HKSAR v. TAO CHING CHUNG

DCCC 923/2024

[2025] HKDC 1670

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CRIMINAL CASE NO 923 OF 2024

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REASONS FOR SENTENCE

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1.  The defendant pleads guilty to one charge of dealing with property known or believed to represent proceeds of an indictable offence, contrary to section 25(1)  and (3)  of the Organized and Serious Crimes Ordinance (“OSCO”), Chapter 455. He admits the Summary of Facts presented by the prosecution. Upon his plea and the facts he has admitted, he is convicted as charged.

Facts

2.  On 24 March 2022, the defendant opened a bank account (“the Account”)[1] with the Bank of China (Hong Kong)  Limited (“the Bank”).  The defendant was the sole signatory of the Account.

3.  When the defendant set up the Account, he reported to the Bank that he opened it for savings or salary purpose.  In the opening mandate, he stated that he worked as a supervisor in an engineering company with a monthly income of HK$10,000 to HK$25,000.

4.  During the period from 25 March 2022 and 30 March 2022, 53 deposits were made into the Account, totaling HK$2,529,062.40.

5.  One of the deposits was made by Mr. Chan Tim-loi.  Mr. Chan transferred HK$254,005 into the Account on 30 March 2022.  At that time, Mr. Chan was a retired person.  He fell victim to an online romance cum investment scam through a dating app “Speedy Loving”.  Mr. Chan was deceived to invest in the US stock market and cryptocurrency with a promise of lucrative return.  He had remitted a total of HK$696,045 into 8 local bank accounts (including the Account)  provided by the unknown swindler between 9 March 2022 and 31 March 2022.  Later when he could not withdraw his money, he realized that he had been deceived. He made a report to the police.

6.  Another deposit into the Account was made by Ms Chan Tsz-yuk.  Ms Chan received telephone calls from unknown swindlers who alleged that Ms Chan had been involved in money laundering activities in the Mainland.  Pursuant to the instructions of the swindlers, Ms Chan transferred a total of HK$400,000 into 3 local bank accounts as directed by the swindlers between 21 March 2022 and 11 April 2022, including a transfer of HK$100,000 into the Account on 29 March 2022.  Ms Chan later realized that this was a scam and made a report to the police.

7.  During the same period from 25 March 2022 and 30 March 2022, 83 withdrawals were made from the Account, totaling HK$2,528,926.69.

8.  Police investigation revealed that the Account was mainly active from 28 March 2022 to 30 March 2022 with numerous inbound and outbound transactions each day. In general, the amount of deposits ranged from a few thousand dollars to HK$400,000.  The incoming funds were quickly transferred out of the Account (by faster payment system)  either at similar amount or with smaller amount in multiple transactions on the same day.  Features of test payments and numerous counterpart were detected.  The Account maintained a low account balance each day.

9.  The defendant was arrested on 16 October 2022.  He remained silent under caution at the time of arrest and during subsequent video-recorded interview.

10.  When the defendant pleads guilty to the Charge, he also admits that: -

(a)  The amount and velocity of the transactions in the Account were not commensurate with the defendant’s background and reported income.

(b)  The account was used as a temporary repository of funds, with confirmed proceeds of crime originated from different scams.

(c)  At the relevant times as particularized in the Charge, the defendant, knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe that the total sum of HK$2,529,062.40 deposited into the Account, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly represented any person’s proceeds of an indictable offence, dealt with these sums of money.

Criminal record of the defendant

11.  The defendant has a clear criminal record.

Personal and family background

12.  The defendant was born on 7 April 1997 in Hong Kong.  He is 28 years old now.  He is single.  His parents have divorced. 

13.  According to the mitigation letters written by the defendant, his mother and stepfather, the defendant’s parents separated when the defendant was two years old.  The defendant then lived with his father who soon had another marriage.  The defendant was later sent by his father and stepmother to live with different relatives for different periods of time, and he was passed around like a “human ball”.  It was only when the defendant was studying in Primary Three that his mother managed to obtain the custody of the defendant from the Court.  The defendant lived with his mother and stepfather thereafter.

