CHOW LILY v. CHOW WAI WAI VIOLET AND ANOTHER

HCAP 22/2019

[2026] HKCFI 1147

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

PROBATE ACTION NO. 22 OF 2019

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DECISION

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A.  INTRODUCTION

1.  This Decision deals with the plaintiff’s summons filed on 24 November 2025 (“the Summons”)  by which she seeks to strike out the following parts of the witness statements recently served by the defendants:

(1)  Paragraphs 4 to 22 of the Supplemental Witness Statement of Kuok Hoi Sang dated 30 July 2025 (“Kuok’s Supp WS”);

(2)  Paragraphs 6 to 47 of the Supplemental Witness Statement of Ma Chi Wing dated 29 July 2025 (“Ma’s Supp WS”);

(3)  Paragraphs 5 and 7 to 26 of the Supplemental Witness Statement of Tam Kwok Wing dated 30 July 2025 (“Tam’s Supp WS”);

(4)  Paragraphs 13, 22 to 33 of the Supplemental Witness Statement of Chow Wai Wai Violet dated 29 July 2025 (“D1’s Supp WS”); and

(5)  Paragraphs 9 to 18, 23 to 25 and 35 to 42 of the Supplemental Witness Statement of Chow Vi Vi dated 29 July 2025 (“D2’s Supp WS”).

2.  These witness statements were served pursuant to the decision of this Court dated 30 October 2024 (“the Amendment Decision”, or “the Amendment Order”, as the case may be), under which, among other things, the plaintiff was granted leave to further amend her Re-Re-Amended Statement of Claim for the purpose of introducing a new plea of undue influence in her challenge of the Deceased’s Will dated 29 October 2015.  Consequential to the granting of such leave, this Court further ordered on the same occasion that:

“Parties shall exchange their respective witness statements covering matters relating to the amendments only […]”[1]

(emphasis added)

3.  The plaintiff submits that the aforementioned parts of the further witness statements served by the defendants should be struck out on the grounds that they:

“[…] go beyond the scope of Paragraph 3(c)  of [the Amendment Order], or they are irrelevant or otherwise scandalous or oppressive”[2]

B.  LEGAL PRINCIPLES

4.  The approach which this Court should follow in this application has been set out by Keith Yeung J in his Decision dated 22 March 2024 given in the present probate action ([2024] HKCFI 887)  (“the K Yeung J’s Decision”):

“44. […]

(a)  The first step is to identify what facts and imputation the Disputed Paragraphs concerned seek to establish and support;

(b)  Then, with the pleaded issues in mind, consider whether those identified facts and imputations are relevant to any primary issues;

(c)  If yes, the evidence may be admitted;

(d)  If not, than bearing in mind the “cardinal test of relevance”, whether the identified facts and imputations are relevant to the collateral issue of credibility, veracity, reliability or objectivity:

(i)  The question is whether the identified facts and imputations materially bear upon the collateral issue;

(ii)  If not, the evidence should not be admitted;

(iii)  But as relevance in this context is a matter of degree, cases are not always clear cut. Hence other than in clear cut cases, considerations will be given as to whether any probative weight of the identified facts and imputations is insufficient to justify the complexity that they will add to the trial, bearing in mind at all times in particular (hence not exhaustive)  the Underlying Objectives, the need to confine the ambit of a trial within proper limits so as to ensure that the trial is focused on the primary issues, the notion of fairness to both the parties and the witness, procedural economy and cost-effectiveness;

(e)  Evidence at this stage is only expunged in clear cases upon the application of the above.”

C.  DISCUSSION

C1.  General observations

5.  Before I go into the disputed parts of the witness statements, I would like to make the following general observations.

6.  Firstly, as submitted on behalf of the plaintiff, when considering the claim of undue influence in the present context, one of the legal principles which this Court should bear in mind is that the physical and mental strength of the testator are relevant factors in determining how much pressure is necessary in order to overbear the will:Re Edwards [2007] EWHC 1119 (Ch)  at [47].

