LAU MEI WAI v. HKSAR

[English Translation - 英譯本]
HCA 1698/2011

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO.1698 OF 2011

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JUDGMENT

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Background

1.  This is an appeal against an order of Master Reuden Lai on 28 March 2012 by which the Plaintiff’s Statement of Claim was struck out and her claims against the Defendant were dismissed in their entirety.

2.  In 2000, the Plaintiff filed a petition for divorce in the District Court (FCMC 7558/2000) against her then husband (hereinafter “ex-husband”).  On 29 January 2001, the District Court granted a decree nisi and made an order requiring the ex-husband, upon the making of the decree absolute, to pay the Plaintiff nominal maintenance of HK$1 per annum.  On 23 April 2001, upon the ex-husband undertaking to provide the two children of the family with all the necessary living expenses, the District Court ordered, with both parties’ consent, that the Plaintiff and the ex-husband were to have joint custody or care and control of the two children of the family.

3.  In July 2007, the Plaintiff made a report to the Cheung Sha Wan Police Station accusing the ex-husband of cheating her and complaining that since 4 May 2007 he had ceased paying her the said maintenance and living expenses.  The police took the view that her complaint did not involve any criminal elements and suggested that she should seek assistance from the District Court or the Social Welfare Department (hereinafter “SWD”).

4.  On 11 July 2007, the Plaintiff submitted to the Legal Aid Department (hereinafter “LAD”) a Questionnaire on Proceedings for Variation (Increase) of Maintenance Order and a Questionnaire on Proceedings for Variation of Custody / Access Order, on both of which she provided the address and phone number of the ex-husband’s workplace.

5.  On 10 August 2007, the Plaintiff made two applications to LAD for legal aid (the file numbers were MAT 16142/07 and MAT 16143/07 respectively) for the purpose of issuing proceedings in the District Court for variation of the maintenance order and custody order made in FCMC 7558/2000.  On 17 August 2007, the Plaintiff wrote to LAD stating that she had nothing to add regarding the two legal aid applications.

6.  In October 2007, the Plaintiff, upon the request of LAD staff, submitted documents pertaining to the transfer by her of certain real property in Dongguan.

7.  On 9 November 2007, the Plaintiff wrote to LAD again, stating that she learnt from the Business Registration Office that her ex-husband’s company had closed down and the contact number was cancelled, and claiming that she was unable to contact him.  On the same day, LAD wrote to the Plaintiff refusing her application for legal aid, by reason of her failure to prove her ex-husband’s financial status and provide his (sic)

8.  (sic) correspondence address or phone number, and reminding her of her right to lodge an appeal within 14 days to the Registrar of the High Court against the refusal of her legal aid applications. The Plaintiff did not lodge any appeal within the time limit and, after a lapse of 4 years, made the claims in the present proceedings.

Plaintiff’s claims

9.  The Plaintiff asked the court to adjudge, pursuant to the Crown Legal Function Procedure Ordinance and Article 35 of the Basic Law, that public officers of LAD, the Police Force, the District Council, the Office of the Ombudsman and the Hospital Authority and so on had committed malfeasance and collective corruption and jointly committed offences, and to order them to tender apologies and pay compensation.

10.  The Plaintiff made an application before Master Lai for withdrawal of the claims against the District Council, the Office of the Ombudsman, the Hospital Authority and others, leaving behind the claims against LAD and the Police Force only.  She also applied for withdrawal of the allegations of collective corruption and joint commission of offences and addition of an allegation of perversion of the course of justice.  In short, in the present appeal, I only need to consider the claims of the Plaintiff against LAD and the Police Force for malfeasance and perverting the course of justice. If there is any evidence substantiating the allegation of perverting the course of justice, I will direct the Plaintiff to amend the Statement of Claim, otherwise it will not be necessary to consider the application to amend the Statement of Claim.

11.  The Plaintiff has put forward 10 grounds of appeal:

(1) The ex-husband is the party under a duty to make financial provision;

(2) The ex-husband has committed a criminal offence by wilfully disappearing and failing to maintain the children of the family;

(3) The ex-husband has committed a criminal offence by committing contempt of court;

(4) The ex-husband has committed a criminal offence by wilfully committing fraud;

(5) The Police Force and LAD owed a statutory duty of care to the Plaintiff;

(6) By respectively failing to investigate the criminal offences committed by the ex-husband and failing to grant legal aid, the Police Force and LAD have breached the said statutory duty of care;

(7) LAD was under a duty to request, through a lawyer, the Police Force to conduct investigation and provide information on the disappeared ex-husband;

(8) The LAD staff member has wilfully made false statements in the affirmation;

(9) The police officers have perverted the course of justice; and

(10) The Master has deprived the Plaintiff of her right to amend the Statement of Claim.