14.  The defendant received education in Hong Kong up to Form Two.  When he was 13 years old, he went to New Zealand where he received education from Year 9 to Year 13. He was offered a vacancy by a university, but due to financial difficulties, he was unable to continue with his education there and returned to Hong Kong in 2016.

15.  At the time of his arrest, the defendant was working as a clerk in a finance company with a fluctuating monthly income between HK$16,000 and HK$20,000.  He is now working as a warehouse worker.

16.  The defendant’s mother is now 57 years old.  In 2024, the defendant and his friend rented a flat in Tuen Mun and lived there, but he has just now moved back to live with his mother in Yuen Long.

Mitigation

17.  According to Mr. Alan Ng, learned counsel for the defendant, the defendant came to know a person via a friend in 2021, and they became friends.  That person shared defendant all his living experience including his unsatisfactory job and sour family relationship.  This person then asked the defendant to lend him a bank account because he did not want his family member to know his financial situation.  Out of naivety, the defendant complied with the request.  Mr. Ng says that the defendant did not ask his friend the purpose of having a bank account, but stresses that the defendant received no benefit for helping his friend.

18.  According to Mr. Ng, the defendant cannot contact this person, or the friend who introduced this friend to him.

19.  Mr. Ng submits that there is no evidence that shows or implies that the defendant knew anything about the syndicate or the crime behind the movement of the money in and out of the Account.  He submits that this is a case where the defendant is guilty of the charge only on the limb that he had reasonable grounds to believe (not actual knowledge)  that the property represented any person’s proceeds of an indictable offence.  Mr. Ng submits that the defendant was only a “cog in the machinery” who received no benefit whatsoever.

20.  Mr. Ng points out that the defendant was 25 years old at the time of the offence, and that while he had heard of money laundering cases in the news at that time, money laundering was something new to him.  Mr. Ng submits that the defendant accepts that he should have asked this friend more questions before lending his bank account to this friend, such as why he needed this bank account, as well as when he would start using and finish using the Account.  Mr. Ng submits that any reasonable man in the defendant’s position would have asked this friend these questions but the defendant had failed to do so.  Mr. Ng further submits that when the defendant thinks about the matter again, he realizes that he did not really know this friend much, and that he in fact did not entirely trust this friend, but he acceded to his request anyway.

21.  Mr. Ng accepts that the amount of money involved, i.e. about HK$2.5 million, was a lot of money, but stresses that the money laundering activities in question last for 6 days only, i.e. from 25 March to 30 March 2022, and that only one bank account was involved.

22.  Mr. Ng also accepts that a sentence of imprisonment is inevitable in light of the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Secretary for Justice v Siu Yun Yee[2], but asks for a sentence as lenient as possible.  He stresses that the defendant has a clear record, and that the defendant wishes to resume working and looking after his mother as soon as possible.

23.  Mr. Ng also refers to HKSAR v Hsu Yu Yi[3] and HKSAR v A male known as Boma Amaso[4] to assist this Court in sentencing.

24.  Mr. Ng submits mitigation letters written by the defendant, his mother and stepfather.  This Court has duly considered all of them.

Reasons for sentence

25.  Money laundering is a serious offence. Section 25(3)  of the OSCO provides that the maximum penalty upon conviction on indictment is a fine of HK$5 million and imprisonment for 14 years.

26.  Since the facts of money laundering offences vary from case to case, there are no sentencing guidelines, but the sentencing principles are clear.

27.  In HKSAR v Wan Kwok Keung[5], the Court of Appeal stated, in paragraph 13 of the judgment, that:-

“Generally, the sentence for “money laundering” offence should mainly reflect the amount of “black money” laundered and not the benefit obtained by the defendant or others. The reason being that it is very difficult to prove the benefit concerned, and in most “money laundering” cases, there may not be evidence to show from what indictable offence the “black money” are in fact derived. Of course if there is information to prove that the “black money” is originated from serious crimes, including drug trafficking, kidnap and blackmail, illegal human trafficking, other organized crimes, etc. or the defendant’s benefit is huge, then the sentence should be adjusted upward.”