7.  Secondly, the plaintiff has drawn this Court’s attention to the K Yeung J’s Decision, particularly to the defendants’ stance at the time that certain parts of the plaintiff’s Supplemental Witness Statement were irrelevant, and K Yeung J’s acceptance of such an argument. Insofar as it is the plaintiff’s submissions that the defendants’ stance has changed and that K Yeung J’s view should be followed, such submissions are rejected. This is because the relevant issues as defined by the pleadings at the time of the K Yeung J’s Decision have been expanded be virtue of the plaintiff’s introduction of a new case of undue influence.  For the present purpose, the question of “relevance” must be considered by reference to the pleaded case of the parties as of now, rather than as of 2024.

8.  For the same reason, the comments made by K Yeung J on relevance of certain evidence should also be viewed with the above context in mind.

9.  In other words, insofar as the reasoning in the K Yeung J’s Decision is relied on as directly applicable herein, the Court has to bear in mind the circumstances under which his Lordship reached his conclusion.

10.  Thirdly, in the course of the plaintiff’s argument, this Court was referred to the Amendment Decision, in which this Court expressed doubt as to:

“whether the defendants would be required to adduce a great deal of evidence consequential to the introduction of the new claim of undue influence, since many of the events relied on by the plaintiff have already been dealt with by the existing witness statements and affirmations.”[3]

11.  It goes without saying that that was only an initial assessment which in no way pre-judged any matter.  It is thus futile for the plaintiff to rely on this statement for the purpose of supporting her arguments herein.

12.  Fourthly, the plaintiff submitted that she would be greatly prejudiced if the defendants are allowed to introduce the disputed witness statements at such a late stage without an opportunity to respond.  It was further said that, because of the additional evidence, the time required to complete the trial would have to be extended, and may even render the trial part-heard.  With greatest respect, I am of the view that the plaintiff is simply not entitled to complain at all, for it was she herself who very belatedly introduced the new claim of undue influence.  The defendants were on the other hand in a passive position.  Indeed, they had objected against the plaintiff’s amendment application, just that they were unsuccessful in doing so.  But once leave has been granted for the plaintiff to rely on the new ground of undue influence, the defendants should be allowed to adduce evidence in their defence of the claim pursuant to the Amendment Order, so long as such evidence is relevant. 

13.  It should also be reiterated that “relevance” is the only criteria in the present application.  It is thus unhelpful for the plaintiff to emphasize that the defendants have adduced supplemental witness statement “totalling 222 paragraphs straddling some 70 pages”.

14.  I now turn to consider the disputed parts of the defendants’ newly served witness statements.

C2.  Kuok’s Supp WS

C2.1  Paragraphs 4 – 9

15.  These paragraphs have been put under the sub-heading “Dr Chow’s Physical and Mental Fitness in 2015”.

16.  In gist, by virtue of these paragraphs, Kuok gives evidence on the Deceased’s having displayed no sign of vulnerability at the material time.  To the contrary, it is said therein that his condition in 2015 was still so good that he had been actively engaged in high-level decisions.

17.  It has been submitted on behalf of the plaintiff that:

“40. In none of the paragraphs covered by Kuok Supp WS, Ma Supp WS, and Tam Supp WS do they show that there are new factual matters relevant to the plea of undue influence being introduced.

(1)  In the case of Kuok Supp WS, the key evidence includes ‘mental sharpness’, ‘mental clarity’, ‘full knowledge and understanding’, ‘informed decisions, and ‘showing no signs of cognitive decline or emotional fragility’.

(2)  […]

(3)  […]

41.  Based on the above, not only is this personal opinion evidence for which there is already existing expert medical evidence, these are matters clearly relevant to and directed at the issue of physical and mental fitness of the Deceased rather than the alternative case of undue influence. There is no independent relevance and there is no explanation why this information is not covered in earlier witness statements. Allowing this evidence to remain only serves to obfuscate the main issues at trial, and permits Ds to fill in the gaps in their evidence.”

18.  Paragraph 61B of the Re-Re-Re-Amended Statement of Claim which is one of the newly added paragraphs in support of the undue influence claim pleaded that:

“The Deceased was mentally and emotionally vulnerable due to his advanced age and sharply declining health in 2015. The Plaintiff relies upon the poor medical condition and state of the Deceased, including his capacity being impaired including the minor stroke on 20 August 2015 and depression in 2015, which impaired his cognitive functions by rendering him susceptible, if not more susceptible, and subject to undue influence and coercion by the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants. The Plaintiff refers to §34 of Dr. Helen Chiu’s Report dated 25 August 2023.”

