KISAMBALE PIUS HENRY v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD
[2026] HKCFI 5540 · HCAL 1104/2021
Court of First Instance
HCAL 1104/2021
[2026] HKCFI 5540
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST
NO 1104 OF 2021
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BETWEEN
| | | |
| | Kisambale Pius Henry | Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
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Before: Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG in Chambers (Open to Public)
Dates of Hearing: 20 August 2026 and 18 September 2026
Date of Handing Down of Decision: 30 September 2026
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D E C I S I O N
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Background
By way of summons filed on 16 June 2026 (“the Summons”), the applicant
applies for an extension of time to appeal against my order made on 22
April 2026, which dismissed the applicant’s application for leave to apply
for judicial review in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal
Board dated 21 July 2021.
Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, stipulates that
“Where an application for leave is refused by a judge …, the applicant may
appeal against the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days
after such order”.
In Re Li Jing [2015] 2 HKLRD 933, it was held that the time for lodging an
appeal against the refusal of granting leave to apply for judicial review
started to run from the date of the making of the order, not from the date
when the sealed order was issued, nor from the date when the sealed order
was mailed, and no account should be taken of the fact that the applicant
received the sealed order late (see also Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA
226).
As my order was made on 22 April 2026, the last day for the applicant to
lodge an appeal was on 6 May 2026. Thus, the time for appealing against my
order has expired, and the applicant requires leave from this court to
appeal out of time.
The applicable law
In considering whether to extend time for appealing a decision refusing
leave to apply for judicial review, the court will take into account: (1)
the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of the
intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of
time were granted (see Jagg Singh v Torture Claims Appeal Board and another
[2020] HKCA 844).
However, the crucial consideration in such an application is whether the
applicant can show that there is a reasonable prospect of success in the
intended judicial review (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur, supra), and the court
will not grant extension for a hopeless appeal to be pursued (see Re
Adumekwe Rowland Ejike [2019] HKCA 702).
Discussion
In the Summons, the applicant explained his delay in lodging the appeal by
saying that he received the court’s judgment on 22 April 2026, he did not
“prepare money” and he did not get any letter from the court about his
case.
At the hearing of the Summons on 20 August 2026, the applicant was absent
but he arrived at the court after the hearing. The applicant then wrote a
letter to this court dated 27 August 2026 to request for another hearing.
I acceded to his request and the case was fixed for another hearing on 18
September 2026.
At the hearing on 18 September 2026, the applicant further explained his
delay by saying that he did not receive this court’s letter and he did not
know that he had to appeal. However, when I asked the applicant how he
came to know that this court made a decision against him, he replied that
he did not know a decision was made against him and he attended the hearing
because he received a phone call to ask him to attend the hearing on 18
September 2026. He did not even know what application he was making except
that he was asking this court to permit him to stay here.
The applicant further said that he had no idea that he was late in
appealing as he did not receive any letter from this court telling him
whether he should appeal or not. When I asked the applicant whether he had
received a letter enclosing this court’s decision, he said “No”. However,
when I showed him the Summons, the applicant confirmed that it was written
by him and he knew that he was applying for time to appeal. He did not
know anything else to say, but he apologized to this court and said that he
would not be late again.
I then pointed out to him that in the Summons, he gave the reason for his
lateness by saying that he did not “prepare money”. The applicant then
agreed that it was the reason for his lateness in appealing. I also
pointed out to the applicant that in the Summons, he said that he received
this court’s decision on 22 April 2026. The applicant agreed with that as
well.
The applicant’s explanations at the oral hearing are clearly not consistent
with the reasons given in the Summons. It is inconceivable that he did not
receive this court’s decision and did not know what application he was
making when he admitted that he wrote the Summons himself. Thus, there was
no satisfactory reason given by the applicant for his lateness in filing
the intended appeal at all.
Moreover, the applicant did not give any valid ground for his intended
appeal. In his supporting affirmation dated 16 June 2026, the applicant
simply said that his life was in danger because he was working with
government and the “Big Boss” was looking for him to kill him. At the oral
hearing on 18 September 2026, when I asked the applicant for his grounds of
appeal, he simply said that he would like to be here because it was safe
for him and he wanted to gather evidence to show me the situation in his
country. These cannot be valid grounds for his intended appeal.
For this application to be successful, the applicant must demonstrate that
this court had made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant
matters already placed before this court or was otherwise plainly wrong
(see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).
The applicant has failed to demonstrate any of the above, and hence there
is simply no valid ground for the intended appeal.
As there is no satisfactory explanation for the applicant’s delay in
lodging the intended appeal, and there is no reasonable prospect of success
in the intended appeal, I am not prepared to grant any extension of time
for the applicant to pursue such a hopeless appeal.
Conclusion
For reasons aforesaid, the Summons is dismissed.
(Michael WONG)
Deputy High Court Judge
The applicant appearing in person
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