28.  The same principle was reiterated by the Court of Appeal in Secretary for Justice v Ngai Fung Sin Apple [2013] 5 HKLRD 104. In paragraph 44 of the judgment, the Court of Appeal stated:-

“Generally speaking, the sentence passed in a “money laundering” case is primarily to reflect the amount of the “illicit/black money” involved. Neither the fact that the “illicit/black money” was actually not derived from an indictable offence nor the defendant’s ignorance of the actual source of the “illicit/black money” is necessarily a valid mitigating factor. On the other hand, if there is evidence which can prove from what serious crimes the “illicit/black money” was derived and if the defendant was aware of the origin of the “illicit/black money”, that would be an aggravating factor (see Secretary for Justice v Lau Man Ying [2012] 4 HKLRD 429 and HKSAR v Xu Xia Li & Anor [2004] 4 HKC16). Based on the same rationale, the fact that the defendant of a “money laundering” case has not obtained any financial benefit is not a mitigating factor.”

29.  In Boma Amaso, the Court of Appeal pointed out that deterrence was the paramount sentencing consideration, but cautioned that the amount of money laundered was not the be-all and end-all of a case though it was a significant feature. It further provided a non-exhaustive list of factors, such as the nature of the predicate offence, the state of the offender’s knowledge, any international dimension in the operation, the sophistication of the offence including the degree of planning, the involvement of organized criminal syndicate, the number of transactions, the length of time over which the offence was committed, whether the offender continued to launder funds after discovering that the funds were proceeds of a crime, as well as the role of the offenders and the acts performed by him[6].

30.  As to the role of the offender and the acts performed by him, Stock VP (as he then was)  pointed out that “the director of a laundering operation or scheme should attract a greater sentence than a person engaged by him although sentences should be sufficient to deter those who might be prevailed upon by directing minds”. Stock VP stressed that it was important to note the “gradations of culpability”, giving the example that a drug addict or petty crook who was paid a small sum to open an account and hand over its operation to another with no more participation and no more knowledge than that it is going to be used for some sort of crime is much less culpable than an offender of a different sort not “used” in that way[7].

31.  In the present case, the amount of money laundered was HK$2,529,062.40.  Mr. Ng says that this was a lot of money, though it must also be said there were many cases where the amounts of money laundered were much larger than this amount.  The Account had been used to receive and withdraw “black money” for 6 days only, i.e. between 25 March 2022 and 30 March 2022.  Hence, the scale of operation can be described as medium or might even be small, and definitely not within the substantial category.

32.  Nevertheless, bearing in mind that the sentencing purposes to be achieved are punishment and deterrence both in the specific sense (i.e. deterring the defendant from committing the same offence again)  and in the general sense (i.e. deterring other people from committing the same or similar offence), a sentence of immediate imprisonment is the only appropriate sentencing option even though the defendant has pleaded guilty and does not have any prior criminal record.  In fact, Mr. Ng concedes that imprisonment is inevitable.

33.  In the present case, the defendant claims that he had lent his bank account to a friend at the latter’s request.  The defendant’s claim is very suspicious.  It is because the defendant could have easily turned down the request of his friend by saying that he had no bank account to lend. It is noted that the defendant opened the Account only on 24 March 2022, and he must have “lent” it out immediately thereafter since the Account started to receive “black money” on the very next day, i.e. 25 March 2022.

34.  Furthermore, this was clearly not a case where the defendant just lent to his friend a bank account that he had already had at the time of his friend’s request. From the fact that the Account was opened on 24 March 2022 and “black money” started to be deposited into the Account on the following day (and if the defendant himself had no connection whatsoever with the predicate offence, as he is claiming now), the only reasonable and irresistible inference must be that this was a case where the defendant opened the Account at the request of his friend, passed it over to his friend, relinquished completely his control over the operation of the Account to his friend, and had never had an intention to take the Account back from his friend.