19.  In my view, paragraphs 4 – 9 of Kuok’s Supp WS clearly cover “matters relating to the amendments” as they serve to negate the plaintiff’s case that the Deceased was mentally and emotionally vulnerable and had had a sharply declining health in 2015 and that his capacity and cognitive functions had been impaired.  Those matters are also undoubtedly relevant because they are related to the Deceased’s physical and mental strength at the material time, which are relevant factors in determining how much pressure is necessary in order to overbear the 2015 Will:Re Edwards: See [6] above. 

20.  The plaintiff argued that since the state of the Deceased’s intellect, comprehension, cognition and mental agility in 2015 is not a fact which is directly provable but can only be inferred from other facts, those other primary facts must be pleaded.  It was also said that the evidence in question is precisely part of those matters which must be pleaded. With respect, I disagree.  In my view, the subject parts of Kuok’s Supp WS are evidence which are introduced in support of the defendants’ plea that the Deceased had been both active and mentally fit and capable at work and in his personal matters in 2015 (this is pleaded in paragraph 86I(2)  of their Re-Re-Re-Amended Defence to Counterclaim), and those matters, being evidence, need not be pleaded.

21.  The plaintiff also submitted that part of the evidence newly introduced by the defendants are also relevant to the long-standing issue of testamentary capacity, which, it was said, should have been included in the previous witness statement, and therefore the defendants should not be allowed to make use of this opportunity to bolster their case on mental capacity. 

22.  This argument can be dealt with quickly by reference to the Amendment Order, which allows parties to put in further evidence so long as they are relevant to the issue of undue influence.  In other words, “relevance” is the only criteria.  There is nothing in the Amendment Order which stipulates that the new evidence must be relevant to the issue of undue influence exclusively.

23.  Insofar as it is the plaintiff’s submissions that it is not open to non-medical experts to give evidence on what they perceive to be the condition of a testator at the material time, such submissions are not understood, for it is trite that such evidence is admissible.  See for example Chiu Man Fu & Others v Chiu Chung Kwan Ying (HCAP 9/2005, unreported, 31 January 2012), in which Poon J (as Poon CJHC then was)  received and accepted evidence from family members of the testator on the testator’s mental conditions and whether there was any impairment of mind: at [99 – 101], [121], [123] and [128] thereof.

24.  Moreover, as pointed out by the defendants’ counsel, the evidence contained in paragraphs 4 – 9 of Kwok’s Supp WS is clearly admissible pursuant to section 58(2)  of the Evidence Ordinance (Cap.8, Laws of Hong Kong), which provides that:

“(1)  […]

(2)  Where a person is called as a witness in any civil proceedings a statement of opinion by him on any relevant matter on which he is not qualified to give expert evidence, if made as a way of conveying relevant facts personally perceived by him, is admissible as evidence of what he perceived.

(3)  In this section, relevant matter (有關聯的事宜)  includes an issue in the proceedings in question.”

25.  For the above reasons, paragraphs 4 – 9 of Kuok’s Supp WS should be allowed to remain.

C2.2  Paragraphs 10 – 21

26.  In these paragraphs. Kuok specifically refers to the Galaxy Macau project and Chevalier’s fresh produce business in Australia in 2015 so as to demonstrate the Deceased’s responsiveness and soundness in decision-making and active involvement in Chevalier Group’s affairs.

27.  The plaintiff’s primary complaint in relation to these paragraphs is that these are unpleaded matters and therefore the defendants should not be allowed to rely on them at the trial.

28.  As explained in the preceding section, with respect, this complaint has no merit at all.  Quite apart from the fact that the defendants’ witness is dealing with the plaintiff’s pleaded case that the Deceased’s health has sharply declined in 2015, the defendants have actually pleaded in paragraph 86I(2)  of their Re-Re-Re-Amended Defence to Counterclaim that the Deceased has been both active and mentally fit and capable at work and in his personal matters in 2015.  This paragraph was added in defence to the plaintiff’s claim of undue influence.  The matters relating to the Galaxy Macau project and Chevalier’s fresh produce business in Australia, in my view, are clearly evidence in support of the said plea, and evidence is not required to be pleaded.

