IQBAL QASIM v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION DEPARTMENT

HCAL 1360/2026

[2026] HKCFI 5311

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1360 OF 2026

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D E C I S I O N

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A. Introduction

1.  Mothers and sons sometimes fall out.  Such an unfortunate occurrence is part of the underlying circumstances of the present case.

2.  Here, the Applicant seeks leave to apply for judicial review so as to challenge a decision or decisions of the Putative Respondent Director of Immigration (“Director”), refusing to grant to the Applicant an extension of permission to stay in Hong Kong, after the Applicant’s Mother withdrew her sponsorship for a dependant visa.

B.  Background

3.  The Applicant is a Pakistani national, born in February 1999.  His mother is also a Pakistani national, born in Hong Kong on 10 January 1975.  On 11 September 2015, the Mother was granted the right to land in Hong Kong, and the Applicant was in 2017 subsequently granted a visa to remain in Hong Kong as a dependant of the Mother.  The dependant visa was twice extended, with the last extension giving permission to remain in Hong Kong until 1 March 2023.

4.  On 5 August 2022, the Mother acquired right of abode and became a permanent resident of the HKSAR.  However, by letter dated 16 January 2023, amongst others, the Mother informed the Immigration Department (“ImmD”) that she was no longer willing to sponsor the Applicant in future dependant visa applications, and she requested to withdraw her sponsorship of the Applicant.  The Mother also cautioned the ImmD to verify whether any future extension of stay applications made by the Applicant were in fact authorised by her.

5.  On 1 March 2023, the Applicant applied for extension of stay as a dependant of the Mother, with a ‘Declaration of Sponsor’ supposedly signed by the Mother as showing her willingness to sponsor the Applicant.  However, on 10 March 2023, the Mother attended at the ImmD, and by letter as well as verbally specifically confirmed that she did not wish to sponsor the Applicant and that she had not signed any document in support of the Applicant’s extension of stay.

6.  On that basis, the Applicant’s application for extension of stay was treated as an application on his own merits, without the Mother’s sponsorship.  The Director’s relevant internal minute identifies that the Director concluded that the substantial change in circumstances took the Applicant outside the prevailing dependant visa policy, and that there were no extenuating grounds warranting an exceptional consideration of the case.  By letter dated 13 March 2023, the Applicant was informed of the Director’s decision (“Refusal Decision”).

7.  An investigation was launched into the suspect ‘Declaration of Sponsor’, but ultimately no criminal prosecution was pursued against the Applicant in that regard.  The Applicant was, however, charged with and convicted of the offence of a ‘breach of condition of stay – overstaying’ since 2 March 2023.  On 19 September 2024, the Applicant was sentenced to 4 weeks’ imprisonment suspended for 15 months.  He was released on recognizance the same day.

8.  On 15 August 2025, the Applicant’s representative attended at the ImmD and submitted a reconsideration request of the Refusal Decision on behalf of the Applicant and the Mother (“1^st Reconsideration Request”).  Included was a letter in which the Mother stated that, although she withdrew her sponsorship in March 2023, due to a misunderstanding between her husband and herself, she now wished to resume her sponsorship of the Applicant’s application for extension of stay.

9.  The Director’s internal minute identifies that the Director noted the absence of the Mother’s continual sponsorship, and that having considered all available information and circumstances, the view was maintained that the Applicant’s application fell outside the prevailing dependant policy and that there existed no strong compassionate or extenuating grounds which warranted an exceptional consideration to deviate from that policy.  Hence the 1^st Reconsideration Request was refused.

10.  Nevertheless, the Director also considered the possibility of granting the Applicant a fresh dependant visa given that the Mother was willing to resume sponsorship.  However, since the Applicant was already 26 years old and had an adverse immigration record, the Director considered that he was no longer eligible under the dependant visa policy to apply to take up residence under the Mother’s sponsorship.  The Director also considered that there were no genuine difficulties for the Applicant to re-establish his life in Pakistan, and no strong compassionate and extenuating grounds warranting exceptional consideration.