Ground of appeal (1): The ex-husband is the party under a duty to make financial provision

12.  The government counsel for the Defendant submits that this issue is totally irrelevant to the present appeal.  The Plaintiff’s reply is: whether the ex-husband had committed the criminal offence of failing to maintain the children depended on whether he had the duty to make financial provision to the children.  She cited the order made by the District Court on 23 April 2001, which indicated that, upon the ex-husband’s undertaking to provide the two children of the family with all the necessary living expenses, the District Court ordered, with both parties’ consent, that the Plaintiff and the ex-husband were to have joint custody or care and control of the two children of the family.  She contends that the Master had misconstrued the order to mean that she and the ex-husband were jointly under the duty to make financial provision to the two children of the family.

13.  Looking at the Reasons for Decision of the Master as a whole, the Master had never sought to interpret the above order, nor had he commented on whether the ex-husband had the duty to make financial provision to the two children of the family.  On the contrary, the Master very well knew that the Plaintiff’s claims were based on the ex-husband’s undertaking to the District Court to provide the two children of the family with all the necessary living expenses.  The interpretation of the order has nothing to do with whether the ex-husband has committed the criminal offence of failing to maintain the children: see paragraphs 13 to 16 below.

Ground of appeal (2): The ex-husband has committed a criminal offence by wilfully disappearing and failing to maintain the children of the family

14.  The Plaintiff submits that according to the order made by the District Court on 23 April 2001, the ex-husband, and he alone, was under the duty to make financial provision to the two children of the family.  She refers to section 27 of the Offences against the Person Ordinance which provides for criminal liability in respect of exposing a child or young person.  She further submits that since 4 May 2007 the ex-husband had, by wilfully disappearing and failing to maintain the children of the family, breached his undertaking to the Court and also contravened the Offences against the Person Ordinance and hence violated the criminal law, and it was not open to the Police Force to shirk their duty to conduct investigation and prosecution.

15.  Section 27(1) of the Offences against the Person Ordinance provides as follows:

“(1) If any person over the age of 16 years who has the custody, charge or care of any child or young person under that age wilfully assaults, ill-treats, neglects, abandons or exposes such child or young person or causes or procures such child or young person to be assaulted, ill-treated, neglected, abandoned or exposed in a manner likely to cause such child or young person unnecessary suffering or injury to his health (including injury to or loss of sight, or hearing, or limb, or organ of the body, or any mental derangement) such person shall be guilty or an offence …”

16.  The offence under section 27(1) comprises three elements: (1) the offender at whom the section is directed is the person having custody, charge or care of a child or young person (the victim); (2) the offender wilfully does certain act such as abandoning or exposing the victim; and (3) such act will likely cause the child or young person unnecessary suffering or injury to his health.  During the period in question, the two children of the family lived with the Plaintiff.  Although the ex-husband undertook to provide the two children of the family with all necessary living expenses and was granted joint custody or care and control with the Plaintiff, it was the Plaintiff who actually had custody, control or care of the children.  The Plaintiff has neither provided any evidence that the ex-husband was the one who actually had custody, control or care of the children, nor adduced any evidence to show that the wilful acts of the ex-husband likely caused them unnecessary suffering or injury to their health.  The mere fact that the ex-husband has breached the undertaking to provide the two children of the family with living expenses cannot constitute an offence under section 27(1), and one can understand why the Police Force did not conduct investigation and prosecution.

17.  The Plaintiff also refers to the UK Child Support Act 1997 and some judicial authorities on the English law, with a view to proving that the ex-husband had committed a criminal offence.  Since those laws are not applicable to Hong Kong, I do not take them into consideration. This ground of appeal fails.

Ground of appeal (3): The ex-husband has committed a criminal offence by committing contempt of court

18.  The Plaintiff refers to section 48B of the District Court Ordinance which stipulates that contempt of court is a criminal offence.  She contends that the Master wrongly decided that the ex-husband’s contempt amounted to a civil dispute and the Police Force did not have any duty to conduct investigation and prosecution.