29.  Mr Sussex SC and Mr Lam then relied on K Yeung J’s comments that since the present action is not a corporate action, to delve into matters concerning the Chevalier Group is too far from the probate action. 

30.  However, one has to read K Yeung J’s comments in the right context.  In the appeal before his Lordship, the question which had to be resolved was whether the plaintiff should be allowed to mention, among other things, the followings in her supplemental witness statement:

(1)  “Ma has received substantial increments in his salary (of 2.53 folds from 2015 to 2022), which was the result of Mr Kuok’s proposal to the Remuneration Committee”[4];

(2)  “For some causes which defied reasoning, since 2015, the work of Mr. Ma seemed to be particularly impressive to Mr. Kuok.  It is unwarranted and totally disproportionate to Mr. Ma’s poor and disappointing performance at Chevalier since 2015.”  She gave the “Senior Housing Project” as an example of “disappointing performance”[5];

(3)  Ma’s request for and Kuok’s approval of payment of Ma’s entrance fee into the Hong Kong Jockey Club be borne by Chevalier[6];

(4)  Personal benefits to Ma with the approval of Kuok disproportionate to Ma’s competence and performance[7].

31.  His Lordship had the following to say:

“49. In his submissions, Mr Chan [for the plaintiff] points out that Ma and Kuok are put forward as independent witnesses. He submits that the paragraphs in this group raise ‘a very important and relevant matter which will require resolution by the trial judge’. He submits that ‘the issue raised is obvious and relevant: Ma had received corporate benefits and substantial salary increments in spite of his work performance at Chevalier. The substantial increment was approved by the Remuneration Committee in response to Kuok’s proposal. Whilst whether this was part of a quid pro quo arrangement or otherwise are matters which P is entitled to raise and ought to be allowed to speak to these factual matters within her knowledge.’ He submits that those factual allegations “are evidently relevant to Ma’s credibility and objectivity”, that the ‘Supp WS in this regard lays down the factual basis for P to raise issues on the credibility and reliability of their evidence’, and that the ‘matters raised in the Disputed Paragraphs provide the factual foundation for P to mount a challenge in cross-examination as to their credit and independence.’ He submits that Ma’s evidence was relied upon by P’s medical expert. He submits further that those paragraphs provide context to §309.

50.  Ms Wu submits that those paragraphs are not relevant to the ‘real issue in dispute, viz the validity of the [Disputed] 2015 Will’, and that they are also irrelevant ‘even regarding the credibility of Ma on the health and condition of the Deceased.’

51.  This is not a corporate action.  The disagreements are not corporate disputes.  The primary issue raised by P is the validity of the Disputed 2009 Will and the Disputed 2015 Will, the latter of which turns on Father’s mental capacity, his knowledge and approval of its terms, and his animus testandi.  Ds’ Counterclaim raises the additional primary issues as to whether P should be passed over.

52.  Clearly, the factual allegations in this group of Dispute Paragraphs are not relevant to any of the primary issues.

53.  In my view, the allegations are not relevant to the collateral issue of credibility, veracity, reliability or objectivity of Ma or Kuok […]”

(emphasis added)

32.  It can therefore be seen that what the plaintiff was trying to adduce back then was evidence which she said would be relevant to a collateral issue of the present case, namely, Ma’s credibility and objectivity.

33.  However, in the present application, what the defendants would like to adduce is evidence on a primary issue, namely, the mental state and vulnerability of the Deceased at the material time.

34.  It is thus futile to refer to K Yeung J’s reasoning which was given in a totally different situation.

35.  The plaintiff further submitted that she would be prejudiced if these paragraphs may remain because she is denied an opportunity to respond to such content.  It was said that in order to properly address the matter, she needs to put together significant listed company materials to isolate and explain the role (if any)  played by the Deceased in the project.

36.  I do not accept the plaintiff’s submissions.  As explained, the prejudice, if any, was caused by the plaintiff’s own delay in seeking to introduce a new claim of undue influence.  She only has herself to blame.  The alleged prejudice (if any)  should not debar the defendants from adducing relevant evidence in countering the plaintiff’s new claim.