35.  And all these were done by the defendant, as he has admitted now, at the time when he did not know much about this friend, and the defendant’s admission must be correct as corroborated by the fact that he did not even know how to contact this friend or the person introducing this friend to him now.  It is clear in my view that any reasonable man in the position of the defendant would have reasonable ground to believe that the Account that he had opened for this friend would be used in connection with criminal offences of some sort.  As it turns out, Mr. Chan Tim-loi and Ms Chan Tsz-yuk who were victims of the deception offences referred to earlier had paid a total of HK$354,005 into the Account, and these proceeds of indictable offences were withdrawn and cannot be traced now.

36.  Mr. Chan Tim-loi and Ms Chan Tsz-yuk were victims of deception offences.  They did not just pay money into the Account opened by the defendant.  Mr. Chan paid the swindlers into different bank accounts between 9 March 2022 and 31 March 2022, and Ms Chan did the same between 21 March 2022 and 11 April 2022, which means that some people had practiced deception on them even before the defendant opened the Account.  The only reasonable and irresistible inference must be that the predicate offences against Mr. Chan and Ms Chan were committed by one or more than one syndicate, and that the defendant had made the Account available for use of such syndicate or syndicates.

37.  As I have already alluded, amongst the money paid into the Account, HK$354,005 had been proven to be proceeds of indictable offences, even though there is no or no sufficient evidence to prove that the defendant took part in or had knowledge of such indictable offences.

38.  There is no evidence of any international dimension in the operation of the predicate offence or the money laundering operation.  There is also no or no sufficient evidence to show that the defendant took part in or had knowledge of the predicate offence.  I have grave suspicion that the defendant had actually received benefit for opening the Account and given it to his friend, but whether or not he had actually received benefit, it makes little difference to the sentence, since according to the authorities, what matters includes the amount of money laundered, and not the benefit received by the defendant.

39.  In Wan Kwok Keung, from the money laundering cases that were set out in Hsu Yu Yi with the amounts involved and the sentences imposed, Yeung JA (as he then was)  observed that:

“In HKSAR v Hsu Yu Yi [2010] 5 HKLRD 536, Cheung JA set out the amounts of money involved and the sentences passed in a number of “money laundering” cases. The sentencing starting point is 3 years or so where the “black money” involved is between 1 million and 2 million dollars, 4 years or so where it is between 3 million and 6 million dollars, and could be over 5 years where it is above 10 million dollars.”

40.  The observation by Yeung JA has been consistently referred to in cases thereafter, such as 香港特別行政區 訴 廖麗婷[8]; 香港特別行政區對Tsang Yiu Kong (曾耀光) [9].

41.  In the present case, the amount of money laundered was HK$2,529,062.40 by means of 53 deposits over a period of 6 days.  Mr. Ng submits that the Court may adopt a starting point of imprisonment for 3 years and 6 months.  Virtually all “black money” had been withdrawn from the Account.

42.  Having considered the facts of this case, and the sentencing considerations as set out in Boma Amaso, I consider that an immediate term of imprisonment for 36 months to be the appropriate starting point. Despite the submission of Mr. Ng, I am of the view that this is the proper starting point, bearing in mind particularly of the role played by the defendant in the offence (as I have said before), and in line with the observation of Yeung V.P. on the sentencing quantum in Wan Kwok Keung.

43.  There is no aggravating feature in this case that requires an increase of the starting point.

44.  The defendant has entered a timely guilty plea.  He is entitled to have his sentence discounted by one-third.

45.  I have also considered all other matters that have been raised in the mitigation of Mr. Ng and the three mitigation letters.  I have no reason to doubt the defendant’s remorse, and the support of his family for his rehabilitation.  I note that he has a clear record. However, after he has been given one-third discount of the sentence, these all other matters have little mitigating effect.

