd Defendant was
the 1st Defendant’s company secretary.
7. The 3rd Defendant was also the sole director of another company named
Grand Tour Bus Services Ltd (“Grand Tour”). At one stage, the 2nd
Defendant was the sole shareholder of Grand Tour.
8. On 31 March 2017, the Plaintiff acting on behalf of Sun Tak and the
2nd Defendant acting on behalf of Grand Tour entered into a management
agreement in writing (the “2017 Management Agreement”). In gist, Sun
Tak authorized Grand Tour to operate Public Bus PZ 1822 (with PIS
License PZ 1822) for a period of 36 months until 31 March 2020, and
Grand Tour should pay the Plaintiff a monthly fee of HK$20,300.
9. On 20 October 2017, the Plaintiff’s son-in-law acting on behalf of Sun
Tak and the 2nd Defendant acting on behalf of the 1st Defendant
entered into an agreement in writing (the “October 2017
Agreement”)[2]. It was agreed that: -
1) Sun Tak should not sell PIS License PZ 1822 before 30 June 2018;
2) The 1st Defendant undertook to purchase PIS License PZ 1822 at a
price that was no less than HK$2.9 million; and
3) The October 2017 Agreement should be valid for 2 years.
10. On 17 January 2018, the Plaintiff acting on behalf of Sun Tak and the
2nd Defendant acting on behalf of the 1st Defendant entered into a
written sale and purchase agreement in respect of PIS License PZ 1822
(the “First January 2018 Agreement”)[3]. It was agreed that: -
1) Sun Tak should sell and transfer PIS License PZ 1822 to the 1st
Defendant for the consideration of HK$2.9 million.
2) Upon signing the First January 2018 Agreement, the 1st Defendant
should pay a deposit of HK$290,000 to Sun Tak. If the 1st
Defendant fails to complete, the said deposit should be
forfeited. If Sun Tak fails to complete, Sun Tak should refund
the deposit and pay a further compensation of HK$290,000 to the
1st Defendant.
3) The shareholding in Sun Tak should be transferred to the 1st
Defendant or a third party designated by the 1st Defendant.
4) Completion should take place on 7 February 2018. Thereupon, the
1st Defendant should pay the balance of the purchase price in
the amount of HK$2.61 million, failing which the deposit will be
forfeited and the ownership of Sun Tak as well as PIS License
PZ1882 should be returned.
5) Upon completion, the Management Agreement between Sun Tak and
Grand Tour should be terminated automatically.
11. It is not in dispute that pursuant to the First January 2018
Agreement: -
1) the 1st Defendant paid a deposit of HK$290,000 to the Plaintiff;
and
2) the Plaintiff executed various documents, the effect of which
was to transfer the shareholding in Sun Tak in favour of the 2nd
Defendant and to appoint the 2nd Defendant as the sole director
of Sun Tak.
12. It transpired that the 1st Defendant had failed to pay the balance of
the purchase price on or before the scheduled completion date pursuant
to the terms of the First January 2018 Agreement.
13. However, the parties chose to keep the transaction alive.
14. With a view to varying the original terms of the First January 2018
Agreement, on 9 June 2018, the Plaintiff acting on behalf of Sun Tak
and the 2nd Defendant acting on behalf of 1st Defendant entered into a
further written sale and purchase agreement (which was backdated to 17
January 2018) (the “Second January 2018 Agreement”)[4]. The terms of
the Second January 2018 Agreement were the same as those of the First
January 2018 Agreement, except: -
1) The purchase price of PIS License PZ 1822 increased from HK$2.9
million to HK$3.09 million.
2) The 1st Defendant should pay a further deposit of HK$200,000.
3) Completion was postponed to 9 September 2018.
15. It is not in dispute that pursuant to the Second January 2018
Agreement, the 1st Defendant paid a further deposit of HK$200,000 on
6 July 2018.
16. Again, the 1st Defendant had failed to pay the balance of the purchase
price on or before the scheduled completion date pursuant to the terms
of the Second January 2018 Agreement.
17. However, the parties, again, chose to keep the transaction alive.
18. On 30 October 2018, the Plaintiff acting in her own capacity and the
2nd Defendant acting on behalf of the 1st Defendant entered into a
further agreement in writing (the “October 2018 Agreement”)[5]. It was
agreed that: -
1) The purchase price of PIS License PZ 1822 be reduced from
HK$3.09 million to HK$2.87 million.