C2.3  Paragraph 22

37.  In the plaintiff’s Supplemental Witness Statement, which was filed on 18 July 2023[8], she mentioned about 2 cheques of HK$1.5 million each which were drawn in favour of Kuok paid out of an account of the Deceased. 

38.  In response, Kuok explains in paragraph 22 of Kuok’s Supp WS the reason why those cheques were issued.  The defendants submitted that this paragraph is relevant and probative to the collateral issue of his credibility, objectivity, independence and reliability, and that such an issue was first raised by the plaintiff and one that continues to form part of her undue influence case.

39.  I am unable to accept the defendants’ submissions in this regard.  In my view, the effect of the Amendment Order is clear. Parties have only been allowed to put in further supplemental witness statements which cover matters which are directly relevant to the plaintiff’s case of undue influence.  It is not enough to say that the further evidence is relevant on the collateral issue of credibility, objectivity, independence and reliability.

40.  I would therefore strike out paragraph 22 of Kuok’s Supp WS.

C3.  Ma’s Supp WS

C3.1  Paragraphs 6 – 9

41.  In these paragraphs, Ma claims that he has not teamed up with Kuok and Tam against the plaintiff, whether in this action or in the Board. He claims his evidence is not misleading as alleged, nor is it lacking in credibility or objectivity, nor has it been influenced by personal interests or benefits. He further confirms that he did not collaborate with Kuok or Tam to pursue any hidden agenda. 

42.  To answer the plaintiff’s evidence in her Supplemental Witness Statement that Kuok, along with Ma and Tam, had suggested her to withdraw her application for the appointment of Administrators Pendente Lite, Ma further explains in paragraph 9 of Ma’s Supp WS that the said request for withdrawal was not driven by any ulterior motive, and that he did not collaborate with Kuok or Tam to pursue any hidden agenda.  Rather, it was a business decision made in good faith, based on legitimate concerns about safeguarding investor confidence and protecting the Chevalier Group from unnecessary disruption.

43.  The plaintiff submitted that such evidence is wholly unrelated to undue influence and therefore should not have been included.

44.  In principle, I agree with the plaintiff.  As explained in Section C2.3 above, matters covering collateral issue rather than the primary issue of undue influence are not covered by the Amendment Order.

45.  However, I note that in paragraph 7 of Ma’s Supp WS, he states that:

“As set out in my First Witness Statement, in the period before Dr Chow’s stroke in January 2016, I met with him regularly and frequently in both official and unofficial settings and contexts. These meetings and interactions formed a routine part of our business practice and took place consistently, except when Dr Chow was away on travel […]”

46.  In my view, the above part of paragraph 7 of Ma’s Supp WS is relevant to the matters which Ma would further explain under paragraphs 10 – 24 thereof which concerns his observation on the Deceased’s mental capacity and involvement in the business.  Therefore, such a part should be allowed to remain.

47.  I therefore order to strike out paragraphs 6, 7 (last sentence only), 8 and 9 of Ma’s Supp WS.

C3.2  Paragraphs 10 – 24 and 27 – 47

48.  In these paragraphs, Ma says, in gist, that the Deceased had consistently demonstrated sound judgment and effective leadership resulting in Chevalier’s good financial results in 2014 – 2016, and that the Deceased did not exhibit signs of frailty or mental incapacity during Board meetings in 2015.  Ma also refers to a number of business projects including 3 senior housing projects in the United States, business relating to the Café Deco Group, the fresh produce supply business in Australia, the sale of Chevalier Engineering Service Centre, and business in Chengdu, in an attempt to prove that the Deceased demonstrated sharp judgement and decisive leadership in key investment decisions, actively fulfilling his duties as Chairman with full mental acuity and hands-on involvement.

49.  For the reasons set out in Section C2.2 above, the plaintiff’s submissions that these matters are not pleaded and that she would be prejudiced if the subject evidence is allowed to be adduced are rejected.

50.  In relation to the 3 senior housing projects in the United States, the plaintiff further submits that matters relating thereto have been held by K Yeung J to be matters which are wholly irrelevant to the probate action.  As explained in Section C1 above, such a submission is misconceived, because “relevance” should be considered in light of the current state of the pleadings. 