19.  Section 48B of the District Court Ordinance provides as follows:

“A judge has the powers of a judge of the Court of First Instance to-

(a) punish for disobedience of a judgment or order of the Court; or

(b) punish for breach of undertaking; or

(c) discipline or punish for breach of a duty imposed upon a solicitor by rules of court.”

The section only confers power on a district judge to impose sanctions for non-compliance with a judgment or order of the District Court without specifying the nature of contempt.  The judge also has the powers to pass a custodial sentence on a person who has committed civil contempt.

20.  Whether contempt of court is civil or criminal in nature depends on the nature of the act committed.  Generally speaking, in a civil case, breach of an undertaking made to the court constitutes civil contempt and is not a criminal offence.  Criminal contempt refers to acts involving interference with the administration of justice, for example, interfering with witnesses, forging or destroying evidence, and so on: see Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, HCMP 2390/2008.

21.  The Plaintiff alleges that, by breaching his undertaking to the District Court, the ex-husband had committed a criminal offence of contempt of court.  However, on any view of the matter, what the ex-husband did only amounted to civil contempt.  If the Plaintiff intends to seek relief, she must commence legal proceedings by herself and cannot request the Police Force to act on her behalf.  This ground of appeal fails.

Ground of appeal (4): The ex-husband has committed a criminal offence by wilfully committing fraud

22.  The Plaintiff alleges that, by wilfully disappearing, failing to maintain the children and wilfully committing fraud, the ex-husband had contravened section 92 of the Crimes Ordinance which involved a criminal act and not a civil dispute, and the Police Force was under the obligation to conduct investigation and prosecution.  The Plaintiff’s case is as follows.  In April 2001, the District Court, accepting the recommendations of a social worker of SWD, ordered that the Plaintiff and the ex-husband were to have joint custody, care and control of the two children of the family until they went to the USA with the ex-husband for long-term residence.  The undertaking given by the ex-husband might be related to this arrangement.  Subsequently, the Plaintiff came to know that the ex-husband co-habited with another woman, and the two children of the family changed their mind, refusing to go to the USA with the ex-husband and insisting on living with the Plaintiff.  The Plaintiff then entered into an oral agreement with the ex-husband, whereby the ex-husband continued to pay wages to the foreign domestic helper and repay the mortgage loan of the flat whereas the Plaintiff paid the living expenses of the two children of the family.  Subsequently, putting up poor performance of his business as an excuse, the ex-husband refused to continue to pay wages to the foreign domestic helper.  In 2005, he further refused to repay the mortgage loan, with the excuse of personal financial hardship.  He issued several post-dated cheques to the Plaintiff in purported payment of $4,000 per month being the living expenses of the two children of the family.  After one year, on 4 May 2007, the ex-husband wilfully disappeared and failed to maintain the children, and the said post-dated cheques were dishonoured.  The Plaintiff accused the ex-husband of wilfully committing fraud.  However, during the above period which spanned 6 years, the Plaintiff neither made any application to the District Court for variation of the maintenance order or custody order nor asked the court to enforce the undertaking given by the ex-husband.  The sergeant who handled the Plaintiff’s complaint took the view that the complaint involved a civil dispute.  He refused to conduct criminal investigation and suggested that the Plaintiff seek relief from the District Court or assistance from SWD.

23.  Although the undertaking given by the ex-husband to the District Court is still binding, the circumstances under which the undertaking was given had changed.  The Plaintiff had further entered into an oral agreement with the ex-husband, and it is this agreement, made in 2005, which formed the basis of the Plaintiff’s claims.  The ex-husband had also performed the agreement for one year or so.  Their dispute is prima facie a civil dispute.  If the Plaintiff was seeking to enforce the undertaking given by the ex-husband to the District Court, she should have commenced proceedings for civil contempt and it was not open to her to seek relief by requesting the Police Force to prosecute the ex-husband.  This ground of appeal fails.

Grounds of appeal (5) and (6): did the Defendant’s breach of statutory duty of care constitute a cause of action?

