HKSAR v. MO WEICHENG

DCCC 143/2025

[2026] HKDC 384

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CRIMINAL CASE NO 143 OF 2025

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REASONS FOR SENTENCE

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1.  Mr Mo pleaded guilty before me to three charges of Dealing with property known or believed to represent proceeds of an indictable offence, contrary to section 25(1)  and (3)  of the Organized and Serious Crimes Ordinance, Cap 455.

2.  Particulars of the three charges are that Mr Mo, between A and B, both dates inclusive, in Hong Kong, together with C, knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe that property, namely a total sum of S in the bank account with T, account number U, in whole or in part directly or indirectly represented any person’s proceeds of an indictable offence, dealt with the said property.

3.  For Charge 1, A is 4 September 2023; B is 31 December 2023; C is other unknown person; S is $5,256,093.17 Hong Kong currency; T is The Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited; U is 521-189373-838.

4.  For Charge 2, A is 4 September 2023; B is 1 January 2024; C is other unknown person; S is $414,076.38 United States currency; T is Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (Asia)  Limited; U is 873530012083.

5.  For Charge 3, A is 22 September 2023; B is 31 January 2024; C is another male surnamed “周” (Chow); S is $695,069.5 Hong Kong currency; T is Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong)  Limited; U is 259-8-715765-1.

Facts admitted by Mr Mo

6.  Between October 2023 and January 2024, scam money originating from different employment/investment frauds were dissipated into (i)  an HSBC account numbered 521-189373-838 in the name of CHHE Trading Limited (“A/C-1”); (ii)  an ICBC account numbered 873530012083 in the name of CHHE Trading Limited (“A/C-2”); and (iii)  an SCB account numbered 259-8-715765-1 in the name of Mr Mo (“A/C-3”).

7.  CHHE Trading Limited (“CTL”)  was incorporated in Hong Kong on 4 September 2023.

8.  At all material times:-

(a)  Mr Mo was the sole shareholder cum director of CTL;

(b)  CTL was the account holder of both A/C-1 and A/C-2, with Mr Mo being the sole signatory; and

(c)  Mr Mo was the account holder of A/C-3.

9.  There was no IRD record on Mr Mo from financial years 2021/22 to financial year 2023/24.

Charge 1 (A/C-1)

10.  PW1 was a victim of online investment fraud.  In July 2023, PW1 was approached by unknown swindler to download a specific online platform for investment with promising return by depositing money into designated accounts. Falling prey to the scam, PW1 was deceived to remit, amongst others, HKD5,000 into A/C-1 on 27 October 2023.  The scam was unveiled when PW1 was unable to withdraw her money.  Case was reported.  As a result of the scam, PW1 suffered a total loss of HKD255,000.

11.  On 14 September 2023, Mr Mo on behalf of CTL applied to open A/C-1 as the sole signatory at an HSBC branch in Shenzhen and the application was sent to HSBC office in Hong Kong for approval.  On 14 October 2023, A/C-1 was formally approved and opened.

12.  During the period from 16 October 2023 to 31 December 2023, A/C-1 recorded a total of 90 deposits amounting to HKD5,256,093.17 (including the deposit from PW1)  and a total of 131 withdrawals amounting to HKD5,253,142.28. In general, the incoming funds were either (i)  integrated and withdrawn in bulks; or (ii)  withdrawn at similar amount on the same day or shortly after. Features of test payment and numerous counterparties were noted.  A/C-1 had been inactive since 30 October 2023, and was closed on 31 December 2023.

13.  On 22 June 2024, Mr Mo was arrested.  In a cautioned VRI conducted on the next day, Mr Mo stated the following:-

(a)  He was educated up to junior high school and is currently unemployed with no income; in 2023, he ran a business in mobile phone accessories and earned about RMB50,000;

(b)  He opened A/C-1 for the purpose of obtaining bank loans in Hong Kong;

(c)  He previously became acquainted with an unknown person through social media called “YY” who offered to help him apply for loan facilities, conduct wealth management and purchase insurance plans in Hong Kong;

(d)  Through the arrangement of the unknown person, he set up CTL and opened A/C-1;

(e)  The signature on the opening mandate was his signature;

(f)  After A/C-1 was opened, he surrendered management of A/C-1 to the unknown person; he did not receive any reward; and

(g)  He could not provide the details or contacts of the unknown person.

Charge 2 (A/C-2)

14.  PW2 was a director of a shipping company in Japan.  On 5 December 2023, PW2 was scammed by an email purportedly sent by a business partner requesting settlement of service fee; as a result, PW2 made two wire transfers of USD198,110 on 7 December 2023 and USD215,846.19 on 12 December 2023 respectively to A/C-2.  Scam was unveiled when PW2 verified with the bona fide business partner.  Case was reported.  PW2’s company suffered a total loss of USD413,956.19.