C3.3  Paragraphs 25 – 26

51.  These paragraphs have been put under the sub-heading “Dr Chow’s cognitive function in 2015”.  By these paragraphs, Ma gives evidence that he observed no signs of the Deceased’s health sharply declining, or his cognitive functions being impaired. It is also said that the Deceased exhibited no symptoms of depression or any signs of being mentally and emotionally vulnerable.  He concludes that there was nothing to suggest that he had become mentally or emotionally vulnerable. He has also given examples which, he says, demonstrate the Deceased’s strategic involvement in the Chevalier Group’s business and activities in 2014 and 2015.

52.  I have already explained why the plaintiff’s grounds of objection in relation to evidence of the same nature should be rejected in Section C2.1 above.  The same reasoning should apply.

53.  These paragraphs should therefore be allowed to remain.

C4.  Tam’s Supp WS

C4.1  Paragraphs 5 and 14 – 17

54.  By these paragraphs, Tam gives evidence that there was no sharp or rapid deterioration in the Deceased’s mental capacity at the material time as alleged, nor any indication that his capacity was impaired.  He states that he sees no basis to question the Deceased’s mental health or cognitive functions.

55.  Similar grounds of objection raised by the plaintiff have been rejected by reasons of explanations given in Section C2.1 above.  The same reasoning should apply.

56.  These paragraphs should therefore be allowed to remain.

C4.2  Paragraphs 7 – 13 and 18 – 25

57.  In these paragraphs, Tam refers to his experience with the Deceased in Board meetings, official functions and public events, in an attempt to show that the Deceased was not “mentally and emotionally vulnerable” at the material time.  He also highlights the Deceased’s duties as an Honorary Consul, so as to demonstrate his “full mental engagement”, “sound mental capacity and professional competence”, and “mental sharpness”.

58.  The plaintiff’s complaints in this regard have been dealt with in Section C2.2 above.  For the same reasons, the plaintiff’s submissions that these paragraphs should be struck out are rejected.

C4.3  Paragraph 26

59.  The content of paragraph 26 is similar to those contained in paragraphs 8 and 9 of Ma’s Supp WS.  For reasons which I have already explained in Section C3.1 above, this paragraph should be struck out.

C5.  D1’s Supp WS

60.  The plaintiff seeks to strike out paragraphs 13 and 22 to 33 of D1’s Supp WS.

61.  Paragraph 13 of D1’s Supp WS refers to the Deceased’s handwritten note dated 26 April 2015 (“the Handwritten Note”)  by which he expressed his intention to gift properties and/or cash to his children.

62.  Paragraphs 22 to 33 thereof contain evidence on:

(1)  the Deceased’s alleged active life (including his attendance to business, community and public duties and frequent travelling)  during 2015;

(2)  Dr Lo Chung Mau’s interaction with the Deceased in October – November 2015.

63.  The plaintiff submitted that:

(1)  D1 is not entitled to rely on the Handwritten Note because it was not pleaded;

(2)  Evidence in paragraphs 22 to 33 (such as “no signs of cognitive decline, emotional vulnerability, or depression”)  is related to mental capacity rather than undue influence;

(3)  Insofar as the evidence on Dr Lo is concerned, it is irrelevant to the case on undue influence.

64.  With respect, I disagree with the plaintiff.  In my view, the above evidence is plainly relevant as to the Deceased’s alleged vulnerability and susceptibility to undue influence, and the defendants are clearly entitled to adduce such evidence to meet the plaintiff’s case of undue influence, as permitted by the Amendment Order.

65.  Further, I disagree with the plaintiff that the defendants should have pleaded the Handwritten Note in the Re-Re-Re-Amended Defence and Counterclaim.  In the circumstances of the present case, I do not think it is a material fact which has to be pleaded.  It is just a piece of evidence in support of the defendants’ case that the Deceased had been mentally fit and capable in his personal matters in 2015[9].