24.  These two grounds of appeal involve the same issues of statutory duty of care and whether the Defendant was in breach of that duty.  The Plaintiff submits that according to section 10 of the Police Force Ordinance, the Police Force is under the statutory duty of care, namely to arrest and prosecute criminal offenders, so as to ensure that the harm done to the victim is minimised.  She also submits that the Legal Aid Ordinance requires LAD to ensure that those who have meritorious claims or defences are not denied access to the court by reason of their lack of financial means.  The government counsel for the Defendant does not dispute that the Police Force and the Director of Legal Aid were under the respective statutory duties.  However, he denies that they were in breach of these duties. He also submits that a breach of statutory duty is not necessarily equal to a breach of civil duty of care under private law, nor does it necessarily give rise to a cause of action.

25.  In Kaisilk Development Ltd v Urban Renewal Authority [2004] 1 HKLRD 907, Rogers VP adopted the legal principles laid down by the House of Lords in X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633 and Stovin v Wise [1996] AC 923, namely that a breach of statutory duty does not necessarily give rise to a cause of action and that all depends on the legislative intent of the enactment which imposes the statutory duty in question.  Rogers VP said (at 918):

“It is trite law that, in the ordinary case, a breach of statutory duty does not, by itself, give rise to any private law cause of action. In the words of Lord Browne-Wilkinson in X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633 at p. 731D-E:

… a private law cause of action will arise if it can be shown, as a matter of construction of the statute, that the statutory duty was imposed for the protection of a limited class of the public and that Parliament intended to confer on members of that class a private right of action for breach of the duty.

Lord Hoffmann expressed the same view in Stovin v Wise [1996] AC 923 at p. 952F when he said:

Whether a statutory duty gives rise to a private cause of action is a question of construction: see R v Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison, ex p Hague [1992] 1 AC 58. It requires an examination of the policy of the statute to decide whether it was intended to confer a right to compensation for breach.

In my view, the plaintiff has not begun to show that it was the intention of the Legislature to provide a private right of action to property owners for any breach of any statutory duty by the defendant.”

The statutory duty under public law is different from the civil duty of care under private law.  The former does not necessarily constitute the latter.  Whether a statutory duty constitutes a civil duty of care under private law is a question of construction of law.  A breach of statutory duty will give rise to a private law cause of action only if, on a correct construction of the law which imposes the statutory duty, the duty was imposed for the protection of a limited class of the public and the legislature intended to confer on the members of that class a cause of action under private law.  A statutory duty imposed by law on government departments, public organisations or indeed anyone will not automatically constitute a duty of care under private law, and a breach of a statutory duty will not automatically give rise to a cause of action under private law.

26.  The Police Force Ordinance provides for the constitution of the police force, police discipline and duties, police powers, procedure and miscellaneous matters.  The statutory duties imposed by section 10 on the Police Force to investigate crimes and to arrest and prosecute offenders are for the protection of the public safety of the society as a whole, not for the protection of the interests of a limited class of the public.  The Ordinance does not expressly provide that if the Police Force is in breach of a statutory duty, it has to be liable for the damage suffered by any member of the public protected by that duty as a result of such breach.  Nor is there anything in the Ordinance which enables me to draw an inference that, apart from imposing the statutory duties on the police, the legislature also intended to make the police force liable for damage suffered by a member of the public protected by a statutory duty as a result of a breach of that duty.  In my judgment, the Police Force Ordinance does not impose on the police force any civil duty of under private law.  If the police force is in breach of a statutory duty, it will not give rise to a private law cause of action in favour of the general public.

27.  The main objective of the Legal Aid Ordinance is to grant legal aid to people with limited means so that they can conduct civil proceedings.  The Director of Legal Aid is under a statutory duty to handle applications for legal aid and grant legal aid to eligible applicants.  This statutory duty is not intended to cater for the interest of a limited class of the public.  It is particularly worth noting that an applicant for legal aid who is aggrieved by a decision of the Director of Legal Aid refusing the application may, pursuant to section 26 or 26A (as the case may be), lodge an appeal to the Registrar of the High Court or bring the decision on review before a special committee formed by the Court of Final Appeal (sic).  These provisions indicate that the intention of the legislature in enacting the Legal Aid Ordinance is that, if the Director of Legal Aid is in breach of his statutory duty, the form of relief available to an applicant for legal aid is to seek an appeal or review, and the Ordinance does not give rise to a cause of action under private law.  Furthermore, as a matter of policy, if a duty of care under private law was imposed on the Director of Legal Aid in addition to the statutory duty, it would be difficult for LAD to operate effectively.  In order to avoid civil liability under private law, the LAD staff might, for fear of receiving complaints or becoming involved in legal proceedings, issue legal aid certificates indiscriminately, thereby causing abuse and wastage of resources; even worse, the whole legal aid system would come to a standstill, as a result of which those who were eligible for legal aid would not obtain the service they should receive.  Therefore, in my judgment, the legislative intent behind the Legal Aid Ordinance is to impose on the Director of Legal Aid certain statutory duties which are owed to the public, but these duties are not intended to give rise to civil duties of care under private law.  It follows that, even though the Director of Legal Aid was in breach of the statutory duty, it did not give rise to any cause of action in favour of the Plaintiff.