15.  On 11 September 2023, Mr Mo on behalf of CTL applied to open A/C-2 (a multi-currency account)  as the sole signatory at an ICBC branch in Hong Kong. The reported business nature of the company was clothing wholesale.  Copies of Mr Mo’s two-way permit and China identity card, as well as the certificate of incorporation and BR certificate of CTL, were submitted as identity proof.

16.  During the period from 1 November 2023 to 1 January 2024, A/C-2 recorded 6 deposits totaling USD414,076.38 (including two deposits from PW2’s company)  and 4 withdrawals totaling USD414,210.41.  In general, the deposits were quickly withdrawn via USD sub-account directly or HKD sub-account with mirror patterns on the same day.

17.  Travel movement record showed that Mr Mo had a day-trip in Hong Kong on 11 September 2023 (ie date of A/C-2 account opening).

18.  On 19 September 2024, Mr Mo was again arrested.

19.  Mr Mo now admits that he had also surrendered A/C-2 to the same unknown person mentioned in the VRI conducted on 23 June 2024.

Charge 3 (A/C-3)

20.  PW3 and PW4 were unacquainted victims of similar online employment fraud.  In January 2024, they were duped by scammer on “Facebook”, who offered them quick cash jobs of boosting the sales of products and services.  They were promised to be refunded with guaranteed commissions by depositing money into designated accounts.  Falling prey to the scams, PW3 and PW4 were deceived into remitting, amongst others, HKD15,516 and HKD7,000 respectively into A/C-3 between 29 and 30 January 2024.  The scams were unveiled when they were unable to get the refund or promised commission.  Cases were reported.  As a result of the scams, PW3 and PW4 suffered total loss of HKD339,802 and HKD47,780 respectively.

21.  On 22 September 2023, Mr Mo opened A/C-3 as sole signatory for savings purpose.  Copy of Mr Mo’s two-way permit and China identity card were submitted as identity proof.  During the period from 27 to 31 January 2024, A/C-3 recorded a total of 278 deposits amounting to HKD695,069.5 (including the deposits from PW3 and PW4)  and a total of 76 withdrawals amounting to HKD695,059 with features of quick dissipation of funds, leaving HKD10.5 behind.  A/C-3 had been inactive since 31 January 2024.

22.  Travel movement record showed Mr Mo had a day trip in Hong Kong on 22 September 2023 (ie date of A/C-3 account opening).

23.  On 22 June 2024, Mr Mo was arrested upon entering Hong Kong via Lok Ma Chau Spur Line Control Point.  In a cautioned VRI conducted on the same day, Mr Mo stated the following:-

(a)  He was educated up to junior high school and is currently unemployed with no income; he previously ran a business in mobile phone accessories;

(b)  He opened A/C-3 for the purpose of obtaining bank loans in Hong Kong; the signature on the opening mandate was his signature;

(c)  Earlier, he became acquainted with a male known as Chow (周)  who claimed he could help poor people apply for loans in Hong Kong;

(d)  Chow asked him to open new bank account(s)  in Hong Kong and to surrender the credentials and bank cards so that he (Chow)  could arrange to maintain frequent transactions (ie deposits of tens of thousands in USD)  in the account(s)  and increase Mr Mo’s credit score for loan application; Chow however did not give any details of the company or bank which provided the purported loan;

(e)  Mr Mo took train to Hong Kong via Lo Wu Control Point on 22 September 2023 with 3 to 4 other persons to meet up Chow who waited for them in Hong Kong; Chow then took them to Central to open bank account(s);

(f)  The online banking password was set by Chow; Mr Mo passed the bank card to Chow after he opened A/C-3; and

(g)  Mr Mo did not know other persons and was unable to get the loan as promised; Chow later became out of reach.

24.  At the relevant times, the amount and flow of transactions in each of A/C-1 to A/C-3 were not commensurate with Mr Mo’s background and reported income.  Further, these A/Cs were being used as a temporary repository of fund, with confirmed proceeds of crime originated from different scams.

25.  Mr Mo now admits the particulars of offence of all the three charges.

Criminal record

26.  Mr Mo has a clear record.

Antecedents

27.  Mr Mo is aged almost 56 (53 at the time of the offences), educated to Secondary school level in the Mainland, unemployed.  Mr Mo was born in the Mainland and resided in Shenzhen with his ex-wife, 2 sons and one daughter.

Mitigation

28.  Mr David Iu of counsel assigned by the Director of Legal Aid mitigated on behalf of Mr Mo.  The following is a summary of the mitigation submissions.