46.  For these reasons, but for the prosecution’s application for enhancement of the sentence pursuant to section 27(11)  of the OSCO, the sentence to be imposed on the defendant will be 24 months’ imprisonment.

Application for enhancement of sentence

47.  The prosecution requests the Court to impose a heavier sentence on the defendant under section 27(11)(b)  of the OSCO. Mr. Ng does not dispute that the prosecution has fulfilled the procedural requirements of the application for an increased sentence.

48.  In support of the application for an enhanced sentence, the prosecution has submitted two witness statements made by Chief Inspector Li Yiu Nam (“CIP Li”)  dated 25 August 2025 and 5 September 2025 respectively pursuant to section 27(2)(c)  and (d)  of the OSCO as supporting information. CIP Li provided the Court with information and data from 2020 to July 2025 on the prevalence of the use of "stooge" in the commission of money laundering offences and the nature and extent of the harm to the community caused directly or indirectly by recent occurrence of such offences. Mr. Ng does not object to the admissibility of the witness statements made by CIP Li. He does not require CIP Li to be cross-examined, and there is no evidence from the defence on the sentence enhancement issue.

49.  In fact, Mr. Ng does not oppose the prosecution’s application for enhancement of sentence under the OSCO.

50.  According to CIP Li, a "money laundering stooge" is someone who has assisted in the money laundering activities but has no or minimal involvement in the predicate offence, or has little or no knowledge of the predicate offence.  Police have discovered that many money laundering stooges in Hong Kong have sold or loaned their own accounts at financial institutions (such as bank accounts or stored value facility accounts)  to criminals for money laundering purposes. Some money laundering stooges are recruited to open new accounts at financial institutions. In either case, the purpose is the same, i.e. the stooges allow criminals to use their accounts for money laundering purposes. Only a very small number of stooges actually operate the accounts for criminals, while the majority of stooges allow criminals to have full access and control of their accounts.

51.  It is clear from the admission of the defendant that he was acting as a money laundering stooge, if he were not involved in or had knowledge of the predicate offence as he is claiming now and has been sentenced on this basis.

52.  Based on the witness statements provided by CIP Li and the data listed in Table A of his first statement, it is clear that deception cases and money laundering cases are widespread and on the rise from 2020 to 2024.  The total number of deception cases and money laundering cases (detected and undetected cases)  was 16,643 in 2020, 20,114 in 2021, 28,936 in 2022, 42,004 in 2023, and 47,063 in 2024. On the other hand, from January to July 2025, the total number of these cases was 26,931.

53.  Furthermore, majority of the arrested persons (in detected cases)  served as money laundering stooges. According to the data provided by CIP Li in Table A of his first statement, in 2020, a total of 2,422 persons were arrested, of which 760 persons (31.38%)  were stooges; in 2021, 3,807 persons were arrested, of which 2,200 persons (58.31%)  were stooges; in 2022, 5,264 persons were arrested, of which 3,708 persons (70.44%)  were stooges; in 2023, 9,239 persons were arrested, of which 6,485 persons (70.19%)  were stooges; and in 2024, 10,496 persons were arrested, of which 7,883 persons (75.10%)  were stooges.  On the other hand, from January to July 2025, the total number of persons arrested was 4,404, of which 3,147 persons (71.46%)  were stooges.  

54.  CIP Li has also set out in Table B of his first statement the amount of reported losses and/or proceeds laundered, and use of stooge accounts in deception cases and money laundering cases (detected with arrest).  It appears from Table B that the amount of losses reported by the victims and the proceeds of crime laundered has always been quite large.

55.  The data provided by CIP Li in Table B are as follows:

(a)  In 2020, 1,844 deception and money laundering cases were detected and arrests were made, with the victims reporting total losses of HK$3,017.89 million. Of these, 845 cases involved losses through stooge accounts, with total losses of HK$1,879.83 million, accounting for 62.29% of the total losses reported by the victims.