2) Upon signing the October 2018 Agreement, the 1st Defendant
should pay a deposit of HK$300,000 to the Plaintiff. If the 1st
Defendant fails to complete, the said deposit should be
forfeited. If the Plaintiff fails to complete, the Plaintiff
should refund the deposit and pay further compensation of
HK$300,000 to the 1st Defendant.
3) The shareholding in Sun Tak should be transferred in favour of
the 1st Defendant or its designated third party.
4) Completion should take place on 1 March 2019, whereupon the 1st
Defendant should pay the balance of the purchase price in the
amount of HK$2.57 million.
5) Upon completion, the Management Agreement between Sun Tak and
Grand Tour should be terminated automatically.
6) If the 1st Defendant failed to pay the balance of the purchase
price on 1 March 2019, the 1st Defendant should return PIS
License PZ 1822 to the Plaintiff.
19. It is not in dispute that pursuant to the October 2018 Agreement, the
1st Defendant paid a further deposit of HK$300,000 to the Plaintiff on
27 December 2018.
20. Again, the 1st Defendant had failed to pay the balance of the purchase
price on or before the scheduled completion date pursuant to the terms
of the October 2018 Agreement.
21. Meanwhile, the 1st Defendant had also failed to return PIS License PZ
1822 to the Plaintiff pursuant to the terms of the October 2018
Agreement (see clause 6).
22. Against this background, on 25 August 2020, (i) the Plaintiff acting
in his own capacity, (ii) the 2nd Defendant acting on behalf of the
1st Defendant, (iii) the 2nd Defendant acting in his own capacity as a
guarantor, and (iv) the 3rd Defendant acting in her own capacity as a
guarantor signed and entered into an agreement in writing titled
保證協議 (the “Guarantee Agreement”)[6]. The Guarantee Agreement
contains the following material terms: -
1) In the preamble, it was recorded that: -
a) the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant signed the October 2018
Agreement;
b) the 1st Defendant cancelled the October 2018 Agreement, and
agreed that the deposit (of HK$300,000) be forfeited; and
c) as the 1st Defendant was unable to return the license (ie
PIS License PZ 1822) to the Plaintiff pursuant to clause 6
of the October 2018 Agreement, the 1st Defendant agreed to
transfer (i) vehicle with license plate MP3339 (the “MP
3339 Vehicle”) and (ii) the operation license in respect
thereof (the “MP 3339 License”) to the Plaintiff as
compensation.
2) Under clause 1, it was agreed that the 1st Defendant should pay
a monthly rental of HK$12,000 to the Plaintiff.
3) Under clause 2, it was agreed that: -
a) The MP 3339 License was worth HK$2,280,000, and the MP 3339
Vehicle was worth HK$1,450,000. Hence, they were worth a
total of HK$3,730,000.
b) The 1st Defendant should transfer the MP 3339 License and
the MP 3339 Vehicle to the Plaintiff.
c) The 1st Defendant (i) warranted that the outstanding
indebtedness (or mortgage) in respect of the MP 3339
License and the MP 3339 Vehicle was less than HK$1.5
million and (ii) promised to repay such outstanding
indebtedness (or mortgage).
d) Under clause 5, the 1st Defendant: -
a) undertook to transfer the 100% shareholding in
朗天(志良)有限公司 in favour of the Plaintiff; and
b) warranted that 朗天(志良)有限公司 only held the MP 3339
License and the MP 3339 Vehicle.
e) Under clause 6, it was agreed that: -
a) the term of the Guarantee Agreement should last for 1 year;
b) after the 1st Defendant completes the transfer of a
passenger service license in favour of 永亮旅運有限公司[7]
which should be wholly owned by the Plaintiff, the
Plaintiff should unconditionally return the MP 3339 License
and the MP 3339 Vehicle to the 1st Defendant;
c) if the 1st Defendant fails to complete the transfer of a
passenger service license in favour of the Plaintiff within
1 year, the 1st Defendant should immediately pay the
original purchase price of HK$2.87 million to the
Plaintiff.
f) Under clause 8, the 2nd and 3rd Defendants agreed to act as the
guarantors of the 1st Defendant, and should the 1st Defendant
fail to discharge the obligations under the Guarantee Agreement,
the Plaintiff could recover her loss from the 2nd and 3rd
Defendants.
