DHESSI IVINDER SINGH v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD/ NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE

CACV 578/2018

[2019] HKCA 621

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 578 OF 2018

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 959 OF 2017)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Yuen JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  This court (Hon Yuen JA and Lisa Wong J) handed down judgment on 2 April 2019 ([2019] HKCA 364) dismissing the applicant’s appeal against an order by Mrs Justice Campbell-Moffat given on 11 December 2018 refusing the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review concerning his non‑refoulement claim. The facts and issues in the appeal before the Court of Appeal, as well as the court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in our judgment and will not be repeated here.

2.  The applicant subsequently applied, by a Notice of Motion on 17 April 2019, for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal and lodged his written submissions on 2 May 2019.

3.  The applicant stated the following in his Notice of Motion:

“The applicant gently did not have enough way to submit best of grounds for judicial review that time the applicant was in prison.

Paragraph 16 of the judgment, CACV 578/2018 dated 2 April 2019, the Honourable Judges did not considered applicant these allegation.

The applicant will be picked out for misappropriating by the adjudicator.

Applicant will be submit best of the grounds as soon as possible.”

4.  The Registrar of Civil Appeals had directed on 23 April 2019 that the Notice of Motion shall be determined on paper only without an oral hearing.  We agree it is appropriate to determine this application on paper.

5.  Section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap. 484 provides that an appeal shall lie to the Court of Final Appeal at the discretion of the Court of Appeal or the Court of Final Appeal, from any judgment of the Court of Appeal in any civil cause or matter, whether final or interlocutory, if, in the opinion of the Court of Appeal or the Court of Final Appeal, as the case may be, the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.

6.  No question of great general or public importance has been identified in the grounds in the Notice of Motion.

7.  Nor do we see any basis for granting leave on the “or otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b).  In paragraph 17 of our judgment, we had referred to the fact that the applicant’s allegations referred to in paragraph 16 had come out of the blue, had not been made before the judge, nor in the notice of appeal, nor in his skeleton submissions, and that he had not provided any satisfactory explanation for his failure to do so in the past.  The conditions of Ladd v Marshall were not satisfied and accordingly this court did not take these new allegations into account.

8.  In the circumstances, we cannot find any basis for granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.

9.  By reason of the above, the Notice of Motion dated 17 April 2019 is dismissed.