11.  That conclusion, and the fact that the Refusal Decision still stood, was notified to the Applicant by letter dated 29 August 2025.

12.  On 24 November 2025, a further reconsideration request (“2^nd Reconsideration Request”) was made on behalf of the Applicant by a barrister.  Reliance was placed on the following points:

(1)  The mother and son relationship between the Applicant and the Mother was an unbreakable blood relationship of the highest order.

(2)  The Applicant was first approved for dependant visa in August 2017.

(3)  The representations made by the Mother on 10 March 2023 were superficial and momentary, caused by an emotional reaction which did not render or result in a genuine desire for the Mother to refuse the continuity of sponsorship for the Applicant.

(4)  The Sponsor had always maintained her position genuinely to continue sponsorship of the Applicant, and her superficial lapse on 10 March 2023 was not genuine.

(5)  Any assertion that the ‘Declaration of Sponsor’ was not signed by the Mother was denied.

(6)  The Applicant and the Mother were both willing to attend at ImmD, with their legal representatives, to address any further enquiries.

(7)  The Applicant has been employed in the construction industry in Hong Kong since the granting of the dependant visa in 2017.

(8)  There were extenuating grounds which warranted exceptional consideration for the Director to exercise discretion in favour of the Applicant.

13.  In passing, it might be commented that the weight placed on point (7) above might raise the question in some people’s minds as to whether the Applicant was or remained dependant on the Mother – at least financially – even before she withdrew her sponsorship.  However, it can of course be accepted that the Applicant has apparently been a productive member of society whilst in Hong Kong.

14.  In any event, after considering all the circumstances, the Director remained of the view that there was no reason or justification to reverse the Refusal Decision.  The Director formed the view that the Mother’s termination of her sponsorship was not purely superficial or momentary, in light of the fact that she was given the opportunity to clarify whether she intended to terminate her sponsorship, and confirmed that she did.  Therefore, there was discontinuity in sponsorship for the Applicant.  The Refusal Decision was made on the information and circumstances then apparent, and on the then reliability of the information provided by the Mother both in writing and verbally revoking her sponsorship for the Applicant.  As a result, the Applicant’s application for extension of stay submitted on 1 March 2023 fell outside the prevailing dependant visa policy, and there were no strong compassionate or extenuating grounds warranting an exceptional deviation from that policy.

15.  By letter dated 8 December 2025, the Applicant was informed that no reasonable justification was found to reverse the Refusal Decision and that it therefore still stood (“December 2025 Decision”).

C.  The Judicial Review Application

16.  These proceedings were commenced by Form 86 dated 30 July 2026.  The identified target of the intended judicial review challenge is the December 2025 Decision, upholding the Refusal Decision on the 2^nd Reconsideration Request.

17.  In the Form 86 and his affirmation, the Applicant has raised three intended grounds of review, being:

(1)  Ground 1: The December 2025 Decision was wrong in principle, unreasonable and procedurally unfair.

(2)  Ground 2: The Director failed to consider humanitarian considerations.

(3)  Ground 3: The Applicant had a legitimate expectation.

18.  I can address those grounds, each in turn.

D.  Ground 1

19.  The Applicant’s case on his intended Ground 1 is that:

(1)  the Director failed to consider that the relationship between the Mother and Applicant was a mother and son unbreakable blood relationship of the highest order;

(2)  the representation made by the Mother not to sponsor the Applicant’s extension was purely superficial and momentary, and did not result in a genuine desire to refuse the continuity of sponsorship;

(3)  because the Mother later confirmed that she intended to continue her sponsorship for the Applicant’s extension of stay, it is unreasonable and procedurally unfair for the Director to reject the reconsideration request;

(4)  the Director failed to inform the Applicant about the Mother’s representation that she would not continue to sponsor the Applicant, removing his chance to clarify the matter with his Mother and the possible reconsideration by her of her decision, as has since occurred.