(b)  In 2021, 2,269 deception and money laundering cases were detected and arrests were made, with the victims reporting total losses of HK$9,662.30 million. Of these, 1,451 cases involved losses through stooge accounts, with total losses of HK$5,565.15 million, accounting for 57.60% of the total losses reported by the victims.

(c)  In 2022, 3,705 deception and money laundering cases were detected and arrests were made, with the victims reporting total losses of HK$36,644.73 million. Of these, 2,886 cases involved losses through stooge accounts, with total losses of HK$36,320.17 million, accounting for 99.11% of the total losses reported by the victims.

(d)  In 2023, 5,529 deception and money laundering cases were detected and arrests were made, with the victims reporting total losses of HK$12,033.26 million. Of these, 3,970 cases involved losses through stooge accounts, with total losses of HK$9,984.38 million, accounting for 82.97% of the total losses reported by the victims.

(e)  In 2024, 5,250 deception and money laundering cases were detected and arrests were made, with the victims reporting total losses of HK$6,115.15 million. Of these, 3,675 cases involved losses through stooge accounts, with total losses of HK$4,466.39 million, accounting for 73.04% of the total losses reported by the victims.

(f)  From January to July 2025, 1,359 deception and money laundering cases were detected and arrests were made, with the victims reporting total losses of HK$2,308.98 million. Of these, 574 cases involved losses through stooge accounts, with total losses of HK$654.64 million, accounting for 28.35% of the total losses reported by the victims.

56.  It is clear from the data provided by CIP Li in Table B of his first statement that for the period between January 2025 and July 2025, the amount of reported losses in all the deception and money laundering cases that had been detected with arrest has dropped significantly, as compared to the corresponding data for each of the years between 2020 and 2024.  For instance, in the first 7 months in 2025, the reported losses of these cases were HK$2,308.98 million, whereas the corresponding data for 2024 were HK$6,115.15 million.  Likewise, the amount of reported losses in these cases (detected with arrest)  involving the use of stooge accounts had also dropped significantly.  The data for the first 7 months in 2025 were HK$654.64 million, accounting for only 28.35% of the reported losses of all these cases that had been detected with arrest, whereas the corresponding data for 2024 was HK$4,466.39 million, accounting for 73.04% of the reported losses of all these cases that had been detected with arrest.  This Court therefore suggested that CIP Li should provide further evidence on how these changes in the data affected the issue on the prevalence of the use of stooge accounts in deception and money laundering cases, and the harm and damage caused by the use of stooge accounts.

57.  It was for this reason that CIP Li filed his second witness statement dated 5 September 2025.  In his second statement, CIP Li points out that if a detected case (deception or money laundering)  has no stooge account identified at the time when the data was captured, the amount of loss in that case will not fall into column 4 of Table B (i.e. the amount of losses in detected with arrest cases involving the use of stooge accounts).  In addition, CIP Li explains the data further by saying that in respect of one of the deception cases reported in July 2025 (CCB RN 25001290), the reported loss was about HK$1.06 billion, and that case had no stooge account identified yet.  If this outlier case is excluded, the reported losses in all deception and money laundering cases (detected with arrest)  would decrease to HK$1,248.98 million, and the amount of reported losses of these cases involving the use of stooge accounts would then represent 52.4% (instead of 28.35%)  of the adjusted total.

58.  Since there is no dispute to the evidence of CIP Li, I accept, beyond reasonable doubt, the truth and accuracy of CIP Li’s evidence and give full weight to the information he has provided.

59.  Under section 27 of the OSCO, I must consider whether the relevant offences are still prevalent at the time of sentencing (rather than when the offences were committed)  because the purpose of increasing the sentence is to target those who intend to commit the relevant offences: see HKSAR v Chung Chi Keung[10]. Furthermore, in considering whether the relevant offences are prevalent, I should not focus on whether the number of the relevant offences has increased or decreased, but rather on the prevalence of the offences: see HKSAR v Xu Mai-qing (徐麥清)[11].