23. Despite the terms of the Guarantee Agreement: -
1) the 1st Defendant had never transferred the shareholding in
朗天(志良)有限公司 (and/or the MP 3339 License and the MP 3339
Vehicle) in favour of the Plaintiff;
2) the 1st Defendant had never transferred any passenger service
license in favour of the Plaintiff; and
3) the 1st Defendant had never paid a sum of HK$2.87 million to the
Plaintiff.
24. The Plaintiff merely received a sum of HK$16,000 on 3 January 2022.
25. In the premises, the Plaintiff commenced the present action on 30
December 2022. Pursuant to the terms of the Guarantee Agreement, the
Plaintiff sues the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Defendants for, inter alia: -
1) the sum of HK$2.87 million; and
2) month rental in respect of PIS License PZ1882 at HK$12,000 per
month (or alternatively at the alleged market rate of HK$15,000
per month).
C. Deliberation
C1. Legal Principles on Contractual Interpretation
26. The legal principles on contractual interpretation are well-
established: -
1) In Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building
Society [1998] 1 WLR 896 at 912H – 913F, Lord Hoffmann stated: -
“(1) Interpretation is the ascertainment of the meaning which the
document would convey to a reasonable person having all the
background knowledge which would reasonably have been available
to the parties in the situation in which they were at the time
of the contract.
(2) The background was famously referred to by Lord Wilberforce
as the ‘matrix of fact,’ but this phrase is, if anything, an
understated description of what the background may include.
Subject to the requirement that it should have been reasonably
available to the parties and to the exception to be mentioned
next, it includes absolutely anything which would have affected
the way in which the language of the document would have been
understood by a reasonable man.
(3) The law excludes from the admissible background the previous
negotiations of the parties and their declarations of subjective
intent. They are admissible only in an action for rectification.
The law makes this distinction for reasons of practical policy
and, in this respect only, legal interpretation differs from the
way we would interpret utterances in ordinary life. The
boundaries of this exception are in some respects unclear. But
this is not the occasion on which to explore them.
(4) The meaning which a document (or any other utterance) would
convey to a reasonable man is not the same thing as the meaning
of its words. The meaning of words is a matter of dictionaries
and grammars; the meaning of the document is what the parties
using those words against the relevant background would
reasonably have been understood to mean. The background may not
merely enable the reasonable man to choose between the possible
meanings of words which are ambiguous but even (as occasionally
happens in ordinary life) to conclude that the parties must, for
whatever reason, have used the wrong words or syntax: see Mannai
Investments Co. Ltd.v.Eagle Star Life Assurance Co. Ltd. [1997]
A.C. 749 .
(5) The ‘rule’ that words should be given their ‘natural and
ordinary meaning’ reflects the common sense proposition that we
do not easily accept that people have made linguistic mistakes,
particularly in formal documents. On the other hand, if one
would nevertheless conclude from the background that something
must have gone wrong with the language, the law does not require
judges to attribute to the parties an intention which they
plainly could not have had. Lord Diplock made this point more
vigorously when he said in Antaios Compania Naviera S.A. v.
Salen Rederierna A.B. [1985] A.C. 191, 201:
‘if detailed semantic and syntactical analysis of words in
a commercial contract is going to lead to a conclusion that
flouts business commonsense, it must be made to yield to
business commonsense.’”
2) In Jumbo King Ltd v Faithful Properties Ltd (1999) 2 HKCFAR 279
at 296D-E, Lord Hoffmann NPJ further explained that: -
“The construction of a document is not a game with words. It is
an attempt to discover what a reasonable person would have
understood the parties to mean. And this involves having regard,
not merely to the individual words they have used, but to the
agreement as a whole, the factual and legal background against
which it was concluded and the practical objects which it was
intended to achieve. Quite often this exercise will lead to the
conclusion that although there is no reasonable doubt about what
the parties meant, they have not expressed themselves very well.
