KOO MING KOWN v. THE BAPTIST CONVENTION OF HONG KONG AND OTHERS

HCA 694/2024

[2025] HKCFI 4680

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 694 OF 2024

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D E C I S I O N

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Introduction and Applicable Principles

1.  I have before me an appeal by the Plaintiff (“P”)  against the Order of Master Bonnie Cheng (“the Master”)  dated 24 February 2025 dismissing P’s request for further and better particulars (“FBPs”)  of the Defence of the 1^st to 4^th Defendants (“the Defence”).

2.  P first made a request for FBPs on 13 September 2024 (“P’s Request”). 

3.  On 15 November 2024, the 1^st to 4^th Defendants (collectively, “Ds”)  filed an Answer to P’s Request. 

4.  Before the Master and before me, 9 of the requests (40 sub‑requests)  in P’s Requests were pursued by P.

5.  O.18, r.12(3B)  of the Rules of the High Court, Cap. 4A provides that FBPs should not be ordered unless the Court is of the opinion that the order is necessary either for disposing fairly of the cause or matter or for saving costs. 

6.  This rule highlights the emphasis on procedural economy, proportionality and cost-effectiveness in the post-CJR culture that encourages parties not to engage in interlocutory skirmishes over FBPs unless there is a genuine need to clarify the opposite party’s case to ensure fairness and to avoid cost-wasting.  It is for the applicant to satisfy that an order of the court is necessary either for fairly disposing of the cause/matter or for saving costs.  It is not enough to show particulars requested are relevant.  It is inappropriate to make requests with a view to cross-examine the other side or to expose some weaknesses of the pleaded case. See Taching Petroleum Company, Limited v Meyer Aluminium Limited [2020] HKCA 1005, §31.

7.  Moreover, the court will refuse to order particulars where the request essentially concerns matters of evidence or are beyond the scope of the averments:  see Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2025, Vol.1, §18/12/70.

Discussion

Requests 1(c)  to (g)  re: para 7 of the Defence

8.  These requests are based on the false premise that the 1^st Defendant (“BCHK”)  had undertaken to pay the legal fees of the 4^th Defendant (“Sandy”).  However, paragraph 7 of the Defence has only averred that BCHK has undertaken to pay the fees of all defendants (save for Hopkins Chan)  in all the Pui Ching Actions (as defined in paragraph 6 of the Defence).  Nowhere has it been averred that Sandy is a defendant in the Pui Ching Actions.  Besides, I cannot see how any undertaking to pay Sandy’s fees is relevant to P’s pleaded claims in fraudulent misrepresentation in the bill of costs submitted in HCA 1339 of 2014 (“HCA 1339”)  and HCA 1619 of 2014 (“HCA 1619”)  and conspiracy to take advantage of the indemnity costs orders to include Sandy’s legal fees which were never agreed.  The request is beyond the scope of the averment and is not necessary.

Requests 2(c)  to (d)  re: para 9 of the Defence 

9.  These requests essentially ask if at the time Sandy accepted the position of BCHK’s legal advisor, that was a paid position and particulars of the charging rate if agreed.  However, these requests are not necessary as it is clear what Ds’ case is from:

(1)  Paragraph 12 of the Defence which pleads that it was orally agreed between Sandy and Rev Lo, for and on behalf of BCHK, that Sandy could charge for works outside the scope of her pro bono service and there would be further agreement on the amount to be charged and scope of such work; and

(2)  Answer to Request 6(f): Ds already stated that during the discussion D4 did not provide Rev Lo with her hourly rate on work outside her pro bono service and/or the payment terms.

10.  Whilst Mr Ho, counsel appearing for P, submitted that Ds could have given a simple answer of “No” but instead referred to paragraph 12 of the Defence, there is no lack of clarity on what Ds’ case is and further particulars unnecessary.

Request 4(e)  re: para 11 of the Defence

11.  The request asks if Sandy had issued any invoice(s)  in relation to work in the Pui Ching Actions other than HCA 1619 and HCA 1339.  Plainly, the request is irrelevant and not necessary when in these proceedings, P has alleged Ds fraudulently and/or conspired to make false claims for legal fees in HCA 1619 and HCA 1339.  There was never averment in paragraph 11 of the Defence that there was any agreement for payment of work covering all the Pui Ching Actions.  The request is beyond the averment in paragraph 11 of the Defence.

Request 5(a)  re: para 11.5 of the Defence

12.  This request asks when external counsel was first engaged in HCA 1619 and HCA 1339.  However, the sub-paragraphs, including paragraph 11.5 of the Defence, merely pleads the matters within the scope of Sandy’s pro bono legal services one being advice on legal litigation and other legal matters where external counsel has been engaged.

13.  I cannot see any ambiguity or need to clarify what Ds’ case is.  Mr Ho, submitted that based on Ds’ pleaded case, if external counsel had been engaged in HCA 1619 and HCA 1339 then D4 could not charge for her advice on litigation and other legal matters in those two actions which were included in her invoices.  Plainly, any inconsistency between pleading and the evidence is a matter for cross-examination and particulars will not be ordered to expose weaknesses in Ds’ case. 