29.  Mr Mo finished junior high school.  Afterwards, he had been running his own grocery store for around 5 to 6 years.  Then, for about 20 odd years, Mr Mo ran his own business in trading mobile phone accessories and in repairing mobile phones, earning a monthly income of RMB50,000.

30.  Due to the pandemic, the business started to suffer from deficit.  Mr Mo’s ex-wife (47)  is running his business meanwhile.

31.  Two of Mr Mo’s children are working while one is still studying in university.

32.  Mr Mo used to contribute around RMB20,000 per month towards the household expenses.

33.  Mr Mo committed the offences subject of Charges 1 and 2 because he wanted to earn some easy loan facilities.  Upon his guilty plea, Mr Mo admits he had reasonable grounds to believe that A/C-1 and A/C-2 would be used for unlawful purposes whilst letting “the other unknown person” as stated in the charges control the said bank accounts.

34.  There is no evidence to show Mr Mo had knowledge as to the nature of the indictable offence(s)  and/or Mr Mo had personally dealt with any money in the bank accounts.

35.  The commission of the offences under Charges 1 and 2 took the following form:-

(a)  Mr Mo came to know “the other unknown person” on social media in the Mainland;

(b)  “The other unknown person” offered to help Mr Mo apply for loan facilities, conduct wealth management, and purchase insurance in Hong Kong;

(c)  As arranged by “the other unknown person”, Mr Mo set up CTL and opened A/C-1 and A/C-2;

(d)  Mr Mo then surrendered A/C-1 and A/C-2 to “the other unknown person”; and

(e)  Mr Mo has never received any rewards for doing so.

36.  Same as in Charges 1 and 2, Mr Mo committed the offence subject of Charge 3 because he wanted to earn some easy loan facilities.

37.  Upon his guilty plea, Mr Mo admits he had reasonable grounds to believe that A/C-3 would be used for unlawful purposes whilst letting “another male surnamed ‘Chow’” as stated in Charge 3 control the said bank account.

38.  There is no evidence to show that Mr Mo had knowledge as to the nature of the indictable offence(s)  and/or Mr Mo had personally dealt with any money in the bank account.

39.  The commission of the offence under Charge 3 took the following form:-

(a)  Mr Mo came to know Chow;

(b)  Chow told Mr Mo that he could help poor people apply for loans in Hong Kong;

(c)  Chow then asked Mr Mo to open a new bank account in Hong Kong ie A/C-3 and to surrender the account’s credentials and bank card so that Chow could arrange to maintain frequent monetary transactions with deposits of tens of thousands of US dollars and to increase Mr Mo’s credits for loan application;

(d)  Chow has never informed Mr Mo of details of the money lender(s);

(e)  Chow brought Mr Mo to Central to open A/C-3;

(f)  After opening A/C-3, Mr Mo passed A/C-3’s password and bank card to Chow;

(g)  Mr Mo has never obtained the loan as promised by Chow;

(h)  Subsequently, Mr Mo was not able to contact Chow; and

(i)  Mr Mo never received any reward for his labour.

40.  Mr Iu emphasized the following mitigating factors:-

(a)  Mr Mo has a clear record in Hong Kong and elsewhere;

(b)  Mr Mo pleaded guilty at the earliest opportunity; and

(c)  Mr Mo has been remanded for almost 2 years; he wishes to be released earlier so he could reunite with and take care of his family.

41.  Mr Iu submitted that since the three offences were committed during the same timeframe, the court might be minded to add up the three monetary sums so that a total sum of HK$9,222,366.07 may be used for estimating a global starting point for the 3 charges; this would then allow the court to make an appropriate order for consecutiveness and/or concurrency among the three associated sentences to arrive at the global sentence.

42.  Mr Iu has no objection to the prosecution’s intended furnishing of information under OSCO and the associated request for enhanced sentence(s).  Mr Iu asked that the extent of enhancement be measured.

43.  Mr Iu submitted on behalf of Mr Mo a mitigation letter written in Chinese by Mr Mo himself.  The contents generally are that Mr Mo has determined to correct his wrongful ways and hopes the court will give him a chance for reform.  Mr Mo asked for a lenient sentence so he may re-integrate into society early and provide for his son who is still pursuing university education.

44.  Upon enquiry by the court, and after taking further instructions, Mr Iu submitted that Mr Mo came to Hong Kong specifically to open A/C-2 and A/C-3.

45.  Mr Iu also agreed that Charge 2 regarding A/C-2 involved an international dimension because USD funds appeared to be remitted from Japan to Hong Kong.

Sentence

46.  Before sentencing Mr Mo, I have had regard to the principles enunciated in Secretary for Justice v Wan Kwok Keung [2012] 1 HKLRD 201, and HKSAR v Boma [2012] 2 HKLRD 33.