20.  In his Reply, the Applicant added that he wished to clarify that he did not want to apply for a dependant visa because he understands that he would be outside that policy because of his age, but wished instead to extend his visa which was granted believing that there are no age restrictions for extension of stay.

21.  None of these points identifies reasonable arguability.  Indeed, the last point made in the Applicant’s Reply is tantamount to an acceptance that granting him a dependant visa (at least now) is impossible, though he would wish for permission to remain on his own merits.

22.  It is trite that an application for extension of stay by person to remain in Hong Kong as a dependant is not granted automatically, but only when the Director is satisfied that the applicant continues to meet the eligibility criteria under the dependant visa policy.  The burden remains throughout on the visa applicant to demonstrate either that his circumstances fall within the dependant visa policy, or that the Director should exercise his discretion to depart from that policy.  There is no requirement on the Director to seek, or to continue to seek, information from the applicant.

23.  It is also settled that it is appropriate and necessary for the maintenance of its suitability for Hong Kong to adopt restrictive immigration practices and policies, where it is the Director who is tasked by the law with the responsibility of the exercise of the power of immigration control, subject only to the Court’s supervisory jurisdiction.

24.  In this case, the Director made the Refusal Decision based on the circumstances at the material time.  There can be no reasonably arguable criticism of any part of the decision-making process, whether as to matters of principle, public law reasonableness or procedural fairness.  Nor is there any reasonably arguable criticism of the process leading to the December 2025 Decision.  However the reconsideration was to occur, the simple fact remained that the Refusal Decision was properly reached on the material available, and it does not matter that the Mother has subsequently suggested that she did not really intend to withdraw her sponsorship of the Applicant.  The fact is that she did withdraw it, and then confirmed that both in writing and verbally.

25.  It is logical that the subsequent and more recently expressed volte face might be treated with significant scepticism.  Though the Applicant has sought to paint the Mother’s withdrawal of sponsorship as superficial and momentary, I do not think that is an accurate description.  It was a stance taken by the Mother in writing on 16 January 2023, and confirmed again in writing and verbally almost 2 months later on 10 March 2023.  The change of stance was not suggested to ImmD until more than two years later.  In any event, the break in continuity of sponsorship was clear.  Further, a blood relationship, however close, is not on its own a basis for the grant of a visa, because there needs to be a genuine relationship of dependency between the applicant and sponsor.  The Director was entitled to come to the conclusion that whatever materials were subsequently provided did not constitute fresh information warranting a reversal of the Refusal Decision.

26.  As to humanitarian or compassionate factors, it is trite that the Director is under no legal duty to take such matters into account, but if he chooses to do so the weight to be given to those factors is essentially a matter for the Director (and not for the Court).  There is no arguable basis to interfere with the Director’s weighing of those factors in the context of this case.

E.  Ground 2

27.  The Applicant’s case on his intended Ground 2 is that the Director failed to consider humanitarian grounds, being the effect that the refusal of the extension of the visa would have on the Applicant if he was to return to Pakistan, when his father had effectively abandoned him and the Mother is present in Hong Kong.  The Applicant asserts extreme hardship if he is to return to Pakistan.

28.  This ground is not reasonably arguable.  From the internal minutes, it is shown that the Director considered that there was no indication of extenuating grounds which might warrant exceptional consideration for exercising a discretion to depart from the prevailing policy, notwithstanding taking into account and weighing the Applicant’s representations as made (for example) in the 2^nd Reconsideration Request.

29.  An intended Wednesbury unreasonableness challenge faces a high hurdle, in circumstances where the Director will be given a wide margin of appreciation in the context of the high policy content on immigration matters.  There is no reasonably arguable basis to suggest that the Director was not entitled to take the view that there were no extenuating circumstances as would warrant exceptional consideration in the Applicant’s case.