C6.  D2’s Supp WS

66.  The plaintiff seeks to strike out paragraphs 9 to 18, 23 to 25 and 35 to 42 of D2’s Supp WS.

67.  As a matter of convenience, paragraph 25 of D2’s Supp WS would be considered first.  It reads:

“Lily’s current allegations of undue influence are unsubstantiated, as are other aspects of her evidence. For instance, she inaccurately attributes Mother with a role in Chevalier’s Toshiba dealership, alleging ties to senior executive at Japan’s Toshiba and Hitachi, claims for which no supporting evidence have been provided and do not exist. Furthermore, she has repeatedly challenged matters that are not reasonably in dispute, including the authenticity of Father’s handwriting and signature on corporate, formal and personal documents, including credit card slips for medical consultations with Dr. Middleton (such as items 142, 144, 145-150, 151-159, 160, 161, 162-164, 165-167, 168 in the Defendants’ List of Documents). She has notably gone so far as to dispute a photograph of Father taken in Taipei alongside deathbed of his friend from the Taiwanese Air Force who was obviously sick and in fact did pass away shortly after that photos were taken as disclosed as items 102 and 103 in the Defendant’s Supplemental List of Documents.”

68.  It was submitted on behalf of the plaintiff that this paragraph is entirely irrelevant to the issue of undue influence, but is simply argumentative.

69.  I agree with the plaintiff.  This paragraph does not relate to the defendants’ case on undue influence at all, but the plaintiff’s litigation conduct generally.  It should therefore be struck out.

70.  As for the other paragraphs of D2’s Supp WS, the plaintiff submitted that they are mere repetition of content already spoken to in D2’s witness statement, and do not contain any new information specifically relevant to undue influence.

71.  I do not agree with the plaintiff’s observation.  While parts of the contents are indeed repetitive of D2’s previous witness statement, I would not go as far as to say that the new witness statement “[does] not contain any new information specifically relevant to undue influence”.  More importantly, it seems to me that they are relevant to the issue of undue influence because they set out the alleged active life of the Deceased at the material time and his alleged ability to make independent judgement.  The evidence is also relevant to the question of whether the Deceased had had sharply declining health and impairment of cognitive function which rendered him susceptible to undue influence in 2015 as alleged by the plaintiff.

72.  I therefore do not think that any other part of D2’s Supp WS should be struck out.

C7.  Striking-out vs further witness statement 

73.  At the hearing, both senior counsel have made submissions on what the appropriate order should be in the event this court upholds the plaintiff’s challenges – whether the subject evidence should simply be struck out or whether the plaintiff should be given an opportunity to respond.

74.  Mr Sussex SC submitted that, in the face of the trial that is so close, the appropriate order should be a striking-out order.  Apparently, Mr Sussex SC appreciated, quite rightly, that it would not be appropriate to introduce new evidence at this very late stage.

75.  Mr Yu SC agreed.  He also pointed out that, apart from the fact that the plaintiff has not sought leave in the Summons to serve further witness statement(s), it is the norm that the Court would only consider granting leave for a party to serve supplemental witness statement(s)  if the application for leave is accompanied with the relevant draft witness statement(s), and there is none here.

76.  I agree with both senior counsel.

D.  ORDER

77.  For reasons of the aforesaid, I order that the following paragraphs be struck out:

(1)  Paragraph 22 of Kuok’s Supp WS;

(2)  Paragraphs 6, 7 (last sentence only), 8 and 9 of Ma’s Supp WS;

(3)  Paragraph 26 of Tam’s Supp WS; and

(4)  Paragraph 25 of D2’s Supp WS.

78.  I also grant leave for the defendants to file and serve revised witness statements accordingly on or before 16 March 2026.

E.  COSTS

79.  Having taken into account the defendants’ success in defending most of the paragraphs in the new witness statements which have been challenged by the plaintiff, and also bearing in mind the categorisation of the arguments made, I make a costs order nisi that the plaintiff shall bear 75% of the defendants’ costs of the Summons, with certificate for two counsel. 

80.  The defendants’ costs shall be summarily assessed in lieu of taxation.  Unless any application for variation of the aforesaid costs order nisi is made within time, the defendants shall lodge and serve their statement of costs within 7 days after the expiry of the 14-day period referred to in the following paragraph.  The plaintiff shall lodge and serve her statement of objection within 7 days thereafter.  Summary assessment of the defendants’ costs will be conducted on paper (no matter whether any statement of objection is lodged by the plaintiff within time)  thereafter.  The costs assessed shall be paid by the plaintiff within 14 days after assessment.

81.  The above order nisi shall become absolute in the absence of application to vary (which, if any, will be disposed of on paper)  within 14 days hereof.