Their language may sometimes be careless and they may have said
things which, if taken literally, mean something different from
what they obviously intended. In ordinary life people often
express themselves infelicitously without leaving any doubt
about what they meant. Of course in serious utterances such as
legal documents, in which people may be supposed to have chosen
their words with care, one does not readily accept that they
have used the wrong words. If the ordinary meaning of the words
makes sense in relation to the rest of the document and the
factual background, then the court will give effect to that
language, even though the consequences may appear hard for
oneside or the other. The court is not privy to the negotiation
of the agreement—evidence of such negotiations is
inadmissible—and has no way of knowing whether a clause which
appears to have an onerous effect was a quid pro quo for some
other concession. Or one of the parties may simply have made a
bad bargain. The only escape from the language is an action for
rectification, in which the previous negotiations can be
examined. But the overriding objective in construction is to
give effect to what a reasonable person rather than a pedantic
lawyer would have understood the parties to mean. Therefore, if
in spite of linguistic problems the meaning is clear, it is that
meaning which must prevail.”
3) In Fully Profit (Asia) Ltd v Secretary for Justice (2013) 16
HKCFAR 351, Ma CJ emphasized the importance of “context”. His
Lordship stated:-
“… What emerges from these cases—and other authorities on
contractual interpretation—is the overall importance of context
when construing contractual terms. The statements of principle
in Investors Compensation Scheme and in Jumbo King refer time
and again to the relevant background against which the relevant
contract and contractual terms must be viewed. It is in my view
not particularly helpful in most cases to refer to the ‘ordinary
and natural meaning’ of words because, as very often experience
tells us, there can be much debate over exactly what is the
ordinary or natural meaning of words. The surer guide to
interpretation is context. Here, I would just add that in the
area of statutory and constitutional interpretation, it is
context that is key; context is the starting point (together
with purpose) rather than looking at what may be the natural and
ordinary meaning of words”
C2. The Commercial Rationale behind the Guarantee Agreement
27. I have no doubt that the Guarantee Agreement is a valid and legally-
binding contract that is supported by good consideration. Having
considered the circumstances surrounding the transactions amongst the
parties, I am of the view the commercial rationale behind is as
follows: -
1) As evidenced by the preamble of the Guarantee Agreement, it is
incontrovertible that the 1st Defendant (which failed to
complete the transaction under the October 2018 Agreement) had
failed to discharge the obligation under clause 6 of the October
2018 Agreement by returning PIS License PZ 1822 to the
Plaintiff.
2) The Plaintiff agreed that instead of compelling the
1st Defendant to return PIS License PZ 1822 in accordance with
the obligation under clause 6 of the October 2018 Agreement, the
1st Defendant should transfer and make available the MP 3339
Vehicle and the MP 3339 License for the Plaintiff to use: see
preamble and clause 6.
3) The arrangement should last for 1 year: see clause 6.
4) During this 1-year period: -
a) The 1st Defendant should pay a monthly rental of HK$12,000
(in respect of PIS License PZ 1822) to the Plaintiff: see
clause 1.
b) The 1st Defendant should transfer the 100% shareholding in
朗天(志良)有限公司 (which only held the MP 3339 Vehicle and
the MP 3339 License) in favour of the Plaintiff, and the
1st Defendant should be responsible for paying the
outstanding mortgage loan over the MP 3339 Vehicle and the
MP 3339 License: see clauses 2 and 3.
5) Upon the expiry of the 1-year period: -
a) The 1st Defendant should complete the transfer of a
passenger service license in favour of 永亮旅運有限公司[8]
which should be wholly owned by the Plaintiff. Thereupon,
the Plaintiff should unconditionally return the MP 3339
Vehicle and the MP 3339 License to the 1st Defendant.
b) Should the 1st Defendant fail to complete the transfer of a
passenger service license in favour of the Plaintiff (or
her designated nominee), the 1st Defendant
should immediately pay the Plaintiff a sum of HK$2.87
million (ie the original purchase price under the October
2018 Agreement): see clause 6.
28. The deal between the parties under the Guarantee Agreement can be
summarized as follows: -
1) Instead of compelling the 1st Defendant to return PIS License PZ
1822 in accordance with the obligations under clause 6 of the
October 2018 Agreement, the parties agreed that the
1st Defendant could retain PIS License PZ 1822.
2) However, within 1 year, the 1st Defendant should transfer a
passenger service license in favour of the Plaintiff (or her
designated nominee, namely永亮旅運有限公司[9]). In light of the
fact that the Plaintiff no longer insisted that PIS License PZ
1822 be returned, the said passenger service license is
compensation for the Plaintiff. As soon as the Plaintiff
receives the said passenger service license, she shall return
the MP 3339 Vehicle and the MP 3339 License to the 1st
Defendant. In this sense, the Plaintiff’s use of the MP 3339
Vehicle and the MP 3339 License during the 1-year period is
merely an interim arrangement.