30.  Further, suggestions by the Applicant in his Reply, that the Director failed to consider that the Applicant stated for 6½ years on a valid visa, and that the Director only rejected the extension of stay application on the basis of the withdrawal of sponsorship without considering any other factor, are demonstrably incorrect.  The internal consideration identifies that the Director was plainly aware of the time spent by the Applicant in Hong Kong prior to the expiration of his permission to stay, and the humanitarian and compassionate factors were taken into account.  The Refusal Decision expressly stated that the Director had found no extenuating grounds (i.e. compassionate or humanitarian grounds) for granting a visit to the Applicant notwithstanding that he fell outside the dependant visa policy.

F.  Ground 3

31.  The Applicant’s case on his intended Ground 3 is that, because the Director previously granted an extension of stay in similar circumstances where the Mother was his sponsor, that gave rise to a legitimate expectation that future applications for extension of stay would be approved in similar circumstances.

32.  However, it is trite that the Applicant had no right of abode or right to land in Hong Kong, and no legitimate expectation that his visa or stay would be renewed upon expiry could reasonably arguably have arisen.  It is also trite that a previous approval does not form any precedent binding on the Director, and the Director made no representation to the Applicant that he could expect permissions of stay would not be affected by subsequent decisions or changes in circumstances.  In any event, it seems to me to be a fallacy to suggest that the Mother continued to agree to sponsor the Applicant’s application for extension of stay, when – at least for some period of time between January and March 2023, and from then until sometime perhaps shortly before August 2025 (see background above) – the Mother had made it clear that she had withdrawn her sponsorship.

G.  Delay

33.  Though dealing with this point last, reference can be made to the delay in making the application for leave to apply for judicial review.

34.  It is trite that an application for leave to apply for judicial review must be made promptly, and in any event within a ‘long stop’ period of three months (unless good reason shown for an extension of time).  In this case, it can be pointed out that these proceedings were commenced well out of time, there has been no request for an extension of time and there is no good reason shown for an extension of time.

35.  First, subject to what was said by the Applicant in his Reply – i.e. that he was not seeking a dependant visa, but an extension of visa based on his own merit – the real underlying challenge is to the Refusal Decision.  The time and intended challenge to the Refusal Decision expired by at least 13 June 2023.  These proceedings were commenced over three years later.

36.  Secondly, an applicant cannot get around or avoid the time requirement by the device of asking the decision-makers to reconsider his decision, in particular where the same arguments are repeated or the same information is relied upon as was previously advanced in support of the original application.  In this case, the nature of the December 2025 Decision was to reconsider the Refusal Decision, broadly on the same arguments and materials.  In any event, even if it is thought that the December 2025 Decision were to set time running afresh, the time within which to make and intended judicial review challenge expired at least by 7 March 2026.  These proceedings were commenced almost 4 months later.

37.  Neither of these periods of delay is insignificant, and no good reason has been shown for grant of an extension of time.  I do not think the making of a data access requests in mid-2025 or again following the December 2025 Decision amounts to a good reason to extend time in the circumstances of this case.

38.  Further, there is no point in granting an extension of time where there are no merits in the application for leave to apply for judicial review.

39.  It might also be pointed out that, if the Applicant had left Hong Kong after the Refusal Decision, as was the requirement placed upon him, not only would there have been no reasonably arguable basis for challenging that decision, it is difficult to think that any application for a visa to return to Hong Kong for residence thereafter would likely have been viewed favourably.

H.  Result

40.  It may be unfortunate that the Applicant and the Mother previously fell out, and it may be better news that they may have since apparently reconciled.  However, in the circumstances and for the reasons set out above, the Applicant has failed to identify any reasonably arguable public law ground of review with any realistic prospect of success.

41.  Therefore, the Applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review is refused.

42.  As to costs, Ms Liu sought the costs of the application against the Applicant.  However, in the exercise of my broad discretion, I make no order as to costs.