DEWI SEPTIYANI v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5394 · HCAL 1525/2026
Court of First Instance
HCAL 1525/2026
[2026] HKCFI 5394
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1525 OF 2026
BETWEEN
| |Dewi Septiyani |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
|Π|consideration of the documents only; or |
| |consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the applicant or |
| |counsel in open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. On this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent be
amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”.
2. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed.
Observations for the applicant:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 1 September 2026, the applicant
applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave
Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal
Board (“the Board”) dated 30 June 2026 (“the Board’s Decision”). The
Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2026/HCAL00
1525_2026_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2026/HCAL00
1525_2026_files/the_Board's_Decision_Corrigendum.pdf
2. The Board found that the applicant had not made out a case for non-
refoulement protection in Hong Kong on any of the applicable grounds
under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“the USM”). Hence, the Board
dismissed the applicant’s appeal/petition against the decision of the
Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 31 March 2026 and
confirmed the same, which rejected the applicant’s non-refoulement
claim.
Amendment
3. In Form 86, the applicant named the Board / Non-refoulement Claims
Petition Office as the putative respondent, when only the Board should
be so named.
4. The Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office is just an office providing
administrative and secretariat support to the adjudicators of the
Board and should not be named as a respondent at all.
5. Thus, this court makes an order on its own motion to amend the name of
the putative respondent to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”.
The applicant’s case
6. It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the
applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s
Decision, which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.
7. In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because
if refouled to Indonesia, she would be harmed or even killed by her
husband named Muhamad Gilang Ferdiansyah due to his previous violence
on her and her discontinuation of remittance to him after her
employment contract as a domestic helper in Hong Kong was terminated.
Disposal on paper
8. The applicant did not request for an oral hearing of the Leave
Application. This court is also satisfied that the Leave Application
can be disposed of based on the written materials before this court.
Hence, the Leave Application is dealt with on paper.
Grounds for judicial review
9. The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the
intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of
Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).
10. The applicant did not advance any ground for her intended judicial
review in Form 86, nor in her supporting affidavit/affirmation dated 1
September 2026.
Discussion
11. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-
refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for
non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the
evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters
allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm,
availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation.
The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way
of judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness, or
irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA
524).
12. Thus, despite the fact that the applicant failed to advance any ground
for the intended judicial review, this court will scrutinize the
Board’s Decision for any errors of law, procedural unfairness, or
irrationality as aforesaid.
13. In assessing the appeal/petition by the applicant, the Board held an
oral hearing on 9 June 2026. The applicant was present via Remote
Official Visit System as she was detained at the material time, and
was thus given the chance to present her case to the Board.
14. As can be seen from paragraphs 45 to 69 of the Board’s Decision, the
Board questioned the applicant extensively at the Board’s hearing to
try to understand her case better. The Board gave full and detailed
reasoning as to why it found that the applicant was not a reliable
witness and her evidence made during the Board’s hearing contradicted
with what were set out in the applicant’s Non-refoulement Claim Form
and given in the screening interview. The Board also found that the
applicant might try to fabricate more evidence in the Grounds of
Appeal so as to enhance her alleged fear for her safety. The Board
found that the applicant’s information and evidence were not
believable and her claimed risks could not be established. Thus, the
Board would dismiss her appeal/petition.
15. Nevertheless, despite its finding on the applicant’s credibility as
summarised above, the Board found that even if the information and
evidence of the applicant were to be accepted, it would still dismiss
her appeal/petition, and had given its full reasons for such a
conclusion in paragraphs 71 to 121 of the Board’s Decision.
16. In gist, the Board found no sufficient evidence showing that the
applicant’s husband had a real intention to seriously harm or kill the
applicant. The threats from her husband were more consistent with
expressions of anger over financial dependency than with a credible,
imminent plan to kill her. In these circumstances, the Board
considered the applicant’s assertion that she would be seriously
harmed or killed by her husband upon her return to Indonesia was too
far-fetched, and the Board did not accept that her perceived risk of
harm from her husband was real and foreseeable.
17. Moreover, the applicant’s problem with her husband was solely a
private dispute that had nothing to do with the Indonesian government
or any of the Convention reasons. Having considered the intensity of
past ill-treatment the applicant claimed and the nature of the threats
made by her husband, the Board did not accept that any ill-treatment,
whether physical or mental, inflicted upon the applicant by her
husband had attained a minimum level of severity.
18. The Board also noted that the applicant had never sought assistance
from the police in Indonesia. The Board found the applicant’s claim
that the Indonesian authorities could not protect her was totally her
own conjecture without factual basis. The Board found objective
information indicating that the Indonesian police and authorities
could provide protection to the public, and the Indonesian government
had taken practical steps to improve their effectiveness and human
rights awareness.
19. Further, the Board had given full reasons in paragraphs 95 to 103 of
the Board’s Decision for its conclusion that it was not unreasonable
or unduly harsh for the applicant to relocate to a place other than
her hometown, such as Jakarta and Medan, to earn a living and to avoid
her perceived harm from her husband, if any, upon her return to
Indonesia.
20. Thus, the Board concluded that the applicant’s claim for non-
refoulement protection failed on all the applicable grounds under the
USM.
21. The finding of facts relating to a non-refoulement claim, including
the assessment of evidence and risk of harm, was solely within the
ambit of the Board in dealing with the applicant’s appeal/petition.
This court finds nothing wrong or unreasonable in the way the Board
reached its decision.
22. Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with
anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly
set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable
grounds under the USM, the burden of proof and the standard of proof.
The Board also correctly identified the issues and observed a very
high standard of fairness. This court could detect no errors of law,
procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The
Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is
not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board to reach its
decision.
23. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung
(2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for
judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which
enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court
that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence
leave must be refused.
Conclusion
24. For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed.
Dated the 23rd day of September 2026
| |( Gladys LEE ) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the applicant| | |
|or his solicitors | | |
|must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent/Handed to the |Sent/Handed to the |
|respondent and such |applicant/the |putative respondent / the|
|interested parties as |applicant’s |putative respondent’s |
|may be directed by the|solicitors |solicitors / such |
|Court the order |on: 23/09/2026 |putative interested |
|granting leave and any| |parties as may be |
|directions given | |directed by the Court / |
|within 14 days after | |the putative interested |
|the leave was granted |Applicant’s ref. no: |parties’ solicitors on: |
|(Order 53, rule 4A); |Nil |23/09/2026 |
| | | |
|b) issue the | | |
|originating summons | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|within 14 days after | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|the grant of leave and| |Claims Petition Office |
|serve it in accordance| |Putative respondent’s |
|with Order 53, rule 5;| |ref. no.: |
|and | |USM 28499 |
| | | |
|c) supply to every | |Director of Immigration |
|other party copies of | |Putative interested |
|every affidavit which | |party’s ref. no.: |
|the Applicant proposes| |QA T/C 258/26 (formerly |
|to use at the hearing,| |RBCZ 5000181/26) |
|including the | | |
|affidavit in support | |Department of Justice, |
|of the application for| |Senior Assistant Law |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |Officer |
|6(5)). | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit 2)|
Form CALL-1