28.  On the above basis, even though the police, in performing their statutory duty, had been negligent by failing to discharge the duty of care to conduct investigation and prosecute the ex-husband, the Plaintiff does not have any cause of action against the police. Similarly, even though the LAD staff did not perform their statutory duty, as a result of which the Director of Legal Aid wrongly refused the Plaintiff’s application for legal aid, she also does not have any cause of action against LAD. The form of relief open to her is to lodge an appeal to the Registrar of the High Court.  She cannot institute proceedings against the Defendant on the basis of breach of statutory duty.  The two grounds of appeal put forward by the Plaintiff in this respect arise from her inability to distinguish the statutory duty under public law from the civil duty of care under private law.  In other words, neither the Commissioner of the Police nor the Director of Legal Aid owed to the Plaintiff any “statutory duty of care” as she alleged.  These two grounds of appeal are devoid of merit.

Ground of appeal (7): LAD was under a duty to request, through a lawyer, the Police Force to conduct investigation and provide information on the disappeared ex-husband

29.  The Plaintiff’s allegation here is that LAD had a duty to request, through a lawyer, the Police Force to conduct investigation and provide information on the disappeared ex-husband.  She has not provided any authorities in support of her allegation.  Madam Chan, the Assistant Director of Legal Aid, points out in her affirmation that, pursuant to section 10 of the Legal Aid Ordinance and section 3(2) of the Legal Aid Regulations, the duty of LAD is confined to handling applications for legal aid, and that LAD neither provides any legal advisory service nor is under any duty to recommend any applicant to turn to other legal procedures.

30.  Section 10 of the Legal Aid Ordinance provides for the grant of legal aid certificates, whereas section 3(2) of the Legal Aid Regulations sets out the information which an application for legal aid must contain.  These provisions do not lend support to the claims made by Madam Chan in her affirmation.  Nor can I find any provision in the Legal Aid Ordinance and the Legal Aid Regulations which addresses the duties of LAD.  This notwithstanding, in light of these statutory provisions as a whole, Madam Chan’s evidence is in my judgment logical.  During the application period, the applicant has not yet been granted a legal aid certificate, and LAD has no authority to conduct investigation for the applicant by using public money.  If the investigation does not yield any result as expected, or if the applicant is not granted a legal aid certificate because she has failed the merits test or means test, how can LAD account to the government for the investigation expenses incurred and explain to those who have been investigated about the disturbance caused to them?  I am satisfied with Madam Chan’s evidence: LAD has neither a statutory duty nor a duty of care under private law to conduct investigation for an applicant who has not yet been granted a legal aid certificate.

Ground of appeal (8): the LAD staff member has wilfully made false statements in the affirmation

31.  The Plaintiff alleged that when she applied for legal aid, she clearly told one Miss Chan, a staff member of LAD (who was believed to be another frontline staff member, not the affirmant Madam Chan) that the ex-husband had disappeared, but Miss Chan still asked her to provide information on assets for the purpose of assessing her means.  However, on 9 November 2007, the day on which she provided information on assets, LAD refused her application for legal aid on the ground that she failed to prove her ex-husband’s financial status and provide his correspondence address or phone number.  The Plaintiff stressed that, given that the failure to provide the ex-husband’s correspondence address or phone number would necessarily be fatal to her application for legal aid, LAD should not have conducted on her the vexing procedure of a means test.

32.  Miss Chan explained that LAD conducted a means test and a merits test on the Plaintiff simultaneously.  Although the Plaintiff did provide the address and phone number of the ex-husband’s workplace in the questionnaire dated 17 August 2007, she wrote to LAD on 9 November 2007 saying that the ex-husband’s company had ceased business and that there was no way she could contact him.  For this reason, the Plaintiff failed the merits test.  As the means test had been completed, LAD refused the Plaintiff’s application.  The Plaintiff did not accept Miss Chan’s explanation and alleged that she had made a false affirmation, for which she was criminally liable, in order to cover up the negligence of LAD in dealing with her application for legal aid.