3) If it transpires that the 1st Defendant fails to transfer a
“passenger service license” in favour of the Plaintiff within 1
year, the 1st Defendant shall pay HK$2.87 million to the
Plaintiff, and this is the original purchase price in respect of
PIS License PZ 1822 under the October 2018 Agreement. This makes
sense. In this scenario, the Plaintiff does not receive the
“compensation” based on the passenger service license to be
transferred by the 1st Defendant. As such, the 1st Defendant
shall pay the purchase price in respect of PIS License PZ 1822,
which was agreed at HK$2.87 million.
C3. The Plaintiff’s Claim for the Contractual Sum of HK$2.87 million
29. The Plaintiff’s claim for the contractual sum of HK$2.87 million is
based on clause 6 of the Guarantee Agreement.
30. For the sake of completeness, I shall set out clause 6 of the
Guarantee Agreement verbatim: -
“本協議期限為一年,待乙方 [ie 1st Defendant]
完成過戶一個客運營業證由甲方 [ie Plaintiff]
全資擁有的永亮旅運有限公司,甲方 [ie Plaintiff]
必須無條件退還以上車輛連牌照給乙方 [1st
Defendant]。如一年後,乙方[ie 1st
Defendant]未能完成牌照過戶給甲方[ie Plaintiff],乙方 [ie 1st
Defendant] 須即時支付給甲方[ie
Plaintiff]原轉讓合約金額港幣$2,870,000.00。”
31. It is not in dispute that as of the time when 1-year period under the
Guarantee Agreement expired (ie 26 August 2021), the 1st Defendant had
failed to transfer any passenger service license (客運營業證) in
favour of the Plaintiff. As such, pursuant to clause 6 of the
Guarantee Agreement, the 1st Defendant should pay HK$2.87 million to
the Plaintiff.
32. However, in their defence and counterclaim[10], the Defendants averred
that: -
1) At a meeting that took place between the 2nd Defendant on behalf
of the 1st Defendant and the Plaintiff on 3 January 2022 (the
“Alleged January 2022 Meeting”), it was agreed that the time for
completion of the Guarantee Agreement be extended to the end of
2022.
2) On 18 October 2022, a passenger service license (客運營業證)
(which was then attached to vehicle with license plate number
GL1805 (“Vehicle GL1805”)) was registered under the name of
永亮旅遊有限公司.
3) Although the Plaintiff did not own the shareholding in
永亮旅遊有限公司, as early as 28 July 2022, the 2nd Defendant
indicated to the Plaintiff that the shareholding in
永亮旅遊有限公司 could be transferred to the Plaintiff.
33. For reasons best known to themselves, the 2nd Defendant[11], who made
a witness statement, did not attend court to testify. As such, the
Defendants’ case based on the Alleged January 2022 Meeting is not
supported by a shred of evidence.
34. In any event, I am of the view that the Defendants’ allegations
regarding the Alleged January 2022 Meeting are wholly incredible.
35. In Lee Fu Wing v Yan Paul Po Ting [2009] 5 HKLRD 513 at 534, DHCJ Au
(as Au JA then was) set out the well-established approach to assessing
credibility. In the course of assessing the credibility of a party’s
case, the court shall consider the following matters:
1) whether the party’s case is inherently plausible or implausible;
2) whether the party’s case is, in a material way, contradicted by
other evidence (documentary or otherwise) which is undisputed or
indisputable;
3) where it is shown that a witness has been discredited over one
or more matters to which he has given evidence using the above
tests, this is relevant to the assessment of his overall
credibility; and
4) the demeanour of the witnesses.
36. In the context of adjudicating a dispute in relation to an alleged
oral agreement or understanding, in Joint and Several Trustees of the
property of Yeung Wing Sing v Yeung Wing Sing & Anor [2021] HKCFI 2018
at para 26, Recorder Yvonne Cheng SC (as Cheng J then was) pointed
out that:
1) contemporaneous written documents and documents which came into
existence before the problems in question emerged are of the
greatest importance in assessing credibility;
2) in deciding whether to accept a witness’s account, importance
should also be attached to the inherent likelihood or
unlikelihood of an event having happened, or the apparent logic
of events;
3) care should be taken in regard to the consistency of the
witness’s evidence with undisputed or indisputable evidence, and
the internal consistency of the witness's evidence;
4) care should be taken in drawing conclusions about truthfulness
and reliability solely or mainly from the appearance of a
witness or from the assessment of a witness’s character; and
5) witnesses’ credibility should be tested by reference to the
objective facts proved independently of their testimony, and the
court should consider their motives and the overall
probabilities.
