DAPIYAH v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5880 · HCAL 741/2025
Court of First Instance
HCAL 741/2025
[2026] HKCFI 5880
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 741 OF 2025
BETWEEN
| |Dapiyah |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|Π|consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the applicant in |
| |open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. On this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent be
amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board” and the name of the
putative interested party be amended to “Director of Immigration”.
2. The summons filed on 11 August 2026 be dismissed.
3. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed.
Observations for the applicant:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 24 March 2025, the applicant
applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave
Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal
Board (“the Board”) dated 19 December 2024 (“the Board’s Decision”).
The Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2025/HCAL00
0741_2025_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The Board found that the applicant’s appeal/petition against the
decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 27
August 2024 (“the Director’s Decision”) failed on all the applicable
grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“the USM”). Hence, the
Board confirmed the Director’s Decision, which rejected her non-
refoulement claim.
Amendments
3. The applicant named “Torture Claims APPeal Board” and “Non-Refoulement
claims Petition OFFice” as the putative respondents, and “Torture
claims APPeal Board” and “Non-Refoulement Claims Petition office” as
the putative interested parties in Form 86, when only the Board should
be the putative respondent, and the Director should be the putative
interested party.
4. The Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office is just an office providing
administrative and secretariat support to the adjudicators of the
Board and should not be named as a putative party at all.
5. Thus, this court makes an order on its own motion to amend the name of
the putative respondent to “Torture Claims Appeal Board” and the name
of the putative interested party to “Director of Immigration”.
Late application
6. By virtue of Order 53, rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap
4A, the applicant had to make the Leave Application within 3 months
when the grounds for the Leave Application first arose, ie when the
Board’s Decision was made.
7. However, the applicant filed Form 86 on 24 March 2025, which was 3
months and 5 days after the Board’s Decision (made on 19 December
2024). The applicant was hence late for 5 days in making the Leave
Application, and this court has to consider whether there is any good
reason to extend the time for the applicant to make the Leave
Application.
8. As held in AW v Director of Immigration [2016] 2 HKC 393, the criteria
for granting an extension of time are:
(i) the length of the delay;
(ii) the reason for the delay;
(iii) the merits of the intended application; and
(iv) any prejudice to the putative respondent and to public
administration.
9. The applicant did not apply for extension of time or provide any
explanation for the delay when she filed the Leave Application.
10. At the oral hearing before this court, the applicant explained the
delay by saying that she was ill at the material time. Upon this
court’s questioning, the applicant confirmed that she had been ill for
just one week.
11. Although the delay of just 5 days is not substantial, the explanation
given by the applicant is clearly not satisfactory. She had 3 months
to make the Leave Application after the Board’s Decision. If she had
been ill for just a week during that period, her illness could not
have prevented her from making the Leave Application within time.
More importantly, there is no merit of the intended judicial review at
all as discussed below. Thus, this court is not prepared to extend
the time for the applicant to file the Leave Application. The Leave
Application can be dismissed on the ground of being made out of time
alone.
12. However, for the sake of completeness, this court will still examine
the merits of the Leave Application.
The applicant’s case
13. It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the
applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s
Decision, which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.
14. In sum, the applicant initially claimed for non-refoulement protection
because if refouled to Indonesia, she would be harmed or even killed
by her ex-husband named Darlan due to a money problem.
15. In her Notice of Appeal/Petition filed with the Board, the applicant
further claimed that her ex-husband would kill her because he knew
that she had a boyfriend in Hong Kong, and she suffered domestic
violence when she was in Indonesia.
16. At the Board’s hearing, the applicant told the Board that there was a
loan problem before her mother died, money was still owed to the
hospital although the applicant did not know how much was owed.
Oral hearing
17. The applicant requested for an oral hearing of the Leave Application
and her case was heard on 15 October 2026.
18. As the applicant had on 11 August 2026 filed a summons requesting to
submit a certificate of marriage and indicated that she was waiting
for independent [sic] visa, this court first asked the applicant for
the purpose of the summons.
19. The applicant confirmed that the purpose of the summons was to show
this court that she is now married to a Hong Kong resident and she
wanted to stay and live here.
20. This court then explained to her that the summons was irrelevant to
the Leave Application, which was dealing with her challenge against
the Board’s Decision regarding her non-refoulement claim.
21. As to the grounds for the applicant’s judicial review, she merely said
that she had nobody back in Indonesia, and the Board’s Decision was
wrong because she would have to be deported.
Grounds for judicial review
22. The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the
intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of
Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).
23. The applicant did not advance any grounds for the intended judicial
review in Form 86.
24. In her supporting affirmation dated 24 March 2025, the applicant only
mentioned that she did not want to go back to Indonesia because her
life was in danger, her ex-husband would kill her, she got domestic
violence when she was in Indonesia, and she also needed to pay the
bill to hospital but she did not have money to pay the bill.
25. As aforesaid, the applicant only said at the oral hearing before this
court that she had nobody back in Indonesia, and the Board’s Decision
was wrong because she would have to be deported.
Discussion
26. First of all, this court will deal with the applicant’s said summons
filed on 11 August 2026 and supported by her affirmation dated 11
August 2026.
27. As mentioned, the applicant confirmed that the sole purpose of the
summons was to prove that she is married in Hong Kong to a Hong Kong
resident and she wanted to stay and live here. However, the fact that
she has a family here in Hong Kong is simply irrelevant to the Leave
Application.
28. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Comilang & Ors v Director of
Immigration [2019] HKCFA 10, family unity rights were not a bar to
refoulement of foreign nationals without a right of abode, even when
they have a spouse and children who are permanent residents of Hong
Kong. Thus, separation with her husband was not a basis on which the
applicant could establish her non-refoulement claim.
29. As it would not be relevant to her non-refoulement claim by adducing
the document mentioned in the said summons and her affirmation dated
11 August 2026, this court is not prepared to admit those documents
and hence the said summons is dismissed.
30. As to the matters that were raised in the applicant’s affirmation
dated 24 March 2025 and at the oral hearing, namely that she faced
danger from her ex-husband, including that she suffered from domestic
violence when she was in Indonesia, as well as the hospital bill that
she was unable to repay, all those matters had been duly assessed but
rejected by the Board. If the applicant intends to challenge the
Board’s finding of facts, it is not permissible in an application for
judicial review unless there were errors of law, procedural unfairness
or irrationality in the Board’s Decision.
31. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-
refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for
non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the
evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters
allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm,
availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation.
The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way
of judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness, or
irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA
524).
32. Thus, this court will examine and scrutinize the Board’s Decision for
any errors of law, procedural unfairness and irrationality, despite
the lack of any valid ground being advanced by the applicant for the
intended judicial review.
33. In assessing the appeal/petition by the applicant, the Board held an
oral hearing on 3 December 2024. The applicant was present and hence
she was given the chance to present her case to the Board in person.
34. As can be seen from the Board’s Decision, the Board had assessed all
the applicant’s claimed risk. The Board’s assessment and
consideration of the applicant’s claims were laid out in paragraphs 51
to 66 of the Board’s Decision.
35. In gist, the Board accepted the basic facts of the applicant’s claims.
However, in relation to the applicant’s risk from her ex-husband, the
Board found that the applicant was not at real risk from him. On the
applicant’s own evidence, she had separated from her ex-husband many
years ago and their divorce was finalized in 2018. Her ex-husband had
re-partnered and had children with his partner.
36. With regards to the applicant’s inability to repay the hospital bill
that was incurred for the treatment of her mother, the Board found no
evidence to suggest that the hospital would inflict serious harm or
death upon the applicant if she could not pay or did not pay.
37. Furthermore, the Board had given its reasons in paragraph 60 of the
Board’s Decision for the finding that the applicant did have avenues
to pursue if she required police assistance or protection in the
future in Indonesia.
38. The Board had also had regard to the applicant’s concern that she had
no house to live in if she returned to Indonesia. The Board had
referred to country of origin information (“COI”) that support
agencies, which protected women’s rights and provided practical
support to women at risk, were available in Indonesia. The Board
found that the applicant did not face a real risk of being without
shelter or accommodation if she was returned to her country.
39. Thus, the Board concluded that the applicant’s claims for non-
refoulement protection failed on all the applicable grounds under the
USM.
40. Although the Board did not make findings as to internal relocation, it
is a well-recognised principle that the decision-maker only needs to
consider internal relocation if the applicant has established that she
qualifies as a refugee pursuant to Article 1A(2) of the Refugee
Convention (see Robinson v SSHD & Anor [1997] EWCA Civ 3090, dated
11.7.1997). In other words, internal relocation only arises if the
applicant has established a real risk of persecution in her home area
(see Gardi v SSHD [2002] 1 WLR 2755).
41. As it is the Board’s finding that the applicant had no real risk of
any of the proscribed forms of harm and that state protection was
available to her, it is not necessary for the Board to consider
internal relocation.
42. The finding of facts relating to a non-refoulement claim, including
the assessment of evidence, COI and risk of harm, was solely within
the ambit of the Board in dealing with the applicant’s
appeal/petition. This court finds nothing wrong or unreasonable in
the way the Board reached its conclusion.
43. Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with
anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly
set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable
grounds under the USM, the burden of proof and the standard of proof.
The Board also correctly identified the issues and observed a very
high standard of fairness. This court could detect no errors of law,
procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The
Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is
not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board to reach its
decision.
44. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung
(2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for
judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which
enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court
that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence
leave must be refused.
Conclusion
45. For reasons aforesaid, the summons filed on 11 August 2026 is
dismissed, and the Leave Application is dismissed for being made out
of time and devoid of merits.
Dated the 21st day of October 2026
| |( Gladys LEE ) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the applicant| | |
|or his solicitors | | |
|must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent/Handed to the |Sent/Handed to the |
|respondent and such |applicant/the |putative respondent / the|
|interested parties as |applicant’s |putative respondent’s |
|may be directed by the|solicitors |solicitors / such |
|Court the order |on: 21/10/2026 |putative interested |
|granting leave and any| |parties as may be |
|directions given | |directed by the Court / |
|within 14 days after |Applicant’s ref. no: |the putative interested |
|the leave was granted |Nil |parties’ solicitors on: |
|(Order 53, rule 4A); | |21/10/2026 |
| | | |
|b) issue the | | |
|originating summons | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|within 14 days after | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|the grant of leave and| |Claims Petition Office |
|serve it in accordance| |Putative respondent’s |
|with Order 53, rule 5;| |ref. no.: |
|and | |USM 24466 |
| | | |
|c) supply to every | |Director of Immigration |
|other party copies of | |Putative interested |
|every affidavit which | |party’s ref. no.: |
|the Applicant proposes| |QA T/C 1087/24 (Formerly |
|to use at the hearing,| |RBCZ 5001036/24) |
|including the | | |
|affidavit in support | |Department of Justice, |
|of the application for| |Senior Assistant Law |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |Officer |
|6(5)). | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit 2)|
Form CALL-1