33.  This complaint does not involve any breach of statutory duty or civil duty of care under private law.  It neither constitutes a cause of action in the present case nor has anything to do with the facts of the present case.  In any event, the Plaintiff failed the merits test as LAD was not under any duty to conduct case investigation for her and she failed to provide the ex-husband’s correspondence address or phone number. This being the case, her application for legal aid was bound to be rejected.  The Plaintiff’s complaint cannot constitute a ground of appeal.

Ground of appeal (9): the police officers have perverted the course of justice

34.  The Plaintiff alleged that police officers had shifted to her the responsibility of making financial provision to the two children of the family, as a consequence of which they did not investigate the criminal offence committed by the ex-husband of failing to maintain the children, did not conduct any investigation on the “missing person” case, and did not investigate the offence of fraud committed by the ex-husband.  It was further alleged that the police officers committed perjury on oath defending and shielding each other, as a result of which justice could not be done, and this was (the Plaintiff said) a perversion of the course of justice. 

35.  These allegations are very serious, but the two bases on which they are made, namely that the ex-husband had committed the two criminal offences of failing to maintain the children and fraud, are misconceived.  As I have already held, they stem from the Plaintiff’s misunderstanding of the law.  Moreover, as the ex-husband’s company ceased operation, the Plaintiff would certainly not be able to contact him at that address by telephone.  This is not a “missing person” case.  There is nothing in the Plaintiff’s allegation of perversion of the course of justice.

Ground of appeal (10): the Master has deprived the Plaintiff of her right to amend the Statement of Claim

36.  This ground of appeal arises out of the Plaintiff’s misunderstanding of the legal procedure.  At the hearing of an application to strike out a statement of claim, if the plaintiff applies to amend the statement of claim, the court will usually deal with the striking-out application before dealing with (and allowing) the application for amendment. It is because upon hearing, the court may refuse to strike out the original statement of claim.  Furthermore, if the statement of claim containing the proposed amendments is to be struck out, it will be meaningless and a waste of time to amend the statement of claim.  A practical approach is: the court will consider both the original statement of claim and the statement of claim containing the proposed amendments.  If the court takes the view that the statement of claim so amended will not be struck out because it has a prospect of success, it will allow the amendments and dismiss the striking-out application.  If the court takes the view that the claim has no prospect of success, it will not allow the amendments.  In the present case, the Master appears to have adopted this procedure.  However, as he took the view that the statement of claim containing the proposed amendments had no prospect of success, he did not allow the amendments.  Similarly, I consider the allegations regarding perversion of the course of justice are wholly unfounded.  The Plaintiff has not yet formally applied for leave to amend the Statement of Claim by adding in the allegation of the police having perverted the course of justice.  In the absence of anything to support the allegation that the police have perverted the course of justice, I will not direct that the Statement of Claim be amended.

Conclusion

37.  The Plaintiff has failed to distinguish criminal contempt of court from civil contempt.  Her cause of action was built upon her erroneous view that a statutory duty of care would automatically give rise to a civil duty of care under private law, and hence her allegations of breach of statutory duty by the Police Force and LAD.  She erroneously considered that the ex-husband had committed the criminal offences of failing to maintain the children and fraud, as a result of which she wrongly alleged that the Police Force had breached the statutory duty to conduct investigation on and prosecute the ex-husband and had breached a duty of care owed to her.  As a result of the above, she also erroneously considered that the police had perverted the course of justice.  She also erroneously thought that LAD had a statutory duty to conduct case investigation for a legal aid applicant and to locate the Applicant’s ex-husband and had therefore breached a duty of care owed to her.

38.  The Plaintiff does not have any reasonable cause of action.  Her Statement of Claim is maliciously injurious, frivolous, vexatious and abusive of process.  I uphold the Master’s order striking out the Statement of Claim and dismissing all of the Plaintiff’s claims against the Defendant.  I dismiss the Plaintiff’s appeal with costs to be taxed if not agreed.

Translated by the Judgment Translation Unit of the Judiciary and vetted by Mr. Edmund Cham, Solicitor.