47.  This case has the following features.  The total amount laundered was just over HK$9 million.  There were a total of 374 deposits and 211 withdrawals in all the three accounts during a period of about 5 months.  International dimension/element was present under Charge 2.  Mr Mo did not appear to know anything about the predicate offence of fraud.  Mr Mo’s role was to open a company and open bank accounts (two under the company name and one under his own name)  and pass over control of the three accounts to other people purportedly in return for assistance with loan applications which never bore fruit.

48.  Bearing in mind the circumstances of the present case and comparing them against the list of non-exhaustive features identified in Boma, and taking into account Wan Kwok Keung para 15, I adjudge it appropriate to adopt an initial global starting point of sentence for the 3 charges to be 5 years’ imprisonment.

49.  For the aggravating factor that Mr Mo came to Hong Kong specifically to open A/C-2 and A/C-3, I add 3 months to reach a final global starting point of 5 years 3 months’ imprisonment.  The principle of totality has been factored in.

50.  Mr Mo pleaded guilty to the charges in good time.  He shall be entitled to the full 1/3 sentencing discount.  There are no other mitigating factors of weight which will justify another sentence reduction.

51.  Prosecution sought to furnish information under section 27(2)  of OSCO in the form of a witness statement of CIP Li Yiu Nam dated 12 February 2026 with a view to showing (i)  the prevalence of money laundering offence; and (ii)  the nature and extent of any harm, whether direct or indirect, caused to the community by recent occurrences of money laundering offence (together “the two grounds”).

52.  Mr Iu has no objection to the reception of this statement nor to the prosecution’s associated request for enhanced sentence(s)  on the basis of the two grounds.

53.  I duly received the statement.

54.  According to Table A on page 5 of the statement, the total number of stooges arrested (ie those who assisted in money laundering activities many of whom had sold their accounts at financial institutions)  in 2025 stood at 5,355.  This compared with the corresponding figure in 2024 of 7,883.  Although it represented a drop of almost 1/3, it still is a substantial figure when compared with the figures in 2021 to 2023.

55.  I am satisfied the use of stooges in money laundering activities and, by implication, the money laundering offence itself (even if only suspected)  is still prevalent.

56.  According to Table B on pages 6 and 7 of the statement, the amount of reported monetary losses (including from overseas victims)  and proceeds laundered locally both involving local stooge accounts in 2025 alone came to $3,933.14M.  This compared with the corresponding figure in 2024 of $4,466.39M.  Although it represented a drop of about 12%, it is still a huge number.

57.  However, the harm to the community is not restricted to reported losses to local victims.

58.  According to para 18 of the statement, the anti-money laundering regime in Hong Kong is hampered by the prevalence of stooges for money laundering activities in the following ways:-

(a)  The prevalence of stooge accounts (“PSA”)  interferes with the normal operation of the banking system, having a negative effect on the reputation of Hong Kong as a well-known international financial hub;

(b)  PSA forms multiple layers of “shields” concealing the identity of the masterminds behind, making it difficult, if not impossible, for police to identify the masterminds behind;

(c)  PSA substantially facilities the commission of crimes and in turn leads to more crimes being committed, as the masterminds could easily get away from their criminal liability;

(d)  PSA makes money laundering easier, which allows culprits to make use of their ill-gotten gains to extend their sphere to engage in a wider range of illegal activities;

(e)  PSA means that law enforcement agencies have to put in more investigation efforts and resources; and

(f)  People with low income or less awareness of the consequences of selling their bank accounts are more likely to be lured by the culprits to take the risks of commission of crimes to surrender their accounts for monetary reward.

59.  From the figures I recited above from Table B, and from what PSA can do to the community, I am satisfied that the harm caused to the community by recent occurrences of the money laundering offence is still substantial.

60.  I am of the view the two grounds have been made out.  I am confident that my power to enhance sentence under section 27(11)  of OSCO has been engaged.  About the extent of enhancement, I adjudge a 20% enhancement will be sufficient to act as an additional deterrent against Mr Mo and would-be followers.

61.  As an act of mercy, I will ignore the decimal places in the calculation of the final global sentence in terms of months.

62.  I will impose individual enhanced sentences for all 3 charges and make an appropriate order to arrive at the final global sentence.

(Mr Mo, please stand)

63.  For Charge 1, the sentence is 43 months’ imprisonment.

64.  For Charge 2, the sentence is 40 months’ imprisonment.

65.  For Charge 3, the sentence is 28 months’ imprisonment.

66.  I order that 5 months of the sentence on Charge 2, and 2 months of the sentence on Charge 3, are each to run consecutively to the sentence on Charge 1, making an aggregate final sentence of 50 months’ imprisonment.