60.  Mr. Chu, Senior Public Prosecutor, submits that even if the Court finds that there is a decrease in the amount of losses in all the deception and money laundering cases involving the use of stooge account, these offences are still prevalent and the harm caused to the community is still substantial.  The defendant’s sentence should still be enhanced under the OSCO, and the decrease may only be relevant to the percentage of enhancement.

61.  Mr. Ng makes no further submissions after the prosecution has filed the second witness statement of CIP Li.

62.  In my judgment, according to data provided by CIP Li in Table A of his first statement, the total number of deception cases and money laundering cases (detected and undetected)  is 26,931 for the first 7 months in July 2025, which means that on average, about 3,847 cases occurred each month, or about 128 cases per day assuming each month has 30 days. If this average figure applies to the whole year of 2025, there will be a notional number of 46,164 cases, which will be very close to the total number of cases in 2024 (47,063), and more than the number of cases in each of the years between 2020 and 2023.  It means that deception and money laundering cases are still very prevalent in Hong Kong.

63.  As to the data provided in Table B, what has been revealed is that the number of deception and money laundering cases (detected with arrest)  has dropped significantly in the first 7 months of 2025.  Only 1,359 cases were detected with arrest, which means that on average, only 194 cases each month.  When these figures are compared with the data for 2024 when a total of 5,250 cases were detected with arrest (or an average of 437 cases each month), there is a decrease in the number of such cases. As such, it must follow that the amount of reported losses of such detected with arrest cases in the first 7 months of 2025 has dropped as compared with the previous year, but it does not reflect the true picture of the prevalence of the offence.  In terms of absolute figures, a loss of 2,308.98 million in the first 7 months of 2025 means on average, a loss of 329.85 million a month, which must still be a substantial loss to the community.

64.  Furthermore, the data in Table B shows that even though the amount of losses in the detected with arrest cases of deception and money laundering involving stooge accounts made up only 28.35% of the total reported losses in all the detected with arrest cases, in terms of absolute figures, the amount of reported losses involving stooges in these detected with arrest cases is still as high as HK$654.64 million, representing an average of HK$93.52 million a month in the first 7 months of 2025.  Furthermore, if the exceptional case involving a loss of HK$1.06 billion is not to be counted, the amount of losses in such detected with arrest cases of deception and money laundering involving stooge accounts would account for 52.4% of the total losses in all these detected with arrest cases.  In terms of the number of such detected with arrest cases involving stooge accounts, there are 574 cases in these 7 months, or on average 82 cases each month, or more than 2 and nearly 3 cases a day.  In my judgment, such data show that the use of stooge accounts in the commission of deception and money laundering case is still prevalent.

65.  In addition, I believe that the data in Table A also provides an indicator of the prevalence of the use of stooges and the severity of the harm caused. Table A shows that in 2020, the use of money laundering stooges was not common among fraudsters. Among those arrested that year, only 31.38% were stooges. However, starting from 2021, the use of stooges to obtain proceeds of crimes became a common tactic in the commission of the predicate offences.  In 2021, the percentage of arrested persons who were stooges to the total number of arrested persons rose to 58.31%, and this percentage remained at or above 70% for each of the years between 2022 and 2024.  Even in the first 7 months of 2025, the percentage of stooges arrested to the total number of arrested persons stands at 71.46%.  This also demonstrates that the use of stooges to commit the specified offences remains prevalent.

66.  Based on the information provided by the prosecution through CIP Li, I find that the prosecution has successfully proved beyond reasonable doubt that the specified offence committed by the defendant is still widespread and that the community has suffered significant losses, directly or indirectly, as a result of the recent occurrence of such offences.  For this reason, I grant the prosecution’s application to enhance the defendant’s sentence.

67.  I also rule that in order to deter anyone from acting as a money laundering stooge, the proper percentage of enhancement should be one-third of the original sentence.

68.  As I have said before, the defendant’s sentence before enhancement is 24 months’ imprisonment.  For the reasons aforesaid, and with an enhancement by one-third, the defendant is accordingly sentenced to a term of 32 months’ imprisonment.