37. The Defendants’ suggestion that the Plaintiff had agreed that the time
for completing the transaction under the Guarantee Agreement be
extended till the end of 2022 is not borne out by any contemporaneous
document.
38. This is inconsistent with the previous practice adopted by the
parties. As evidenced by the series of written contracts executed by
the parties (ie the 2017 Management Agreement, the October 2017
Agreement, the First January 2018 Agreement, the Second January 2018
Agreement, the October 2018 Agreement, and the Guarantee Agreement),
all along, the parties carefully recorded their contractual dealings
with each other in writing. Although the aforesaid agreements were
not professionally drafted by lawyers, the parties were serious enough
to ensure that their consensus with each other was embodied in the
contractual documents. In fact, when the parties agreed that the First
January 2018 Agreement be varied, they carefully drafted and executed
the Second January 2018 Agreement (which replaced the First January
2018 Agreement).
39. In light of the previous conduct of the parties and the practice that
they adopted, I am of the view that it was inherently improbable that
the parties would verbally vary the terms of the Guarantee Agreement
in a casual manner. Bearing in mind the history of the parties’
contractual dealings, I am of the view that had the parties agreed
that the terms of the Guarantee Agreement be varied, such a variation
would have been recorded in writing. There was plainly no reason why
contrary to their previous practice, the parties did not bother to
record the alleged variation in writing.
40. In my view, the objective circumstances show that the parties had not
agreed that the terms of the Guarantee Agreement be varied and that
the time for completion be extended. This explains why the alleged
variation is not evidenced by a shred of documentary evidence.
41. The fact that the parties had not orally agreed to vary and/or extend
the terms of the Guarantee Agreement is also consistent with, and
borne out by, the fact that the Plaintiff ignored the 2nd Defendant’s
WhatsApp message on 28 July 2022[12].
42. Pausing here, it is noteworthy that contrary to their pleaded case
that the shareholding in 永亮旅遊有限公司 (which held the passenger
license attached to Vehicle GL 1805) was offered to the Plaintiff, in
his WhatsApp message on 28 July 2022[13], the 2nd Defendant merely
proposed (i) that the passenger service license (ie PIS License
PZ1882) be returned to the Plaintiff or (ii) that the passenger
service license (ie PIS License PZ1882) be purchased at the alleged
market price of HK$1.3 million.
43. In the absence of any variation to the Guarantee Agreement, the 1st
Defendant should have transferred the passenger service license before
the contractual deadline on 25 August 2021 (ie 1 year after the
Guarantee Agreement was executed), failing which the agreed
contractual sum of HK$2.87 million should be paid. The Plaintiff
obviously took the view that the 1st Defendant was not entitled to
renege from the transaction and to shift the goal post. This was the
reason why she ignored the 2nd Defendant’s WhatsApp message on 28 July
2022. In this connection, I fully accept the Plaintiff’s oral
evidence, which is consistent with the objective circumstances.
44. For all the above reasons, I find and conclude that: -
1) Contrary to the Defendants’ allegations, the parties had never
agreed that the terms of the Guarantee Agreement be varied or
that the completion of the transaction under the Guarantee
Agreement be extended to late 2022.
2) Pursuant to clause 6 of the Guarantee Agreement (which had never
been varied), the 1st Defendant should have transferred a
passenger service license to the Plaintiff on or before 25
August 2021 (ie 1 year after the Guarantee Agreement was
executed), failing which the 1st Defendant should immediately
pay the Plaintiff a sum of HK$2.87 million.
3) The 1st Defendant had failed to transfer any passenger service
license to the Plaintiff on or before 25 August 2021.
4) Accordingly, pursuant to clause 6 of the Guarantee Agreement,
the 1st Defendant is liable to pay the Plaintiff the said
contractual sum of HK$2.87 million.
45. In any event, I should, for completeness, also point out that the
Defendants cannot rely on the passenger service license attached to
Vehicle GL1805 to absolve themselves from liability.