14.  As for Mr Ho’s submissions that there is inconsistency between paragraph 11.5 of the Defence and Answer 4(d)  and other paragraphs of the Defence, again this is a matter for cross-examination and at most may expose a weakness in Ds’ case.  I do not agree there is a lack of clarity in paragraph 11 on what Ds’ case is even if there are weaknesses.

Requests 9(e)-(f)  re: para 15 of the Defence

15.  Request 9(e)  seeks particulars of the assistance rendered or to be rendered by Sandy in setting up the Pui Ching Follow Up Committee (“the Committee”)  and whether Sandy charged or would charge for such assistance. 

16.  P’s case relates to Sandys’ costs in HCA 1619 and HCA 1339 but not that she had charged for her assistance in setting up the Committee.  Plainly, the request is neither relevant nor necessary.

17.  Request 9(f)  asks whether the Committee has actually been set up and if so, the names of the members, the terms of reference and scope of duties of the Committee.  There is no dispute that the Committee had been set up.  I simply cannot see how the request is relevant or necessary.  The request goes beyond the averments in paragraph 15 of the Defence resting on the premise that there was a further agreement between Sandy and the Committee on her charging for her assistance to the Committee.

Requests 10(e), (f), (g), (h)  and (k)  re: para 16 of the Defence

18.  Requests 10(e)  and (f)  concern whether the acceptance to act as the Committee’s legal advisor was in writing or oral and if oral, the name of the individual who received Sandy’s acceptance.  Again, I cannot see how the request is relevant or necessary when it has never been averred that there was any separate agreement between the Committee and Sandy in respect of payment of Sandy’s fees other than the pleaded agreement between Sandy and BCHK.  Accordingly, requests 10(g)  on whether there was a written retainer, request 10(h)  that if there was no retainer, whether there was any agreement on charging the Committee and the rate and payments terms, are plainly not relevant nor necessary and is beyond the averment in paragraph 16 of the Defence.

19.  As for request 10(k), asking whether there was another set of terms of reference and/scope of her duties being the legal adviser of the Committee, this is clearly also not relevant nor necessary.

Requests 11(c)-(f), (h)-(j), (m)-(o)  and (t)  in relation to para 18 of the Defence

20.  Mr Ho submitted that the requests arise because Ds have not properly pleaded the underlying agreement in paragraphs 11-19 of the Defence which gave rise to Sandy’s entitlement to charge for her invoice in relation to HCA 1619.  He submitted that there was no plea on what further discussions there were on the scope of work and hourly rate for those work outside the pro bono matters that she would charge. However, as mentioned above, I take the view that this is sufficiently pleaded in paragraph 12 of the Defence as clarified in Ds’ Answers to Request 6(f). Requests 11(c)-(f), (h)‑(j)  are not relevant nor necessary to clarify Ds’ case and are really matters for evidence.

21.  As for requests 11(m)  seeking the names of the Committee members on 27 February 2023, I do not see how it is necessary when it was pleaded the Committee on behalf of BCHK had approved Sandy’s invoice.

22.  Similarly, for requests 11(n), (o)  and (t)  concerning the manner of the approval by the Committee of Sandy’s invoice in relation to HCA 1619, it is beyond the averment in paragraph 18 of the Defence and is not necessary.

Requests 12(a), (c)-(f), (h)-(j), (l)-(n)  and (t)  in relation to para 19 of the Defence

23.  These requests mirror those requests made in request 11 but pertain to Sandy’s invoice in relation to HCA 1339.  For the same reasons above, I am not satisfied that these requests are relevant or necessary.

Request 13(h)  in relation to para 20 of the Defence

24.  This request asks whether any provision for Sandy’s fees since her appointment as honorary legal advisor and/or in-house lawyer in respect of HCA 1339 and HCA 1619 has been made in the accounts of BCHK.

25.  Mr Ho submitted that the request was raised because there is a further underlying agreement by conduct between Sandy and BCHK in respect of payment of fees.  However, as mentioned above, that is not Ds’ averments. 

26.  The request is clearly beyond the averment in paragraph 20 of the Defence which simply pleads that BCHK instructed its solicitors to prepare and file two Bills of Costs according to the two invoices issued by Sandy in relation to HCA 1339 and HCA 1619.

Disposition and Order

27.  Accordingly, I also would not order Ds to answer the FBPs and would therefore dismiss the appeal against the Master’s Order.

28.  Costs should follow the event.

29.  However, despite the eloquent submissions of Mr Chan SC, leading Mr Yip, counsel appearing for Ds, I am not convinced that Ds have demonstrated that P has misused this appeal or this appeal was brought vexatiously or amounts to an abuse of process even in view of P’s reported crusade or campaign as found by K Yeung J in Koo Ming Kown v The Baptist Convention of Hong Kong & Ors [2024] HKCFI 2869 at §103(a)  and that by letter from Ds’ solicitors dated 9 July 2025, P was invited to discontinue this appeal.  I will not order indemnity costs against P.

30.  Having considered Ds’ Statement of Costs and the objections raised by Mr Ho, adopting a broadbrush approach, I have summarily assessed Ds’ costs of this appeal at HK$256,000.