46. First of all, as discussed above (see paragraph 42), there is simply
no evidence showing that the Defendants had offered the passenger
service license attached to Vehicle GL1805 to the Plaintiff. In this
regard, the pleas in the Defendants’ defence and counterclaim[14]
regarding the events that took place on 28 July 2022 are completely
misleading.
47. Moreover, there is ample contemporaneous documentary evidence[15]
showing that Vehicle GL1805 has been charged in favour of Bank of East
Asia.
48. As mentioned (see paragraph 28 above), the purpose of transferring a
passenger service license in favour of the Plaintiff under clause 6 of
the Guarantee Agreement is to compensate her for forgoing the right to
recover PIS License PZ 1822 pursuant to the terms of the October 2018
Agreement. There is no suggestion that PIS License PZ 1822 was subject
to any encumbrance at the time when the October 2018 Agreement was
executed. In the premises, the only sensible construction of clause 6
of the Guarantee Agreement is that the 1st Defendant should transfer a
passenger service license that is free from encumbrance in favour of
the Plaintiff. If the 1st Defendant could discharge its contractual
obligation by transferring a passenger service license that is subject
to encumbrance, the commercial purpose of compensating the Plaintiff
would be defeated, and the Plaintiff would be seriously prejudiced.
This would be absurd, and could not be what the parties intended.
49. For all the above reasons, I conclude that pursuant to clause 6 of the
Guarantee Agreement, the 1st Defendant is liable to pay the Plaintiff
the said contractual sum of HK$2.87 million.
50. Clause 8 of the Guarantee Agreement reads as follows: -
“本協議是甲方游銀君女士[ie Plaintiff]與乙方金恩巴士車行 [ie 1st
Defendant]之間定立,並需陳東陽先生 [ie 2nd
Defendant],身份證號碼… 及黃雅麗小姐 [ie 3rd
Defendant],身份證號碼…同意為金恩巴士車行公司 [ie 1st
Defendant]作為此協議擔保人,若然今後金恩巴士車行 [ie 1st
Defendant]有任何的問題產生而未能履行此協議,游銀君女士 [ie
Plaintiff]可向上述兩位追討所有損失。”
51. The 2nd and 3rd Defendants have agreed: -
1) to act as the guarantors of the 1st Defendant with regard to the
obligations and liability under the Guarantee Agreement; and
2) that if the 1st Defendant fails to discharge the obligations
under the Guarantee Agreement, they would bear the loss suffered
by the Plaintiff.
52. The 1st Defendant has failed to discharge its obligations and
liability under clause 6 of the Guarantee Agreement by paying the
Plaintiff the agreed contractual sum of HK$2.87 million, and, as such,
the Plaintiff has suffered loss and damage to the extent of HK$2.87
million.
53. Pursuant to clause 8 of the Guarantee Agreement, the 2nd and 3rd
Defendants, as the 1st Defendant’s guarantors, are liable to
compensate the Plaintiff and to pay her the said sum of HK$2.87
million.
C4. The Plaintiff’s Claim for Monthly Rental of HK$12,000
54. I now address the Plaintiff’s claim for monthly rental of HK$12,000
(in respect of PIS License PZ 1822).
55. Clause 1 of the Guarantee Agreement provides that:-
“乙方 [ie 1st Defendant]須支付每月租金港幣$12,000給甲方 [ie
Plaintiff]。”
56. As pointed out, the duration of the arrangement under the Guarantee
Agreement was only 1 year. Clause 6 expressly provides that:
“本協議期限為一年”.
57. When the 1-year period expired, the 1st Defendant should either (i)
transfer an unencumbered passenger service license in favour of the
Plaintiff or (ii) pay the agreed contractual sum of HK$2.87 million
(for acquiring PIS License PZ 1822 under the October 2018 Agreement):
see clause 6. Thereupon, the transaction between the parties would be
completed, and the parties would cease to have any further dealings
with each other.
58. Against this background, it appears to me that the
objective contractual intention of the parties is such that the 1st
Defendant should only be liable to pay monthly rental of HK$12,000 to
the Plaintiff during the agreed 1-year contractual period from 25
October 2020 to 25 October 2021 (ie HK$12,000 per month x 12 months =
HK$144,000). The parties could not have intended that the 1st
Defendant should continue to pay monthly rental to the Plaintiff
indefinitely.
59. It is not in dispute that the Plaintiff received a sum of HK$16,000 on
3 January 2022[16].
60. According to the Defendants’ pleaded case[17], at the Alleged January
2022 Meeting, it was agreed that the monthly rental to be paid by the
1st Defendant should be reduced from HK$12,000 to HK$8,000.
61. As pointed out, as the 2nd Defendant did not testify, the Defendants’
allegations regarding the Alleged January 2022 Meeting are not borne
out by any evidence.
62. Moreover, for the same reasons set out in paragraphs 37 to 40 above, I
am of the view that the Defendants’ allegations are incredible. In
light of the previous conduct and practice of the parties, I do not
believe that they would verbally vary the Guarantee Agreement in a
casual manner in the absence of any documentary record. Had the
parties agreed that the monthly sum payable under clause 1 of the
Guarantee Agreement be reduced or varied, they would have recorded
their new consensus in writing. This was never done, and the most
probable explanation was that the parties had not reached any new
consensus at all.
63. In my view, it was more likely than not that the 1st Defendant simply
made a partial payment on 3 January 2022, and the Plaintiff (who was
on the receiving end) reluctantly accepted the same.
64. In the premises, the 1st Defendant is liable to pay the Plaintiff an
aggregate outstanding fee of HK$128,000 (ie HK$144,000 less HK$16,000)
under clause 1 of the Guarantee Agreement.
65. It is not in dispute that the 1st Defendant has failed to pay the said
sum of HK$128,000 to the Plaintiff.
66. Accordingly, pursuant to clause 8 of the Guarantee Agreement, the 2nd
and 3rd Defendants, as the 1st Defendant’s guarantors, are liable to
compensate the Plaintiff and to pay the sum of HK$128,000 to pay the
Plaintiff.
D. Disposition
67. For all the above reasons, I order that the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd
Defendants shall jointly and severally pay the Plaintiff: -
1) the sum of HK$2,870,000; and
2) the sum of HK$128,000.
68. I further order that there be interest on the aforesaid sums at 1%
above prime rate from 26 August 2021 (ie the day after the 1-year
period under the Guarantee Agreement expired, by which time the
Defendants should have honoured their contractual obligations) to the
date of this judgment, and thereafter interest at the judgment rate
until payment in full.
69. Costs should follow the event.
70. I make a costs order nisi that the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Defendants shall
jointly and severally pay the Plaintiff’s costs incurred in the
present action, including all costs reserved, to be taxed on a party-
to-party basis, if not agreed.
71. I thank Ms Cyndi Ho for her assistance.
( Alan Kwong )
Deputy High Court Judge
Ms Cyndi Ho, instructed by Yung & Au, for the Plaintiff
1st Defendant, Golden Champion Travel Company Limited, in person, absent
2nd Defendant, Chan Tung Yeung, Andrew, in person, absent
3rd Defendant, Wong Nga Lai, in person, absent
-----------------------
[1] Since the pleadings in this action are in English, I am of the view
that it would be convenient to write the present Judgment in English as
well. The Defendants, who are no longer legally represented, can liaise
with my clerk to arrange a court interpreter to explain the contents of
this Judgment to them.
[2] Bundle 2, page 187
[3] Bundle 2, page 201
[4] Bundle 2, page 209
[5] Bundle 2, page 217
[6] Bundle 2, page 232
[7] There is a typo in the Guarantee Agreement. “永亮旅運有限公司” shall
be read as “永亮旅遊有限公司”
[8] There is a typo in the Guarantee Agreement. “永亮旅運有限公司” shall
be read as “永亮旅遊有限公司”
[9] There is a typo in the Guarantee Agreement. “永亮旅運有限公司” shall
be read as “永亮旅遊有限公 司”
[10] See paragraphs 36 and 37
[11] None of the Defendants attended the trial.
[12] Bundle 3, page 468
[13] Bundle 3, page 468
[14] See paragraph 37.2.
[15] See eg charge over vehicles executed in favour of the Bank of East
Asia dated 10 February 2023 and the Statement of Particulars of Charge
under Form NM1 filed with the Companies Registry (Bundle 2, pages 251 to
260)
[16] See the bank records at Bundle 2, page 237.
[17] See their defence and counterclaim, para 36.1(i)
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